Unlike wars of the past in which the vast majority of belligerents were mostly Nation-States, the belligerents in today’s wars -– a phenomenon known as fourth generation warfare -– consist of criminal enterprises, fanatical opportunists, and terrorists with gang-like networks that transcend boundaries. Sadly the impact of this phenomenon has eluded most of the military strategists, who seem bent on using and applying conventional methods/TTPs against an asymmetric non-conventional threat. In fact, the only weapon in the conventional warfare arena that has the potential to counter the belligerents effectively in this fourth generation warfare has not been given adequate consideration. Civil affairs (CA)/Civil military operation (CMO) is the “only” war fighting functional area that possesses the capabilities which could effectively be used to defeat belligerents in fourth generation warfare. Specifically, the U.S. should give adequate consideration on winning the hearts and minds by using CA/CMO to foster and support credible governance and targeted economic developments (part of CA/CMO area of expertise).
According to G.I.Wilson, “fourth generation warfare” is not entirely new, but rather a creative and adaptive application of the past wars in which the “moral” dimension of war outweighs technology. He argued that “fourth generation warfare” represents warfare in transition; traditional strength is bypassed or redefined, focus is shifted away from high technology to ideas, and conflicts are shifted from simply destroying military targets and regular conventional to destroying of socio-economic or political-cultural “center.”1

Because insurgency flourishes in corrupt/unstable environments, the U.S. needs to build and support credible leadership in order to win hearts and minds. In fourth generation warfare, a friendly force deals with three predominant groups: the pro friendly forces, the undecided/on-the-fence, and the active insurgents (including their constituencies and supporters/financiers. Iraq and Afghanistan shows this characteristic, the insurgents are sending one message to their supporters, another to the undecided population, and a third to the coalition decision makers. Supporters are told that they are defending their faith and country against outside invaders who will eventually leave. The coalition, particularly the Americans, is advised to withdraw or be engaged in an endless costly fight.2
Hence, in this kind of warfare whoever wins or influences the hearts and minds of the two groups in contention (1st and 2nd group) has a greater advantage and is most likely to win the campaign in the long run. Therefore, most fourth generation warfare engagements involve tactical maneuvers targeted to win the support of these two groups. Decisive victory in these kinds of engagements is rarely achieved due to dynamic and fluid nature of events. Situation dependent is the operative word in this environment; the two groups are prone to be swayed to one side or the other depending on how persuasive an action or inaction of each opposing force appeals to them. Xxxxxxxxxxx Will expand on CA roles in governance/leadership.

Wining the hearts and minds: Socio-Economic development. The saying “ An idle mind is the devils workshop” is very true in most areas where insurgency is prevalent. For example, in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, unemployment abounds and there are no jobs to occupy the restive minds of youths. The lack of socio-economic infrastructure eventually created a disconnection within the society, and the population became alienated from the international community. In the case of Lebanon and Palestine, the insurgence took the initiative by creating jobs; building schools, and started numerous socio-economic programs. A case in point was the Hezboallah’s actions after the recent thirty-four days battle with Israel. As soon as the battle was over, Hezboallah immediately mounted a vigorous “ hearts and minds” campaign by organizing humanitarian relief to displaced citizens of Lebanon. They also established a reconstruction fund, which provided $200,000.00 to each family whose house was destroyed during the battle. A perfect example of how CA/CMO effectively used socio-economic development to combat belligerents was in Haqlaniya city in the Al Anbar province of Iraq. The city was practically run by a notorious insurgent group (Ansa Sunni) who paid up to $200 to unemployed locals to carry out suicide attacks against the coalition forces. However, the CA team assigned to Haqlaniya was able to counter this threat and turn things around by embarking on civil projects that created employments that did not include martyrdom. Among other economic projects, the CA team renovated and refurbished 13 schools, created a trash removal project that employed 40 locals, built a community Internet café and super clinic. As a result these developments, a permissive environment was created in a previously hostile community. The CA method in Haqlaniya was so successful that not only were they able to win over the two groups, their activities in the community also encouraged some of the insurgents to take actions that are favorable to the coalition forces .4
However, the big powers have largely remained unchanged in their approach to the fourth generation warfare; they have continued to place greater emphasis on direct-action action missions. The natures of direct-action missions are usually fast, violent, and can show effects almost immediately; however, in an insurgency, direct-action might sometimes be detrimental to civil-military operations. In Iraq, the insurgency uses Information Operation (IO) to counter direct-action of the coalition forces. It is an undisputed fact that the survival of the insurgency in Iraq totally depends on the appeal to emotional issues such as ethnicity and religion. The insurgents understand this reality, so they tailor their messages to focus on those emotional issues that make their constituents’ blood boil. Every action or inaction of the coalition forces is portrayed/twisted into a threat to Iraqi culture and religion. Insurgency by its nature lasts a long time, and direct action is not a silver bullet to defeat it. In fact, such actions sometime can be counter productive and can create more insurgents.
This enemy cannot be overcome by simply killing them. Their death means martyrdom. Where they fall, dozens or hundreds spring up to take their places. They cannot be overcome solely through firepower attrition, because all death caused by the West accrue to this enemy’s benefit, proving their thesis that annihilation is still king in all struggles for power. Waging conflict with massive firepower and high technology are hallmarks of great Satan to them….However, we still have a window of opportunity to make a dramatic difference if we work hard at creating Iraqi jobs, establish venues of free press, provide extensive Internet and media access to Iraqi people and enhance the infrastructure.


1 G.I. Wilson, “ Fourth Generation Warfare: How Tactics of the Weak Confound the Strong.” www.miltary.com, September 8, 2003


2. Haqlaniya