http://elombah.com/index.php/special-reports/15409-dimka-s-coup-obasanjo-danjuma-are-cowards-uk-high-commissioner

The UK High Commission said it had great difficulty locating M.D. Yusufu, inspector general of police and one of the top six members of the Muhammed government, finally tracking him down shortly after noon "hiding” at his home. Yusufu's behaviour that Friday matched that of Murtalla Mohammed’s second in command, Olusegun Obasanjo, and

army chief -of-staff, Theophilus Danjuma and MEA commissioner Garba, which he characterized as "gutless." ---------1976 US DIPLOMATIC CABLES - RELEASED THIS WEEK BY WIKILEAKS AND DISCOVERED BY ELOMBAH.COM.

Dimka's Visit To Uk High Commissioner

1. Lt. Col. B.S. dimka, the reported assassin of murtala muhammed, called on UK high commissioner Sir Martin Lequesne February 13 1976, about an hour after the late nigerian head of state was killed. Given below (paragraph 5 and following) is the verbatim text of the report of the conversation as submitted by lequesne to the fco. Lequesne gave me a copy of the report this morning.

2. Immediately after dictating the report friday morning, lequesne arranged for a copy of it to be taken urgently to m.d. ysufu, inspector general of police and one of the top six members of the muhammed government. The high commission had great difficulty locating yusufu, finally tracking him down shortly after noon "hiding " at his home. Le quesne told me this morning that yusufu's behavior on friday matched that of obasanjo, army chief-of-staff danjuma and mea commissioner garba, which he characterized as "gutless."

3. When finally located at mid-day friday, yusufu seemed resigned to whatever might happen to him, refusing a high commission offer to move him out of his house to a safe location "where he might be able to regroup his colleagues."

As for the behaviour of the other three, lequesne says he has been reliably informed that they "ran home" and changed into civilian clothes as soon as they heard the dimka broadcast. Garba was not heard from for the rest of the day.

Obasanjo made no appearance until mid-afternoon and chances for the counter-coup appeared good.

As for danjuma, he went to the bonny camp on victoria island around midday to rally loyalist military forces but was so unnerved and out-of-control that his principal staff officer col. Isama, had to take charge.

It was isama who persuaded the others that the operation to retake the radio station should be surgical and careful so as not to injure civilian technicians and equipment that would be needed if the attack were successful.

Danjuma had reportedly instructed that the station be "smashed down" with armored cars and heavy guns. It was isama who led the counterattack on radio station in the early afternoon.

(comment: this does not jibe with information from embassy's dao that attack on radio station was led by col. Ibrahim babangida, director of armor of the nigerian army. Dao saw babangida leading his armor past embassy chancery on way to station. Force consisted of three british scorpion tanks, two french ferret armored cars, three panhard armored cars with ninety millimeter guns, and three truck loads of infantry totalling about 100 men.)

4. Readers will note dimka's statement to lequesne to the effect that obasanjo had been killed. This corroborates indications we have received from other sources to the effect that he was indeed one of the targets of dimka's operation. We and the british surmise that col. Dumuja, who was shot in his mercedes automobile friday morning while proceeding along the same route to dodan barracks nromally followed by obasanjo, was mistaken for obasanjo.

5. Following is the text of Lequesne's memorandum to the FCO.

Quote:

1. At about 9:10 a.m. on 13 february the head of changery informed me that colonel dimka had come to the high commission and wished to see me. I went out to meet him. Three armed soldiers were in the outer waiting-room and colonel dimka, unarmed and without his cap, was in the inner waitng-room. I brought him into my room. He showed no particular sense of urgency or hurry at any stage in our conversation. The head of chancery was present throughout.

2.colonel dimka started by saying that he had taken control of the government and had come to ask me to transmit a message urgently to general gowon that he should come to togo. Generals muhammed and obasanjo had to his regret been killed "resisting arrest." i asked what had happened to general danjuma. Colonel dimka said that he had not yet been found. When he was it would depend on him. Colonel dimka indicated clearly that he meant by this that if general danjuma opposed the new "government" he too would be killed.

3. I asked colonel kimka why he had taken this step. His reply was far from clear. He said that under general muhammed the country was going communist, which was “contrary to our constitution" and to what the country wanted. "we" wanted to change the policy and get back to real non-alignment. The present situation was one-sided. A parti- cular group had been running the country in its own way. Genrral muhammed had accepted a bribe of twenty five million pounds from the russians.

4. He criticised the recent promotions to general rank which had ignored the established tradition of promotion. General dajnuma was not the best officer in the army. He had neglected the other ranks.

Many people had been sacked for corruption while others who had been equally corrupt continued to occupy high places. Those who had been corrupt would be dealt with by legal means. He implied that some of those recently dismissed would be reinstated though he denied, in reply to my euestion, that it was his intention to recall them all.


5. A lot of charges were needed at home. The present government had done noting but carry out probes. The military governors were being directed from lagos and had no opportunity to exercise individual initiative. "we" intend to draw a straight line under the past and get the country right again from its basic foundations. "none of us is interested in political appointments. We want someone to come in and reconcile the bad feelings." that is why general gowon should come back. There may have been a need for general gowon 's leadership to be changed, but he should have been given a chance to do this.

6. I told colonel dimka that, as a diplomatic representative it would be improper for me to play any part in nigerian domestic poli- tics. To send a message to general gowon as he requested would be to do just this. I could not therefore do what he wanted. Colonel dimka accepted this without demur and immediately changed his tack and said that what he wanted was that i should report what he had said to my government. I said that i would of course do this.

7. I asked colonel dimka who his colleagues were to whom he referred throughout as "we". His reply was again imprecise. He said "we are the young revolutionaries." he was the most senior officer in the group the others were majors. They had acted because the other ranks were waiting for a bloody rising. The coup in 1966 had been started by the other ranks.

8. I asked what support he had in the country. He said airily that there had been moves in ibadan, kaduna, kano and jos - but it struck me as he spoke that his reply was more an enumeration of the major cities outside lagos than the statement of a man who actually knew what was being done in these places.

9. I told colonel dimka that i found some contradiction between his claim to be a leader of young revolutionaries and his criticism of the government for a left-ward trend. He gave a rather vague reply to the effect that he and his colleagues wanted changes.

10. Our conversation ended at about 0945. I accompanied colonel dkmka outside to the waiting-room, and then to the top of the stairs. He said that he would return later to see me again. He did not.

11. I arranged for a copy of the telegram which i sent to london reporting this conversation to be shown to the inspector gen- eral of police later in the morning.

12. Colonel dimka was throughout calm and apparently under no feeling of urgency. I judged that the vagueness and incoherence of most of what he said was due not to any stress but to the fact that his ideas were indeed incoherent and unformulated. Even had he seriously wanted me to send a message to general gowon it was incredible that, having, as he claimed, just taken over the responsibility of government, he should take the time himself to come down to hajola house to make the request. But in fact he dropped his request without argument when i said i could not comply with it. There was something almost frivolous about the whole business and he left me with no impression that he was acting in accordance with any predetermined plan.

dayokanu: Please what makes them cowards?

And what makes a warlord who fled the warfront a hero

According to your folklore

naptu2: Murtala Muhammed



Just before 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 1976, the following curious announcement was heard on Radio Nigeria:

"Good morning fellow Nigerians,

This is Lt. Col. B. Dimka of the Nigerian Army calling.
I bring you good tidings. Murtala Muhammed's deficiency has been detected. His government is now overthrown by the young revolutionaries. All the 19 military governors have no powers over the states they now govern. The states affairs will be run by military brigade commanders until further notice.

All commissioners are sacked, except for the armed forces and police commissioners who will be redeployed.

All senior military officers should remain calm in their respective spots. No divisional commanders will issue orders or instructions until further notice.

Any attempt to foil these plans from any quarters will be met with death.
You are warned, it is all over the 19 states.
Any acts of looting or raids will be death.

Everyone should be calm.
Please stay by your radio for further announcements.
All borders, air and sea ports are closed until further notice.

Curfew is imposed from 6am to 6pm.

Thank you. We are all together."

naptu2: Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa



Just prior to this broadcast, then Head of State, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, along with his ADC (Lt. Akinsehinwa), Orderly and driver, had been assassinated on his way to work in a thin skinned black Mercedes Benz car without escorts. The unprotected car had slowed down at the junction in front of the Federal Secretariat in Ikoyi, Lagos, when a hit team which allegedly included Lt. William Seri and others, casually strolled up and riddled it with bullets.

naptu2: Murtala Muhammed's limousine (National Museum, Onikan, Lagos).

naptu2: (L-R) Vice Admiral Michael Adelanwa (Chief of Naval Staff), Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters), General Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State & Commander in Chief), Lieutenant General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (Chief of Army Staff), Air Vice Marshall John Yisa Doko (Chief of Air Staff) and Alhaji Muhammed Dikko Yusuf (Inspector General of Police).



On the morning of the 13th of January 1976 General Murtala Ramat Muhammed was assassinated when a hit squad submachine gunned his Mercedes Benz Limousine as it slowed down at the junction of Bank Rd and Ikoyi Rd. Other hit teams simultaneously went after other key functionaries of the regime's troika, namely the Chief of Staff, SHQ, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. T. Y. Danjuma. The Military Governors of Kwara and Oyo States, Colonels Ibrahim Taiwo and David Jemibewon, respectively, were also targeted.

Taiwo, who had been the national coordinator of the July 1975 coup that brought Mohammed to power, was abducted and killed by a team led by Major K. K. Gagara. Jemibewon, whose name had been added to the list of targets by Lt. Col T. K. Adamu, merely because Adamu "did not like his face", escaped.

General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) has written that he was late in leaving home that day on account of a visit by Brigadier Olu Bajowa to get a name for his new baby. When it became apparent that there was trouble, Obasanjo executed an escape and evasion manoeuvre, spent most of the day at the house of a civilian friend in Ikoyi monitoring the situation by telephone, but later emerged to become the Head of State. His would be assassins mistook then Colonel Dumuje for him along Awolowo road in Lagos, seriously wounding that officer.

That morning, General Danjuma followed his usual route at the usual time, 7:30 a.m., which route consisted of leaving his home by car for the Chief of Naval Staff’s Jetty at Queen’s Drive, where he would board a launch which would take him to the Ministry of Defence Jetty at the Marina. From there he would usually walk across the road into his office in Army Headquarters.

On this morning he found Col. Bali and the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Adelanwa, awaiting him at Queens Drive. They rode together to the Marina without incident and reached their offices without any sign of unusual movements.

He was busy reading his newspapers in the office at a few minutes past eight when Col. Bali came in and asked him if he had heard what happened. When he said he had not, Col. Bali then told him that there had been a voice over the radio announcing that there had been a coup. The first thing that General Danjuma asked for was a radio, since he did not usually keep one in his office. A radio was brought in and a number of other officers came in to the office to listen. As soon as he heard the announcement he sent for then Col. Ibrahim Babangida. Ibrahim Babangida and Domkat Bali were two particularly efficient officers who had served with General Danjuma during the war.

General Danjuma told Col. Babangida who was commanding the Recce Squadron to get to Ikeja where his armoured cars were parked and secure his unit as swiftly as he could. As he was about to leave, General Danjuma further suggested to him that he should go on a motorcycle, since the roads were said to be clogged with traffic. This instruction had another tactical advantage in that any of the coup participants looking out for loyal soldiers would hardly have expected to find them on the pillion seats of motorcycles.

After Babangida left, General Danjuma received a phone call from Col. Muhammadu Buhari, the Governor of Bornu State. Col. Buhari was trying to call the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, General Obasanjo, but he had been put on to the wrong office. General Danjuma asked him if he had heard what had happened and he replied that he had not. General Danjuma briefed him on what he had heard on the radio and also told him that he had rung Dodan Barracks and discovered that General Muhammed had not reached his office, even though he had ascertained from General Muhammed’s wife that he had left home. Col. Buhari’s only comment was “I hope they haven’t killed him”. General Danjuma instructed him to contact the Brigade Commander in his area immediately and secure loyalty there and make sure that no one left the barracks in the town.

The next phone call that came into his office was from General Bisalla. He asked General Danjuma if he had heard what had happened. General Danjuma said that he had heard, but that all would soon be under control. General Bisalla simply hung up the phone. It was later learnt that on replacing the phone he turned to a top civil servant who was standing next to him and commented, “So this is how people ruin one’s career”. His office was just above General Danjuma’s in the Ministry of Defence Building.
Immediately after this call, General Danjuma, on the advice of Colonel Bali, moved his headquarters to Bonny Camp.

Colonel Babangida got to Ikeja Cantonment and secured his armoured vehicles. Supported by these vehicles he proceeded to Radio Nigeria, where he had a conversation with his close friend Dimka. Dimka's initial reaction to Babangida's arrival was to ask him if he came to play "Chukwuma and Nwawo" with him; drawing a historical parallel with the negotiations between Colonel Conrad Nwawo (on behalf of Ironsi) and Major Patrick Nzeogwu in Kaduna in January 1966. However, Dimka got concerned with the presence of armored vehicles in the background and asked them to be withdrawn.

But it turns out that Babangida's orders had not been to negotiate a surrender or other outcome, but to stop the broadcast - by any means necessary - including destruction by shelling. When he made contact with Bonny Camp to report his activities at the radio station, this order was reiterated to him by General Danjuma, incredulous that a conversation with Dimka had even occurred and that the radio station was still playing Dimka's broadcast. A brief but fierce fire fight (reportedly led by Major Chris Ugokwe) subsequently dislodged the coup plotters from the station.

When shooting started Dimka simply walked away, past all the soldiers surrounding the building as well as driving through numerous checkpoints on his way, first to Jos and then eventually to Abakaliki where he was captured by Police in the company of a woman of easy virtue.

Texas.Cowgirl:
NL is obviously slow and boring tonight.

Time for my SE brothers to praise and worship their masters.

Yawns
*Logs off NL for now*

"hiding " at his home

3. When finally located at mid-day friday, yusufu seemed resigned to whatever might happen to him, refusing a high commission offer to move him out of his house to a safe location "where he might be able to regroup his colleagues."

he has been reliably informed that they "ran home" and changed into civilian clothes as soon as they heard the dimka broadcast. Garba was not heard from for the rest of the day.

As for danjuma, he went to the bonny camp on victoria island around midday to rally loyalist military forces but was so unnerved and out-of-control that his principal staff officer col. Isama, had to take charge.

nap2: Now, let's take a look at some passages from the telegram.

1
The High Commissioner said that they had to search for Yusuf and that he was hiding at his home. Wouldn't his house be an obvious place to look for him? Therefore how come the High Commission had a difficult time "finding him"? If he was indeed hiding, wouldn't his home be an obvious place for the coupist to find him? So, if he was cowardly and hiding, why would he be hiding at his home?



If Yusuf was cowardly, gutless and hiding, wouldn't he have taken up the British offer to move him to a safe location (which the coup plotters would not know about) rather than staying at his home (which would be an obvious target for the coupists)?



Reliably informed by whom and how do we judge the reliability of the informant?


Once again, what's the source off this information and how do we judge the reliability of the source?

But it turns out that Babangida's orders had not been to negotiate a surrender or other outcome, but to stop the broadcast - by any means necessary - including destruction by shelling. When he made contact with Bonny Camp to report his activities at the radio station, this order was reiterated to him by General Danjuma, incredulous that a conversation with Dimka had even occurred and that the radio station was still playing Dimka's broadcast
A brief but fierce fire fight (reportedly led by Major Chris Ugokwe) subsequently dislodged the coup plotters from the station

kettykings:

I now understand something about the Nigerian military of that Era the monkeys work while the baboons chop , how come nothing was even heard about this young man behind the dislodgment of the coup plotters Maj Chris Ugokwe when it came to dislodging they remembered their under dogs, rather it is a certain Babangida that is being rated a hero in Nigeria today.
i kind of wonder why this man has even chosen to remain at the back ground when all kinds of loafers walk around claiming to be second coup and civil war heroes and how they struck to kill Aguiyi Ironsi (an unarmed general whom Britain relied on to maintain peace and stability after the first coup) and all that when in fact they could not stop the Tiger himself (Nzeogwu).
Notice here that it was the same kind of bloody coup led by majority of Igbo soldiers and some few yorubas that led to the civil war but here it was not even treated as a middle belt coup eventhough 100% of the coupist were from Middle belt and the targets were yorubas and hausas


Please Notice again that even though this young Biafran man was found worthy to go and dislodge coup plotters when it came to sharing offices and perks of offices the Inept Government of that day did not remember Biafrans. you can check the Military ruling council list, the Ministers of the Era and the Governors of that Era.

The question really is how come the Benjamin Adekunle or even his Boys were not sent to dislodge this middle belt coup plotters ? which occurred in the Core of the west and was even worse than the crossing of Biafran troups to Ore the periphery or the West.

Also Notice how brief the Operation to dislodge the coup plotters was , no innocent middle belt or plateau civilian was ambushed or killed or even arrested unlike the Bloody Genocide that was carried out by an inept and disorganized touts in Military Uniform in July 1966 .

Finally this is a discuss attend to the discuss and not the discussants

nap2: When researching historical events, you need to read different sides of the story from different (even opposing) sources, so that you can get a balanced view and come to your own conclusions about what happened.

Remember that the British were accused of being complicit in Dimka's coup. On the day of the coup (while the coup was in progress) Dimka went to the British High Commission. Also remember that some of Murtala's policies were against British interests.

VolvoS60:



^^^^
Accused by who?

(Although I do agree that there are several sides to a story and its prudent to get as much info as possible from all sides.)

nap2:

1) Chris Ugokwe was sent to dislodge the coupists because of his position in the Nigerian Army. Ibrahim Babangida was initially sent, because he was the Commander of the Armoured Corp at the time. At the time General Danjuma favoured an all out attack on the radio station, so he expected Babangida to use his tanks to destroy the radio station if necessary. Danjuma was shocked when Babangida reported that he had had discussions with Dimka (because he expected Babangida to go for an all out attack). Chris Ugokwe was a regimental commander in the armoured corps (sort of like Babangida's deputy), so it was only natural that Danjuma should order Ugokwe to engage the coup plotters.
https://www.nairaland.com/439929/colonel-chris-ugokwe-grudge-nigerian

The first attempt to reach and dislodge the coupists at the radio station was carried out by a group of soldiers from the 126 Battalion Bonny camp reportedly led by one Lt. Jalingo. They were repulsed near the Obalende bridge flyover, by 2/Lt Umukoro in an armored vehicle. At least one soldier died in the hail of co-axial MG fire. The others were later co-opted at gunpoint by Major Mukoro and made to make mini-broadcasts in pidgin English and vernacular, praising the coup.

I joined the Nigerian Army on April 13, 1962, with General Mohammed Buhari and the late General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, among other colleagues. These were my contemporaries in the army and we enrolled the same day


If I had fought on the Nigerian side, maybe I would have risen to the rank during the promotion exercise after the war. But even without the war, one is not sure whether I would have become a General before my retirement. As you know, the base of a triangle is wide and as you go up, it becomes slimmer, meaning that only one will make it, for instance, to the position of Chief of Army Staff even if all of you enrolled the same day in the army. Besides, after the rank of Major, every other rank in the Army is based on vacancy and Federal Character.

For those of us who fought on the side of Biafra, the period of the war did not count in our promotion. However, quite frankly, I have no regret at all. The build up to the civil was so complicated that the kits and kin of Ndigbo were rounded up across the country and shot and we just felt that Nigeria was not safe for us. So, we all ran back to the East for safety. I had no choice but to fight for my people (Biafra) during the war.



What were your happy memories in the Army?

Those were the times when I went for military operations outside the country, especially the one on Lake Chad where we lost 21 islands in 1984. Then Gen. Muhammadu Buhari was the Commanding Officer, Third Armored Division and he called me that we must recapture the islands. I was a Col. General Staff then.



While on the operation, I moved the three armoured divisional headquarters to Maiduguri and asked the 21 Armoured Brigade to move to Badger and we planned the operation and succeeded in recapturing all the islands and added two more as bonus. I felt very proud with the operation, considering the short period of time.


What are your unpleasant memories of your service in the army?

It was a sad moment for me when on February 13, 1976, the late Col. Buka Zuka Dimka tried to topple the Nigerian Army and in the process assassinated the late Gen. Murtala Mohammed. I felt so bad about it such that I wasted no time when Gen. Babangida came to me and said that I should assemble armoured cars; that we were moving to Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria to dislodge him. It was he (Babangida, the Core Commander) and I (Regimental Commander, Nigerian Army, Armoured Division) that mounted 13 armored cars and drove to the station and I was happy the operation was successful. As such, we were able to regain the country from the dissidents. The only damage was that they assassinated the military head of state but did not succeed to topple the government.

lucenzo: Dude, no one is talking about ojukwu here. Why must you read tribal meanings in everything you do smh..

dayokanu:

The answer to the bold is YES.

Ibo soldiers killed other regional leaders, ironsi had a good 6 months to address the issue what did he do?

Let me ask if you were the aggrieved party whose leader was killed and 6 months later ironsi from the killers ethnic group was pussyfooting all over What would you do?

Tony Spike: After reading this piece, it is clear that Lt. Col. Dimka was sponsored by some elements. It seem the British Mi6 is involved in the whole scenario. Firstly, Dimka had no coherent reason to kill Murtala Mohammed; he basically just wanted to satisfy his masters. Murtala Mohammed was one of Nigeria's finest leader. He stood for discipline, anti-corruption and fiscal responsibility. Mohammadu Buhari was another leader in Murtala's mould. He was booted out by General Babangida, another protegee of America's CIA. Unfortunately, the quality of leaders we've had since the time of Murtala and Buhari are shameful thieving lots, including the current President. Well said...

Katsumoto:

Murtala wasn't in position for too long. But based on his actions before 'winning' the position, I wouldn't class him one of the finest.

1. His decision to sack civil servants summarily would later introduce large scale corruption as civil servants started looking out for themselves right from the first day on the job. Yes he was trying to stamp out corruption.

2. He failed to cross the Niger during the civil war incurring the biggest losses (men and equipment), resigned his commission and then went on holiday to England while the war was on. What kind of patriot does that?

3. His initial aim in the July 1966 coup was for the Northern region to secede. If an individual had such objectives, how could he claim to serve the whole and not just parts?

Dede1:


For the first time on this forum you appeared decidedly factual. Good to see you have turned a corner.

Tony Spike: After reading this piece, it is clear that Lt. Col. Dimka was sponsored by some elements. It seem the British Mi6 is involved in the whole scenario. Firstly, Dimka had no coherent reason to kill Murtala Mohammed; he basically just wanted to satisfy his masters. Murtala Mohammed was one of Nigeria's finest leader. He stood for discipline, anti-corruption and fiscal responsibility. Mohammadu Buhari was another leader in Murtala's mould. He was booted out by General Babangida, another protegee of America's CIA. Unfortunately, the quality of leaders we've had since the time of Murtala and Buhari are shameful thieving lots, including the current President. Well said...

Murtala Muhammed represents one of the greatest tragedies that has befallen Nigeria. An unintelligent, ill disciplined, uncharismatic, unprincipled and nondescript failed soldier, it is indeed a measure of the extent to which the nation has been unlucky to have been saddled with such despicable characters that ultimately shaped Nigeria’s destruction. As fate would have it, the Jan. 1966 coup unleashed a chain of circumstances that threw up characters like Murtala Muhammed who ordinarily would have remained an isolated and unknown officer for the duration of his career.

In the aftermath of the Major Kaduna Nzeogwu led coup, Murtala Muhammed and other Northern officers organised a secessionist coup (Araba) and pogrom that targeted and consumed the lives of over 50,000 innocent Eastern civilians in the first barbarity of such a scale to be seen in Africa. Artisans, traders, civil servants, children were all hacked to death. Women were raped and killed, pregnant women were first raped, then had their stomach cut open, the unborn children plucked out and stabbed to death. It was an orgy of bloodbath that rivalled Hitler’s death camps in Nazi Germany. Murtala Muhammed personally participated in this bloodletting preparatory to seceding from Nigeria. The flag of the Northern republic was already flying and Yakubu Gowon had also preparatory to Northern secession given his now famous “no basis for Nigerian unity” speech.

However, before the smouldering flames and dust could settle, the face of crass opportunism by Murtala Muhammed, Yakubu Gowon and other Northern officers emerged. On persuasion by the British, desirous of a willing stooge to aid their exploitation of Nigeria’s resources, the officers who had premised their coup and pogrom on secession did a volte-face and changed from secession to “one Nigeria.” It is ironical that after displaying such barbarity and blood lust targeted at ordinary civilians who had no hand in a coup organised by the military-political class, the same officers that orchestrated and participated in such pogrom of genocidal proportions changed course and proved their lack of principles and opportunism by insisting on Nigeria.

But the damage had already been done. The mass killing of civilians had established a fault line and a sense of insecurity that made co-habitation in the same nation impossible. Yakubu Gowon had failed as head of state to protect the lives and property of citizens in repeated attacks, paving the way for the civil-war, but this was only to give the blood hungry likes of Murtala Muhammed a further opportunity to satisfy their lust for blood.

As the civil-war commenced, Murtala Muhammed entered the war in the Midwest campaign where he robbed the Central Bank in Benin, and began his litany of war crimes. Federal forces under his command unleashed a massacre of Ibos in Benin city and environs, however Asaba became the legendary centre were Murtala Muhammed set a record of war crimes. In a rain of blood, tens of thousands of innocent youths, some of them just 6 years old were lined up on the streets of Asaba and executed in cold blood on the direct orders of Murtala Muhammed. The Asaba massacre was the first of its kind in Africa and remains one of the bloodiest to date in the history of the African continent. As a further testimony to the bloodlust and depravity demonstrated by Murtala Muhammed and his forces, few kilometres away in Onitsha, another barbaric massacre was unleashed in the Apostolic Church where over 300 civilians, devout Christians including women and children who had stayed back and continued in their prayers after the fall of Onitsha were brutally murdered in cold blood.

No doubt, one of the greatest murderers, war criminals, and opportunists in Nigeria‘s chequered history, his entire war career is littered with war crimes committed in different theatres of war. But beyond his crude barbarity which he repeatedly manifested in the rape of women and cold blooded massacre of defenceless civilians, he was an ill disciplined, failed soldier who In spite of the immense amounts of men and ammunition at his disposal suffered crushing defeats in most of his military campaigns against barely armed Biafran soldiers. His military campaign to take Onitsha, where he acted against orders from military headquarters ended in a humiliating defeat, and his 96 vehicle column of heavily armed troops who were ambushed and totally wiped out at Abagana are some of the worst defeats suffered by the Nigerian army in the civil war. His string of tactical failures led to his exit from the war theatre.

In July 1975, he seized power in a coup but was shot dead in a military putsch in February 1976, at last a victim of the bullets he had used to kill so many. In the end he left behind a legacy of barbarities, war crimes, bank robbery, destruction of the federal civil service and failure as a soldier. An avowed secessionist who became an opportunist apostle of one Nigeria, not because he genuinely believed in Nigeria, but for reasons of opportunism. The emergence of his likes as leaders, remains the greatest reason why Nigeria has failed.

Murtala Muhammed’s hands are soiled with so much blood, and even though by his death he escaped justice in the physical, he is sure getting his punishment in the spiritual realm. His entire generation of descendants shall also continue to pay one way or the other for the sins of their father.

By Comrade Lawrence Chinedu Nwobu
http://asaba.com/?p=352

Katsumoto:



Abeg go and have your snuff.

GenBuhari: A lot of details about the aborted coup is very hard to comprehend.

Only things that are certain are that:

Muritala Mohammed had lost the approval of the west nations USA and UK.

Obasanjo took over and was immediately pro-west.

Obasanjo did not report to work at his usual time in the morning that Muritala was assassinated.

There is a theory that Obasanjo and Babangida conducted the covert coup in which Muritala Mohammed was assassinated, Dimka was just probably a .foolish officer who was tricked or coerced into claiming responsibility for the coup and paid with his life,together with 70 others who were probably honest and innocent.