AuschwitzPrefec's Posts
Nairaland Forum › AuschwitzPrefec's Profile › AuschwitzPrefec's Posts
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ... 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 (of 53 pages)
SmartPolician:Okoro, the silence that greeted the VAT ruling secured by Lagos and Rivers from your yeast tells us all we need to know about your parasitic position. Since independence your leaders never hid their parasitism on others . Restructuring has commenced and we understand there must be a weaning period for you parasites so it will be done in gradual stages. |
A subsequent demonstration of Heavy Weapons at the Benin airport and public statements of assurance from the Commander of the 4th area command (Col. Nwawo) only served to lull the civilian population into a false sense of security. [b]Behind the scenes, other events demonstrated the widening gulf between Ibo and non-Ibo officers. For example, on August 5, a company of soldiers led by Lt. (later Captain & "Major" Igbinosa arrived in Benin from Lagos with orders to escort a consignment of boats (procured by Ejoor from the Delta) to the Bonny sector in the East, where Lt. Col. Adekunle was operating. Igbinosa was promptly turned back by Lt. Col. Nwawo and other Midwest Ibo officers at the Area Command HQ (13). Curiously, in his "Journal of Events" (15), Ojukwu interpreted this event as follows: "Nigerian troops start amassing troops and stockpiling large quantities of arms in the Midwest in preparation for an attack on Biafra." The following day, on August 6, an embarrassed Ejoor (whose neutrality was now in doubt) confronted these same Midwest Ibo army colleagues with newspaper reports about the formation of a "southern solidarity front" to include the East, Midwest and West to the exclusion of the North (14). Not surprisingly, they denied. Interestingly, Ojukwu issued a public warning that day, to Ejoor reminding him of his pledges to keep the region neutral. However, two days later, on the night of August 8, Biafran army uniforms were secretly issued to selected Midwestern Ibos while weapons were withdrawn 'for routine check' from non-Ibo soldiers in the 4th Area Command HQ. The Police wireless station at Asaba closed down (as usual) for the night. The stage was set (14).Between 3 a.m. when they crossed the Niger Bridge and 7:00 a.m. when the Biafran 12th battalion and 101st divisional HQ group arrived in Benin City, feverish activities took place among key officers of the 4th area command. Those in the know, manipulated and stonewalled their colleagues while rumors spread like wildfire (14). As it were, a group of Midwest Ibo officers had actually been slated to welcome Lt. Col. Banjo at Ikpoba Hill that morning (13).[/b] |
ElSudani:Okoro will oppose no doubt . If you say Nigeria is too small what of your proposed dot nation ? Pig. |
SmartPolician:Only the SS and SW hold this position. The SE will forever oppose restructuring as they are not in anyway capable of self sustaining themselves without parasitic leaching from the federal govt. A powerful central govt is beneficial to the SE most than any other people outside the Fulani rent seeking class . |
The Gathering Storm. As far back as April 6th, 1967 almost two months before the proclamation of secession, special branch police reports had alerted the federal government of certain activities that were to take on significance later (10). Two officers from the eastern region, (Lt. Col. Ude and Major Obioha) were in contact with some of their counterparts in the Midwest to make arrangements for the possible occupation of the Midwest by troops from the Eastern Area Command. The pretext would be that the Midwest was not strong enough to defend itself and that Midwest Ibos needed protection. This occupation was to be coordinated with a simultaneous seizure of the Western region, which (according to the report) was why some individuals (presumably Ojukwu, Awolowo and Adebayo) were advocating that "northern" troops leave that region. Ude and Obioha apparently met with Lt. Cols. Igboba, Nwawo, Okwechime and Nwajei, along with Major David Odiwo and a civilian hotelier, Joseph Nwababa. Igboba and Nwajei reportedly reconnoitered the Ilusi and Ubiaja areas of the region to determine their suitability as a springboard for operations. This option would have meant bypassing Benin while advancing through Owo to Ibadan. Using the African Continental Bank (ACB), money was allegedly laundered through Nwababa to Military and Police operatives. [This detailed intelligence report provides another glimpse into the degree of dishonesty in Banjo's relationship with Ojukwu. When Ademoyega was released from Warri prison, Banjo told him that it was he (Banjo) that suggested the Midwest and Lagos moves to Ojukwu, who accepted because of his 'confidence' in him. Obviously, Banjo was unaware that plans for the invasion had been fostered even before Biafra was proclaimed.] On July 11, a week after "police action" had commenced, Ejoor declared that the state would promptly and resolutely resist any incursion of its territory; unfortunately, signs that an invasion was indeed coming were essentially ignored. The Asaba end of the Niger Bridge was wide open. The federal blockade was not enforced by troops of the 4th area command, none of whom were under the operational control of Ejoor. Trade with the Onitsha market continued unabated. The Asaba Textile Mills, which was dependent on the Afam power station for electricity supply, had its power cut off on July 18th. The crude oil pipeline from Warri to the Port Harcourt refinery was also sabotaged (14). These acts heightened apprehension in the Midwest and raised eyebrows in Lagos. In his book (10), Major General Joe Garba (rtd) describes an irritant in the relationship between certain Midwest officers in Lagos (for example, Captain George Innih) and their northern counterparts during this period. It had to do with demands from the former that the 4th Area Command be given "adequate weapons" to defend the state, rather than rely on "northern" troops. However, in the setting of suspicions about the pro-East tilt of the majority of officers in the Midwest at that time, the federal government was, understandably, not in a hurry to flood the Midwest with weapons which might in all probability simply be handed over to Ojukwu. |
At the time of the Biafran Invasion, there had been no "northern" troops in the Midwest. The Nigerian Army 4th Area Command had two battalions organized in nine companies. Two companies were based in Benin, two in Agbor, two in Asaba, and one each in Warri, Auchi and Ekiadolor. It was manned by Midwesterners, under the command of Lt. Col. Conrad Nwawo [the same officer to whom Major Patrick C.K. Nzeogwu (also Midwest Ibo) had surrendered in Jan 1966]. Because several non-Ibo officers remained in Lagos and Kaduna, all but three officers on the ground (Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Majors Ogbemudia and Eremobor) of the rank of Major and above were Midwestern Ibos. Probably 75% or more of the 42 officers were Ibo-speaking. Indeed, in addition to possessing a sizable chunk of the rank and file, among the strategic positions in the Command, Ibo-speaking officers held the following: Commander, 4th Area Command (Lt. Col. Nwawo) General Staff Officer 1 (Operations) (Lt. Col. Nwanjei) Staff Officer (Civil-Military Liaison), Governors Office Commander, Benin Garrison, including two companies (Lt. Col. Ruddy Trimnell) Battalion Commander (Lt. Col. Igboba) Battalion Commander (Lt. Col. Ochei) Commanding Officer, Depot. (Lt. Col. Keshi) Officer in charge, Engineers/ Communications (Lt. Col. Okwechime) Company Commander, Auchi area Company Commanders, Asaba area (including Major Alabi-Isama) Company Commanders, Agbor area Company Commander Warri area Company Commander, Ekiadolor Unit Non-Ibos held the following positions: Quarter Master-General, 4th area command (Major Ogbemudia) Intelligence Officer (Major Eremobor) Col. David Ejoor (Military Governor, Midwest), was thus caught between numerous Midwestern Ibo officers (whom he could neither trust nor control) and the federal government (whom they did not trust). Not exactly a stranger to intrigue, Ejoor (as Commander 1st battalion, Enugu), narrowly escaped death (from Majors Anuforo and Ifeajuna) at the Ikoyi Hotel in Lagos, Jan 15,1966. He also slipped out of an attempted kidnap (by Ojukwu) during the burial of Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi at Umuahia on Jan 20, 1967. As noted above, he tried to play a balancing act as a neutral, by declaring that the Midwestern region 'would not become a battlefield'. It was a no win situation. |
The 18th battalion took Warri without incident. Major Chukwuka released Major Adewale Ademoyega from Warri prison before making his radio broadcast to the people of the Delta (9). Discerning listeners knew that Chukwuka was one of the January 1966 coup plotters in Lagos who had killed Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, a son of Warri, Federal Minister for Finance and arguably the Midwest's most influential politician at that time. Ademoyega had been transferred to Warri from Uyo prison after a fistfight with Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna over the ultimate failure of their coup in Lagos. After expropriating all the Mark IV bolt-action rifles from the Warri Police Station, he headed for Benin City where he assumed training and command (as "Lt. Col.") of a newly conscripted 700 man battalion, based at the Edokpolo Grammar School. This battalion (called the 19th) was to advance in support of the 12th battalion as part of the new 12th brigade. When on August 13, "Lt. Col." Ademoyega relieved "Lt. Col." Ifeajuna as Chief of Staff of the "Liberation Army", Lt. Col. Henry Igboba (Midwest Ibo) took over the 19th battalion. Ifeajuna returned to Enugu as Liaison Officer for the Liberation Army (9). The 13th battalion under Ivenso secured itself at Auchi and Agenebode, then crossed the border into then Kwara (West-Central) state (now Kogi) in the former northern region. By August 13th, they had captured Okene, Atanai and Iloshi, arbitrarily killing some civilians in the process (17). Their role was to protect the northern flank of the main force while cutting off supply lines to federal troops at Nsukka (8, 15, 19). |
illicit:Story. The only reason your useless Ojukwu declared Biafra was because Gowon carved out two states from your parasitic yeast. You did a coup on Jan 15 to prevent the federal parliament from granting the Ibo weary so-called minorities leave from your Okoro blighted yeast You later declared Biafra and dragged same Ibo weary minorities into your rogue nation. Okoro , steer clear from the SS and focus on your five leprous states. |
SalamRushdie:Okoro, these ministers will serve better than the moribund useless ones in existence. By the way, why does anything pertaining to regionalism pain you parasites ? We are going back to regional governance whether you like it or not. You will be expelled to your Okoro Biafra if you try to impede our return to regional autonomy. Parasite |
illicit:Oh really ? I thought the war was because Igbos were being killed in the north. Liar. |
JohnnA1:We must restructure Nigeria back to Pre Ironsi Zikist one unity begging Nigeria . |
THE ASSAULT At 3 a.m. on Wednesday, August 9, 1967, the fourth anniversary of the democratic creation of the Midwestern region, a motorized rifle brigade consisting of 3000 Biafran soldiers and militiamen, under the command of Lt. Col. ["Brigadier"] Victor Banjo, crossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha into Asaba. The Biafran Invasion of the Midwest had begun. Transported in over 100 trucks and civilian vehicles, this was the nucleus of what eventually was planned to be designated the "101st division", also known as the "Liberation Army of Nigeria" or the "Midwest Expeditionary Force". Upon arrival in the Midwest, they split up into three spearheads, destined to peal off from one another at Agbor. Units fired indiscriminately into the air as they arrived unchallenged at successive tactical objectives. The seizure of the Midwest was essentially accomplished within 12 hours. The 101st HQ group included Major ('Lt. Col.') Emmanuel Ifeajuna as Chief of Staff and Captain ("Major" Joe Isichie as QuarterMaster General. Much later in the campaign, Lt. ("Major" Fola Oyewole (upon release from prison in Enugu, where he (and Adeleke) had been detained for the January 15 coup) became Isichie's deputy.The 12th Battalion, under Lt. Col. Festus Akagha, made a dash for Benin City, [the capital]. The 18th battalion under Major Humphrey Chukwuka, headed for Warri, [in the oilrich delta] with Sapele and Ughelli as secondary objectives. The 13th battalion under Lt. Col. Mike Ivenso, swung northwards toward Auchi, with Agenebode (across the Niger from Idah, in Benue State), and Okene (in then Kwara state) as secondary objectives. A detachment was to head for Jebba to destroy the Niger Bridge at that location. Unknown to Banjo, a unit led by Lt. Col. Ochei (a Midwest Ibo officer), specifically attacked the Government house in Benin, ostensibly ordered by Ojukwu to capture the governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor dead or alive . Fortuitously, Major Ogbemudia (then quarter-master-general) had changed the guard detail at the Government House during the night. Therefore, the soldiers on duty, not being part of the plot to hand-over the state resisted. Ejoor escaped, separated from the rest of his family. Other than some fighting in the Siluko area, this was the only resistance the "Liberation Army" had to face in its initial phase of operations. The 12th battalion had originally operated in the Ogoja sector before being re-deployed to take part in the Midwest operation It was supposed to have breakfast in Benin City, then proceed speedily toward Ibadan and Lagos on two axes springing from Ore and Okitipupa. The Ore group was to split into two groups, one pushing to Ibadan through Ondo and Ife, while the other was to drive through to Ijebu-Ode on to Lagos. Instead, the 12th battalion stalled in Benin City, while Banjo and Ojukwu argued back and forth for three days about whom to appoint Governor/ Administrator of the Midwest. Ojukwu had apparently initially preferred Lt. Col. Nwawo as the governor But Banjo, eager to avoid creating a restive non-Ibo population, independently and separately approached Lt. Col. David Ejoor (through the Catholic mission), Major Sam Ogbemudia (through an agent) and Lt. Col. Trimnell (a molato officer with ancestral links to Aboh division), in that order The first two declined. Ojukwu turned down the latter, ultimately choosing Major Albert Nwazu Okonkwo, a Midwest Ibo medical officer After the first of several recalls to Enugu, Banjo returned to Benin City on August 11/12, 1967 to resume the fatally delayed westward thrust of the 12th battalion, which had now been re-designated a brigade. |
BossGerald:Ewu bastard , who be Yoruba ? |
It turns out that during the Commander-in-Chief's conference on June 7 in Lagos, Lt. Col. David Ejoor (Military Governor) was told that "Midwestern State will be kept free from active operations unless where necessary, but the border between the Eastern States and the Midwest will be completely sealed off." (10, 12) Therefore, on June 18, at a speech in Asaba, Ejoor reiterated a public commitment that the Midwest would not be turned into a battlefield. Sensitive to his own Midwest Ibo constituency, the prevailing wisdom at the time was that the war was a confrontation between the 'Northern' and 'Eastern' regions in the larger context of Nigerian unity. But within 7 weeks after Ejoor's speech, "Biafran" troops were in control of the Midwest and hurtling across the West on their way to Lagos. That campaign and its far-reaching implications, ladies and gentlemen, is the focus of my speech tonight. |
From January 4-5, 1967 all military leaders of Nigeria met in Aburi, Ghana to resolve Nigeria's dilemma. Thereafter, conflicting versions of what was and was not agreed became the stuff of a propaganda war between Ojukwu and the federal government. On Jan 14-15, solicitors-general from all over the country met in Benin City to discuss the legal implications of Aburi and review all decrees passed by the Military since Jan 17, 1966. On Jan 17-18, they discussed a draft decree on decentralization. This was followed on Jan 25 by a an inconclusive meeting (again in Benin City) of senior Nigerian Officers from all regions to discuss the reorganization of the army after the events of 1966. On March 9-10, the Supreme Military Council met (yet again in Benin City) to ratify the decentralization decree. Ojukwu did not attend, citing security concerns. However, he showed up alone by Helicopter in Benin City on March 12 at which time Ejoor briefed him on the deliberations of the meeting he missed . He still was not pleased. This decree (No. was issued a few weeks later, practically making Nigeria a confederacy On April 30, the National Peace Committee met in Benin City to review efforts to resolve the crisis. In the weeks that followed it was pretty clear that Ojukwu was heading toward secession. On May 26, a crucial joint meeting of the chiefs and elders of the Eastern Consultative Assembly was convened in Enugu . It mandated Ojukwu to proclaim the eastern region as an independent republic of Biafra. On May 27, therefore, Gowon preemptively declared a state of emergency and announced the creation of twelve states out of the four regions. The Midwest region became a state with no change in its size or configuration, while the other regions were divided. One of the most significant results of this exercise, was the splitting of the eastern region into three parts, separating (and land locking) the inland Ibo from the oil rich coastal minorities of the Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers provinces. On May 30, 1967, one year after the infamous "Unification Riots" took place in the then Northern region, 34 year old Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, mandated by the East Regional Consultative Assembly, proclaimed the Republic of Biafra. Tracing a diary of events in 1966, Ojukwu stated (among other things) that: "The widespread nature of the massacre and its periodicity May 29, July 29, and September 29 show first, that they were premeditated and planned, and second that Eastern Nigerians are no longer wanted as equal partners in the Federation of Nigeria." (15) Based in Lagos, the federal government under 33 year old Major-General Yakubu Cinwa Gowon, did not accept the proclamation. The "northern group of states", having suppressed their own prior instincts for secession, perceived it as an economic threat to its survival and well being. The federal government believed that it had not exhausted alternatives to complete disintegration, even though communication with Ojukwu in particular had broken down. Almost immediately, therefore, steps were taken to bring the situation under control. By June 3, a total naval blockade of the bights of Benin and Biafra (later renamed 'Bonny') had been ordered. Oil tankers and other ships heading for Bonny and Calabar were intercepted and diverted. Ojukwu was formally dismissed from the Nigerian Army on July 1st. The 'police action' land phase of what is now referred to as the Nigerian Civil War subsequently began in earnest at 0530 hrs on July 6, 1967. Troops concentrated at Vanderkya [in Benue State] under the command of Major Martin Adamu opened a barrage of fire in support of an assault on Garkem and Obudu in the Ogoja sector. A few hours' later troops under Major Sule Apollo opened up a second front from Ankpa and Idah toward Enugu Ezike and Okutu in the Nsukka sector. It turns out that during the Commander-in-Chief's conference on June 7 in Lagos, Lt. Col. David Ejoor (Military Governor) was told that "Midwestern State will be kept free from active operations unless where necessary, but the border between the Eastern States and the Midwest will be completely sealed off." |
From the perspective of the Midwest, Ibo-speaking officers and men from the Ika, Asaba and Aboh divisions of the state joined the massive exodus of easterners from other parts of the country. This was in response to the May 29 and July 29 killings and the subsequent call by the Military Governor of the Eastern region, (Lt. Col. C. O. Ojukwu) for all Ibos to return 'home' in the wake of further acts of 'ethnic cleansing' in September 1966. [Subsequently, Ojukwu expelled all non-Ibo Midwesterners from the eastern region, including students.] Because of the complete breakdown of military discipline and trust occasioned by the widespread killings of Ibos, it became apparent that troops had to return to their regions of origin. For this reason, a regional army structure was approved corresponding to the four regions of the country at that time . The 1st, 2nd , 3rd and 4th area commands were based in the Northern, Western, Eastern and Midwestern regions, respectively. Since the northern region essentially controlled the federal government, northern troops remained in Lagos. This raised two issues: Whether a mixed regional force ought to control Lagos, as federal capital. Whether northern troops should remain in the West to protect the northern flank of northern troops in Lagos, who would be cut off from the north, should their colleagues in the West be recalled. On August 9, 1966 the Ad-Hoc Committee had indeed recommended that northern troops be repatriated from Lagos and the West, but Gowon demurred. This led the West to believe that it was "occupied" and became a sore point in West-North relations for quite some time. In the tense period of political maneuvering leading up to the civil war, the different area commands had different degrees of motivation for and ability to procure arms and ammunition. The 1st area command in Kaduna allegedly had the advantage of simply using federal connections to do this. Excess weapons in Lagos were reportedly moved up north, and certain prominent businessmen are said to have helped to import arms. Northern troops returning from other regions took their weapons along. The 3rd area command in the east made its own arrangements, which (as we now know) were grossly inadequate by the time a decision was made to secede. The 2nd area command in Ibadan was in a difficult position because of the presence of northern troops. Concerned about the lopsided ethnic structure of the 4th area command, and the potential for abuse, the Governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor prevented a private group led by Mr. Yon DaKolo and Lt. Col. Mike Okwechime from importing weapons to Benin. Instead, he asked the federal government to provide the Midwest region with weapons directly, choosing not to do so secretly. Hence a small consignment of weapons was sent to Benin to beef up the 20 odd Mark 4 rifles held by the 300 soldiers there at the time. Three keys to the armory were made. Midwest Ibo officers (Lt. Cols. Conrad Nwawo and Sylvanus Nwajei) held two keys, while Major Sam Ogbemudia (Bini-Edo) ostensibly held the third. Because of this complex arrangement, with Lagos regulating the supply of arms on the one hand, and the absence of any credible attempt to recruit new soldiers locally on the other, the 4th area command was never in a position to independently defend the region or state in a sustained manner from any threat even if all the officers were loyal. At the September 1966 Constitutional conference for the political future of the country, the Midwest was the only region to support the preservation of a federation with a strong center. This was based at the time on enlightened self-interest, because the leadership feared that the barely three year old oil, cocoa, rubber, timber and port rich region would in all likelihood become a target of hostile intent and domination by its larger, more cohesive, more organized and more powerful neighbors. Midwestern Ibo officers who felt the confederate and even secessionist arrangements proposed by other regions was a better approach opposed this position, hammered out by the Urhobo Governor, Lt. Col. Ejoor, Chief Anthony Enahoro (Ishan-Edo), and a group of non-Ibo intellectuals from the University of Ibadan. Such disagreements over policy reflected deep divisions within the political milieu over which Ejoor presided |
The Minister of Works will each collaborate amongst themselves in constructing ,refurbishing and maintaining road networks that connects each region. |
By Regional ministers, I am implying that ministries like Works , Education and Agriculture to have 6 ministers each representing each zone. For example, there should be a Minister for Works for the SW, SS, SE, NE, NW , NC. Same should apply for Education, Agriculture, Transportation and Health. Other non viable ministries must be abolished and this new ministerial portfolios will fill the vacuum. |
Jomonix:Another concentration camp will emerge in the form of Biafra . Continue |
victory36:Well deserved . It's only a pity that Gowon insisted on having you guys back. The war should have stopped the minute the SS was liberated from Biafra and from there, a 30ft wall erected to fence you out. |
victory36:Oh so random and unnecessary ? We should just ignore all the artrocities committed by your heebo orcs since Jan 15. You think your victim hood holds water outside your Okoro enclave ? |
Ngozi123:Land Thief . Oyigbo message is still there for you. |
MP3GAGAdotCOM:Ewedu is a very nutritious meal. But what will a cannibal know about plant diet. |
Emergingnation: |
Abia has finally decided to join the 20th century in the 21st century. Mediocres |
Ngozi123:Fool, SS people do not need any other people's validation to know who they are. Besides, your problem is not ours . Fight for your useless Biafra without dragging us into it. God knows that the day a unified SS front emerges and decides to leave Nigeria ,it will be you heebo parasites that will be at the forefront fighting alongside the Fulani to stop us from leaving |
007kjb:Propaganda ? We will make sure this generation is made aware of the artrocities committed by Biafran soldiers on the so-called ethnic minorities in both the Midwest and Eastern Region. |
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ... 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 (of 53 pages)
Igbinosa arrived in Benin from Lagos with orders to escort a consignment of boats (procured by Ejoor from the Delta) to the Bonny sector in the East, where Lt. Col. Adekunle was operating. Igbinosa was promptly turned back by Lt. Col. Nwawo and other Midwest Ibo officers at the Area Command HQ (13). Curiously, in his "Journal of Events" (15), Ojukwu interpreted this event as follows: "Nigerian troops start amassing troops and stockpiling large quantities of arms in the Midwest in preparation for an attack on Biafra." The following day, on August 6, an embarrassed Ejoor (whose neutrality was now in doubt) confronted these same Midwest Ibo army colleagues with newspaper reports about the formation of a "southern solidarity front" to include the East, Midwest and West to the exclusion of the North (14). Not surprisingly, they denied. Interestingly, Ojukwu issued a public warning that day, to Ejoor reminding him of his pledges to keep the region neutral. However, two days later, on the night of August 8, Biafran army uniforms were secretly issued to selected Midwestern Ibos while weapons were withdrawn 'for routine check' from non-Ibo soldiers in the 4th Area Command HQ. The Police wireless station at Asaba closed down (as usual) for the night. The stage was set (14).
was issued a few weeks later, practically making Nigeria a confederacy 
