₦airaland Forum

naptu2: Murtala Muhammed

https://photos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/294088_10150393176507790_803501862_n.jpg

Just before 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 1976, the following curious announcement was heard on Radio Nigeria:

"Good morning fellow Nigerians,

This is Lt. Col. B. Dimka of the Nigerian Army calling.
I bring you good tidings. Murtala Muhammed's deficiency has been detected. His government is now overthrown by the young revolutionaries. All the 19 military governors have no powers over the states they now govern. The states affairs will be run by military brigade commanders until further notice.

All commissioners are sacked, except for the armed forces and police commissioners who will be redeployed.

All senior military officers should remain calm in their respective spots. No divisional commanders will issue orders or instructions until further notice.

Any attempt to foil these plans from any quarters will be met with death.
You are warned, it is all over the 19 states.
Any acts of looting or raids will be death.

Everyone should be calm.
Please stay by your radio for further announcements.
All borders, air and sea ports are closed until further notice.

Curfew is imposed from 6am to 6pm.

Thank you. We are all together."

naptu2: Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa

https://photos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-snc7/320657_10150393263197790_749909217_n.jpg

Just prior to this broadcast, then Head of State, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, along with his ADC (Lt. Akinsehinwa), Orderly and driver, had been assassinated on his way to work in a thin skinned black Mercedes Benz car without escorts. The unprotected car had slowed down at the junction in front of the Federal Secretariat in Ikoyi, Lagos, when a hit team which allegedly included Lt. William Seri and others, casually strolled up and riddled it with bullets.

naptu2: Murtala Muhammed's limousine (National Museum, Onikan, Lagos).

https://photos-b.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-prn1/45175_461908027789_5459037_n.jpg

naptu2: (L-R) Vice Admiral Michael Adelanwa (Chief of Naval Staff), Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters), General Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State & Commander in Chief), Lieutenant General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (Chief of Army Staff), Air Vice Marshall John Yisa Doko (Chief of Air Staff) and Alhaji Muhammed Dikko Yusuf (Inspector General of Police).

https://photos-g.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/310250_10150393346522790_1305962792_n.jpg

On the morning of the 13th of January 1976 General Murtala Ramat Muhammed was assassinated when a hit squad submachine gunned his Mercedes Benz Limousine as it slowed down at the junction of Bank Rd and Ikoyi Rd. Other hit teams simultaneously went after other key functionaries of the regime's troika, namely the Chief of Staff, SHQ, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. T. Y. Danjuma. The Military Governors of Kwara and Oyo States, Colonels Ibrahim Taiwo and David Jemibewon, respectively, were also targeted.

Taiwo, who had been the national coordinator of the July 1975 coup that brought Mohammed to power, was abducted and killed by a team led by Major K. K. Gagara. Jemibewon, whose name had been added to the list of targets by Lt. Col T. K. Adamu, merely because Adamu "did not like his face", escaped.

General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) has written that he was late in leaving home that day on account of a visit by Brigadier Olu Bajowa to get a name for his new baby. When it became apparent that there was trouble, Obasanjo executed an escape and evasion manoeuvre, spent most of the day at the house of a civilian friend in Ikoyi monitoring the situation by telephone, but later emerged to become the Head of State. His would be assassins mistook then Colonel Dumuje for him along Awolowo road in Lagos, seriously wounding that officer.

That morning, General Danjuma followed his usual route at the usual time, 7:30 a.m., which route consisted of leaving his home by car for the Chief of Naval Staff’s Jetty at Queen’s Drive, where he would board a launch which would take him to the Ministry of Defence Jetty at the Marina. From there he would usually walk across the road into his office in Army Headquarters.

On this morning he found Col. Bali and the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Adelanwa, awaiting him at Queens Drive. They rode together to the Marina without incident and reached their offices without any sign of unusual movements.

He was busy reading his newspapers in the office at a few minutes past eight when Col. Bali came in and asked him if he had heard what happened. When he said he had not, Col. Bali then told him that there had been a voice over the radio announcing that there had been a coup. The first thing that General Danjuma asked for was a radio, since he did not usually keep one in his office. A radio was brought in and a number of other officers came in to the office to listen. As soon as he heard the announcement he sent for then Col. Ibrahim Babangida. Ibrahim Babangida and Domkat Bali were two particularly efficient officers who had served with General Danjuma during the war.

General Danjuma told Col. Babangida who was commanding the Recce Squadron to get to Ikeja where his armoured cars were parked and secure his unit as swiftly as he could. As he was about to leave, General Danjuma further suggested to him that he should go on a motorcycle, since the roads were said to be clogged with traffic. This instruction had another tactical advantage in that any of the coup participants looking out for loyal soldiers would hardly have expected to find them on the pillion seats of motorcycles.

After Babangida left, General Danjuma received a phone call from Col. Muhammadu Buhari, the Governor of Bornu State. Col. Buhari was trying to call the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, General Obasanjo, but he had been put on to the wrong office. General Danjuma asked him if he had heard what had happened and he replied that he had not. General Danjuma briefed him on what he had heard on the radio and also told him that he had rung Dodan Barracks and discovered that General Muhammed had not reached his office, even though he had ascertained from General Muhammed’s wife that he had left home. Col. Buhari’s only comment was “I hope they haven’t killed him”. General Danjuma instructed him to contact the Brigade Commander in his area immediately and secure loyalty there and make sure that no one left the barracks in the town.

The next phone call that came into his office was from General Bisalla. He asked General Danjuma if he had heard what had happened. General Danjuma said that he had heard, but that all would soon be under control. General Bisalla simply hung up the phone. It was later learnt that on replacing the phone he turned to a top civil servant who was standing next to him and commented, “So this is how people ruin one’s career”. His office was just above General Danjuma’s in the Ministry of Defence Building.
Immediately after this call, General Danjuma, on the advice of Colonel Bali, moved his headquarters to Bonny Camp.

Colonel Babangida got to Ikeja Cantonment and secured his armoured vehicles. Supported by these vehicles he proceeded to Radio Nigeria, where he had a conversation with his close friend Dimka. Dimka's initial reaction to Babangida's arrival was to ask him if he came to play "Chukwuma and Nwawo" with him; drawing a historical parallel with the negotiations between Colonel Conrad Nwawo (on behalf of Ironsi) and Major Patrick Nzeogwu in Kaduna in January 1966. However, Dimka got concerned with the presence of armored vehicles in the background and asked them to be withdrawn.

But it turns out that Babangida's orders had not been to negotiate a surrender or other outcome, but to stop the broadcast - by any means necessary - including destruction by shelling. When he made contact with Bonny Camp to report his activities at the radio station, this order was reiterated to him by General Danjuma, incredulous that a conversation with Dimka had even occurred and that the radio station was still playing Dimka's broadcast. A brief but fierce fire fight (reportedly led by Major Chris Ugokwe) subsequently dislodged the coup plotters from the station.

When shooting started Dimka simply walked away, past all the soldiers surrounding the building as well as driving through numerous checkpoints on his way, first to Jos and then eventually to Abakaliki where he was captured by Police in the company of a woman of easy virtue.

[size=14pt]NIGERIA: STUDENT RANSACK BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION DURING DEMONSTRATION AGAINST ASSASSINS OF FORMER HEAD OF STATE GENERAL MUHAMMED, WHILE MEMORIAL SERVICE HELD FOR DEAD LEADER.[/size]

27 February 1976

Story

Rioting students, demonstrating over the death of former Nigerian Head of State, General Murtala Muhammed, ransacked the British High Commission in Lagos on Tuesday (17 February).

The students, calling for a full investigation into the attempted coup in which General Muhammed was killed, were eventually driven from the building by Police using tear gas. But first the hundreds of students smashed windows and ransacked the Reuter news agency office in the building.

The attack came after a visit to the High Commission by Lieutenant-Colonel B.S. Dimka, leader of the coup, who tried to have a message relayed to another former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, who lives in Britain.

The students carried banners and called for the extradition of General Gowon to Nigeria to face changes that the helped plan the coup.

Britain claimed compensation for damage to the building, but later withdrew the claim.

The Nigerian government issued a statement saying that the coup, on 13 February, was aimed at restoring General Gowon to power.

Most of the armed forces remained loyal to the government and quickly crushed the rebellion.

General Gowon was ousted by General Muhammed in July, 1975, while he was in Uganda for an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Conference.

General Muhammed, who was 37, was buried at his home town of Kano, in Northern Nigeria 36 hours after his assassination in Lagos.

At the end of seven days of mourning on Friday (20 February) memorial services for the late General were held in Christian churches and mosques throughout the country.

1.

GV Cathedral with security guards outside

0.13

2.

SV New leader entering cathedral for memorial service

0.32

3.

GV Mosque with military leaders leaving service

0.53

4.

GV Demonstrators through streets

1.15

5.

CU Placards and banners 'No room for traitors in Nigeria' and 'Cia go home -- you killed Muhammed'

1.26

5.

GV & CU British High Commission being repaired after demonstrators had broken windows (4 shots)

1.50

http://elombah.com/index.php/special-reports/15409-dimka-s-coup-obasanjo-danjuma-are-cowards-uk-high-commissioner

The UK High Commission said it had great difficulty locating M.D. Yusufu, inspector general of police and one of the top six members of the Muhammed government, finally tracking him down shortly after noon "hiding” at his home. Yusufu's behaviour that Friday matched that of Murtalla Mohammed’s second in command, Olusegun Obasanjo, and

army chief -of-staff, Theophilus Danjuma and MEA commissioner Garba, which he characterized as "gutless." ---------1976 US DIPLOMATIC CABLES - RELEASED THIS WEEK BY WIKILEAKS AND DISCOVERED BY ELOMBAH.COM.

Dimka's Visit To Uk High Commissioner

1. Lt. Col. B.S. dimka, the reported assassin of murtala muhammed, called on UK high commissioner Sir Martin Lequesne February 13 1976, about an hour after the late nigerian head of state was killed. Given below (paragraph 5 and following) is the verbatim text of the report of the conversation as submitted by lequesne to the fco. Lequesne gave me a copy of the report this morning.

2. Immediately after dictating the report friday morning, lequesne arranged for a copy of it to be taken urgently to m.d. ysufu, inspector general of police and one of the top six members of the muhammed government. The high commission had great difficulty locating yusufu, finally tracking him down shortly after noon "hiding " at his home. Le quesne told me this morning that yusufu's behavior on friday matched that of obasanjo, army chief-of-staff danjuma and mea commissioner garba, which he characterized as "gutless."

3. When finally located at mid-day friday, yusufu seemed resigned to whatever might happen to him, refusing a high commission offer to move him out of his house to a safe location "where he might be able to regroup his colleagues."

As for the behaviour of the other three, lequesne says he has been reliably informed that they "ran home" and changed into civilian clothes as soon as they heard the dimka broadcast. Garba was not heard from for the rest of the day.

Obasanjo made no appearance until mid-afternoon and chances for the counter-coup appeared good.

As for danjuma, he went to the bonny camp on victoria island around midday to rally loyalist military forces but was so unnerved and out-of-control that his principal staff officer col. Isama, had to take charge.

It was isama who persuaded the others that the operation to retake the radio station should be surgical and careful so as not to injure civilian technicians and equipment that would be needed if the attack were successful.

Danjuma had reportedly instructed that the station be "smashed down" with armored cars and heavy guns. It was isama who led the counterattack on radio station in the early afternoon.

(comment: this does not jibe with information from embassy's dao that attack on radio station was led by col. Ibrahim babangida, director of armor of the nigerian army. Dao saw babangida leading his armor past embassy chancery on way to station. Force consisted of three british scorpion tanks, two french ferret armored cars, three panhard armored cars with ninety millimeter guns, and three truck loads of infantry totalling about 100 men.)

4. Readers will note dimka's statement to lequesne to the effect that obasanjo had been killed. This corroborates indications we have received from other sources to the effect that he was indeed one of the targets of dimka's operation. We and the british surmise that col. Dumuja, who was shot in his mercedes automobile friday morning while proceeding along the same route to dodan barracks nromally followed by obasanjo, was mistaken for obasanjo.

5. Following is the text of Lequesne's memorandum to the FCO.

Quote:

1. At about 9:10 a.m. on 13 february the head of changery informed me that colonel dimka had come to the high commission and wished to see me. I went out to meet him. Three armed soldiers were in the outer waiting-room and colonel dimka, unarmed and without his cap, was in the inner waitng-room. I brought him into my room. He showed no particular sense of urgency or hurry at any stage in our conversation. The head of chancery was present throughout.

2.colonel dimka started by saying that he had taken control of the government and had come to ask me to transmit a message urgently to general gowon that he should come to togo. Generals muhammed and obasanjo had to his regret been killed "resisting arrest." i asked what had happened to general danjuma. Colonel dimka said that he had not yet been found. When he was it would depend on him. Colonel dimka indicated clearly that he meant by this that if general danjuma opposed the new "government" he too would be killed.

3. I asked colonel kimka why he had taken this step. His reply was far from clear. He said that under general muhammed the country was going communist, which was “contrary to our constitution" and to what the country wanted. "we" wanted to change the policy and get back to real non-alignment. The present situation was one-sided. A parti- cular group had been running the country in its own way. Genrral muhammed had accepted a bribe of twenty five million pounds from the russians.

4. He criticised the recent promotions to general rank which had ignored the established tradition of promotion. General dajnuma was not the best officer in the army. He had neglected the other ranks.

Many people had been sacked for corruption while others who had been equally corrupt continued to occupy high places. Those who had been corrupt would be dealt with by legal means. He implied that some of those recently dismissed would be reinstated though he denied, in reply to my euestion, that it was his intention to recall them all.


5. A lot of charges were needed at home. The present government had done noting but carry out probes. The military governors were being directed from lagos and had no opportunity to exercise individual initiative. "we" intend to draw a straight line under the past and get the country right again from its basic foundations. "none of us is interested in political appointments. We want someone to come in and reconcile the bad feelings." that is why general gowon should come back. There may have been a need for general gowon 's leadership to be changed, but he should have been given a chance to do this.

6. I told colonel dimka that, as a diplomatic representative it would be improper for me to play any part in nigerian domestic poli- tics. To send a message to general gowon as he requested would be to do just this. I could not therefore do what he wanted. Colonel dimka accepted this without demur and immediately changed his tack and said that what he wanted was that i should report what he had said to my government. I said that i would of course do this.

7. I asked colonel dimka who his colleagues were to whom he referred throughout as "we". His reply was again imprecise. He said "we are the young revolutionaries." he was the most senior officer in the group the others were majors. They had acted because the other ranks were waiting for a bloody rising. The coup in 1966 had been started by the other ranks.

8. I asked what support he had in the country. He said airily that there had been moves in ibadan, kaduna, kano and jos - but it struck me as he spoke that his reply was more an enumeration of the major cities outside lagos than the statement of a man who actually knew what was being done in these places.

9. I told colonel dimka that i found some contradiction between his claim to be a leader of young revolutionaries and his criticism of the government for a left-ward trend. He gave a rather vague reply to the effect that he and his colleagues wanted changes.

10. Our conversation ended at about 0945. I accompanied colonel dkmka outside to the waiting-room, and then to the top of the stairs. He said that he would return later to see me again. He did not.

11. I arranged for a copy of the telegram which i sent to london reporting this conversation to be shown to the inspector gen- eral of police later in the morning.

12. Colonel dimka was throughout calm and apparently under no feeling of urgency. I judged that the vagueness and incoherence of most of what he said was due not to any stress but to the fact that his ideas were indeed incoherent and unformulated. Even had he seriously wanted me to send a message to general gowon it was incredible that, having, as he claimed, just taken over the responsibility of government, he should take the time himself to come down to hajola house to make the request. But in fact he dropped his request without argument when i said i could not comply with it. There was something almost frivolous about the whole business and he left me with no impression that he was acting in accordance with any predetermined plan.

Now, let's take a look at some passages from the telegram.

1

"hiding " at his home

The High Commissioner said that they had to search for Yusuf and that he was hiding at his home. Wouldn't his house be an obvious place to look for him? Therefore how come the High Commission had a difficult time "finding him"? If he was indeed hiding, wouldn't his home be an obvious place for the coupist to find him? So, if he was cowardly and hiding, why would he be hiding at his home?

3. When finally located at mid-day friday, yusufu seemed resigned to whatever might happen to him, refusing a high commission offer to move him out of his house to a safe location "where he might be able to regroup his colleagues."

If Yusuf was cowardly, gutless and hiding, wouldn't he have taken up the British offer to move him to a safe location (which the coup plotters would not know about) rather than staying at his home (which would be an obvious target for the coupists)?

he has been reliably informed that they "ran home" and changed into civilian clothes as soon as they heard the dimka broadcast. Garba was not heard from for the rest of the day.

Reliably informed by whom and how do we judge the reliability of the informant?

As for danjuma, he went to the bonny camp on victoria island around midday to rally loyalist military forces but was so unnerved and out-of-control that his principal staff officer col. Isama, had to take charge.

Once again, what's the source off this information and how do we judge the reliability of the source?

drnoel: now this is part of our history, for our children learn in schools. 1000 likes.
Pls post more videos, clips or stuff u can find not just on this topic but on our history....

GenBuhari: where is the confession.

How do we know that that clip was him confessing?

naptu2: Yes. The military rule about coups. . . .MAKE SURE YOU SUCCEED!

Success = government position. Failure = death (or if you are lucky, imprisonment).

(Most people knew this rule back in the days of military rule. Even Babangida quoted this rule when he was head of state. It is an unwritten rule).

naptu2: I forgot to ask you, is Danjuma "core north" and "muslim"?

SLIDE waxie: Is it dt old coup or a new one?
Cos i dnt get it, who wants to hear?

U jes wanna trigger another tribal war again. Whichever sha, count me in!

naptu2: 1) So, who are "his people"?

2) He's who's foot soldier? (Please be specific and provide names of the individuals).

3) I see you didn't say anything about Ifeajuna/Nzeogwu who also killed a head of government and other leaders, but were not executed.

4) You earlier alluded to the fact that Danjuma wasn't executed and you seemed to suggest that this was because he was a "core northerner" and "muslim", but I see you've now shifted your position Why did you shift your position?

5) Lastly, how many coups have been led by officers from "the core north"?