As the possibility of an armistice increased during the spring
of 1953 the all important matter of air superiority assumed
a new aspect. On 28 April, during the peace talks, a
compromise agreement had been reached to the effect that
the final terms of the armistice would make no mention of
the re-construction of the airfields, but would ban the
introduction of any further troops and equipment into Korea
after the cease-fire. During the spring of 1953, FEAF
reconnaissance flights brought back information that was
clearly indicative of the Communists' intention to exploit this
clause by bringing a significant number of North Korean
airfields to operational standards. This would enable them
to fly a maximum number of tactical aircraft to these bases
during the last hours of the war. In order to counter this
threat to post-armistice UN air superiority, thirty-five North
Korean airfields were listed as targets. During May, June and
July SAAF Sabres frequently participated in raids against
these airfields.
On the last day of the war the SAAF recorded the largest
number of combat sorties flown on Sabres during the course
of a single day of operations. On that day they used 14
operational aircraft to fly 41 combat sorties. These last
missions were directed against any Communist attempt to
bring combat aircraft into North Korea and consisted of
fighter sweeps along the Yalu and Ch'ongch'on Rivers. Thus 2
Sqn ended the war with a maximum effort on a type of
operation not at all typical of their general experience in
Korea.
During more than thirty months of operational deployment
in the Far East the officers and men of the SAAF contingent
demonstrated a thorough-going professionalism in their
approach to the assigned task. This was characterized above
all by a flexibility which enabled them to adapt to changing
circumstances within the UN organization of which they
were part. Their flexibility was also demonstrated by their
ability to deal with novel and frequently changing enemy
tactics as well as with a hostile physical environment.
A consideration of the following data will assist in forming
an appreciation of the measure of their success. The various
sources yield slight and insignificant variations in the total
number of sorties credited to the pilots of 2 Sqn during the
course of the war. The squadron War Diary lists 10 597
sorties on Mustangs, while the corresponding figure
given in the Mission Returns and Statistical Data Tables is 10
569. Totals for the number of combat sorties flown on
Sabres vary between 1 427 and 1 454.The South Africans
thus flew approximately 12 000 of a grand total of 352 023
operational sorties undertaken by fighter-bomber units in
Korea. This represents 3,423% of all fighter-bomber sorties
and 1,158% of all FEAF combat sorties.
It is based on the fact that from
June 1950 until July 1953 FEAF possessed or controlled an
average of 62 squadrons with 1 249 aircraft on strength at
any one time. The
squadron operated with an above average effectiveness.
This achievement had its price, however, for whilst the other
UN squadrons averaged 19 casualties (Killed and Missing in
Action), the South African average was 35, including one
member killed in a ground crew accident. These
sacrifices were not made in vain. Militarily, the SAAF had
contributed to the repulse of an act of Communist
aggression, while politically the South African Government
and nation had clearly demonstrated their will to resist.

The names of those who died and are listed as missing can
be found on the memorial plaque in the gardens of the union Buildings in Pretoria in the Korean War, the famous squadron ("The Flying Cheetahs" took part as South Africa's contribution. It won many American decorations, including the unusual honour of a United States Presidential Unit Citation in 1952: 2 Sqn had a long and distinguished record of service in Korea flying F-51D Mustangs and later F-86F Sabres. Their role was mainly flying ground attack and interdiction missions as one of the squadrons making up the USAF's 18th Fighter Bomber Wing. During the Korean conflict the squadron flew a grand total of 12 067 sorties for a loss of 34 pilots and two other ranks. Aircraft losses amounted to 74 out of 97 Mustangs and four out of 22 Sabres. Pilots and men of the squadron received a total of 797 medals including 2 Silver Stars - the highest award to non-American nationals - 3 Legions of merit, 55 Distinguished Flying Crosses and 40 Bronze Stars.
8 pilots became POW's. Casualties: 20 KIA 16 WIA

Brave female NA soldiers on the front lines in the north east.

Random pictures;

bidexiii:
Battle field discussion (picture/video's) of african military; these is a thread where by we discuss military histories and the harsh realty of war are being shared be it in pictures and video !

. I see u

Expecting more equip n support
Rumor has it the New CinC myt base in NE 4 some time to lead campaign.

IbnSultaan:
. I see u

Tnk's man !

Another different NA camouflage ..... ?
I think I like it but,only it does not blend in perfectly with the north-east terrain !

bidexiii:

Tnk's man !

GMB is concern abt the Military. The could be seeing the first wave of action frm his administration

bidexiii:

Tnk's man !

GMB is concern abt the Military. The could be seeing the first wave of action frm his administration,,,

CION operations;

Eeben barlow speaks on the pmc-trained 72 strike force and tactics used to destroyed boko haram; http://sofrep.com/40633/eeben-barlow-speaks-pt-3-tactics-used-destroy-boko-haram/

NA MT-LB (1st and 2nd pic)
Soldier with AGL pose beside a MOWAG IFV
4th pic ;An MGL on technical's .m

PHOTOS: Nigerian army clear Boko Haram camps in Alagarno.


Nigerian troops have this morning successfully completed a raid on all terrorist camps in Alagarno in Borno State. Alagarno is the major haven of terrorists ahead of Sambisa forest.

A number of weapons and equipment were captured during the operation. Items captured from the terrorists included Armoured vehicles, several arms and ammunitions of various sizes and calibres, power generating sets, grenades and Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs), bows and arrows, megaphones and rolls of copper cable which the terrorists used as one of the materials to make IEDs.

Cordon and search as well as mop up of the community is still on going to make the environment safe for displaced locals to return.

Aside being one of the strongholds of terrorists in the State, Alagarno also provided routes used by the terrorists to neighbouring towns and countries. The thick forest in the area had made it a safe haven for the terrorists for a long time as the terrain was not easily accessible and it was endowed with natural hideouts from aerial bombardments.

More pictures from insurgents camp.....

Random pictures;

More .....

The Nigeria armed forces and Defense ministry might be on is way to start the bid for the SUKHOI, SU-30. Check these out-www.worldbulletin.net/news/150158/ni

bidexiii:
Another different NA camouflage ..... ?
I think I like it but,only it does not blend in perfectly with the north-east terrain !

looks strange,if not for the infantry corps bagde i won't have agreed.oga Boolet are you seeing this

Nigerdeltaboi:

looks strange,if not for the infantry corps bagde i won't have agreed.oga Boolet are you seeing this

If not for the infantry corps badge, I would,nt have believe it's a NA soldier.

Nigerdeltaboi:

looks strange,if not for the infantry corps bagde i won't have agreed.oga Boolet are you seeing this

Yes oo, things have since changed.

CION Pictures;

boolet:

Yes oo, things have since changed.

woow

Nigeria army commandos in the north-east.

POST-RECAPTURE BY NIGERIAN FORCES, NORMALCY
RETURNS TO BOKO HARAM’S ERSTWHILE CALIPHAL HQ
OF GWOZA:-
1) Mi-35hind stationed in gwoza
2)Maj gen chris olokunlade Nig director of Defense Information; background is an Agusta A109 LUH
3)NAF pilots in gwoza
4) & 5) NA T-72M

pic curled frm beeg's

More pictures

THE SIX DAY WAR:
The first full-scale battles of the Six Day War came on
the morning of June 5, 1967 after a roughly 20 day
period of increasing tensions between Israel and the
Arab states, principally Egypt, Syria and Jordan. But
while the battles commenced in June, the start of the
war actually came two weeks earlier on May 22, when
Egypt blockaded Israel’s southern port of Eilat and the
Gulf of Aqaba. Through the gulf came vital cargo
including 80 percent of Israel’s oil imports, and
blockading such an international waterway is
recognized under international law as a casus belli, or
act of war. Reacting to the Egyptian move, U.S. President
Johnson said in a televised address the next day:
... the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping
has brought a new and grave dimension to the
crisis. The United States considers the gulf to be an
international waterway and feels that a blockade of
Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous
to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent
passage of the international waterway is a vital
interest of the international community. (New York
Times, May 24, 1967)
Despite the grave provocation, Israeli Foreign Minister
Abba Eban spent almost two weeks traveling to the
capitals of Europe and to Washington in an ultimately
futile effort to defuse the crisis and avoid war, but in the
end Egypt and its allies had made war inevitable. This
was recognized first and foremost by the Egyptians
themselves. President Nasser, for example, in a speech
on May 26, 1967 said:
Recently we felt we are strong enough, that if we
were to enter a battle with Israel, with God’s help,
we could triumph. On this basis, we decided to take
actual steps …
Taking Sharm al Shaykh [i.e., blockading Israel’s
port of Eilat] meant confrontation with Israel.
Taking such action also meant that we were
ready to enter a general war with Israel. (Speech
to Arab Trade Unionists, reprinted in The Israel-
Arab Reader, 1984, p. 176; emphasis added.)
On the same day Mohammed Heikal, Nasser’s closest
confidante and the leading journalist in the Arab world,
wrote in the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram:
This week the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel
was an alternative accomplished fact imposed and
now being protected by the force of Arab arms. To
Israel this is the most dangerous aspect of the
current situation … Therefore it is not a matter of
the Gulf of Aqaba but of something bigger. It is the
whole philosophy of Israeli security. It is the
philosophy on which Israeli existence has pivoted
since its birth and on which it will pivot in the
future.
Hence I say that Israel must resort to arms.
Therefore I say that an armed clash between
the UAR and the Israeli enemy is inevitable.
(Reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader, p 181;
emphasis added; UAR, or United Arab Republic, was
another name for Egypt.)
From the Israeli point of view, as June approached
Egypt had already committed one act of war in
blockading the Gulf of Aqaba, which diplomacy had
failed to reverse. Meanwhile Egypt, Jordan and Syria,
acting in concert, were mobilizing forces on Israel’s
borders, and large Iraqi forces were moving into place,
along with contingents from other Arab countries.
Because of its small population, Israel’s combat
strength depended on civilian reservists, and with full
mobilization (and oil imports largely blocked) the
country’s economy faced collapse. As Nasser and Heikal
correctly observed, in such a situation Israel either had
to surrender or attack. On the morning of June 5, Israel
attacked.

CONTINUATION;

Egypt and Israel: The Balance of Forces on the Eve
of War
The Egyptian forces in Sinai just prior to the outbreak of
hostilities included seven divisions, totaling almost
100,000 troops, and 1000 tanks along with abundant
artillery. They were deployed in three coordinated lines,
offering both offensive and defensive options, but
Soviet doctrine, which Egypt followed, suggested a
strategy of allowing Israel to attack the strongly-held
Egyptian positions, and once the attack was blunted and
the attackers bloodied, to swing onto the offensive. Such
tactics were used with great success in the famous WWII
Battle of the Kursk Salient, in which the Red Army
enveloped and decisively defeated attacking Nazi forces
totaling some 800,000 troops, and then immediately
launched an offensive against their German foes.
The first Egyptian line was manned by the Second, Sixth
and Seventh Divisions in Sinai, covering each of the
three possible routes through the desert between the
Suez Canal and the Israeli border, while the Palestinian
Division covered the northern Gaza Strip. All were
motorized infantry divisions with ample armor and
artillery.
Behind this first line was a second, at varying distances
of thirty to sixty miles from the Israeli border, which
was held by the Egyptian Third Division and a Special
Task Force led by General Sa’ad al Din Shazli, a favorite
of Nasser. Again following Soviet doctrine, these
divisions had a dual role – both to contain any Israeli
penetration of the first line, and to swing onto the
offensive when the opportunity arose. Both divisions
were a mix of motorized infantry brigades and armored
brigades, thus combining speed and mobility with
firepower.
The third line was roughly midway between Israel and
the Suez Canal, near Bir Gifgafa and Bir Thamada, and
was manned by the highly-regarded Fourth Armored
Division and a motorized infantry brigade. Thus
deployed these forces were able to defend the large
Egyptian air base at Bir Gifgafa, and to hold the key
Mitla and Gidi mountain passes over which passed the
vital central and southern roads through the desert. As
well, the armored division could come forward to attack
any Israeli forces that penetrated the first two lines, and
could take part in the planned offensive as well.
Facing these Egyptian forces, and the strong likelihood
of war on three fronts, the Israelis could marshal only
45,000 men and 650 tanks. (Israel: The Embattled Ally,
Nadav Safran, p 242-3) Three Israeli divisions led the
way, known by the names of their commanders, Tal for
Major General Israel Tal, Sharon for Major General Ariel
Sharon, and Yoffe for (reserves) Major General
Avraham Yoffe. In addition, in the south opposite
Kuntilla was a independent brigade led by Col. Albert
Mandler.
With no strategic depth Israel needed to immediately
take any battle into enemy territory, and therefore
concentrated their task forces on three narrow axes.
However, by shuffling their forces around, and
employing ruses, such as deploying wooden tanks to
create a fake division, the Israelis fooled the Egyptians
into believing that the main Israeli attack, as in the 1956
War, would be in the southern sector.
7:45 AM, June 5, 1967: The Israeli Air Attack
While Egypt, and most foreign military observers,
expected Israel to attack, no one expected Israel to
attack in the way that it did. In most air forces a
substantial percentage of planes at any time are down
for maintenance; taking that into account, plus planes
Israel would have to hold back for air defense, the
Egyptians expected that much less than half of Israel’s
jets could take part in an anticipated attack against
Egypt’s airbases.
But in fact at the start of the fighting 90 percent of
Israel’s planes were operational, and only twelve
fighters were held back for air defense. All the rest,
including jet trainers retrofitted for combat, were
thrown into the initial attacks against the Egyptian air
force. Flying low through previously discovered gaps in
the Egyptian radar net, and approaching from
unexpected directions, mostly from the west (that is,
from the Mediterranean), the Israelis achieved
complete tactical surprise. They also chose to attack not
at dawn, when the Egyptians were known to be on alert,
but at 7:45 AM, when most senior Egyptian military and
political leaders would be caught in the usual massive
Cairo traffic jams, and thus out of touch.
Most importantly, the Israelis attacked in small groups
of just four planes. While the first group was on the
target, another group of four was on the way, and
another four were just taking off. As the first wave
finished its attacks, the second wave was about to
attack, and the third wave was on its way, and when the
third wave was finished, the first was back to attack
again, having rearmed and refueled in just minutes. In
this way Israel kept the main Egyptian airbases under
constant devastating attack for more than two and a
half hours, allowing no time for recovery.
First cratering the runways with special penetrating
bombs to prevent Egyptian planes from taking off, the
Israeli pilots then concentrated on the Egyptian
bombers that could devastate Israel’s cities, and on
Egypt’s most advanced MiG fighter jets. When these
were destroyed the target list was widened to include all
other military planes, SAM-2 missile sites and radar
installations, and smaller airbases, until all eighteen
Egyptian airbases had been hit.
In the first day of fighting 80 percent of Egypt’s bombers
were destroyed along with 55 percent of its fighter jets.
Those losses, combined with the devastation of the
airbases and command and control centers
demoralized the Egyptian high command, and gave
Israel control of the skies over the southern front.
Israeli losses totaled just 19 planes, mostly from ground
fire.

CONTINUATION
The Simultaneous Israeli Ground Attack
Simultaneous with the Israeli
air attacks, Israeli ground
forces went into action in the
Sinai and Gaza. The Israeli plan
was composed of three
phases, based on political and
military considerations. The
political consideration was that
great power intervention could
force a cease fire at any point,
so Israel wanted to be sure of
early concrete
accomplishments in the field
that could at least be traded
for an end to the Egyptian
blockade that precipitated the
war. The military consideration
was that, as already described, the first part of the war
necessarily involved attacks against entrenched
defenders, in the Sinai especially in the area of Abu
Ageila and Kusseima, and in Gaza at Rafah. And, since
the Air Force would be busy with its own attacks, there
would be little if any air support in these initial
engagements. Such “break-in” battles tend to be costly
and difficult, especially without full air support, and
there was no way to be sure which would succeed first.
The Israeli strategy was therefore to be flexible enough
in the second phase to exploit whichever attacks had
made the most headway. As a saying in the IDF goes,
“plans are merely the basis for change,” meaning that it
doesn’t make sense to plan in too much detail, since
unexpected opportunities are sure to arise. Too
detailed plans might well push field commanders to
follow the plan and miss the opportunity.
The overall Israeli strategy was therefore to penetrate
into the open spaces of the Sinai, and then fight the kind
of war in which the Israel Defense Forces excelled, a
war of movement and maneuver, with the air force and
the ground forces working together. The aim was not to
engage in more costly frontal assaults, as in the break-
in battles, but rather to so dislocate and confuse the
opposing commanders that they would panic, causing
their armies to fall apart.
Phase One: The Break-in Battles
General Tal’s division was tasked with attacking the
fortified Rafah/El Arish sector, near the Mediterranean
coast, straddling the Gaza/Egypt border. The Israeli
soldiers had to face deep minefields, behind which
were well dug-in infantry, and on the perimeter anti-
tank weapons in reinforced concrete bunkers. To the
rear were over 100 tanks in defensive positions and
numerous artillery pieces.
Tal’s strategy was to avoid the minefields and attack
from the rear – his forces approached Rafah from the
north-east, through the town of Khan Yunis, which fell
after a bitter tank battle. Tal’s forces then launched a
pincer attack on Rafah junction, and a reinforced
paratroop brigade, led by Colonel Rafael Eitan (who
would later become Chief of Staff of the IDF), took a
southerly route around Rafah then turned northwards,
through sand dunes that the Egyptians had assumed
impassable to armor. Surprising the defenders, Eitan’s
brigade soon penetrated into the Egyptian artillery park
south-west of Rafah, wreaking havoc. After reducing
these positions Tal’s forces headed southwest taking
other defended positions, and by the morning of June 6
El Arish and its approach road were firmly in Israel’s
hands.
Meanwhile the crucial central sector was entrusted to
General Sharon, whose battle to take the heavily
defended Kusseima/Abu Agheila strongholds is still
considered a classic. The best description of the
Egyptian defenses, and the intricate plan Sharon
devised to overcome them, is from Sharon himself:
Since 1956 the Egyptians had completely rebuilt the
Abu Agheila fortifications according to the latest
Soviet concepts of linear defense. About fifteen
miles from the Israeli border the Ismalia road
crossed a long swell of sand known as Um Cataf.
There the Egyptians had constructed three parallel
trench systems intersecting the road. Anchored in
the north by high soft dunes and in the south by
jagged ridges and broken foothills, each line was
several miles long and each encompassed an array
of gun positions, storage depots, and lateral
communications trenches. In the front of the first
line was a thickly laid mine field. With the trench
system manned by a full infantry brigade and with
its flanks secured on either end by the terrain, this
position itself constituted a major defensive
obstacle.
A mile or so behind the trenches the Egyptians kept
a mobile reserve of over eighty tanks ready to move
in any direction, the sword that complemented their
defensive shield. Just to the south of the tanks was
their artillery deployment – eighty 122- and 130-mm
guns whose range far outmatched my own guns.
Perimeter outposts screened this concentration of
forces on the approaches to the east and especially
in the north, where the flank was guarded by an
infantry battalion supported by tanks and artillery
in a fortified position which we code-named
Oakland.
To destroy Abu Agheila it would be necessary to
identify and exploit the position’s inherent
vulnerability. Here we would be up against good
defensive fighters whose numerical strength was
not much less than ours, and whose firepower was
in some ways greater than ours – a far cry from the
offensive-defensive ratio of three to one usually
considered minimal for an attack against prepared
positions. So the plan of battle would have to
emphasize concentration of forces, surprise, and
maneuver. And the action would have to take place
at night, our traditional method of reducing the
odds and negating the advantages of prepared
fortifications …
What I had in mind was a closely coordinated attack
by separate elements of our forces on the Egyptian
trench lines, tanks and artillery … [with the attacks
developing] from the north, from the west (at the
rear of Abu Agheila), and from the east (at the front
of the position) in a continuous unfolding of
surprises, each force securing the flank of its
neighbor …
In my overall approach the first order of business
would be to create a deception against Kusseima
with a brigade under Uri Baidatz. Then I would
isolate the battlefield. In the south a screening force
of tanks, half-tracks and mortars under Arie Amit
would block any reinforcements from Kusseima.
This force would also give us a lodgement once we
were ready to move in that direction. In the north I
would launch a reinforced armored battalion,
including my best tanks, the British Centurions
under Natke Nir, against Oakland, the position that
guarded Abu Agheila’s northern flank. Once Natke
took Oakland, he would then circle around to the
rear of Abu Agheila, setting up blocking forces as he
went on the road to Jebel Libni, where the Egyptian
reserves were. The Centurions would then be in a
position to assault the base from behind.
Once the field was isolated, we would attack the
entire depth of the Egyptian positions
simultaneously. That would be the “taboulah,” the
shock that would unbalance the defenders. Kuti
Adam’s infantry brigade would come down on the
northern end of the trench lines through the
ostensibly secure dunes. At the same time my
artillery commander, Yakov Aknin, would
concentrate all the division’s artillery fire on the
trenches just in front of Kuti’s attack, making life
hell for the defenders as they tried to respond to
the unexpected assault. To the right of Kuti’s
brigade, helicopters would land Danny Mat’s
paratroop brigade, which would strike into the
artillery positions, preventing the Egyptian long-
range guns from hitting our own forces. Once the
infantry had disrupted the trenches, our tank
brigade under Mordechai Zippori would move
through the mine fields in a narrow frontal assault.
At the same time, Natke’s Centurions would hit the
Egyptian tanks from behind and come in on the rear
of the trenches. And all of this would happen at
night, compounding the Egyptians’ confusion as
they struggled to piece together what was
happening to them. (Warrior, Ariel Sharon, p.
188-190)
The battle, complex on paper and even more so in the
field, went more or less according to plan. With the
main battles fought during the night and morning of
June 5/June 6, by mid-morning the positions were
entirely in Israeli control, at a cost of 40 killed and 140
wounded.
Between Rafah and Abu Agheila was Wadi Haridin, sand
dunes thought to be impassible to vehicles, and thus
left undefended by the Egyptians. But after the 1956
war, before Israeli troops left the Sinai, they had
scouted out the entire area, and found that the wadi
was difficult but passable. Their report, duly filed away,
had been recalled by Sharon during the crisis, and
located.
The third Israeli division, under Yoffe, was therefore
split in two. While the battles in Rafah and Abu Agheila
were still raging, one half of Yoffe’s division made the
slow trek through Wadi Haridin near Abu Agheila, and
emerged from the dunes to surprise and attack Egyptian
forces near Bir Lahfan junction, which were trying to
come to the aid of the defenders at Rafah and Abu
Agheila. Defeating this force, Yoffe’s troops then joined
with the bulk of Tal’s forces from El Arish, which had
wheeled southward, to attack and isolate the second
Egyptian line near Bir Lahfan, which was held by Egypt’s
Third Division. The other half of Yoffe’s division passed
directly through Sharon’s lines and the still-unsecured
perimeter of Abu Agheila, and attacked the central
sector of the same Third Egyptian Division, near the key
high ground of Jebel Libni, southwest of Bir Lahfan. The
forces of Tal and Yoffe thus came together in a pincer
attack against the north and central sectors of the Third
Division, and by dusk on June 6 the Jebel Libni bases
and surrounding areas had fallen.
(Meanwhile, the remainder of Tal’s division which had
not headed south from El Arish advanced along the
Sinai coast, eventually advancing to take Kantara on the
Suez Canal and then turned south to take up positions
opposite Ismalia.)
With the success in this phase of the battle in the Sinai,
Israel had accomplished its minimal objectives,
unhinging the Egyptian defenses in the central Sinai,
and putting the rest of Egypt’s forces under threat. In
any cease-fire discussions Israel would now be in a
strong position to demand the removal of the blockade

CONCLUDING PART.
Phase Two: Exploiting the Success
At this stage Egypt’s citizens and many of her soldiers
did not yet grasp the scope of their losses, and the
state-controlled media was reporting that Egyptian
forces had penetrated deep into Israel, that Tel-Aviv had
been bombed and the Haifa oil refineries set alight. But
Egypt’s military chief, Marshal Amer, did understand the
disaster that had occurred, and he cracked. On the
afternoon of June 6 Amer began issuing contradictory
orders directly to his field commanders, eventually
ordering an immediate and total retreat. Sensing Amer’s
panic, some Egyptian commanders abandoned their
troops and fled back to Cairo, the better to save
themselves. The retreat turned into a rout.
For their part the Israelis, their air force now free to
support the ground forces, concentrated on the
remaining Egyptian armored forces in the Sinai,
especially the crack Fourth Division near the passes.
Yoffe’s forces proceeded southwest to attack and take
Bir Hassana and then continued 30 miles in the same
direction to attack the southern positions of the Fourth
Division near Bir Thamada. Meanwhile the bulk of Tal’s
forces headed for Bir Gifgafa, and an attack on the
northern flank of the Fourth Division.
Sharon’s division drove south towards Nakhli, and with
Col. Mandler’s Brigade, which had earlier taken Egyptian
positions at Kuntilla, attacked Shazli’s task force and
elements of the Sixth Division from two directions. The
Egyptian forces began to withdraw towards the Mitla
Pass and a hoped-for escape across the Suez Canal. But
tanks exposed on desert roads were easy targets for the
Israeli air force, which exacted a terrible toll. Between
Sharon’s and Mandler’s tanks and the Israeli jets, much
of Egypt’s Sixth Division was trapped in a killing field
and would soon cease to exist.
Meanwhile Yoffi and Tal were racing through the
Egyptian forces that remained, straining to beat them to
the passes that offered the Egyptians their only hope of
escaping back across the Suez Canal. At this the Israelis
partially succeeded. While Yoffi blocked the Mitla and
Gidi passes, Tal’s forces were not as successful blocking
the Khatmia pass (on the Ismalia road). While Sharon
drove much of the Egyptian army into the trap,
significant elements of the Egyptian Fourth Division
were able to force the Khatmia pass over night and
escape. Despite this, large portions of the 3rd and 6th
Divisions and Shazli’s forces were trapped and
destroyed, their blackened tanks and APC’s littering the
desert.
Entirely independently of these battles, a small
operation was launched to take Sharm el Sheikh, from
which the Egyptians had enforced their blockade. Sharm
fell without a fight, its defenders having fled.
Thus, after 96 hours the war in Sinai was over.
In the course of the fighting more than 5000 Egyptian
soldiers were captured, including 500 officers, who were
taken as prisoners to trade for the few Israeli pilots who
had been shot down and captured. But the bulk of the
captured Egyptians were given food and water and
transported to the canal, where Egyptian boats came to
ferry them home. Those Egyptians who eluded capture
did not fare as well – many who tried to get back on
their own died in the desert, falling victim to
dehydration and exposure.
Israel's losses in the battles with Egypt were 275
soldiers killed and 800 wounded, very high for a country
of only 2 million, but comparatively light considering
the size of the battles and the magnitude of the victory.
Egypt's losses were much higher — according to
statements by President Nasser more than 11,500
soldiers were killed, and independent estimates put the
number of wounded as high as 50,000.

Random pictures;

The NA. In gwoza as freed 4 boys under the tutelage and workforce of BH.