Ethnic militia has taken the front seat in any contemporary discourse on Nigeria and its emerging democracy. The restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria on 29 May, 1999 also signaled the emergence and continued proliferation of vigilante groups, ethnic and sectional militias as well as secessionist or separatist groups. According to Okechuwu (2003) prominent among these are O’ odua people’s Congress (OPC), formed in 1994 as a militant arm of Afenifere,, a pan- Yoruba group and National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) that were in the forefront of protesting the annulment of the June 12,1993 general elections. The short lived Arewa peoples’ Congress (APC) appears to have been formed to serve as a check on OPC incessant attacks on the Hausa/Fulani population in Lagos and other Yoruba towns.
The Igbo’s peoples Congress (IPC), a militant arm of Ohanaeze Eastern Mandate in response to, OPC and others that frequently vandalize their goods and properties across the country was formed in 1999. Others are the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante outfit set up by Abia and Anambra State government to curb criminal activities in 1999, the Egbesu Boys (1998), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 2000, Tiv Militia 2001, Jukun Militia 2001, Ijaw Militia 1999, Itsekiri Militia 1999, and the Militia arm of movement for the survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP)1992.
The dissatisfaction with the structure, operation and power configuration under Nigeria federalism’ is responsible for the unprecedented emergence of the groups. The increase in crime rate and the helpless attitude of law enforcement agencies towards this have been cited by their founders and admirers to claim legitimacy for these groups.
Agbaje (2002) observed that the activities of these groups have assumed a dysfunctional dimension and threaten the objectives of peaceful co-existence. Their activities have exceeded the limits imposed by societal consensus. These however, have a direct correlation with Nigeria’s tradition of political brinkmanship, involving threats and counter-threats of breakdown of rule-induced and system –supportive behaviour in contexts etched by the tendency of the political elite to prefer fission to fusion, coming apart rather than sticking together, at moments of great national crises.
It is noteworthy that ethnic militia groups and their activities are more pronounced under the present democratic rule than its preceding regimes, especially the military. This might not be unconnected with the relative liberal environment created by democracy and its degree of tolerance. Democracy entails hearing different shades of views and making the best out of those views. But due to lack of proper orientation this liberal democracy posture encourages banditry and has ironically popularized violence as a means of seeking redress and settling old scores. Under the fourth republic there are reported cases of violent clashes between the Hausas and Yoruba’s, between the Hausas and Igbo’s, between ethnic militia groups and government forces and in some cases intra-ethnic clashes. The next section of this chapter will look at the formation and activities of Oodua peoples’ Congress (OPC).
Formation and activities of Oodua people’s Congress
In Nigeria, the practice of ethnic politics has sustained the belief that each of the over 250 ethnic groups must struggle for its own share of national resources. These usually come in the form of recruitment to top positions in government and the distribution of government institutions and social services. At times, certain ethnic groups have threatened to secede from the federation in order to draw attention to their claim to greater share of the national cake (Tanumo, 1970).
Osuntokun (2001) observed that the birth of OPC on 24 August, 1994 was connected with a feeling of alienation which many members of the Yoruba group had been experiencing since 1954, when they were sidelined from the mainstream of Nigerian politics. This feeling was validated and became acute with the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola. The desire to resist further marginalization of the Yoruba inspired Dr. Fredrick fashehun to form the OPC. The persecution and clamp-down on the Yoruba intellectuals and activists by the Abacha regime and the eventual death of Chief M.K.O. Abiola in detention strengthened the case of the Yoruba for self-determination and attracted more and more of their kinsmen into the organization. By March 1999, the OPC had opened about 2,786 branches in different parts of Yorubaland, and large number of people were clamed to have become members, with claims sometimes going as high as 3 million people.
Akinyele (2001) reports that Odua peoples’ Congress membership is open to everybody who is a Yoruba by origin though the would-be member has to validate this by obtaining an application form which is sold for one hundred and fifty naira (N150.00) only. Although members are given identification cards, they also identify one another through sign language and the representation of certain wild animals or insects designed or inscribed on their upper arm. Members are made to swear an oath that enjoins them to work for the progress of Yorubaland at all times and to keep the secrets of the congress. The congress adopted the effigy of Oduduwa, the ancestor or progenitor of the Yoruba people, as its symbol. This effigy is printed on the tee-shirt commonly worn by OPC members. The motto of the Congress is “TIWA NI” which means “It’s our own”. The slogan of OPC is “Oodua ni mi tokan tokan, Oodua ni mi tokan tara” meaning “I am the personification of Oduduwa body and soul”. The OPC anthem, which comments on the marginalisation of the Yoruba and expresses their desire to chart a new course runs as follows:

Ile ya, ile ya o, Omo Oodua, ile ya,
Ti ako ba mo ibi a nre, nje ko ye ka pada sile
Ejawo lapon ti oyo, ka lo gbomi ila kana.
Ile ya, ile o, Omo Oodua ile ya.
Home beckons, children of Oduduwa
Heed the call for a return
If we do not know where we are going,
Shouldn ‘t we return home?
Leave the Apon soup that does not draw
And go for okro.
Home beckons, children of Oduduwa let’s go home (Sunday vanguard, 7 March, 1999 p. 23 and Concord 14 March 1999).
According to its founding president, Dr. Fredrick Fasehun, the OPC was formed to defend and champion the rights of every Yoruba person on the earth. The OPC, however, plays a dual role, for apart from its desire for self-determination also acts and exists as a vigilante group (the week magazine February 18, 2002).
However, with a Yoruba man as president of Nigeria, the OPC has toned down its political role and operates mainly as a vigilante group which eventually has led it into violent conflict and clashes with other groups especially non Yoruba in Yorubaland. These clashes and the militant approaches taken by the OPC between 1999 and 2003 are now examined.
Activities of Oodua people’s Congress
The activities of the OPC began to generate serious concern in September 1998 when the congress called for a boycott of the local government elections scheduled for December of that year. The OPC had no faith in the transition programme of the government headed by General Abdulsalam Abubakar, believing that a return to democracy should be preceded by the restructuring of the federation. This explains the persistence of the OPC’s call for a sovereign National Conference. The stand of OPC on the election brought the members into direct confrontation with the police. This hostility has so far claimed the lives of over 200 policemen and many more members of the congress (Daily Champion, 15 January 2000, p. 34; This Day, 6 March 1999, p. 13 and 16 January 2000, p. 18, The News, 31 January 2000).
The OPC was involve in the ethnic clash that occurred in Sagamu on 17 July, 1999. As a major Kolanut trade center in Yorubaland Sagamu attracted a sizeable number of Hausa settlers. The fighting which broke out there was precipitated by the death of a Hausa woman who was said to have flouted the order restricting women from coming out of their homes during specific hours of the night during the annual Oro festival. The confrontation resulted in the death of about 50 people, while a reprisal attack in Kano on 22 July 1999 claimed over 100 lives. The governors of Ogun and Kano states held several meetings to reconcile the Hausa and Yoruba communities in their states before peace was restored (The News, 31 January 2000).
The event that actually brought the OPC under public scrutiny was the clash of rival factions of dockworkers at the Apapa Port on 9 September 1999. Evidence indicates that the OPC intervened in support of the Yoruba faction to prevent the “annexation” of the Lagos Port by the Ijaw faction that had recently won a trade union election in Port Harcourt. By the end of the fight, 16 people had lost their lives in a gruesome manner. The violence eventually spilled over into neighbouring Ajegunle, inhabited by both Ijaw and Yoruba people. A curfew was imposed on the settlement for about a month before a truce was established, after several meetings between the community leaders and the Governor of Lagos State (The Guardian, 15 September 1999 and The News, 31 January 2000).
The situation was gradually returning to normalcy when the Ketu riot broke out on 26 November 1999. This was a battle for the control of the popular Mile 12 market which pitted Yoruba against Hausa. The OPC was drawn into the riot in which daggers and other lethal weapons were freely used. When an official statement put the death toll at 30, it is widely believed that the real figure was as high as 115 (Saturday Champion, 27 November 1999:5; Sunday Guardian, 16 January 2000: 15). Due to frustration or in desperation, the federal government ordered the police to shoot members of the OPC on sight. Some leaders of the north believed that the government response was not sufficient to guarantee the safety of lives and properties of northerners living in Yorubaland. Hence, the decision to form the Arewa people’s Congress (APC) as a center force to the OPC. The situation was worsened by the report that this rival congress would be launched in Ibadan, the heart of Yorubaland, on 27 December 1999. The rumors of this event prepared the ground for the swift reaction of the OPC to an accident involving a Hausa tanker-driver at the Ojoo junction on 5 January 2000. It was another catastrophe as 10 lives were lost and 30 houses burnt (The News, 31 January 2000).
However, it was a coincidence that on the same day 6 people lost their lives and 12 house were burnt on Akala street, Mushin, in a cleansing operation against suspected armed robbers in Lagos by the OPC. While the police strongly condemned the OPC, the residents of Akala hailed the OPC members as liberators. The weight of public opinion compelled the Lagos State Governor to endorse the action of OPC during his fact finding mission to the area. The stand taken by the governor on the so-called “Akala purge” has sunce gained him a reputation as a patron of the OPC (The News, 31 January 2000, Daily Champion, 24 January 2000 and the Guardian, 16 January 2000).
Another important event shaped the image of OPC publicly as an organization differently seen as either benevolent or dangerous, was the abduction and murder of Mr. Sunday Afolabi, the Divisional police Officer (DPO) for Bariga by suspected members of OPC on 9 January 2000. This incident prompted President Olusegun Obasanjo to impose a blanket ban on all ethnic militias in the country, and he also threatened to impose a State of emergency o Logos Sate if Government Bola Tinubu failed to flush out the OPC from the state. The (then) Inspector General of police, Musiliu Smith, placed a reward of N100,000 on the head of Gani Adams, the leader of the militant youth wing of the OPC. The Arewa people’s Congress (APC) raised the ransom to N300,000 (punch, 30 January 2000). The Northern Senators’ Forum (NSF) called for the removal of General David Jemibewon, the Yoruba minister in charge of Police Affairs, while expressing its support for the imposition of emergency rule in Lagos (Punch, 30 January 2000; Weekend Concord, 29 January 2000). This turn of events led the governors of the Yoruba states of Ogun, Oyo, Osun and Ondo to issue a statement in support of Governor Bola Tinubu on 17 January 2000. Prominent Yoruba traditional leaders-the Obas-as well as the Afenifere organization also warned that they would resist the imposition of emergency rule on any part of Yorubaland, in view of the experience of 1962 (Obafemi Awolowo, 1987).
Akinyele (2001) believed that the incidence involving the OPC in Ilorin in October, 2000 signaled the beginning of violence resulting from divisions created by Ilorin politicians. The OPC, notorious for perpetrating violence since 1998, mobilized its members from parts of South West Nigeria and marched on Ilorin city with the purported aim of dethroning the Emir and installing a “Yoruba Oba” from Afonja descendants. This incident was apparently influenced by some members of Afonja’s descendants located in Ganmo in the outskirts of Ilorin where the invaders converged. The move was also influenced by the fact that the then Governor of Kwara State, Mohammed Lawal, is a direct descendant of Afonja in Ilorin. The police, however, foiled the attempt of the OPC members after killing 6 of them (Punch, 16 October 2000). Sambo (2005) noted that the incidence involving OPC in Ilorin in October 2000 was considered as a transgression by the people of Ilorin who do not entirely see themselves as Yoruba.
Activities of other Similar Groups
Frank Odita (2000) noted that over the years, vigilante groups have emerged in communities and cities across the country. The most prominent ones include the Onitsha Marked Amalgamated Traders’ Association (OMATA) in Anambra State, the Bakassi Boys of Aba in Abia State, the OPC in the South-Western States, the operation Zaki Zaki in most parts of the north-east, and the Egbesu Boys of the Niger Delta. These groups were formed ostensibly to deal with the rising level of crime which the police had failed to curb because it was ill-funded, understaffed, ill equipped, ill trained and ill motivated. The high level of unemployment and social crises that characterized the last years of military rule in Nigeria also led to corresponding increase in violent crimes. The situation degenerated to a point such that the military administrators had to create a special task force comprising members of the armed forces, to fight crime. The military personnel in these special units returned to barracks when the nation returned to democracy, thus leaving the police in a worse situation than before.
Criminals have exploited the lack of preparedness of the police, and citizens have therefore resorted to vigilante groups and ethnic militias who have been credited with a high level of success even though they often act arbitrarily and employ violence. The level of acceptance of these vigilante groups is illustrated by the success story of the Bakassi Boys. The group was formed originally in Aba, Abia State, in 1999. Its success in routing the criminals in that locality encouraged the people of Onitsha, the popular market city in Anambra State, to pressurize their governor in November 1999 to invite the Bakassi Boys to sanitize the town. The invitation resulted in the formation of the Anambra chapter of the group. Later the state House of Assembly passed a law that transformed the group into the Anambra Vigilante Service (AVS) to forestall its proscription by the presidency on the grounds that the group was becoming lawless (Daily Champion, 15 November, 2000).
In neighbouring Imo State, people also watched these developments with keen interest. By April 2000, the State House of Assembly similarly appealed to their governor to invite the Bakassi Boys to rid Imo State of armed robbers. One of the speakers argued that investors were scared of coming to the state because of insecurity of life and property (Punch, 24 November 2001).
Alhaji Wada Nas (2001) observed that, the ineffectiveness of the police constitutes a greater threat to national stability than the existence of the ethnic militias.

Implications
No doubt, we are quite aware that the OPC a pan Yoruba organization is considered a serious threat and the number one enemy of the incumbent civilian administration. Indubitably, the members are also quite aware of the mass arrest and detention as well as the extra-judicial killing of innocent citizens in Lagos and other South Western States in police attempt at curbing the growing influence of the group now held vicariously liable for all crimes committed in Lagos and its environs.
Due to violence allegedly being perpetrated by the OPC members the Federal Authorities threatened to declare a state of emergency in Lagos State. Precisely, President Obasanjo stated in his letter dated January 13, 2000 sent to the Lagos State Government that a “Stronger order” had been given to the Lagos State Police Command “to do everything in its power to seek out, arrest and bring to justice, any lawless and criminal person who parades himself as a member of OPC or any similar body”. Since then thousands of Nigerians resident or visiting Lagos have been subjected to unprecedented brutality in the hands of the special squad of MOPOL. Similarly, in November, 1999, President Obasanjo had ordered the police to shoot OPC members on sight over the bloody clash that occurred at Mile 12 between traders of Hausa and Yoruba extractions. It is interesting to know that there is not a single member of the OPC in the list of 23 persons that were charged to court for murder in respect of the Mile 12 incident (CDHR), 2001).
By implication, the President empowered the men of the Nigerian Police to kill with impunity. Even though it generated widespread condemnations, the President never deemed it fit to revoke the order and since then, the merciless maiming and killing of OPC and non-OPC members have continued.
Other Yoruba-based organizations are not spared as shown in the way the International Press Center (IPC) located along Ijaye Road, Ogba was invaded on January 19, 2000 by armed policemen, who came to arrest the members of the Oodua Liberation Movement (OLM) who had hired the IPC’s conference center for a press briefing. Unfortunately for the policemen, the briefing was over before their arrival and the failure to arrest any of the OLM members led to the arrest of four journalists namely, Wale Adeoye and Tunde Aremu of Punch, Nicholas Nwafor who reports for Tempo and Lekan Otufodurin, the co-ordinator of journalists for Christ, a religious movement for Christian journalists. Other victims include Moses Olabode arrested in Mushin on January 18, Taiwo Otitolaye, the OLM, Deputy National Co-ordinator also arrested in Ogba on January 19. For four hours, Ogba wa under siege as passers-by were brutalized.
The CDHR in 2001 reports that on Sunday, January 23, 2000 Oko- Oba Agege was plunged into chaos when armed policemen invaded the area around 2 00am under the pretence of fishing out OPC member. A house to house raid was conducted and some of those arrested include Adi Olaiya, Jubril Balogun, Suraju Oseni, Ismaila Gbemisola, Alfa Saliu, Morufu, Adiat Afis, Munir Onifade and others who were taken to Elere and Panti police stations. On January 11, properties belonging to Mr. Odukoya, as well as Mr. And Mrs. Soeso were burnt while Adeshola Hospital was vandalized by police in Somolu area of Lagos. While the corpses of those killed and whose families cannot be contacted are left to rot beside the roads, the travails of those arrested continue in the detention center in an attempt to extract “Confessions”. Most of them are held incommunicado. Our investigations (CDHR) have revealed that no less than 2000 suspected OPC members are being detained in different police stations in south western states, out of which over 1500 are languishing behind bars in Lagos and most of them are being held in Adeniji Adele, Panti, Kirikiri, and other detention centers.
More disturbing, however, is the fact that most of those arrested are later paraded as armed robbery suspects, while those taken to court are charged for murder and sundry offences before Magistrate Courts which lack the jurisdiction to try such serious offences. It is pertinent to point out that the new wave of terrorism presents the hostility of the state against the OPC since the formation of the group.
Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that this new wave of state terrorism is not limited to the south west alone. The tale of the Niger Delta region has always been a tale of sorrow and woes. Odi, the second largest town in Bayelsa State was destroyed by Nigerian soldiers drafted to the area to fish out the killers of the twelve policemen who were murdered by some hoodlums, who have since been arrested by the police in circumstances totally unrelated to the dastardly expedition. Thousands of people were killed while all the buildings in the town were burnt and by the time the soldiers were withdrawn and replaced with anti-riot policemen, the town had become desolate. Earlier, Choba, a village in Rivers State was sacked while its women were raped by soldiers who were also drafted to the area to maintain peace, following the class between the town’s youth and Wilbros, a multi-national oil servicing company. Some of the youths who are to contribute to the development and growth of the coastal states like Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Ondo and Delta are languishing and wasting away in different detention centers, while their waterways have been seized by armed personnel on behalf of foreign interests.
However, it should be pointed out here that nearly every body abhors violence in whatever form or manner. But the haste with which the security agents and indeed the federal government hold militant groups such as OPC responsible for any criminal act(s) without investigation calls for a rethink. The danger this portends is that criminally-minded persons in the society will explore the opportunity of the blanket labeling to commit heinous crimes knowing that the searchlight will always be away from them.
Economically, the series of crises and counter attacks from the government is enough to scare away would-be investors especially the foreign ones from the country since they would not be willing to invest their resources in areas without peace. Even the local investors or those already on the ground would want to relocate to areas where they feel their investments are safe or there is relative peace. The long run effects of this is that more people are thrown out of job and they become ready tools for the militant groups as well.
Despite all the poverty eradication or reduction programmes, there is still poverty amidst plenty since the resources are not channeled to programmes that have direct bearing on people’s life like education, heath, job creation, and provision of social amenities both in rural and urban centers. The young who are mostly members of these groups embraced them as a result of frustration.
The religious axis of the society does not fare well either, as those who hold sway here also run after worldly materials at the expense of the Godly work they have chosen to do. Consequently, the youths are not given proper spiritual guidance; the society is at the receiving end, with increase in crime rates and higher negative activities from the various militant groups.
The huge number of people lost as a result of the activities of OPC and other militia groups and the wanton destruction of properties during their different clashes as well as the losses occasioned by the police either accidentally or deliberately in the process of curbing the activities of the militia groups are so grave that they can not be ignored especially the ones perpetrated by the police.
Another implication of the problem that should be a source of national concern is the source of weapons used by the OPC and other ethnic militias. There is ample evidence to show that some of the weapons used in recent communal clashes, and even for armed robberies are from the government armoury (Tell, 22 May 2000). Other weapons seem to have found their way into the country through its porous borders. The involvement of Nigeria in peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone may have encouraged the smuggling of arms into the country. In the case of the OPC, most of the weapons are locally made They include the dreaded Oodua magical stick, axes, and cutlasses of various shapes, and some guns (Akinyele, 2001) An unconfirmed source reveals that the source of supply stretches across the whole of Yorubaland, from remote villages in Ijebuland to the most obscure spot in Oke-Ogun along the border of Nigeria with the Republic of Benin. Although the lines of supply are concealed, it is not inconceivable that some of the guns may have been bought at Awka in Igboland.
However, the quantity and caliber of the guns are inferior to those used in the clashes between the Tiv and the Jukuns and between the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo communities of the Nigeria Delta. If the federal government dose not act promptly to discover the sources of these weapons, the quantity of guns in circulation may encourage organized crime on a much larger scale than it is being witnessed now. The chapter shall now examine ways by which this problem can be managed.
Management
The federal government could adopt three options to curtail or deal with the OPC The first which has been actively canvassed by northerners is the imposition of a blanket ban on all ethnic congresses in the country but the problem here is hoodlums and criminals will have a free day to carry out their nefarious activities since the police are seen as their accomplices.
The second approach is to encourage the different congresses to form an umbrella organization under which they could articulate their demands: A harmonious relationship between these groups would bring peace that would translate to more economic activities, generating more employment and a reduction in criminal activities.
The third approach is to transform the operation and activities of the OPC and the other congresses to make them acceptable to the generality of the people. The transformation should include educating members of the OPC and other congresses, giving them leadership training that will improve the image of the congress, The programme should also include a working relationship with the police to rid the society of hoodlums and criminals.
The Government should stop playing lip service to the development of the Niger Delta. In this regard the OMPADEC and NDDC should be constituted in such a way as to include representatives of mass organizations in the Niger Delta.
The government should stop militarizing the democratic system. The government of Obasanjo should embrace dialogue, instead of deploying soldiers and anti-riot policemen to engage in guerilla- warfare-like operations under the pretext of maintaining law and order.
The federal government should not toy with any idea that will subvert the democratic process let alone implementing it (the idea of declaring state of emergency in areas where criminal offences are perpetrated by armed robbers, hoodlums or the creation of a special police squad for the Niger Delta.) If the Nigerian police is repositioned, motivated, retrained, adequately equipped and given proper orientation, it will be better positioned to curb crimes in the country.
President Olusegun Obasanjo should not be allowed to give shoot-at-sight or shoot-on-sight orders on any group of Nigerians or foreigners since such unconstitutional orders are subject to serious abuse by the security forces who are blood thirsty.
The federal government must be restrained from unleashing violence on innocent citizens for offences allegedly committed by members of the called militant groups.


Conclusion
A people’s committee should be set up to resolve the Police-OPC confrontation and to create a platform for both to work harmoniously for the benefit of the wider society.
The government can discourage the emergence of ethnic militias in Nigeria by the adoptions. Of fair play and equity in the allocation of national resources and positions.
The ethnic congresses should expand their cultural and educational programmes to make them acceptable to Nigerians since they would now be seen to be contributing to the growth and development of the nation.
Finally, in the word of Momoh (2000) none of the leaders of the militia congresses is a warlord in the actual sense of the term; none of the congresses possesses exclusive control over a homeland, such that the federal government does not have access to it, none of the congress controls mineral resources that can attract external intervention especially from western countries, in the event of a dispute with the federal government; and the dominant hold of the minorities on the armed forces makes it extremely difficult for any part of the country to secede.