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Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 12:53pm On Jul 29, 2015
Henry120:


Operatives are able to identify and eliminate their targets from kilometers away in any weather or climatic condition.

Which they can also do in an open topped vehical

And on top of that, an open topped vehical provides better close-in situational awareness
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 1:02pm On Jul 29, 2015
Patchesagain:


Which they can also do in an open topped vehical

And on top of that, an open topped vehical provides better close-in situational awareness

Men sitting in an M-ATV already know where the enemy is, so the likelihood of been caught unawares is slim.

And on top of that, they have proper systems which they can deploy to neutralize targets and an added advantage of armour for cover.

The M-ATV is an all round better platform for S.F troops.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 2:10pm On Jul 29, 2015
Henry120:


Men sitting in an M-ATV already know where the enemy is, so the likelihood of been caught unawares is slim.

And on top of that, they have proper systems which they can deploy to neutralize targets and an added advantage of armour for cover.

The M-ATV is an all round better platform for S.F troops.

Ok Herny

You, the civilian internet warrior, are right

All the special forces in the world, with millions of hours of operational experience and a history dating back to light vehicle based raids and recon in WW2, are wrong

1. SAS - WRONG

2. Australian 2nd Commando Regiment - WRONG

3. German Kommando Spezialkräfte - WRONG

4. Green Berets - WRONG

I am not wasting my time if you are just going to repeat the same nonsense over and over. This isnt a discussion, this is you being pointlessly stubborn.

2 Likes

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 11:56am On Jul 30, 2015
Patchesagain:


I am not wasting my time if you are just going to repeat the same nonsense over and over. This isnt a discussion, this is you being pointlessly stubborn.

Took you long enough mate!

1 Like

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 12:24pm On Jul 30, 2015
Patchesagain:


Ok Herny

You, the civilian internet warrior, are right

All the special forces in the world, with millions of hours of operational experience and a history dating back to light vehicle based raids and recon in WW2, are wrong

1. SAS - WRONG

2. Australian 2nd Commando Regiment - WRONG

3. German Kommando Spezialkräfte - WRONG

4. Green Berets - WRONG

I am not wasting my time if you are just going to repeat the same nonsense over and over. This isnt a discussion, this is you being pointlessly stubborn.


So if this is the case, why are the likes of MARSOC, GROM, Saudi Special forces, Czech Special forces, Croatian, Special forces deploying the M-ATV as a primary SPV?


You are yet to prove that the Soft-skin is better than the Sandcat or M-ATV.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 12:54pm On Jul 30, 2015
Henry120:


So if this is the case, why are the likes of MARSOC, GROM, Saudi Special forces, Czech Special forces, Croatian, Special forces deploying the M-ATV as a primary SPV?


You are yet to prove that the Soft-skin is better than the Sandcat or M-ATV.

You have yet to prove that MARSOC, GROM, Saudi's, Czech or anyone else is using it as their "primary SPV"

Unless you back that statement up with fact, I am done here.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 1:04pm On Jul 30, 2015
Patchesagain:


You have yet to prove that MARSOC, GROM, Saudi's, Czech or anyone else is using it as their "primary SPV"

Unless you back that statement up with fact, I am done here.

The Primary SPV of MARSOC personnel in their current theatre of battle is the M-ATV, same thing for Saudi special forces in Yemen.


Now, where is your evidence that proves your soft-skins are better than the M-ATV or Sandcat?
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 1:19pm On Jul 30, 2015
Henry120:


The Primary SPV of MARSOC personnel in their current theatre of battle is the M-ATV, same thing for Saudi special forces in Yemen.


Now, where is your evidence that proves your soft-skins are better than the M-ATV or Sandcat?

Henry

Your word is not evidence

Provide something to substantiate your claims

Until then, I am done here.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 1:22pm On Jul 30, 2015
Patchesagain:


Henry

Your word is not evidence

Provide something to substantiate your claims

Until then, I am done here.

Patrick,

At no point did i say that, a simple google search would break your current shackles of ignorance.

Both Saudi and MARSOC extensively field the M-ATV in their current theater of operations.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 2:02pm On Jul 30, 2015
Henry120:


Patrick,

At no point did i say that, a simple google search would break your current shackles of ignorance.

Both Saudi and MARSOC extensively field the M-ATV in their current theater of operations.

Substantiate this claim
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 2:10pm On Jul 30, 2015
Patchesagain:


Substantiate this claim

Saudi Arabia has deployed 45 mine-resistant ambush- protected Oshkosh M-ATVs, while the United Arab Emirates has deployed 50 Emirati-made Nimr four-wheel-drive multipurpose armored vehicles.

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/03/middleeast/yemen-saudi-forces/

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/07/23/saudi-yemen-land-forces-coalition-aden/30570663/
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 4:49pm On Jul 30, 2015
Henry120:


Saudi Arabia has deployed 45 mine-resistant ambush- protected Oshkosh M-ATVs, while the United Arab Emirates has deployed 50 Emirati-made Nimr four-wheel-drive multipurpose armored vehicles.

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/03/middleeast/yemen-saudi-forces/

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/07/23/saudi-yemen-land-forces-coalition-aden/30570663/

Neither say they are specifically used by SF

And no mention of the US
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 6:42pm On Jul 30, 2015
Patchesagain:

Neither say they are specifically used by SF
And no mention of the US
You are beyond pathetic. What troops are deployed by the saudis in yemen?
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 12:23pm On Jul 31, 2015
Henry120:


You are beyond pathetic. What troops are deployed by the saudis in yemen?

You seen footage from the war with the Huthi's?

Unless the Saudi Special Forces also use M60 Pattons and V-150's I am sure to say that they have deployed more than just SF

Also, no mention of US or other Special forces using your precious MATV
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 4:38pm On Jul 31, 2015
Patchesagain:


You seen footage from the war with the Huthi's?

Unless the Saudi Special Forces also use M60 Pattons and V-150's I am sure to say that they have deployed more than just SF

Also, no mention of US or other Special forces using your precious MATV

All sources point to Saudi Special forces, stop been pathetic.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 5:43pm On Aug 03, 2015
Henry120:


All sources point to Saudi Special forces, stop been pathetic.

Saudi Special forces use the M60 Patton?
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 11:20pm On Sep 20, 2015
Henry, with your professed choice of vehicles for SF, here and on Beegeagle, I have one question.
What is Nigerian SF doctrine?
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 12:44am On Sep 21, 2015
frumentius:
Henry, with your professed choice of vehicles for SF, here and on Beegeagle, I have one question.
What is Nigerian SF doctrine?

Do you even know my professed choice of Vehicle for SF?



I can't claim to know what Nigerian SF doctrine is. Although we've had a commando div since the Nigerian civil war, 3 commando div, with the advent of extremist terrorism, a lot of it's doctrine have most likely changed and been improved upon.

At this point, i can only speculate.

- Who is the adversary? “What is the socio-political, economic
and cultural environment that we are going to have to deal
with?”, unfortunately, the adversary might be the same cobbler we interact with in the streets, or the guy in the meat store and in many cases the little defenceless girl her father must to the terrorists.


- Counter Indoctrination and radicalism

- Soft power approaches, similar to those currently run by the ONSA ( Office of the National Security Adviser), here in Nigeria. And other psychological operations programs

- additional trainings on how to work in different cultural/ ethnic & Religious settings.

- Additional commando still raids, what the Americans would call kill/ capture missions.

- Recon, Targeted assassinations and hostage rescue.

- Generally, the doctrine on the use of SF units and how they are going to now be deployed would have been much updated to reflect on the Nigeria's contemporary realities. How assets are deployed, when they are and what are available to them.


Nigerian S.F units are embedded with normal infantry, but i do not see them carrying out the sort of raids members of the 72 MSF execute.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 2:28am On Sep 21, 2015
Henry120:


Do you even know my professed choice of Vehicle for SF?

Now, now, no need to unsheath the claws. I merely ask because once you've defined the reason for a SF unit, then you answer all the other questions on size, equipment, training, tools etc. To me it seems you just bang on about vehicles regardless of mission. For example, you dismiss RDRVs off-hand, without offering alternatives for what suitable vehicle fulfills that mission.
On the other hand, you correctly promote LAVs, but seem to think that's all that's needed. Both are needed, to fulfill different special operations.
I guess what I'm saying is the mission defines the tools that SF will utilise. More important, SF is a strategic tool, not tactical.

Your 72 MSF, for example, is not what I'd call SF; special operations capable yes. Much like the US Rangers. They're a tactical direct action unit and any commander who misunderstands this risks blunting the unit. To illustrate doctrine and its application, let's play a war-game:

The town of Doro Gowon has been taken over by 2000 Boko Haram fvckers. You don't need me to tell you how strategic the place is as it sits athwart Lake Tchad on the border with Tchad, Cameroun and Niger up the coast. Their supply lines extend to all three countries, and the MNJTF is as dysfunctional as it is today. Without causing an international incident and adhering to international law, and using Nigerian assets as they are today, how would you take it back?

Step by step, if you please, and as realistic as possible.

5 Likes

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 8:06am On Sep 21, 2015
frumentius:


Now, now, no need to unsheath the claws. I merely ask because once you've defined the reason for a SF unit, then you answer all the other questions on size, equipment, training, tools etc. To me it seems you just bang on about vehicles regardless of mission. For example, you dismiss RDRVs off-hand, without offering alternatives for what suitable vehicle fulfills that mission.
On the other hand, you correctly promote LAVs, but seem to think that's all that's needed. Both are needed, to fulfill different special operations.
I guess what I'm saying is the mission defines the tools that SF will utilise. More important, SF is a strategic tool, not tactical.

Your 72 MSF, for example, is not what I'd call SF; special operations capable yes. Much like the US Rangers. They're a tactical direct action unit and any commander who misunderstands this risks blunting the unit. To illustrate doctrine and its application, let's play a war-game:

The town of Doro Gowon has been taken over by 2000 Boko Haram fvckers. You don't need me to tell you how strategic the place is as it sits athwart Lake Tchad on the border with Tchad, Cameroun and Niger up the coast. Their supply lines extend to all three countries, and the MNJTF is as dysfunctional as it is today. Without causing an international incident and adhering to international law, and using Nigerian assets as they are today, how would you take it back?

Step by step, if you please, and as realistic as possible.

This is the exact reason why i asked whether you knew what my preferred choice of vehicles for S.F is. There seems to be a misunderstanding between the vehicles i like and what actually is a realistic deployment.


The arguments we had a couple of weeks back on the ideal vehicle for SF units wasn't because i did not fancy RDRVs, it was because i wanted us to have a debate on them looking at the Pros and Cons of these vehicles. If you haven't noticed, we ( Nigerians) and the South-Africans, especially Patrick (Patches689), Mikeczar, Jln115, Andrewza and the rest of them aren't usually on the same page. We so often take sides......... The argument on SF vehicles is educational, not because i don't like them.


My ideal special forces vehicle is the Sherpa Special Forces Vehicle (pictured below), it mirrors my thoughts on how a special forces vehicle should look like. My comment on Beegeagle on my preferred SFV also shows what my general out-look on optimising local resources. Instead of importing the Sherpa Special Forces Vehicle, we (Nigeria) should use a local alternative, in this case, the Proforce Leopard MK 2 vehicle, and modify it to suit special mission operations.



So, on RDRVs, we don't actually disagree.




On the use of LAVs, again, it all boils down to optimising local resources.

LAVs have their advantages over MRAPs, and are sure as hell better than soft-skin vehicles. In Nigeria, we manufacture quite a number of LAVs, so instead of spending $500,000 on importing hundreds of MRAPs, we could spend half or 1/3 that money on more LAVs for Nigerian troops. It makes a lot of sense to me, as we not only support local industry, we would also have more men in protected mobility, than in soft-skins. On each occasion i promote LAVs i cite instances of it's general deployment around the world in various ATO. The Ukrainians, Egyptians, Israelis etc etc all use them in their varios ATO.

* P.S, i'm not advocating that MRAPs shouldn't be deployed in large numbers, although under-reported, we have one of the world's worst IED rates, especially Road side IED and VBIED.



I do not think LAV are all and be all, I just want them to fill a gab. An LAV isn't and IFV or an MBT. It is fire-power, not protection that wins wars.


I also promote the use of 23mm cannons on Nigerian army LAVs. We've seen these cannons deployed on Army VBLs, Igirigi and Streit LAVs, I think this practice should be more encouraged.



I guess what I'm saying is this, I don't expect SF units to be deployed in the regular Infantry missions ( direct action missions), and even if they are, they would be deployed in the proper Infantry mobility assets.

I agree with RDRVs, however my preferred RDRV is a bit different from yours, because i want my SF to have some sort of protection.


Nigeria's 72 MSF is a SOF unit, not an SF unit. In the same mould as U.S army Rangers. Yes i agree.

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 8:07am On Sep 21, 2015
frumentius:


To illustrate doctrine and its application, let's play a war-game:

The town of Doro Gowon has been taken over by 2000 Boko Haram fvckers. You don't need me to tell you how strategic the place is as it sits athwart Lake Tchad on the border with Tchad, Cameroun and Niger up the coast. Their supply lines extend to all three countries, and the MNJTF is as dysfunctional as it is today. Without causing an international incident and adhering to international law, and using Nigerian assets as they are today, how would you take it back?

Step by step, if you please, and as realistic as possible.

I'll come back to this in due course.




Operation Zaman Lafiya ( Doro Gowon recapture)

Assets available to the Nigerian military for this operation.

- 1x ATR-42

- 1x King air 350er

- 2x CH-3A


- 2x Alpha jet

- 2x MI-35 attack Helicopter

- 3x LUH armed ( Gazelle, Fennec)

- 4x T-72 MBT

- 3x Shilka 23-4 AAA used in fire support role

- 3x ERC-90 sagie

- 2x MRLS

- 2x Oto melera artillery

- 2x Bofors artillery

- 3x D-30 artillery

- 2x mine clearance vehicles

- Fire support, 60mm and 82 mm mortars

- MRAPs and Soft skins

- 14.5mm

- 12.7mm

- Handheld automatic grenade launcher firing 40 mm grenade

- RPG-7

- Aeyron Tactical drones

- 1500 Nigerian troops

- 200 members of the civilian JTF and local fighters

Operation execution

Analysis and Next Steps
Warfare is subject to many variables from training, luck, manpower, finance, geography etc

Geography has dictated this conflict right from the beginning, with the sect setting up camp in the Mandara Mountains as far back as 2004. However in this operation on Doro Gowon, it is lake Chad that presents a geographical challenge.


This is why the two main enemy Key Terrains have been Lake Chad and the Mandara Mountains. Other zones essentially existed as defensive buffers to these territories. Nigerian forces have correctly identified these areas and have aimed to isolate them in order to draw the enemy into actions where they can be destroyed by superior firepower before forces attack Doro Gowon.


Securing these zones separates Boko Haram from its supply lines, base areas and rest areas, reducing their freedom of movement across borders, as well as robbing them of lucrative sources of income by controlling the Lake Chad/ Sahel/ Central African smuggling routes. Also just as important it has starved them of food and fuel, due to their helpful habit of slaughtering everyone in areas they capture, there are precious few farmers left or even people who could travel back and forth to markets and they could take food from.

Secondly, Armoured vehicles are extremely fuel inefficient, particularly if poorly maintained, the enemies insistence on using these prestige weapons will have put immense pressure on their logistics.

All these present advantages for the Nigerian military and it's attack on Doro Gowon.


Tactically the Nigerian operation seeks to have several effects on the enemy:Isolate, Destroy, Clear, Hold, Secure


-the attack to the north and east of the AO (isolate in order to Destroy and Clear) and preventing the enemy from creating a new significant front in the Centre and West by clearing (Clear and Secure).


Cameroun, Tchad and Niger only participate by defending their side of the border, thereby denying enemy forces the route to escape. MNJTF is dysfunctional, not un-available! All scenarios play out.


If this were a hammer and anvil operation, the Nigerians act as the hammer whilst the Camerounians, Chadians and Nigeriens function as the anvil.
Chadian forces key role has been to exploit their connections, skill, firepower and mobility to unnerve the enemy by cutting them off from their northern sanctuaries securing the Western shore of Lake Chad and closing the trap formed by Nigerian forces advancing north.

* Again all operations carried out by Chad, Niger and Cameroun are within the armbits of their territories.


ISR Proper and Psyops

-1x ATR-42 is deployed from the Airforce base in maiduguiri for extensive ISR mission, delivering enemy coordinates to artillery crews.

-1x King air 350er also deployed from maiduguiri to track enemy movements feeding data in real-time to operations commanders

-2x CH-3A drones deployed from Yola Air force base down to AO, this taking over from 1x ATR-42 and 1x King air 350er crew. The essence is to ensure continious, 360 degrees, Day and Night surveillance, providing commanders the best intel to prosecute the mission.


In addition to round the clock surveillance missions, psyops operation begin to be in effect most likely run by the DSS with leaflets to try and pressurise Boko Haram members on the run as well as stories of commanders cooperating with Nigerian forces. The essence of this Psyops missions is to create the possibility of doubt within the camps of enemy forces, and possibly induce reduced morale amongst men of enemy forces, and could lead to internal infighting amongst enemy forces.



Attack Proper

1x ATR-42 and 1x King air 350 eor are deployed in the AO, delivering real-time enemy positions to artillery crews who commence day and Night bombardment of enemy positions.

- 6x artillery pieces during the day

- 2x MRLS and 4x artillery pieces during the night

- Special forces recon teams on Dirt bikes also deployed to also assist in target identification of enemy positions to artillery crews, who adjust and continue firing.

- 2x Alpha jets are deployed from NAF base maiduguiri to commence carpet bombing of known enemy heavy equipment positions.

- with enemy positions significantly weakened, on the 4th day ground operations begin proper. All artillery bombardments cease, while Gunships, Tanks, AFVs, Shilka, MRAPs and Personnel are deployed for a full on frontal attack.

* Remeber the Camerounians, Chadians and Nigeriens are the anvil, while Nigeria is the hammer.


- Mine clearance vehicles, to counter risks from IEDs and mines planted by enemy forces.

- 4x Tanks,

- 3x Shilka,

- 3x ERC-90 AFV deployed into town to further weaken enemy defences. We have seen the enemy driving VBIEDs in frontal assaults against Tanks of the Nigerian army.

- Ground forces proper split into 3 groups are further deployed into Doro Gowon supported by Air assets from 2x MI-35 gunships and 3x armed scout Helicopters providing close air support for troops.

Infantry supported by 82 mm and 60 mm mortars, 23mm mounted on VBL and LAVs, 14.5mm mounted on Pick-up trucks and 12.7mm mounted on Otokar Cobras.

-Infantry operations and clearing of town by Nigerian forces completed

- Mopping up operations continue and are completed by Nigerian forces.


- 1000 Boko-Haram fighters confirmed killed by Nigerian forces.

- 250 Killed by Camerounians, chadians and Nigeriens securing their side of the border.

- all heavy enemy assets destroyed

- 450 prisoners arrested

- 250 Boko-haram members escape

- Friendly forces casualty, 20 Nigerian troops killed in operations, mostly by IEDs and ambushes.

- 35 injured.


Verdict Doron Gowon liberated.

3 Likes

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 12:13pm On Sep 21, 2015
Will be back later this evening. Must go and play with some Frenchies!
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 12:18pm On Sep 21, 2015
frumentius:
Will be back later this evening. Must go and play with some Frenchies!

Frum, we need close up photos. Do share enough photos from the exercise.

1 Like

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 12:15am On Sep 22, 2015
frumentius:


Now, now, no need to unsheath the claws. I merely ask because once you've defined the reason for a SF unit, then you answer all the other questions on size, equipment, training, tools etc. To me it seems you just bang on about vehicles regardless of mission. For example, you dismiss RDRVs off-hand, without offering alternatives for what suitable vehicle fulfills that mission.
On the other hand, you correctly promote LAVs, but seem to think that's all that's needed. Both are needed, to fulfill different special operations.
I guess what I'm saying is the mission defines the tools that SF will utilise. More important, SF is a strategic tool, not tactical.

.

At-least you are becoming a little bit more sincere....... Although you still got a long way to go, it's a decent start.

1 Like

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by patches689: 1:03pm On Sep 23, 2015
Henry120:


I'll come back to this in due course.




Operation Zaman Lafiya ( Doro Gowon recapture)

Assets available to the Nigerian military for this operation.

- 1x ATR-42

- 1x King air 350er

- 2x CH-3A


- 2x Alpha jet

- 2x MI-35 attack Helicopter

- 3x LUH armed ( Gazelle, Fennec)

- 4x T-72 MBT

- 3x Shilka 23-4 AAA used in fire support role

- 3x ERC-90 sagie

- 2x MRLS

- 2x Oto melera artillery

- 2x Bofors artillery

- 3x D-30 artillery

- 2x mine clearance vehicles

- Fire support, 60mm and 82 mm mortars

- MRAPs and Soft skins

- 14.5mm

- 12.7mm

- Handheld automatic grenade launcher firing 40 mm grenade

- RPG-7

- Aeyron Tactical drones

- 1500 Nigerian troops

- 200 members of the civilian JTF and local fighters

Operation execution

Analysis and Next Steps
Warfare is subject to many variables from training, luck, manpower, finance, geography etc

Geography has dictated this conflict right from the beginning, with the sect setting up camp in the Mandara Mountains as far back as 2004. However in this operation on Doro Gowon, it is lake Chad that presents a geographical challenge.


This is why the two main enemy Key Terrains have been Lake Chad and the Mandara Mountains. Other zones essentially existed as defensive buffers to these territories. Nigerian forces have correctly identified these areas and have aimed to isolate them in order to draw the enemy into actions where they can be destroyed by superior firepower before forces attack Doro Gowon.


Securing these zones separates Boko Haram from its supply lines, base areas and rest areas, reducing their freedom of movement across borders, as well as robbing them of lucrative sources of income by controlling the Lake Chad/ Sahel/ Central African smuggling routes. Also just as important it has starved them of food and fuel, due to their helpful habit of slaughtering everyone in areas they capture, there are precious few farmers left or even people who could travel back and forth to markets and they could take food from.

Secondly, Armoured vehicles are extremely fuel inefficient, particularly if poorly maintained, the enemies insistence on using these prestige weapons will have put immense pressure on their logistics.

All these present advantages for the Nigerian military and it's attack on Doro Gowon.


Tactically the Nigerian operation seeks to have several effects on the enemy:Isolate, Destroy, Clear, Hold, Secure


-the attack to the north and east of the AO (isolate in order to Destroy and Clear) and preventing the enemy from creating a new significant front in the Centre and West by clearing (Clear and Secure).


Cameroun, Tchad and Niger only participate by defending their side of the border, thereby denying enemy forces the route to escape. MNJTF is dysfunctional, not un-available! All scenarios play out.


If this were a hammer and anvil operation, the Nigerians act as the hammer whilst the Camerounians, Chadians and Nigeriens function as the anvil.
Chadian forces key role has been to exploit their connections, skill, firepower and mobility to unnerve the enemy by cutting them off from their northern sanctuaries securing the Western shore of Lake Chad and closing the trap formed by Nigerian forces advancing north.

* Again all operations carried out by Chad, Niger and Cameroun are within the armbits of their territories.


ISR Proper and Psyops

-1x ATR-42 is deployed from the Airforce base in maiduguiri for extensive ISR mission, delivering enemy coordinates to artillery crews.

-1x King air 350er also deployed from maiduguiri to track enemy movements feeding data in real-time to operations commanders

-2x CH-3A drones deployed from Yola Air force base down to AO, this taking over from 1x ATR-42 and 1x King air 350er crew. The essence is to ensure continious, 360 degrees, Day and Night surveillance, providing commanders the best intel to prosecute the mission.


In addition to round the clock surveillance missions, psyops operation begin to be in effect most likely run by the DSS with leaflets to try and pressurise Boko Haram members on the run as well as stories of commanders cooperating with Nigerian forces. The essence of this Psyops missions is to create the possibility of doubt within the camps of enemy forces, and possibly induce reduced morale amongst men of enemy forces, and could lead to internal infighting amongst enemy forces.



Attack Proper

1x ATR-42 and 1x King air 350 eor are deployed in the AO, delivering real-time enemy positions to artillery crews who commence day and Night bombardment of enemy positions.

- 6x artillery pieces during the day

- 2x MRLS and 4x artillery pieces during the night

- Special forces recon teams on Dirt bikes also deployed to also assist in target identification of enemy positions to artillery crews, who adjust and continue firing.

- 2x Alpha jets are deployed from NAF base maiduguiri to commence carpet bombing of known enemy heavy equipment positions.

- with enemy positions significantly weakened, on the 4th day ground operations begin proper. All artillery bombardments cease, while Gunships, Tanks, AFVs, Shilka, MRAPs and Personnel are deployed for a full on frontal attack.

* Remeber the Camerounians, Chadians and Nigeriens are the anvil, while Nigeria is the hammer.


- Mine clearance vehicles, to counter risks from IEDs and mines planted by enemy forces.

- 4x Tanks,

- 3x Shilka,

- 3x ERC-90 AFV deployed into town to further weaken enemy defences. We have seen the enemy driving VBIEDs in frontal assaults against Tanks of the Nigerian army.

- Ground forces proper split into 3 groups are further deployed into Doro Gowon supported by Air assets from 2x MI-35 gunships and 3x armed scout Helicopters providing close air support for troops.

Infantry supported by 82 mm and 60 mm mortars, 23mm mounted on VBL and LAVs, 14.5mm mounted on Pick-up trucks and 12.7mm mounted on Otokar Cobras.

-Infantry operations and clearing of town by Nigerian forces completed

- Mopping up operations continue and are completed by Nigerian forces.


- 1000 Boko-Haram fighters confirmed killed by Nigerian forces.

- 250 Killed by Camerounians, chadians and Nigeriens securing their side of the border.

- all heavy enemy assets destroyed

- 450 prisoners arrested

- 250 Boko-haram members escape

- Friendly forces casualty, 20 Nigerian troops killed in operations, mostly by IEDs and ambushes.

- 35 injured.


Verdict Doron Gowon liberated.

Give me a day or two to work on this
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 12:05am On Sep 30, 2015
Henry120:

...

Thanks for your effort Henry. Were I your commander I would not accept your plan. I shall point out why anon. But first, my whole point was that doctrine matters more than the assets/tools at one's command. No commander ever commits to a FIBUA fight when other options are available.
What are those options in this specific scenario (now comes the part where I critique and reject your plan, 2nd Lt Henry)?

1) The enemy has 1 source of supply - via Lake Tchad from Niger, Cameroun and Tchad. You have made no effort to cut this off. An excellent asset like the SBS could infiltrate the shoreline by night and disable all usable boats abutting the town; gunboats stationed on the lake could dissuade all incoming vessels from landing anywhere close to the town;

2) The scenario called for observance of international law, so artillery and shelling the town is out of the question. Civilian casualties are unavoidable in war, but any plan should be demonstrate that care has been taken to minimise them. This one doesn't;

3) Logistics, logistics, logistics. Warfighting turns on this and there's not a whiff of it in your plan;

4) The enemy's disposition. Apart from previous behaviour by the enemy, and rather formulaic references to "Psyops", no effort is made to ascertain the enemy commander's concept of defence and to counter it; and

5) Terrain. How does this aid or not the attacking commander's plan and intent? Not at all mentioned in your plan.

To conclude, the parameters of the scenario call for a commander's thought on how to fight [we call that doctrine].
Notice how I'm still defining the fight to come? Before bringing all that info in to decide how and with what I fight?

It's called doctrine. In another setting, Arab armies could also do with the same lesson: having the military assets, using them and knowing what use they are in the battlefield, is not the same as how to NOT use them, and when you do, use them devastatingly.

Now, having critiqued your plan, would you like that I provide my own?

And to anyone else interested in the exercise, to make it realistic, only Nigerian assets available.

2 Likes

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 6:27am On Sep 30, 2015
frumentius:


Thanks for your effort Henry. Were I your commander I would not accept your plan. I shall point out why anon. But first, my whole point was that doctrine matters more than the assets/tools at one's command. No commander ever commits to a FIBUA fight when other options are available.
What are those options in this specific scenario (now comes the part where I critique and reject your plan, 2nd Lt Henry)?

1) The enemy has 1 source of supply - via Lake Tchad from Niger, Cameroun and Tchad. You have made no effort to cut this off. An excellent asset like the SBS could infiltrate the shoreline by night and disable all usable boats abutting the town; gunboats stationed on the lake could dissuade all incoming vessels from landing anywhere close to the town;

2) The scenario called for observance of international law, so artillery and shelling the town is out of the question. Civilian casualties are unavoidable in war, but any plan should be demonstrate that care has been taken to minimise them. This one doesn't;

3) Logistics, logistics, logistics. Warfighting turns on this and there's not a whiff of it in your plan;

4) The enemy's disposition. Apart from previous behaviour by the enemy, and rather formulaic references to "Psyops", no effort is made to ascertain the enemy commander's concept of defence and to counter it; and

5) Terrain. How does this aid or not the attacking commander's plan and intent? Not at all mentioned in your plan.

To conclude, the parameters of the scenario call for a commander's thought on how to fight [we call that doctrine].
Notice how I'm still defining the fight to come? Before bringing all that info in to decide how and with what I fight?

It's called doctrine. In another setting, Arab armies could also do with the same lesson: having the military assets, using them and knowing what use they are in the battlefield, is not the same as how to NOT use them, and when you do, use them devastatingly.

Now, having critiqued your plan, would you like that I provide my own?

And to anyone else interested in the exercise, to make it realistic, only Nigerian assets available.

Please do provide yours, i'm eager to read it.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 3:57pm On Sep 30, 2015
iblawi:
I really don't know if you just want to make a case out of this simple thing, Henry already gave you the best reply. Argentina consider there meko 360 a destroyer while we consider ours a Frigate. Is that political as well?

Secondly, you don't even know what a strategic lift is and what a tactical lift is. There role, size, range, speed and payload is completely different and a C-130 cannot be referred to as a strategic lift. It is plainly a tactical lift.

The point that I was trying to make, diplomatically, is that yes... most often than not it is political, ships especially but also other things such as Argentina's TAM which they call an "MBT" but is actually just a Marder IFV with a turret and 105mm gun technically an MBT... but everyone knows it isnt anywhere near an MBT. And yes, to answer your question the Argentinians considering their Frigate a destroyer is 100% political.

And no, the definition of tactical and strategic airlift refers to the manner in which planes are employed and not role/size/payload. Tactical airlift is for deployments INSIDE the AO while strategic refers to deployments OUTSIDE the AO... so, the SADF paradrop at Cassinga was tactical airlift while the SANDF deployment of troops to staging posts in Entebbe for deployment into CAR would have been strategic airlift.

Hence why I said that if henry was trying to say they considered them a strategic and not tactical then I wouldnt make much of an argument... even though that would be a stretch as well.

However, Heavy and Medium airlift is pretty cut and dry and has nothing to do with doctrine and everything to do with capability.
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 4:25pm On Sep 30, 2015
frumentius:


The town of Doro Gowon has been taken over by 2000 Boko Haram fvckers. You don't need me to tell you how strategic the place is as it sits athwart Lake Tchad on the border with Tchad, Cameroun and Niger up the coast. Their supply lines extend to all three countries, and the MNJTF is as dysfunctional as it is today. Without causing an international incident and adhering to international law, and using Nigerian assets as they are today, how would you take it back?

Step by step, if you please, and as realistic as possible.

OK, I will bite.

Spent some time this evening making maps, will post my little ms paint battle plan tomorrow night grin

2 Likes

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 6:30pm On Sep 30, 2015
frumentius:


Thanks for your effort Henry. Were I your commander I would not accept your plan. I shall point out why anon. But first, my whole point was that doctrine matters more than the assets/tools at one's command. No commander ever commits to a FIBUA fight when other options are available.
What are those options in this specific scenario (now comes the part where I critique and reject your plan, 2nd Lt Henry)?

1) The enemy has 1 source of supply - via Lake Tchad from Niger, Cameroun and Tchad. You have made no effort to cut this off. An excellent asset like the SBS could infiltrate the shoreline by night and disable all usable boats abutting the town; gunboats stationed on the lake could dissuade all incoming vessels from landing anywhere close to the town;

2) The scenario called for observance of international law, so artillery and shelling the town is out of the question. Civilian casualties are unavoidable in war, but any plan should be demonstrate that care has been taken to minimise them. This one doesn't;

3) Logistics, logistics, logistics. Warfighting turns on this and there's not a whiff of it in your plan;

4) The enemy's disposition. Apart from previous behaviour by the enemy, and rather formulaic references to "Psyops", no effort is made to ascertain the enemy commander's concept of defence and to counter it; and

5) Terrain. How does this aid or not the attacking commander's plan and intent? Not at all mentioned in your plan.

To conclude, the parameters of the scenario call for a commander's thought on how to fight [we call that doctrine].
Notice how I'm still defining the fight to come? Before bringing all that info in to decide how and with what I fight?

It's called doctrine. In another setting, Arab armies could also do with the same lesson: having the military assets, using them and knowing what use they are in the battlefield, is not the same as how to NOT use them, and when you do, use them devastatingly.

Now, having critiqued your plan, would you like that I provide my own?

And to anyone else interested in the exercise, to make it realistic, only Nigerian assets available.

Let's see how i can defend my plan.


- I agree that not using the SBS was an error (they are an important tactical asset and should have been used). I made sure to point out that although the MNJTF is dysfunctional, we cannot just discount it. The MNJTF was formed in 1996, dysfunctional doesn't mean non-operational.

*Tchad, Niger and Cameroun not part of the attack on Doron Gowon, would only secure their own borders. In your parameters, there was no instruction stating these countries won't secure their own borders.



- As regards to shelling the town, the scenario called for observance of international law, I completely agree. However in my submission, I did state that Boko-Haram militants had an healthy habit of slaughtering residents in the towns they occupy, and examples abound Baga, Doron-Baga, Dikwa, Gambarou-Ngala, Mafa, Michika, Madagali, Shafa even major towns like Mubi and Bama.

In-truth, within the context of observance of international law, I do not believe that the use of shells and heavy artillery on the attack on Doron-Gowon is illegal. given the past antecedents of the terrorists in areas they occupy howitzers are a strategic tool in the take-over of Doron-Gowon. Use of shells is appropriate.


- Logistics, it's very important. Without the logistical supply, no operation can be done. I Should have added it.



- I believe ISR missions carried out by NAF assets should cover this point. I didn't go into detail because it would have required additional a significant more "write-up" in my already significant post.


- Terrain was mentioned.

"Key Terrains have been
Lake Chad and the Mandara Mountains. Other zones
essentially existed as defensive buffers to these territories.
Nigerian forces have correctly identified these areas and
have aimed to isolate them in order to draw the enemy
into actions where they can be destroyed by superior
firepower before forces attack Doro Gowon.
Securing these zones separates Boko Haram from its
supply lines, base areas and rest areas, reducing their
freedom of movement across borders, as well as robbing
them of lucrative sources of income by controlling the Lake
Chad/ Sahel/ Central African smuggling routes."





N/B My understanding of how the Nigerian Army would take over Doron-Gowon is all open-source knowledge garned from years of following the Nigerian military.

It is my personal opinion and probably does not represent how the Nigerian Army would re-take Doron-Gowon.

2 Likes

Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Patchesagain: 12:44am On Oct 01, 2015
frumentius:


Now, now, no need to unsheath the claws. I merely ask because once you've defined the reason for a SF unit, then you answer all the other questions on size, equipment, training, tools etc. To me it seems you just bang on about vehicles regardless of mission. For example, you dismiss RDRVs off-hand, without offering alternatives for what suitable vehicle fulfills that mission.
On the other hand, you correctly promote LAVs, but seem to think that's all that's needed. Both are needed, to fulfill different special operations.
I guess what I'm saying is the mission defines the tools that SF will utilise. More important, SF is a strategic tool, not tactical.

Your 72 MSF, for example, is not what I'd call SF; special operations capable yes. Much like the US Rangers. They're a tactical direct action unit and any commander who misunderstands this risks blunting the unit. To illustrate doctrine and its application, let's play a war-game:

The town of Doro Gowon has been taken over by 2000 Boko Haram fvckers. You don't need me to tell you how strategic the place is as it sits athwart Lake Tchad on the border with Tchad, Cameroun and Niger up the coast. Their supply lines extend to all three countries, and the MNJTF is as dysfunctional as it is today. Without causing an international incident and adhering to international law, and using Nigerian assets as they are today, how would you take it back?

Step by step, if you please, and as realistic as possible.

Some questions:

1. Doro Gowon - if you look on google earth you can see that the town has been leveled. Are we still going to operate under the pretext that there are civilians there?

2. What do I have access to? everything in the nigerian army inventory?

3. The town of Shiwari is 10km away - do i hold this town? If I do - who has the initiate/momentum?
Re: African Militaries Strictly Discussions Thread. by Nobody: 12:29am On Oct 03, 2015
Henry120:


Let's see how i can defend my plan...

Why? This is no competition. There were gaps in your plan, as there will be in mine. Personally, I've always found it takes at least 3 drafts before Higher signs off. An example: In the DRC our Field Engineers had to go out and repair a school in some forlorn village up in the Pinga hills. An Indian patrol had taken fire and commandeered the school as it was the highest point from which to maintain over-watch and wait for QRF and air evac. UN decided the villagers had to be mollified and the school fixed. Yours truly had to devise the plan for SANDF Engineers to venture into bandit country, fix a school and get out, while making nice with the natives. Simple, right?

In the den (out planning man-cave), the guys tore my plan apart because of "little things" like, "what if the wood supplies run out and the guys have to go down into the jungle to chop trees?" Now I could've defended my plan and said I was only asked to plan how to get them and back safely. Mind you, this was only with my colleagues, before Higher had even seen the 1st draft.

I guess what I'm saying is every plan has deficiencies and military ones moreso. We all learn from crit, particularly because the next person sees things differently.

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