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Abstract

Pearl Harbor…The Pearl Harbor Was U.S. Naval Base On Oahu Island, Hawaii, Where The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service Launched A Surprise Attack Against The United States Naval Base, Hawaii Territory on 7 December 1941. Remembering Pearl Harbor Attack Brings To Mind The Incidence That Occurred Between Japan And The United States. In The History Of America, The Incidence Is Still As If It Was Yesterday; Still Glaring Even After 77 Solid Years So. This Article Will Focus On The Entire Scope of The Pearl Harbor Experience.

Pearl Harbor Incidence-A Historical Event of 77 Solid Years

Where Is Pearl Harbor Located?

Pearl Harbor is a lagoon harbor on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, west of Honolulu. It has been long visited by the Naval fleet of the United States before it was acquired from the Hawaiian Kingdom by the U.S. with the signing of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875. Much of the harbor and surrounding lands is now a United States Navy deep-water naval base. It is also the headquarters of the United States Pacific Fleet. The U.S. government first obtained exclusive use of the inlet and the right to maintain a repair and coaling station for ships here in 1887. The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Empire of Japan on December 7, 1941, was the immediate cause of the United States’ entry into World War II

Preliminary Of The War

The United States had disengaged all economic relations with Japan by mid-1941 and was at the same time providing material and financial help to China. Japan had been at loggerhead with China since 1937, and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 secured that the Soviets were no longer a threat to the Japanese on the Asian mainland. The Japanese were tactical and strategic about weakening U.S. Naval strength, so they believed that once the U.S. Pacific Fleet was neutralized, all of Southeast Asia would be open for conquest.

However, American foreign policy in the Pacific had more to do with the U.S. support for China in the late 1930s, and Japan’s aggression against China therefore necessarily would bring Japan into serious conflict with the United States. As early as 1931, the government of Tokyo had stretched its tentacles of control over Manchuria the Chinese province, and the Japanese had a concrete hold on the region with the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo the following year. A clash at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing on July 7, 1937, hinted the dawn of open arms struggle between Japan and the United Front of Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party. In response, the United States government extended its first loan to China in 1938.

More so, in July 1939 the U.S. made a declaration of bringing to an end the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 with Japan. Starting in the summer of 1940, the U.S. began to barricade the export to Japan of materials that were useful in war. Between June 1940 and the day of the crisis of December 1941, there was an upsurged tension constantly mounted between the belligerents. In July 1941, the Japanese had already occupied all of Indochina and had covenanted an alliance with the Axis powers (Germany and Italy). At this time, the U.S. government cut off or disengaged all commercial and financial relations with Japan. Japanese assets were brought to a standstill, and an embargo was placed on shipments to Japan of petroleum and other crucial war materials needed to sustain them. Militarists were steadily gaining dominion in the Tokyo government; they bitterly kicked against U.S. aid to China, which by this time had been fired up. They saw in the German invasion of the Soviet Union an unrivaled or unopposed opportunity to go after a policy of aggression (war tendencies) in the Far East without danger of an attack upon their rear by the forces of the Red Army (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic). In spite that, negotiations looking forward to finding some kind of understanding between the two belligerents (the United States and Japan) happened in the duration the autumn of 1941, and it became extremely visible by the end of November that no agreement or compromise was attainable.

Moreover, Japan, despite their readiness to take action, continued to negotiate with the United States up to the D-day of the Pearl Harbor attack, the government of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki made a final decision on war. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the commander-in-chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, had meticulously organized the attack against the U.S. Pacific Fleet with great care. Once the U.S. fleet was out disabled, the way for the unhindered Japanese conquest of all of Southeast Asia and the Indonesian archipelago would be paved. The order for the assault was given on November 5, 1941, and on November 16 the task force began its assignation in the Kuril Islands. Commanders were allocated instructions that the fleet might be recalled or retrieved, however, in case of a favorable result of the response of the negotiations in Washington, D.C. On November 26, Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi led a fleet including 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, and 11 destroyers to a point some 275 miles (440 km) north of Hawaii. From there about 360 planes in total were launched.

Warnings
The U.S. Pacific Fleet had been situated at Pearl Harbor since April 1940. To add to this, nearly 100 naval vessels, 8 battleships inclusive, were substantial military and air forces. As the tension mounted, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, who was also in command at Pearl Harbor, were warned of the outcome and the possibility of war, specifically on October 16 and also on November 24 and 27. The notification of November 27, to Kimmel, began thus; “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning,” went further to say that “negotiations have ceased,” and directed the admiral to “execute an appropriate defensive deployment.” Kimmel also was given orders to “undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.” The communication of the same day to Short stated that “hostile action is possible at any moment” and, like its naval counterpart, urged “measures of reconnaissance.”

Responses
In response to the several warnings, the strategies taken by the army and navy commanders were inadequate. Short ordered an alert against sabotage and concentrated most of his fighter planes at the base on Wheeler Field in an effort to avoid damage to them. He also allocated orders to operate five of the mobile radar sets that had been configured on the island from the hour of 4:00 AM to 7:00 AM, were considered to be the most dangerous period. And as such, Radar training, however, was in a far-from-advanced stage.

Furthermore, Admiral Kimmel, despite the fact that his intelligence had not been able to hit the right spot of substantial elements in the Japanese fleet—especially the first-line ships in carrier divisions 1 and 2—did not extend his reconnaissance activities to the northwest, the logical point for an attack. He fast-forwarded the whole fleet (except that part which was at sea) in the harbor and granted a part of his personnel to go on shore leave. Neither of these officers suspected that the base at Pearl Harbor would itself be subjected or vulnerable to attack. Nor, for that matter, is there any signal that their superiors in Washington D.C. were in any way conscious or alert of the coming danger. In the 10 days amidst the war warning of November 27 and the Japanese attack itself, no additional action was taken by Washington.

To be sure, in the early hours of Sunday on December 7, Washington had knowledge of the fact that the Japanese ambassadors had been told to ask for an interview with the secretary of state at 1:00 PM (7:30 AM Pearl Harbor time). This was a lucid indication that war was in anticipation or at the corner. The message took some time to be decoded, and it was not in the hands of the chief of naval operations until about 10:30. It was delivered to the War Department between 9:00 and 10:00 AM. Gen. George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army chief of staff, was out horseback riding and did not see the dispatch until he arrived at his office about 11:15 AM. The chief of naval operations, Adm. Harold Stark, even then did not think that the communication called for any additional instructions to Kimmel. However, Marshall decided to send a new warning and gave orders to the military command to have a dialogue with the navy. He did not make any call on the telephone, fearing that his words might be obstructed, and instead resorted to sending his dispatch by telegram. There was a mix-up or confusion in communication, and because of that, the warning did not reach Hawaii until after the attack had begun. It is of a necessity to observe that it had not been filed until noon, only an hour before the Japanese planes unleashed on the base.

At Pearl Harbor itself, there were incidents that if properly interpreted, would have given a snippet information concerning the warning. Four hours before the decisive moment (taking a stand), a Japanese submarine was seen by the minesweeper, USS Condor. About two and a half hours later, the commander of the destroyer USS Ward sent a message saying that he “had attacked, fired upon, and unleashed depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area” near Pearl Harbor. While Kimmel waited patiently for confirmation and approval of this report, the Japanese opened hostilities. In these same morning hours, U.S. Army Pvt. George Elliott, practicing on the radar set after its normal closing time, noticed a gigantic flight of planes on the screen. When he telephoned his lieutenant, he was told to ignore the observation or take it lightly, as a flight of B-17 bombers from the United States was expected at that time. Once again an opportunity was missed.

The Attack On Pearl Harbor

On November 26, 1941, the Japanese Striking Force (task force) of six aircraft carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku—left Hittokapu Bay on Kasatka (currently Iterup) Island in the Kurile Islands, during the course of the journey, to a position northwest of Hawaii, with the intention to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for the two attack waves and 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), with nine fighters from the first wave inclusive.

The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to combat carriers as its first objective and cruisers as its second, with battleships as the third target. The first wave carried or had most of the ammunition to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes which were built by default to act as an anti-roll mechanism and a rudder extension that allowed them to take action effectively in shallow waters. The aircrews were commanded to select targets with the highest value ( which were battleships and aircraft carriers) or if these were not in place, any other high-value ships (cruisers and destroyers). Dive bombers in the First Wave were to attack or combat ground targets. Fighters were ordered to attack repeatedly and consistently, and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to make sure they did not get into the air to interrupt the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters’ fuel started to finish or reduced they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and get back to the combat scene. Fighters who were to serve CAP duties where needed, and of importance, especially over U.S. airfields...CONTINUE at [https://www.siaglobe.com/pearl-harbor/]

japan cleared their doubt that year oooo..... one of the few war movies that really got me hard is "Pearl Harbour"

You right, Japan hit the U.S. right in the heart @Justflow!

justflow1:
japan cleared their doubt that year oooo..... one of the few war movies that really got me hard is "Pearl Harbour"

there is also one Hacksaw Ridge... about a seventh day Adventist medical solduer who wouldn't want to use a gun...

If war technology was that vast and sophisticated 77 years ago only God know what will be available now.
I am pretty sure we can't have a third world war cos that means the human race will just go into extinction.

Also, from the story read, I can deduce that the Americans have this unpleasant ego and overconfidence. Thanks to the Japs that reawaken them to the reality of life.

To sum this up, Francis Fukuyama made this clear in his book, "History and the Lastman", that any entanglement to trigger ww3, the war will be fought with sticks and stones!

bodee:
there is also one Hacksaw Ridge... about a seventh day Adventist medical solduer who wouldn't want to use a gun...

If war technology was that vast and sophisticated 77 years ago only God know what will be available now.
I am pretty sure we can't have a third world war cos that means the human race will just go into extinction.

Also, from the story read, I can deduce that the Americans have this unpleasant ego and overconfidence. Thanks to the Japs that reawaken them to the reality of life.

yea i have watched hacksaw ridge the para medic guy was bullied in camp for acting maverick, he amazingly saved the lives of close to 70priavtes and some of his bullies and bosses with a rifle, that movie is very inspirational,

the japs were so confidential of there readiness, they caught the americans unaware at pearl harbour, one of the waterloos of america till date, they cannot forget that war with ease
but truth be told, if the japs wage a war or ignite something of that nature, the japs will be surprise as to what they will get this time around,

have you watch "Saving private Ryan1999" (looks like u do war movies alot)