₦airaland Forum

From the perspective of the Midwest, Ibo-speaking officers and men from the Ika, Asaba and Aboh divisions of the state joined the massive exodus of easterners from other parts of the country. This was in response to the May 29 and July 29 killings and the subsequent call by the Military Governor of the Eastern region, (Lt. Col. C. O. Ojukwu) for all Ibos to return 'home' in the wake of further acts of 'ethnic cleansing' in September 1966. [Subsequently, Ojukwu expelled all non-Ibo Midwesterners from the eastern region, including students.]

Because of the complete breakdown of military discipline and trust occasioned by the widespread killings of Ibos, it became apparent that troops had to return to their regions of origin. For this reason, a regional army structure was approved corresponding to the four regions of the country at that time . The 1st, 2nd , 3rd and 4th area commands were based in the Northern, Western, Eastern and Midwestern regions, respectively. Since the northern region essentially controlled the federal government, northern troops remained in Lagos. This raised two issues:

Whether a mixed regional force ought to control Lagos, as federal capital.
Whether northern troops should remain in the West to protect the northern flank of northern troops in Lagos, who would be cut off from the north, should their colleagues in the West be recalled. On August 9, 1966 the Ad-Hoc Committee had indeed recommended that northern troops be repatriated from Lagos and the West, but Gowon demurred. This led the West to believe that it was "occupied" and became a sore point in West-North relations for quite some time.

In the tense period of political maneuvering leading up to the civil war, the different area commands had different degrees of motivation for and ability to procure arms and ammunition. The 1st area command in Kaduna allegedly had the advantage of simply using federal connections to do this. Excess weapons in Lagos were reportedly moved up north, and certain prominent businessmen are said to have helped to import arms. Northern troops returning from other regions took their weapons along. The 3rd area command in the east made its own arrangements, which (as we now know) were grossly inadequate by the time a decision was made to secede. The 2nd area command in Ibadan was in a difficult position because of the presence of northern troops. Concerned about the lopsided ethnic structure of the 4th area command, and the potential for abuse, the Governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor prevented a private group led by Mr. Yon DaKolo and Lt. Col. Mike Okwechime from importing weapons to Benin. Instead, he asked the federal government to provide the Midwest region with weapons directly, choosing not to do so secretly. Hence a small consignment of weapons was sent to Benin to beef up the 20 odd Mark 4 rifles held by the 300 soldiers there at the time. Three keys to the armory were made. Midwest Ibo officers (Lt. Cols. Conrad Nwawo and Sylvanus Nwajei) held two keys, while Major Sam Ogbemudia (Bini-Edo) ostensibly held the third. Because of this complex arrangement, with Lagos regulating the supply of arms on the one hand, and the absence of any credible attempt to recruit new soldiers locally on the other, the 4th area command was never in a position to independently defend the region or state in a sustained manner from any threat even if all the officers were loyal.

At the September 1966 Constitutional conference for the political future of the country, the Midwest was the only region to support the preservation of a federation with a strong center. This was based at the time on enlightened self-interest, because the leadership feared that the barely three year old oil, cocoa, rubber, timber and port rich region would in all likelihood become a target of hostile intent and domination by its larger, more cohesive, more organized and more powerful neighbors. Midwestern Ibo officers who felt the confederate and even secessionist arrangements proposed by other regions was a better approach opposed this position, hammered out by the Urhobo Governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor, Chief Anthony Enahoro (Ishan-Edo), and a group of non-Ibo intellectuals from the University of Ibadan. Such disagreements over policy reflected deep divisions within the political milieu over which Ejoor presided

Respect

Though 🤷

From January 4-5, 1967 all military leaders of Nigeria met in Aburi, Ghana to resolve Nigeria's dilemma. Thereafter, conflicting versions of what was and was not agreed became the stuff of a propaganda war between Ojukwu and the federal government.

On Jan 14-15, solicitors-general from all over the country met in Benin City to discuss the legal implications of Aburi and review all decrees passed by the Military since Jan 17, 1966. On Jan 17-18, they discussed a draft decree on decentralization.

This was followed on Jan 25 by a an inconclusive meeting (again in Benin City) of senior Nigerian Officers from all regions to discuss the reorganization of the army after the events of 1966. On March 9-10, the Supreme Military Council met (yet again in Benin City) to ratify the decentralization decree.

Ojukwu did not attend, citing security concerns. However, he showed up alone by Helicopter in Benin City on March 12 at which time Ejoor briefed him on the deliberations of the meeting he missed . He still was not pleased.

This decree (No. was issued a few weeks later, practically making Nigeria a confederacy

On April 30, the National Peace Committee met in Benin City to review efforts to resolve the crisis. In the weeks that followed it was pretty clear that Ojukwu was heading toward secession. On May 26, a crucial joint meeting of the chiefs and elders of the Eastern Consultative Assembly was convened in Enugu . It mandated Ojukwu to proclaim the eastern region as an independent republic of Biafra. On May 27, therefore, Gowon preemptively declared a state of emergency and announced the creation of twelve states out of the four regions. The Midwest region became a state with no change in its size or configuration, while the other regions were divided. One of the most significant results of this exercise, was the splitting of the eastern region into three parts, separating (and land locking) the inland Ibo from the oil rich coastal minorities of the Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers provinces.

On May 30, 1967, one year after the infamous "Unification Riots" took place in the then Northern region, 34 year old Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, mandated by the East Regional Consultative Assembly, proclaimed the Republic of Biafra. Tracing a diary of events in 1966, Ojukwu stated (among other things) that: "The widespread nature of the massacre and its periodicity May 29, July 29, and September 29 show first, that they were premeditated and planned, and second that Eastern Nigerians are no longer wanted as equal partners in the Federation of Nigeria." (15)

Based in Lagos, the federal government under 33 year old Major-General Yakubu Cinwa Gowon, did not accept the proclamation. The "northern group of states", having suppressed their own prior instincts for secession, perceived it as an economic threat to its survival and well being. The federal government believed that it had not exhausted alternatives to complete disintegration, even though communication with Ojukwu in particular had broken down. Almost immediately, therefore, steps were taken to bring the situation under control. By June 3, a total naval blockade of the bights of Benin and Biafra (later renamed 'Bonny') had been ordered. Oil tankers and other ships heading for Bonny and Calabar were intercepted and diverted. Ojukwu was formally dismissed from the Nigerian Army on July 1st. The 'police action' land phase of what is now referred to as the Nigerian Civil War subsequently began in earnest at 0530 hrs on July 6, 1967. Troops concentrated at Vanderkya [in Benue State] under the command of Major Martin Adamu opened a barrage of fire in support of an assault on Garkem and Obudu in the Ogoja sector. A few hours' later troops under Major Sule Apollo opened up a second front from Ankpa and Idah toward Enugu Ezike and Okutu in the Nsukka sector.

It turns out that during the Commander-in-Chief's conference on June 7 in Lagos, Lt. Col. David Ejoor (Military Governor) was told that "Midwestern State will be kept free from active operations unless where necessary, but the border between the Eastern States and the Midwest will be completely sealed off."

Oluwole rest


Same Midwest that you attacked in lagos last election because dem resemble omo ibo??

Hypocrisy no kee you

BossGerald:
Oluwole rest


Same Midwest that you attacked in lagos last election because dem resemble omo ibo??

Hypocrisy no kee you

Ewu bastard , who be Yoruba ?

AuschwitzPrefec:
Ewu bastard , who be Yoruba ?

OK oo, what are you? Ijaw man from iragbiji??

Ojukwu the criminal warmonger like Peter girigory Obi father the grandfather of drug lords

THE ASSAULT

At 3 a.m. on Wednesday, August 9, 1967, the fourth anniversary of the democratic creation of the Midwestern region, a motorized rifle brigade consisting of 3000 Biafran soldiers and militiamen, under the command of Lt. Col. ["Brigadier"] Victor Banjo, crossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha into Asaba. The Biafran Invasion of the Midwest had begun. Transported in over 100 trucks and civilian vehicles, this was the nucleus of what eventually was planned to be designated the "101st division", also known as the "Liberation Army of Nigeria" or the "Midwest Expeditionary Force". Upon arrival in the Midwest, they split up into three spearheads, destined to peal off from one another at Agbor. Units fired indiscriminately into the air as they arrived unchallenged at successive tactical objectives. The seizure of the Midwest was essentially accomplished within 12 hours.

The 101st HQ group included Major ('Lt. Col.') Emmanuel Ifeajuna as Chief of Staff and Captain ("Major" Joe Isichie as QuarterMaster General. Much later in the campaign, Lt. ("Major" Fola Oyewole (upon release from prison in Enugu, where he (and Adeleke) had been detained for the January 15 coup) became Isichie's deputy.

The 12th Battalion, under Lt. Col. Festus Akagha, made a dash for Benin City, [the capital]. The 18th battalion under Major Humphrey Chukwuka, headed for Warri, [in the oilrich delta] with Sapele and Ughelli as secondary objectives. The 13th battalion under Lt. Col. Mike Ivenso, swung northwards toward Auchi, with Agenebode (across the Niger from Idah, in Benue State), and Okene (in then Kwara state) as secondary objectives. A detachment was to head for Jebba to destroy the Niger Bridge at that location.

Unknown to Banjo, a unit led by Lt. Col. Ochei (a Midwest Ibo officer), specifically attacked the Government house in Benin, ostensibly ordered by Ojukwu to capture the governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor dead or alive . Fortuitously, Major Ogbemudia (then quarter-master-general) had changed the guard detail at the Government House during the night. Therefore, the soldiers on duty, not being part of the plot to hand-over the state resisted. Ejoor escaped, separated from the rest of his family. Other than some fighting in the Siluko area, this was the only resistance the "Liberation Army" had to face in its initial phase of operations.

The 12th battalion had originally operated in the Ogoja sector before being re-deployed to take part in the Midwest operation It was supposed to have breakfast in Benin City, then proceed speedily toward Ibadan and Lagos on two axes springing from Ore and Okitipupa. The Ore group was to split into two groups, one pushing to Ibadan through Ondo and Ife, while the other was to drive through to Ijebu-Ode on to Lagos. Instead, the 12th battalion stalled in Benin City, while Banjo and Ojukwu argued back and forth for three days about whom to appoint Governor/ Administrator of the Midwest. Ojukwu had apparently initially preferred Lt. Col. Nwawo as the governor But Banjo, eager to avoid creating a restive non-Ibo population, independently and separately approached Lt. Col. David Ejoor (through the Catholic mission), Major Sam Ogbemudia (through an agent) and Lt. Col. Trimnell (a molato officer with ancestral links to Aboh division), in that order The first two declined. Ojukwu turned down the latter, ultimately choosing Major Albert Nwazu Okonkwo, a Midwest Ibo medical officer

After the first of several recalls to Enugu, Banjo returned to Benin City on August 11/12, 1967 to resume the fatally delayed westward thrust of the 12th battalion, which had now been re-designated a brigade.

The whole thingy is a just a dick measurement stuff between Ojukwu and Gowon

illicit:
The whole thingy is a just a dick measurement stuff between Ojukwu and Gowon

Oh really ?

I thought the war was because Igbos were being killed in the north.

Liar.

AuschwitzPrefec:
Oh really ?

I thought the war was because Igbos were being killed in the north.

Liar.

That could have been sorted out at Aburi but ego won't let them

illicit:
That could have been sorted out at Aburi but ego won't let them

Story.

The only reason your useless Ojukwu declared Biafra was because Gowon carved out two states from your parasitic yeast.

You did a coup on Jan 15 to prevent the federal parliament from granting the Ibo weary so-called minorities leave from your Okoro blighted yeast


You later declared Biafra and dragged same Ibo weary minorities into your rogue nation.

Okoro , steer clear from the SS and focus on your five leprous states.

AuschwitzPrefec:
Story.

The only reason your useless Ojukwu declared Biafra was because Gowon carved out two states from your parasitic yeast.

You did a coup on Jan 15 to prevent the federal parliament from granting the Ibo weary so-called minorities leave from your Okoro blighted yeast


You later declared Biafra and dragged same Ibo weary minorities into your rogue nation.

Okoro , steer clear from the SS and focus on your five leprous states.

Guy

I am not Okoro

I am Yoruba

Tribalist much?

U fall my hand bro

illicit:
Guy

I am not Okoro

I am Yoruba

Tribalist much?

You can claim Pygmy Jew all I care.

Okoro

The 18th battalion took Warri without incident. Major Chukwuka released Major Adewale Ademoyega from Warri prison before making his radio broadcast to the people of the Delta (9). Discerning listeners knew that Chukwuka was one of the January 1966 coup plotters in Lagos who had killed Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, a son of Warri, Federal Minister for Finance and arguably the Midwest's most influential politician at that time. Ademoyega had been transferred to Warri from Uyo prison after a fistfight with Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna over the ultimate failure of their coup in Lagos. After expropriating all the Mark IV bolt-action rifles from the Warri Police Station, he headed for Benin City where he assumed training and command (as "Lt. Col.") of a newly conscripted 700 man battalion, based at the Edokpolo Grammar School. This battalion (called the 19th) was to advance in support of the 12th battalion as part of the new 12th brigade. When on August 13, "Lt. Col." Ademoyega relieved "Lt. Col." Ifeajuna as Chief of Staff of the "Liberation Army", Lt. Col. Henry Igboba (Midwest Ibo) took over the 19th battalion. Ifeajuna returned to Enugu as Liaison Officer for the Liberation Army (9).

The 13th battalion under Ivenso secured itself at Auchi and Agenebode, then crossed the border into then Kwara (West-Central) state (now Kogi) in the former northern region. By August 13th, they had captured Okene, Atanai and Iloshi, arbitrarily killing some civilians in the process (17). Their role was to protect the northern flank of the main force while cutting off supply lines to federal troops at Nsukka (8, 15, 19).

At the time of the Biafran Invasion, there had been no "northern" troops in the Midwest. The Nigerian Army 4th Area Command had two battalions organized in nine companies. Two companies were based in Benin, two in Agbor, two in Asaba, and one each in Warri, Auchi and Ekiadolor. It was manned by Midwesterners, under the command of Lt. Col. Conrad Nwawo [the same officer to whom Major Patrick C.K. Nzeogwu (also Midwest Ibo) had surrendered in Jan 1966]. Because several non-Ibo officers remained in Lagos and Kaduna, all but three officers on the ground (Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Majors Ogbemudia and Eremobor) of the rank of Major and above were Midwestern Ibos. Probably 75% or more of the 42 officers were Ibo-speaking. Indeed, in addition to possessing a sizable chunk of the rank and file, among the strategic positions in the Command, Ibo-speaking officers held the following:

Commander, 4th Area Command (Lt. Col. Nwawo)
General Staff Officer 1 (Operations) (Lt. Col. Nwanjei)
Staff Officer (Civil-Military Liaison), Governors Office
Commander, Benin Garrison, including two companies (Lt. Col. Ruddy Trimnell)
Battalion Commander (Lt. Col. Igboba)
Battalion Commander (Lt. Col. Ochei)
Commanding Officer, Depot. (Lt. Col. Keshi)
Officer in charge, Engineers/ Communications (Lt. Col. Okwechime)
Company Commander, Auchi area
Company Commanders, Asaba area (including Major Alabi-Isama)
Company Commanders, Agbor area
Company Commander Warri area
Company Commander, Ekiadolor Unit
Non-Ibos held the following positions:

Quarter Master-General, 4th area command (Major Ogbemudia)
Intelligence Officer (Major Eremobor)

Col. David Ejoor (Military Governor, Midwest), was thus caught between numerous Midwestern Ibo officers (whom he could neither trust nor control) and the federal government (whom they did not trust). Not exactly a stranger to intrigue, Ejoor (as Commander 1st battalion, Enugu), narrowly escaped death (from Majors Anuforo and Ifeajuna) at the Ikoyi Hotel in Lagos, Jan 15,1966. He also slipped out of an attempted kidnap (by Ojukwu) during the burial of Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi at Umuahia on Jan 20, 1967. As noted above, he tried to play a balancing act as a neutral, by declaring that the Midwestern region 'would not become a battlefield'. It was a no win situation.

The Gathering Storm.

As far back as April 6th, 1967 almost two months before the proclamation of secession, special branch police reports had alerted the federal government of certain activities that were to take on significance later (10). Two officers from the eastern region, (Lt. Col. Ude and Major Obioha) were in contact with some of their counterparts in the Midwest to make arrangements for the possible occupation of the Midwest by troops from the Eastern Area Command. The pretext would be that the Midwest was not strong enough to defend itself and that Midwest Ibos needed protection. This occupation was to be coordinated with a simultaneous seizure of the Western region, which (according to the report) was why some individuals (presumably Ojukwu, Awolowo and Adebayo) were advocating that "northern" troops leave that region.

Ude and Obioha apparently met with Lt. Cols. Igboba, Nwawo, Okwechime and Nwajei, along with Major David Odiwo and a civilian hotelier, Joseph Nwababa. Igboba and Nwajei reportedly reconnoitered the Ilusi and Ubiaja areas of the region to determine their suitability as a springboard for operations. This option would have meant bypassing Benin while advancing through Owo to Ibadan. Using the African Continental Bank (ACB), money was allegedly laundered through Nwababa to Military and Police operatives.

[This detailed intelligence report provides another glimpse into the degree of dishonesty in Banjo's relationship with Ojukwu. When Ademoyega was released from Warri prison, Banjo told him that it was he (Banjo) that suggested the Midwest and Lagos moves to Ojukwu, who accepted because of his 'confidence' in him. Obviously, Banjo was unaware that plans for the invasion had been fostered even before Biafra was proclaimed.]

On July 11, a week after "police action" had commenced, Ejoor declared that the state would promptly and resolutely resist any incursion of its territory; unfortunately, signs that an invasion was indeed coming were essentially ignored. The Asaba end of the Niger Bridge was wide open. The federal blockade was not enforced by troops of the 4th area command, none of whom were under the operational control of Ejoor. Trade with the Onitsha market continued unabated. The Asaba Textile Mills, which was dependent on the Afam power station for electricity supply, had its power cut off on July 18th. The crude oil pipeline from Warri to the Port Harcourt refinery was also sabotaged (14). These acts heightened apprehension in the Midwest and raised eyebrows in Lagos. In his book (10), Major General Joe Garba (rtd) describes an irritant in the relationship between certain Midwest officers in Lagos (for example, Captain George Innih) and their northern counterparts during this period. It had to do with demands from the former that the 4th Area Command be given "adequate weapons" to defend the state, rather than rely on "northern" troops. However, in the setting of suspicions about the pro-East tilt of the majority of officers in the Midwest at that time, the federal government was, understandably, not in a hurry to flood the Midwest with weapons which might in all probability simply be handed over to Ojukwu.

A subsequent demonstration of Heavy Weapons at the Benin airport and public statements of assurance from the Commander of the 4th area command (Col. Nwawo) only served to lull the civilian population into a false sense of security. [b]Behind the scenes, other events demonstrated the widening gulf between Ibo and non-Ibo officers. For example, on August 5, a company of soldiers led by Lt. (later Captain & "Major" Igbinosa arrived in Benin from Lagos with orders to escort a consignment of boats (procured by Ejoor from the Delta) to the Bonny sector in the East, where Lt. Col. Adekunle was operating. Igbinosa was promptly turned back by Lt. Col. Nwawo and other Midwest Ibo officers at the Area Command HQ (13). Curiously, in his "Journal of Events" (15), Ojukwu interpreted this event as follows: "Nigerian troops start amassing troops and stockpiling large quantities of arms in the Midwest in preparation for an attack on Biafra." The following day, on August 6, an embarrassed Ejoor (whose neutrality was now in doubt) confronted these same Midwest Ibo army colleagues with newspaper reports about the formation of a "southern solidarity front" to include the East, Midwest and West to the exclusion of the North (14). Not surprisingly, they denied. Interestingly, Ojukwu issued a public warning that day, to Ejoor reminding him of his pledges to keep the region neutral. However, two days later, on the night of August 8, Biafran army uniforms were secretly issued to selected Midwestern Ibos while weapons were withdrawn 'for routine check' from non-Ibo soldiers in the 4th Area Command HQ. The Police wireless station at Asaba closed down (as usual) for the night. The stage was set (14).

Between 3 a.m. when they crossed the Niger Bridge and 7:00 a.m. when the Biafran 12th battalion and 101st divisional HQ group arrived in Benin City, feverish activities took place among key officers of the 4th area command. Those in the know, manipulated and stonewalled their colleagues while rumors spread like wildfire (14). As it were, a group of Midwest Ibo officers had actually been slated to welcome Lt. Col. Banjo at Ikpoba Hill that morning (13).[/b]

Major-General Yakubu Gowon was very concerned about the dynamics of the Midwest before the invasion (12). Recognizing that (by prior agreement) there were no "northern" troops in the Midwest, he (Gowon) took the precaution of quietly creating a new brigade at Okene (in modern day Kogi State). According to Garba (10), a company was also positioned at Ore and may have been the group that put up some resistance at Siluko. All of these soldiers later came under the command of 28 year old Lt. Col . Murtala Ramat Mohammed. Although he was the coup-leader, he ceded leadership to Gowon after the July 29, 1966 counter-coup and was practically a man in search of a mission for some time after that. In a curious twist of fate, the Biafran invasion gave the Kano-born, Hausa-speaking Mohammed an opportunity to return to his ancestral home in Auchi in the Midwest region as a Liberator (17).

Initially, these Okene based troops were being massed in preparation for a possible dash to Agbor through Auchi, in the Midwestern region, to cut off any attempt by the Biafran Army to match on Benin City and on to Lagos (12). According to Ejoor, the nucleus of this unit was the 3rd battalion originally based in Ibadan, which had been transferred to Okene. In Ejoor's opinion (13), the subsequent eastward movement of most of this battalion to provide reinforcement for the Nsukka sector, opened up the flank for Ojukwu's invasion of the Midwest. Events validate Ejoor's perspective, because the 3rd battalion was not in place to stop Ivenso from entering Okene on August 13th.

Clearly monitoring the unstable situation in the Midwest, and looking for a pretext based on real or imagined troop movements, Ojukwu struck on August 9th, fast and with near-total surprise. Near total, because the clouds of imminent invasion were noticed by at least a few others. One Sergeant Major, for example, desperately sought guidance from a few non-Ibo officers to pre-emptily arrest all Midwest Ibo officers. He was quite prepared to do this, he said, as long he had an order to do so. No one was willing to bite the bullet, perhaps for fear it might boomerang. Those were anxious days (17).

By pre-arrangement, the Midwestern Area Command put up no resistance, essentially folding into the Biafran rearguard. Among others, the Officers who were most deeply involved in all of this were Lt. Cols. Mike Okwechime, Igboba, Nwajei, Ochei and Col. Conrad Nwawo. [Nigerian Army Headquarters took the view that these "Nigerian" officers were involved in a coup d'etat against the Midwestern region of Nigeria; this attitude that affected the way those who survived were treated after the war ended in Jan 1970.

The Military Governor, Col. David Ejoor, eventually escaped to Lagos, after an unusual August 11/12 midnight meeting with Lt. Col. Banjo at the Catholic Seminary in Benin City. During this encounter, he apparently declined an offer to serve as Governor and assist in efforts to remove both Gowon and Ojukwu from office and form a new reconciliatory national government in the "Dominion of Southern Nigeria". Lt. Col. Nwajei, 'Major' Alale and an unnamed Biafran 'officer' (possibly Achuzia) apparently witnessed this interesting meeting. Banjo not only apologized to Ejoor for the attack on Government House, but also stated that Ojukwu had told him that Ejoor was fully aware of the plan to seize the Midwest!

On August 13, having decided that the situation was too complicated, Ejoor slipped out of the capital, dressed in a disguise, hitching a ride in a car until he got to the Sakpoba River. From there he reportedly trekked to an Urhobo settlement where he mounted a bicycle, which he says he rode for 80 miles to his mother's village at Ebor-Orogun. He remained in hiding until September 23, when (with Benin and Warri safely back in federal hands), he emerged to rendezvous with Lt. Col. Benjamin Adekunle at Warri, enroute to Lagos by air. After stints as Director of Training and Planning at Supreme Headquarters and Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy, years later, as a Major General, he eventually became the last person to hold the title of 'Chief of Staff, Army'. He was retired in July 1975, at which time the title was changed to 'Chief of Army Staff' .

Banjo not only declared a free and independent Midwest region, but also expressed lack of support for the concept of an independent Biafra, infuriating Ojukwu in the process. On August 11, Lt. Col. Nwawo appealed to all soldiers in the 4th area command to "return to duty". Conceivably, their role was to help garrison the Midwest while the main group of Biafrans proceeded to Lagos. At this point, Major Sam Ogbemudia, (who was subsequently declared wanted and had a bounty placed on his head), explains in his memoirs that he went underground to assist in organizing a resistance movement (14). For those interested in parallels, this was akin to the French or Polish Resistance against Nazi occupation in the forties. Ogbemudia was trained in special warfare techniques at Fort Bragg in the United States, and had also been Chief Instructor (support weapons wing) at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna. Under Major Nzeogwu and Colonel Shodeinde, he taught classes in guerrilla warfare to military trainees.

AuschwitzPrefec:
You can claim Pygmy Jew all I care.

Okoro

Are we going to start measuring dicks too now bro

C'mon

illicit:
Are we going to start measuring dicks too now bro

C'mon

Fck off already

AuschwitzPrefec:
Fck off already

Cum on

THE OCCUPATION

With the announcement of Major Okonkwo's appointment as Military Administrator, Midwest, came the imposition of a dusk to dawn curfew and other measures consistent with martial law. Only individuals with passes could move freely at night. The administrative machinery of the civil service was manipulated to empower those who supported the invasion (or were trusted) rather than the traditional seniority based hierarchy. Mr. Agbajor (an Itsekiri police officer who had escaped from a northern hit squad at Makurdi in September 1966) became Chief of Police. Mr. Esedebe (Midwest Ibo) functioned as Head of Service.

Some military officers then persuaded a number of traditional rulers in the Ibo-speaking areas of the state to sign petitions calling for a merger with their "kith and kin" in the east. Local Governments across the board were mandated to donate materials for transportation to Enugu to assist in the War effort. Salt was rationed because of its presumably more important use as a raw material for explosives. Because of the cutoff of northern sources of cattle, meat became scarce. Shortages of other essential commodities also developed. As might be expected, not everyone was equally affected by the shortages, creating yet another sore point (among many) for ethnic resentment.

Outright molestation, harassment and killing of non-Ibo civilians occurred on a daily basis. At night "suspected saboteurs" were fished out of their homes and arrested. The Hausa community in the Lagos street area of Benin and other parts of the state were targeted for particularly savage treatment, in part a reprisal for the pogroms of 1966, but also out of security concerns that they would naturally harbor sympathies for the regime in Lagos. But non-Hausas were just as badly treated. And as the hostility of the local population became more intense, so did the degree of indiscrete brutality for "internal security". Non-Ibo alumni of St. Patrick's College, Asaba and Government College, Ughelli, found to their chagrin that old school ties meant nothing in the new dispensation

Radio broadcasts "educated" the public about the role of 'gallant' Biafran troops who had only come to liberate them from the "bondage of the feudal Hausa-Fulani oligarchy". An economic cooperation agreement was announced between the 'independent' states of Biafra and the Midwest. The truth, though, was that Ojukwu retained authority to approve all expenditures made by the Okonkwo regime and it was not until September 13th that normal postal, telephone and telegraphic services between Biafra and the Midwest were resumed . Counter-propaganda was indeed launched by federal radio, which appealed to the citizens of the state for loyalty and cooperation.

In this atmosphere, civil resistance and disobedience germinated, predominantly among non-Ibos. But a few Midwest Ibo-speaking soldiers and civilians did become leery about the invasion and felt the 'interference' from "across the Niger" was getting out of hand. On the other side of this opinion divide was the powerful, so-called "Enugu clique", eager to share in the destiny of the corporate Ibo nation. Such ambiguous sensitivities and antipathies within and between "western" and "eastern" Ibos have always existed. Long after the civil war, for example, it even affected negotiations about the creation of a proposed Anioma state .

The Resistance

According to an Army manual, "a resistance movement is the organized element of a disaffected population, which resists a government or occupying power with means varying from passive to violently active. Resistance movements begin to form when dissatisfaction occurs among strongly motivated individuals who cannot further their cause by peaceful and legal means".

Not much has been written about the popular resistance. In their memoirs, Ademoyega and Ejoor make passing reference to it. Much of what we know comes from the written account of Ogbemudia corroborated by oral testimony. For some reason, Alexander Madiebo saw things differently from his position as Commander of the Biafran Army in Enugu, even claiming in his narrative that "Benin was taken early that morning without a single loss of life, amidst frantic jubilation by the entire local population." . One can only wonder about which population he was referring, and the veracity of intelligence reports reaching the East.

Many resistance groups may have operated in the Midwest, but one in particular was organized and very effective. This group was the one formed by Chief Michael A. Ojomo in Benin on August 18th. According to Ogbemudia, "….In a short time, recruitment and training started, and volunteers came in hundreds. Soon afterwards, an effective system of hit and runs was in operation…..By 26th of August, we had assembled a reliable force of about 600 men and 180 women……"

Supportive citizens, who were too old for action, donated their single and double-barrel cartridge guns. Recruits performed armed and armless combat, isolating and capturing Biafran sentries. Night raiders spat salt into the eyes of soldiers, while attractive girls distracted them with sex, obtained intelligence, and even stole their weapons. In a manner reminiscent of the Vietcong in Vietnam, corpses of freedom fighters were recovered at great peril for burial, frustrating the Biafran units who had just engaged them in firefights. In the Siluko area, 50 Biafran soldiers (about half of a company) were drowned by a group of "Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekiri swimmers" who lost 16 men in the fight

At the behest of the resistance, female cooks put all kinds of things in the meals of the Biafran soldiers. Supported by threatening letters written to harass the Biafran command, rumors spread about the risk of poisoning by locals. It is speculated that even the Administrator, Major Okonkwo, stayed away from food cooked by his official cooks, particularly if they were non-Ibo.

But all did not go well indefinitely. Undercover agents were infiltrated into the group and counter-insurgency raids on villages became more frequent and ruthless. Nine of the girls were killed, some in suspicious circumstances. Faced with threats of severe reprisals, extreme caution among the local population became the watchword.

However, by this time, they were encouraged by news of the progress of the federal army. After reorienting the movement to undertake psychological and deception missions in support of the theater commander, Major Ogbemudia himself eventually disengaged from guerrilla warfare activities to return to Army HQ in Lagos. From there, he joined the hastily organized Second Infantry Division of the Nigerian Army making its way to Benin City .

According to Ejoor, similar activities took place in the Delta. Small groups of Biafran soldiers looking for local Hausa communities in the riverine areas, were drowned by local Urhobo swimmers in the treacherous currents of the Ethiope River.

[Oral folk tales claim that even native doctors joined the resistance, using spells and 'juju' to cause unusual ailments among Biafran troops such as massive testicles, clearly an impediment to mobility.

So any one still thinking these Igbos were hapless victims should read every post here .

Endgame

Major Albert Nwazu Okonkwo's title as Military Administrator of the Midwest region was changed to 'Governor' of the "autonomous, independent and sovereign republic of Benin" on Sept 19, 1967. This proved to be the shortest lived republic in history because less than 24 hours later, at 6 p.m. on Sept 20, 1967 Benin City was recaptured by troops of the second division, Nigerian Army. At the head of these troops were Lt. Col. Sam Ogbemudia (in charge of support weapons), Major Adeniran (CO, leading battalion) alongside Major Ike Nwachukwu, under Lt. Col. Alani Akinrinade (CO, 6th brigade), under the overall command of Col. Murtala Mohammed. [Adeniran was no stranger to Benin, having served in the mutinous Ibadan based 4th battalion. In the rumpus after July 29, 1966, a unit from that battalion had raided the Benin prison and abducted some January 15 coup detainees.]

The Benin operation was conducted in a giant pincer movement with motorized infantry and infantry on foot. They were supported by 81mm Mortar and 105mm medium artillery along with Ferret, Fox and Saladin Scout Cars. The main assault group came down from the north through Auchi and Ehor via Ikpoba Hill. This bottle-necked the retreating Biafrans, eager to avoid being trapped against an onslaught from the other group coming from the West through Ore, even as Col. Adekunle's feared 3rd division was simultaneously landing at Warri in the south.

The 2nd division advance toward Benin from Ore in the west had been delayed by the destruction of the Oluwa bridge by retreating elements of the Biafran 12th battalion. Thus, the final assault on Benin was undertaken along three flanks that sprung from Ehor, 56 kilometers north of the city. The right flank swung around westwards through Uhiere to Oluku junction where the Owo-Benin and Ore-Benin roads intersect. The central flank made a direct dash for Benin along the main Auchi-Benin road. The left flank cut through eastwards to Ugonoba (on the Benin-Agbor road) via Eguaholor. They were programmed to then swing westwards to link up with the central flank at Ikpoba Hill for the final push into Benin.

Anticipating the arrival of federal troops and the possibility of street fighting, many civilians in the city had fled to the villages . The 101st HQ had itself been withdrawn to Agbor two days before, on September 18th just as Banjo was being recalled to Enugu ostensibly to assume the position of Chief of Defence Staff. In reality, he and Ojukwu were playing out the last phase of their many cat and mouse games. The decision to move the Liberation Army HQ to Agbor, understandably made in the light of a brutally honest assessment of the military situation, became a major political controversy in Biafra. Banjo (and Ademoyega) were later accused of "abandoning Benin", yielding 40 miles of frontline to the enemy without a fight! On arrival in Benin, federal troops found that the Treasury and Central Bank had been looted of approximately $5.6 million allegedly by retreating Biafran troops.

Other than mop-up operations in small pockets (such as the fierce gun-battle at the Benin Prison) there was no major fighting in Benin once federal troops arrived.

Elements of the Third Marine Division assisted the Second Division in clearing the Delta region from a springboard stretching from South point (Forcados), through Escravos to North point. In an enveloping move designed to cutoff escape and reinforcement routes from Benin to Sapele to Amukpe to Agbor to Asaba, Adekunle (in coordination with Mohammed) took the two bridges along the Benin-Sapele road over the Ethiope River. While this did not prevent escape of stragglers through Sakpoba via Urhonigbe to Agbor, it isolated the Biafran 18th battalion from its divisional headquarters in Benin which had only just been hurriedly moved eastwards to Agbor. Warri, Sapele and Ughelli fell easily.

Those Biafran troops who found themselves cut off, simply abandoned their uniforms and weapons and merged imperceptibly into the rural civilian population, waiting for a chance to escape eastwards.

From a tactical perspective, based not only on terrain, but also the lack of sophistication of the hurriedly trained fighting troops, both sides relied heavily on basic infantry "fire and movement" methods along main roads rather than jungle paths for their advance. At other times, though, the 2nd division employed "Hook" tactics in dense forest maneuvers . Indeed, the Biafran Chief of Staff wandered into the cross hairs of one such ambush, barely escaping alive. Artillery and Mortar support was liberal, using "predicted shoot" techniques. As was the trademark of other Nigerian divisions, fire-discipline was not a priority. Ammunition was expended in great quantities.

Having sprung from Auchi, the attack along three axes out of Ehor used by Mohammed to retake Benin in 1967 was reminiscent of that taken by British Admiral Rawson in 1897. At that time, however, the "punitive" force sprung from Forcados and sailed up the Benin River to Ugharegin (Ogharegi), near Sapele. The assault on Benin was then conducted from the south along three converging axes. The main assault was via Ologbo creek (from Ologbo), with subsidiary assaults via the Jamieson river (from Sakpoba), and Ughoton creek (from Gele Gele).

illicit:
Are we going to start measuring dicks too now bro
C'mon

thats the difference between yoruba christain and muslims.