I think it is high time I shared this. The book tells a whole lot about the genesis of Nigeria's problems and how the so-called three major ethnic groups contributed to the mishaps of the country, in the name of interests, greed and all what not.

The book is superbly detailed and quite lengthy for the present day Nigerian. So, to make it readable, I'd be posting chapters of the book in bits.

PS: The purpose of this is to understand our Nation's history and how it got to where it is today. Without a doubt, the book might just end up changing the orientation of some persons ahead of the 2019 elections.

Efewestern, Onosprince, Oloripapa, Igbodefender, AkinPhysicist, Omenkalives, Omenka, Tonyebarcanista, Izonpekin, NtoAkwaIbom, Jetleee, Fratermathy, laudate, onuwaje, Ishilove, et al...

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Max Siollun is a historian and commentator on Nigerian political and governmental issues, specializing in Nigerian history and the Nigerian military’s participation in politics. Although born in Nigeria, he was educated in England and is a graduate of the University of London. For the past decade has been a well-known columnist for several publications on Nigerian history and contemporary affairs. His balanced critiques on Nigerian history and the Nigerian military’s intervention in politics has given him a reputation as one of the most renowned scholars on Nigeria’s post-independence history and has gained him unprecedented access to documentary and eyewitness sources regarding Nigeria’s history.

Fantastic read Max did a great job on this piece. A must read for all

PREFACE

Sometimes referred to as the “Giant of Africa,” with a population of over 140 million, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country; a quarter of all Africans are Nigerian. Nigeria is located in west Africa, just north of the equator and south of the Sahara desert. Its southern coastline dips into the Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria is the United States’ largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, with annual trade between the two countries in 2009 valued at approximately $30 billion.

Nigeria exports more than one million barrels of crude oil a day to the United States (representing nearly 50% of Nigeria’s daily crude oil production), and it is projected that by 2015, Nigeria will provide 25% of the United States’ oil supply.1 With the United States’ frequently strained relations with Arab countries, Nigeria is increasingly viewed in Washington as an alternate dependable crude oil supplier.

Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) is larger than the combined GDP of its fteen neighbouring west African countries that make up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It is a regional economic, political and military superpower in west Africa, is blessed with abundant wealth from crude oil and natural gas, has the best-educated workforce in Africa, and enjoys a vibrant free press with over one hundred privately owned newspapers and magazines.

Its nationals are leaders in arts, science, nance and literature. Professor Wole Soyinka is Africa’s most distinguished playwright and was the rst African to win the Nobel Prize for literature. Nigeria’s former Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is a Managing Director of the World Bank. Dr. Augustine Njoku-Obi developed a cholera vaccine. Despite having all the prerequisites to become a superpower, Nigeria staggers from one crisis to another. After ten military coups, three heads of government assassinated, three ruinous decades of military dictatorship, and a civil war that claimed a million lives, Nigeria is still struggling to fulll its vast potential.

Under military rule, the country abandoned its traditionally agriculture-based economy and adopted a dangerously polarized oil-dominant economy that is extremely susceptible to uctuations in oil prices. Nigeria became almost totally dependent on earnings from its crude oil exports which currently account for over 90% of its foreign exchange earnings. Since Nigeria’s oil is exclusively located in the south of the country, this also polarized the country on ethnic and religious lines, with the mainly Christian inhabitants of the oil-producing southern areas bitterly resenting that the revenue from oil drilled from their land is used to develop non-oil producing areas.

Oil is obtained from only 9 of Nigeria’s 36 states.1 Approximately 75% of Nigeria’s oil and over 50% of its earnings are obtained from just three of these oil-producing states.2 Despite producing the overwhelming majority of Nigeria’s wealth, the inhabitants of the oil communities do not have the political strength to resist control of their resources by Nigeria’s federal government.

Nigeria’s crude oil wealth paradoxically became an impediment to its democratic development, as it incentivized the country’s military to seize and retain political power. Within 18 months of seizing power, the Nigerian military threatened the corporate existence of the country as two different factions of the army attempted to secede, replicated Nigeria’s political and societal cleavages within itself, and plunged the country into the brutal famine ravaged Biafran civil war that claimed over a million lives, and presented Western viewers for the rst time, with their now prototypical imagery of the emaciated and starving African child. The excesses of the Nigerian military were largely ignored by Western governments which were anxious not to interrupt a generous supply of crude oil. Nigeria’s “Bonny Light” crude oil is highly attractive to its Western importers as it has a low sulfur content and is easy to rene. Therefore Western relations with Nigeria are largely dictated by economic interests rather than by any sense of altruism or adherence to democratic principles.

It is often said that history is written by victors. In many cases in Nigeria, history is not written at all. A combination of ofcial reluctance to divulge combustible past events in a country permanently poised on an ethnic and religious powder keg, and the determination of the dramatis personae to avoid having their misdeeds exposed, means that early Nigerian post-independence history is in many places a collection of folktales and fables. This has also caused Nigeria to be greatly misunderstood and misrepresented overseas, especially in the area of the Nigerian military’s pivotal interference in the politics and governance of Nigeria. Nigerians are aware that their military-ruled them for 30 out of the country’s rst 40 years after independence. Yet there is little situational awareness of how the military became so politically powerful. Even though ostensibly democratic today, Nigeria is still dominated by the same military cabal that over four decades sporadically overthrew democratically elected governments, fought the Biafran civil war and imposed an economic blockade that caused famine and a million deaths, recklessly squandered the country’s oil wealth, and played the greatest role in disrupting the country’s political evolution.

The decade between 1966 and 1976 was the most politically explosive decade of Nigeria’s history during which it almost disintegrated, and Nigerian governments mastered the art of taking their country to the edge of an abyss and pulling back at the last moment. Most of the prior books on this time period were written by the protagonists, and their accounts are sometimes tainted by their embittered personal experiences and grievances. There is a substantial readership that desires a balanced, impartial and full account of that crisis-racked decade. This book seeks to educate the reader about the dynamic that existed within the military and which inuenced its conduct and interference in Nigerian politics. Rather than giving the sanitized version of coups that is in other books, the author has deliberately given extremely graphic accounts of events in order for the reader to appreciate the ruthless brutality that often accompanies military coups d’états.

Nigeria’s return to civilian democratic rule in 1999 has encouraged greater freedom of expression and political debate regarding topics that were considered taboo in the days of military rule. This has presented a welcome opportunity to discuss previously taboo topics, in order that future generations can learn from them and avoid the mistakes of the past. Those that do not heed history are doomed to repeat it.

PREFACE

Sometimes referred to as the “Giant of Africa,” with a population of over 140 million, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country; a quarter of all Africans are Nigerian. Nigeria is located in west Africa, just north of the equator and south of the Sahara desert. Its southern coastline dips into the Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria is the United States’ largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, with annual trade between the two countries in 2009 valued at approximately $30 billion.

Nigeria exports more than one million barrels of crude oil a day to the United States (representing nearly 50% of Nigeria’s daily crude oil production), and it is projected that by 2015, Nigeria will provide 25% of the United States’ oil supply.1 With the United States’ frequently strained relations with Arab countries, Nigeria is increasingly viewed in Washington as an alternate dependable crude oil supplier.

Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) is larger than the combined GDP of its fteen neighbouring west African countries that make up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It is a regional economic, political and military superpower in west Africa, is blessed with abundant wealth from crude oil and natural gas, has the best-educated workforce in Africa, and enjoys a vibrant free press with over one hundred privately owned newspapers and magazines.

Its nationals are leaders in arts, science, nance and literature. Professor Wole Soyinka is Africa’s most distinguished playwright and was the rst African to win the Nobel Prize for literature. Nigeria’s former Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is a Managing Director of the World Bank. Dr. Augustine Njoku-Obi developed a cholera vaccine. Despite having all the prerequisites to become a superpower, Nigeria staggers from one crisis to another. After ten military coups, three heads of government assassinated, three ruinous decades of military dictatorship, and a civil war that claimed a million lives, Nigeria is still struggling to fulll its vast potential.

Under military rule, the country abandoned its traditionally agriculture-based economy and adopted a dangerously polarized oil-dominant economy that is extremely susceptible to uctuations in oil prices. Nigeria became almost totally dependent on earnings from its crude oil exports which currently account for over 90% of its foreign exchange earnings. Since Nigeria’s oil is exclusively located in the south of the country, this also polarized the country on ethnic and religious lines, with the mainly Christian inhabitants of the oil-producing southern areas bitterly resenting that the revenue from oil drilled from their land is used to develop non-oil producing areas.

Oil is obtained from only 9 of Nigeria’s 36 states.1 Approximately 75% of Nigeria’s oil and over 50% of its earnings are obtained from just three of these oil-producing states.2 Despite producing the overwhelming majority of Nigeria’s wealth, the inhabitants of the oil communities do not have the political strength to resist control of their resources by Nigeria’s federal government.

Nigeria’s crude oil wealth paradoxically became an impediment to its democratic development, as it incentivized the country’s military to seize and retain political power. Within 18 months of seizing power, the Nigerian military threatened the corporate existence of the country as two different factions of the army attempted to secede, replicated Nigeria’s political and societal cleavages within itself, and plunged the country into the brutal famine ravaged Biafran civil war that claimed over a million lives, and presented Western viewers for the rst time, with their now prototypical imagery of the emaciated and starving African child. The excesses of the Nigerian military were largely ignored by Western governments which were anxious not to interrupt a generous supply of crude oil. Nigeria’s “Bonny Light” crude oil is highly attractive to its Western importers as it has a low sulfur content and is easy to rene. Therefore Western relations with Nigeria are largely dictated by economic interests rather than by any sense of altruism or adherence to democratic principles.

It is often said that history is written by victors. In many cases in Nigeria, history is not written at all. A combination of ofcial reluctance to divulge combustible past events in a country permanently poised on an ethnic and religious powder keg, and the determination of the dramatis personae to avoid having their misdeeds exposed, means that early Nigerian post-independence history is in many places a collection of folktales and fables. This has also caused Nigeria to be greatly misunderstood and misrepresented overseas, especially in the area of the Nigerian military’s pivotal interference in the politics and governance of Nigeria. Nigerians are aware that their military-ruled them for 30 out of the country’s rst 40 years after independence. Yet there is little situational awareness of how the military became so politically powerful. Even though ostensibly democratic today, Nigeria is still dominated by the same military cabal that over four decades sporadically overthrew democratically elected governments, fought the Biafran civil war and imposed an economic blockade that caused famine and a million deaths, recklessly squandered the country’s oil wealth, and played the greatest role in disrupting the country’s political evolution.

The decade between 1966 and 1976 was the most politically explosive decade of Nigeria’s history during which it almost disintegrated, and Nigerian governments mastered the art of taking their country to the edge of an abyss and pulling back at the last moment. Most of the prior books on this time period were written by the protagonists, and their accounts are sometimes tainted by their embittered personal experiences and grievances. There is a substantial readership that desires a balanced, impartial and full account of that crisis-racked decade. This book seeks to educate the reader about the dynamic that existed within the military and which inuenced its conduct and interference in Nigerian politics. Rather than giving the sanitized version of coups that is in other books, the author has deliberately given extremely graphic accounts of events in order for the reader to appreciate the ruthless brutality that often accompanies military coups d’états.

Nigeria’s return to civilian democratic rule in 1999 has encouraged greater freedom of expression and political debate regarding topics that were considered taboo in the days of military rule. This has presented a welcome opportunity to discuss previously taboo topics, in order that future generations can learn from them and avoid the mistakes of the past. Those that do not heed history are doomed to repeat it.

Noo I can't read this on a hot afternoon

Ratello:
Fantastic read Max did a great job on this piece. A must read for all

I'm telling you.Every politically conscious Nigerian should have and read that book over and over.One should also have his other book-"SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE".

Paperwhite:
I'm telling you.Every politically conscious Nigerian should have and read that book over and over.One should also have his other book-"SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE".

God bless your memory and judgments bro!

CHAPTER 1. THE PRE-COUP DAYS: POLITICS AND CRISIS

When it gained independence from the UK in 1960, hopes were high that, with mineral wealth and the most educated workforce in Africa, Nigeria would become Africa’s rst superpower and a stabilizing democratic inuence in the region. However, these lofty hopes were soon dashed and the country lumbered from crisis to crisis, with the democratic government eventually being overthrown in a violent military coup in January 1966. From 1966 until 1999, the army held onto power almost uninterrupted (except for a short-lived return to democracy between 1979 and 1983) under a succession of increasingly authoritarian and corrupt military governments and army coups. Military coups and military rule (which began as an emergency aberration) became a seemingly permanent feature of Nigerian politics. Nigeria has been democratic since 1999. The period from 1999 till the present is the longest period that Nigeria has ever gone without suffering a military coup. Despite being ruled by the military for most of their post-independence history, the majority still insist that democracy is their preferred method of governance.

Keep it up op!!!

Thanks for the tag Sanchez01

He's very active on twitter as well. Some people believe his book on the civil war is the most balanced

I haven't read any of his books, but i'll probably give this a try

Paperwhite:
I'm telling you.Every politically conscious Nigerian should have and read that book over and over.One should also have his other book-"SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE".

Where can I download it?

Jetleeee:


Some people believe his book on the civil war is the most balanced

I haven't read any of his books, but i'll probably give this a try

lolsss
you..read book ke! BAHAAAHAhAHAHAHAHAHAHA.........

when they say they will "probably" give reading a book a try,gbagbe

Maduawuchukwu:


Where can I download it?

Goggle or check his twitter page ?@maxsiliounfor further direction.But you can buy the book from book vendors.

Maduawuchukwu:


Where can I download it?

Read this essay with the expectation to further your research on the subject matter.

.

INDEPENDENCE

An army ofcer named Captain David Ejoor commanded the army guards at the midnight ag raising ceremony on Nigeria’s Independence Day on October 1, 1960. Little did Ejoor know then what a pivotal role he and his army colleagues would play in their country’s political destiny. The causes and origins of military intervention in Nigerian politics are so complex that they cannot be separated from the prevailing political situation at the time. After Nigeria gained independence from the UK on October 1, 1960, its domestic politics tried to emulate those of its former colonial master by adopting a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. There the similarities ended.

The political culture of the UK is one of rened debate and sophisticated party manoeuvring by comparison to Nigeria’s politics, fragmented as it is along regional and ethnic lines. The country was articially created by a colonial power without the consent of its citizens. Over 250 ethnic groups were arbitrarily herded together into an unwieldy and non-consensual union by the UK. Nigeria was so ethnically, religiously and linguistically complex that even some of its leading politicians initially doubted it could constitute a real country. It was infamously referred to as “the mistake of 1914.”1 During one of Nigeria’s early constitutional conferences, future Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa stated that Nigeria “existed as one country only on paper. It is still far from being united. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country.” Another prominent politician stated that “Nigeria is not a nation; it is a mere geographic expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are English or Welsh or French. The word ‘Nigeria’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.”

The largest ethnic groups in the north of the country were the Muslim, traditional and socially conservative, Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. Intermarriage and cultural assimilation had blurred the distinction between the two ethnicities and Nigerians refer to them in compound form as the “Hausa–Fulani.” The south was dominated by two competing ethnic groups: the proud and culturally rich Yorubas in the south-west, and the energetic and vibrant Igbos in the south-east. The British carved the country into three regions broadly corresponding to the location of these three largest ethnic groups. Hemmed in between them were approximately another 250 disparate ethnicities. Some were millions strong and others had only a few hundred members. Most of these groups had nothing in common with each other outside of their mutual suspicion and hostility.

The differences between them were accentuated by religion. The south of the country is predominantly Christian and the north predominantly Muslim. The general outlook of the people in the north and south is so different as to give them practically nothing in common and to make physical confrontation between them a virtual certainty. There is less difference between an Englishman and a Spaniard, with their shared Latin-derivative languages and culture, than there is between a Muslim northerner and a Christian southerner, with their diametrically opposed religions, language, food, manners, dress and culture. The cultural differences between the ethnic groups made it virtually impossible for Nigerians to have any commonality of purpose.

Party politics (and political parties) took on the identity and ideology of each of the three geopolitical regions in the north, south-east and south-west. The dominant and largest political party in the Northern Region was the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), whose motto of “One North, One People” gave an entirely accurate description of its objectives. It was unashamedly a regional party, did not bother to eld candidates outside the Northern Region and was dismayed that it did not receive reciprocal treatment from southern parties. The NPC also resisted attempts by southern parties to eld candidates in the Northern Region and regarded southern parties’ campaigning in the Northern Region as assaults on its territorial sovereignty. Southerners viewed the NPC as the party of the Hausa–Fulani ethnic group. The Western Region’s dominant party was the Yoruba-led Action Group (AG) and the Eastern Region was dominated by the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which was controlled by the Igbos. These regional-based parties assured two things: rstly that none of the parties could govern Nigeria on its own, and secondly that ethnic conict was only a matter of time away.

onuwaje:
Keep it up op!!!

Bro how far naa, long time o

IsiAbuncha:


Bro how far naa, long time o

I send u mail na u never reply am

onuwaje:


I send u mail na u never reply am

I just dey see am now sef, replied

continued...

The different regions began jostling each other even before Nigeria gained independence from the UK. In 1953 the southern AG and NCNC parties tabled a motion in the federal House of Representatives calling for Nigeria’s independence in 1956 (the motion was tabled by Anthony Enahoro). Northerners were apprehensive as they felt the Northern Region did not yet have an administration and educated workforce capable of operating independently of the British colonial rulers. AG and NCNC delegates walked out when the Northern majority in the House diluted the motion by removing the reference to “1956” and substituted it with a more modest goal of attaining independence when practicable. The NPC leader, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, regarded the 1956 date as “an invitation to commit suicide.” When they left the House, Northern delegates were jeered and harassed by southern mobs in Lagos for their reluctant approach to independence. This humiliation rankled long in the Northern memory.

After independence in 1960 the NPC took control of the federal government with the NCNC as the junior partner in a shaky coalition. The NPC’s deputy leader, Tafawa Balewa, became the Prime Minister and the NCNC’s eloquent leader Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe took the ceremonial role of Governor-General until 1963, when the country became a republic, upon which his title was changed to “President.” The AG formed the opposition with the energetic Obafemi Awolowo as Leader of the Opposition. The Yoruba were left out in the cold while the Igbo and Hausa–Fulani parties (the NCNC and NPC respectively) colluded. The constitution of the government was odd.

The NPC’s immensely powerful leader, the Sardauna of Sokoto Alhaji, Sir Ahmadu Bello, could have become Prime Minister but chose to instead become Premier of the Northern Region, and handed over the Prime Minister’s chair to his deputy, Tafawa Balewa. The Sardauna was only interested in matters pertaining to the south to the extent they had consequences in the Northern Region. Bello’s comment that “I would rather be called Sultan of Sokoto than President of Nigeria” summed up his outlook. Bello was doubtless the most powerful politician in the country by virtue of being the leader of its biggest party in Parliament, and by being Premier of the Northern Region, and was an inspirational gure for Nigeria’s Muslim population. However, while Balewa was regarded as a humble man, with integrity, he was also — rightly or wrongly — viewed by many southern politicians as Bello’s puppet. Southerners resented the fact that the government was being ruled by proxy by a regional ruler and viewed Bello as the real power behind the throne. This perception was not helped when Bello referred to Balewa his “lieutenant in Lagos.” This may have encouraged the southern politicians’ disrespectful attitude toward Balewa and the Northern Region. The fact that many of the southern politicians, such as Azikiwe and Awolowo, were extremely erudite intellectuals, while Balewa and Sardauna did not have university degrees, made some southern politicians feel that the Northern politicians were not intellectually t to rule the country.

Northern leaders feared that a Yoruba and Igbo alliance from the south could swamp them, threatening their way of life and their political dominance. Bello expressed these fears: “A sudden grouping of the eastern and western parties (with a few members from the north opposed to our party) might take power and endanger so endanger the north. This would, of course be utterly disastrous.”1 Bello’s fear was not without justication and Northerners for their part resented the condescending attitude of southerners. Some southerners regarded Northerners as backward, uneducated and unsophisticated, and some Northerners felt southerners were no more than ill-mannered indels.

I guess the wait is just about over... Could not continue with this because of a busy schedule.

The Northern Region had threatened to secede unless it was given half the seats in the post-independence Parliament. It was eventually given more seats in Parliament than the two southern regions put together. This meant that no meaningful governmental decision affecting Nigeria could be taken without the consent of the Northern political leaders. Southern rulers belatedly began to appreciate that Northern politicians were not as backward as they had thought and that the lopsided Parliament meant that Northern politicians would control Nigeria’s politics forever. Northerners felt vulnerable due to the overwhelming educational advantage of the south. At independence, Northerners accounted for just 10% of primary school enrolments, and of over one thousand students at the University of Ibadan, just over fty were Northern. Despite the fact that the Northern Region constituted two thirds of Nigeria’s land mass, the number of secondary schools in the south outnumbered those in the Northern Region by a ratio of over twenty to one.

Concerned that the better educated southerners might gobble up the best jobs in the Northern Region, the Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, embarked upon a “northernization” program with the aim of lling job vacancies in the Northern Region with Northern candidates. Where no qualied Northern candidate was available, expatriates were hired in preference to southerners. This antagonized many southerners.

In 1963 a census revealed that the population of the south was greater than that of the Northern Region. Each region’s census results determined its share of seats in the Parliament, and each region was widely assumed to have inated its population count. The results from the south showed a preposterously high rate of population growth, unprecedented in the history of mankind. The Prime Minister ordered a veri- cation of the results, after which an additional eight million people were “found” in the Northern Region. The verication exercise showed that the Northern Region did after all have a larger population than the south. The census gures caused mutual bitterness between the Northern Region and south, with each region accusing the other of massively distorting the census gures. It also carved a huge rift in the NPC– NCNC coalition and leaders from both parties publicly traded insults. The United States noted that:

The facts of geography and population assure that under the constitution, the federal government will continue to be dominated by the party representing the tradition-bound Moslems of the north, who are generally contemptuous of the south and unsympathetic to its problems. The southern regions, which are deeply divided along tribal, regional, and party lines, resent northern domination.1 The tragedy which subsequently occurred was based on mutual fear. The south feared that the Northern Region would use numerical advantage to suppress the south. The Northern Region feared that southerners would use superior academic qualications to dominate the Northern Region.

Action Points:

The Northern Region had threatened to secede unless it was given half the seats in the post-independence Parliament. It was eventually given more seats in Parliament than the two southern regions put together. This meant that no meaningful governmental decision affecting Nigeria could be taken without the consent of the Northern political leaders. Southern rulers belatedly began to appreciate that Northern politicians were not as backward as they had thought and that the lopsided Parliament meant that Northern politicians would control Nigeria’s politics forever

The South, led by the Yorubas and the Igbos, plunged Nigeria into its present state by allotting half the seats in the parliament to the North, just because they needed to be appeased. Today, decisions cannot be made and conclusions arrived at without the North being involved.

In 1963 a census revealed that the population of the south was greater than that of the Northern Region. Each region’s census results determined its share of seats in the Parliament, and each region was widely assumed to have inated its population count. The results from the south showed a preposterously high rate of population growth, unprecedented in the history of mankind. The Prime Minister ordered a veri- cation of the results, after which an additional eight million people were “found” in the Northern Region.

Well, what do I know?

Where can I get the soft copy for this book please

Sanchez01:
I think it is high time I shared this. The book tells a whole lot about the genesis of Nigeria's problems and how the so-called three major ethnic groups contributed to the mishaps of the country, in the name of interests, greed and all what not.

The book is superbly detailed and quite lengthy for the present day Nigerian. So, to make it readable, I'd be posting chapters of the book in bits.

PS: The purpose of this is to understand our Nation's history and how it got to where it is today. Without a doubt, the book might just end up changing the orientation of some persons ahead of the 2019 elections.

Efewestern, Onosprince, Oloripapa, Igbodefender, AkinPhysicist, Omenkalives, Omenka, Tonyebarcanista, Izonpekin, NtoAkwaIbom, Jetleee, Fratermathy, laudate, onuwaje, Ishilove, et al...

can you pls share link to access this book. Been searching for it since