Marginalization Begot Thug Livin

Tomorrow, July 7, marks the 40th anniversary of the commencement of the Nigerian Civil War, the 30-month conflict between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the secessionist Eastern Region of the country that was christened Biafra.
Over one million Nigerians, mainly Igbos perished in the war and its aftermaths.
At a time when echoes of war continue to reverberate in the Niger Delta and elsewhere over perceived injustice, the scars of the civil war and the lessons therein serve as a reminder to the nation that 40 years after, a number of the misgivings that preceded the war still abound in the polity.

Indeed, the civil war remains one of the darkest chapters in the nation's history. It was the culmination of the myriad of problems that plagued the Nigerian state from independence in 1960 in the quest for true nationhood.

From Independence to January 15, 1966 when a group of military officers struck in the first coup d'etat, the country was on a steady slide into anarchy. Regionalism tribalism, thuggery and political brinksmanship had become the tools of politicking.
The Action Group crisis which began as a personality rift between party leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and his deputy, Samuel Ladoke Akintola split the party down the line into warring factions. The bloody riots in the Western House of Assembly and the subsequent declaration of state of emergency in the Western region by the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa further heated the polity. The controversy that trailed the 1963 census and its rejection by mainly Southern politicians, the allegation and counter-allegations of rigging of the 1964 federal elections by the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) with support base in the North and United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) with considerable support from the South, pushed the country to the brinks. Political stalemate was only a matter of time.
There were also the Tiv riots. Elections in the West in 1965 brought more violence, arson and looting. Unlike the 1962 situation, the Balewa administration failed to declare a state of emergency and virtually did nothing. In the heat of the political upheaval across the nation, the Balewa government hosted the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference on the declaration of independence by the minority white government of Ian Smith in the then Rhodesia.
What, perhaps led the nation into the path of civil strife was the January 15, 1966 coup staged by a group of military officers, supposedly to rescue the nation from anarchy and total collapse. Whatever the messianic intent of the coup planners, the execution brought a different twist to the fortunes of the nation.
In the coup which inadvertently installed Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo, as head of state, the ethnic distribution of the casualties was lopsided if unintentional. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Balewa, the Federal Prime Minister both northerners, Chief S.L. Akintola Premier of Western Nigeria and Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister, were killed. Four Northern officers and two Western officers were also killed. Only one eastern officer was killed. Though there was initial euphoria in the wake of the coup, it left deep-seated distrust within the ranks of the military, an institution hitherto thought to be shielded from ethnicity and regionalism.
Ironsi's declaration of a unitary state did little to assuage the fear of Igbo hegemony among political and military elites in the north.
The May 1966 riots in Northern towns resulted in the massacre of Igbos and the July 29 counter-coup which swept away the six-month Ironsi regime and installed General Yakubu Gowon which equally targeted the Igbos for reprisal. In addition to Ironsi, 33 officers of Eastern origin, mainly Igbos, were killed.
As Igbos from all part of the North and West returned home, Northerners in East became targets of retaliation. Non-Easterners were expelled from the East. This polarisation of the Nigerian crisis into Eastern Region/Federal Government conflict effectively set the stage for the civil war. All efforts to resolve the stalemate failed. The most significant was the meeting of the Supreme Military Council in Aburi, Ghana in January, 1967. Both parties interpreted the agreements differently.

What followed the declaration of the Independent State of Biafra by then Col. Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was the commencement of hostilities on July 7, 1967 and 30 months of bloodbath. By the time the war ended in January, 1970 both parties had seen the futility of war. War has never resolved political differences. This is why both government and aggrieved components of the Nigerian federation must at all times explore the dialogue option in the resolution of national issues, no matter how thorny.
It is, however, sad that 40 years after the war, many of the issues that remotely and directly led to the war remain unresolved. For one, the conduct of credible elections remains elusive even in the 2007 polls. Election problems featured prominently in the build up to the Nigerian civil war. The much-talked-about electoral reform has become more imperative for the government of the day.
The unitary government declared by Ironsi contributed to the tension that heralded the civil war. Despite several state creation exercises that followed Gowon's initial 12 states, unitary tendencies still pervade governance at the centre, partly due to long years of military rule in the country.
We believe that as democracy takes firm roots in Nigeria, there can be no excuse for unitary tendencies. For now, there is too much concentration of power at the centre, at the expense of the federating units.
This is why the National Assembly must revisit the issue of constitutional review with a view to enthroning true fiscal federalism in the country. That is the only way to guarantee equity and social justice among the federating units of the Nigerian nation. Unless this is done and quickly too, the war drum that started to beat on July 7, 1967 will continue to echo in places like the Niger Delta.