₦airaland Forum

lionel4power:
I don't think the Gripen is a 4.5 gen fighter jet.

nemesis4u

Gripen E is easily 4.5 gen

Odunayaw:
You've spoken my mind
I wish we could just get ADS like even pantsir as stop gap for now till the block 3 comes out

what if i fly out of pantsir engagement range

most effective IADS operates with multi layered coverage

u will need short range medium range and long range sam for a effective IADS

Odunayaw:
But on this same thread I have laid to rest the question of radar cover

The NAF uses the Russian P17,P35 and Tin Shield.

arent these radars installed in NAF airbases ?

nemesis4u:
arent these radars installed in NAF airbases ?

Yes they are installed at the Maiduguri and Yobe state respectively airforce base.

i wrote this long time ago

i have a different point of view though ,

the only guarantee of a foolproof air defense is your fighter elements.

ground based air defense is essentially a supporting and back up element.

SAMs are basically classified according to slant range and engagement altitude.

we have
1.MANPADS
2.SHORT RANGE SAM
3.ER-SHORADS
4.MEDIUM RANGE SAM
5.LONG RANGE SAM
6.VERY LONG RANGE SAM

against maneuvering and agile targets using terrain masking flight profile ,

1.MANPADS will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario
2.SHORT RANGE SAM will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario
3.ER-SHORADS will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario
4.MEDIUM RANGE SAM
5.LONG RANGE SAM
6.VERY LONG RANGE SAM

MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM will be useless against the above targets.

MANPADS SRSAM ERSHORAD are best effective against maneuvering and agile targets flying at low altitudes in order to evade the radar , because of the low engagement range capability , very quick response time , very short kill chain , low escape zone , high maneuvering capability , seeker sensitivity, acquisition and lock on is optimal at low ranges.

my point being u have to select ur sam depending on ur requirements and conditions .
1.point defense / base defense / area defense
2.terrain to be protected , flat / mountainous / valleys
3.static defense / mobile defense
4.stand alone / networked
5.internal sensors / external sensors
6.integral protection / deterrence

etc etc

if MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM comes up against a maneuvering and agile targets flying at medium to high altitudes (a foolish decision in the first place) then the best case scenario for the MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM will be to force the fighter to dump its weapons and fuel and turn tail.
ie MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM achieved a MISSION KILL which is as good as a TARGET KILL.


the best scenario is when u have all of these networked , integrated and in overlapping mode
1.MANPADS protects against low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets
2.SHORT RANGE SAM protects against low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets , maneuvering targets on weapon delivery run , PGMs , cruise missiles
3.ER-SHORADS forces low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets to either abort mission or to fly up into the engagement envelope of MRSAM / LRSAM or get killed.
4.MEDIUM RANGE SAM kills target within their engagement envelop at medium or high altitudes , if the targets have been forced to the kill zone or if the target is unaware of the existence of the said SAMs. however kill probability is low especially against receding targets while high on head on mode.
5.LONG RANGE SAM good against bombers, awacs , tankers , and against a flight/group of fighter formations, also good if the fighter pilot falls asleep during flight
also tries to force targets to descend into lower altitudes to be caught up by MRSAM SRSAM ETC.
6.VERY LONG RANGE SAM same above with additional anti ballistic capability.

kind of sleepy now ,
Pantsir-S1/S2 system is a point defense system a SRSAM to be exact not a medium range sam.

good night guys

nemesis4u:
Gripen E is easily 4.5 gen

but not the Gripen C/D?

Odunayaw:
If you are on the defence why substitute for more attackers
Moreso,ADS apart from its physical prowess also serves as a psychological tool. A chadian jet will be forced to fly very low or very high if he is painted by a guidance radar

You know of IFF transponders?
While tracking the intruder jets take into the air to visually identify aided by GCI

Again this is not cowboy lands, every action comes with a price. You don't shoot down everything cause you have a flying cane

IFF is to identify allied MILITARY aircraft. What about non-hostiles like civilian airliner or just hobbyist light aircraft with unknown intentions? you can't really know all this from the ground using radar technology alone.

SAMS are mostly used as a 'force multiplier' and as a PSYOP as you rightly said.

a SAM can't really substitute manned aircraft. The US tried it, it failed flat

bidexiii:
Please don't let us leave it.

Can NAF F7 jets stop Chadian Mig29.....

Bros... technically its an interceptor. (According to odunayaw) it should be able to hold its own against the MiGs, if the conditions are right.

another post which i wrote long ago

INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

REQUIREMENTS :

1.an automated Air Defense command and control center for controlling and monitoring of Air Defense Operations.
In network centric warfare era, RASP(recognizable air situation picture) information is required to be made available at the appropriate level for taking tactical decision. These levels are

1.strategic level
2.Operational level
3.tactical level

The information sharing involves sharing of the information among navy, army and civil radar network. The system will receive data from different types of homogeneous/ heterogeneous radars, reports from mobile observation posts and data from various other Air Force Airbases or Civilian agencies viz Air Traffic Control, Air Force Movement Liaison Unit etc. to create real time comprehensive recognized air situation picture (RASP) at the Command & Control Center (C & C Center). The connectivity of sensors/agencies from/to the C&C Center will connected on a redundant high speed wide area network based on IP protocol.

the automated Air Defense command and control should have the following features
1.Adaptable to legacy systems
2.High availability rate
3.Open architecture and state of the art HMI
4.Upgrade ability and expand ability
5.Situational awareness and Analysis
6.Generation of Recognized, accurate, updated and complete real time Air Situation Picture (RASP) for local as well as centralized air space control and surveillance Threat Evaluation on the basis of Identification of track.
7.Integration of various types of radars and adaptable to user legacy systems.
8.System generated solution for Weapon assignment including Surface to Air Guided Weapons, AAA and aircraft (Fighter aircraft interception control)
9.Automation of tactical functionalities viz. Interception, Aircraft recovery, Threat evaluation, PAD (Passive Air Defense) warning etc.
10.Automatic track Identification based upon flight plan and IFF data with manual override
11.Interception solution & commands for defender aircraft against target.
12.Flight Plan ingestion & collision resolution.
13.Surveillance alert generation.
14.Simulation of exercise environment through multi identity tracks.
15.Dissemination of weapon control orders & other tactical commands to weapon units.
16.Record & Replay of operator actions as well as ASP situations.
17.Air Defense Resource Planning, management & deployment including radar coverage area analysis
18.Post mission analysis
19.Air tasking order processing
etc

at the minimum the idea is to provide an appropriate solution to identify the track information in the Air.
1.To produce a “Recognized Air Situation Picture” (RASP) by using the information received from different radars and other assets.
2.To provide a perfect WA solution for enemy aircraft/missiles using different interception tactics (for Combat Air Patrol), SAM missiles and AAA.
3.To achieve automation in the Air-Defense hierarchy of the concerned air force.


WHAT IS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A MODERN GOOD SAM

1.High Mobility
2.High Resistance to Jamming
3.Optimal Missile Range and corresponding Radar Power
4.Lower Band Operating Frequencies
5.Advanced Digital Signal and Data Processing
6.Defensive Counter Measures and Emitting Decoys
7.Low Probability of Intercept Techniques
8.Digital Data links/Network Centric Setup
9.Dual Missile Seekers
10.Ability for Interception of PGMs
etc

SAM missiles are not standalone much depends on the radars supporting it.

The limit of the interception range of a modern surface-to-air missile system can be easily estimated.
Given the radar performance parameter R0, which is the maximum range for initial detection of a target with a radar cross section of one square meter, the detection range for a target with a radar cross section σ, is:

R det (σ)=R0·σ1/4

After initial detection, there is a time delay or reaction time during which a firm track is established, the target is identified, and the missile is launched. The time dependence of the target range, as measured from the radar, is:

R target (t)=[[{R2 det (σ)-altitude2}½- V target .t]2 +altitude2]½

here
2 stands for square
½ stands for square root
altitude = target altitude
V target = target speed
R det(σ) = radar detection range for a target with a radar cross section σ

Again the time dependence of the range of the intercepting surface-to-air missile, as measured from the radar is

R SAM (t)=V SAM ·(t−τ delay )

here
V SAM = surface-to-air missile average speed
t delay = time delay or reaction time

By setting these two equations equal, R SAM (t) = R target (t), the maximum potential interception range, as limited by surface-to-air missile fly-out, can then be calculated as a function of several variables.

these kind of calculations and analysis are required to set up Weapon Engagement Zones WEZs which are a critical part of air defense planning because they represent the defense posture against the air and missile threats.

WEZ is an airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon system and can be sub divided into the following

(a) FEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft.
(b) HIMEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with high-altitude SAMs.
(c) LOMEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles.
(d) SHORADEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with SHORAD weapons. It may be established within a low- or high-altitude missile engagement zone.
(e) JEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which multiple AD systems (SAMs and aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats.

Again air defense includes includes various types of defensive coverage depending on operational requirements

(a) Area Defense. Area defense uses a combination of weapon systems (e.g. aircraft and SAMs) or various combinations of airborne and ground-based sensors and shooters to defend broad areas.

(b) Point Defense. Point defense protects limited areas, normally in defense of vital elements of forces or installations. For example, a SAM or AAA unit positioned to protect an airfield is considered point defense.

(c) Self-Defense. Self-defense operations allow friendly units to defend themselves against direct attacks or threats of attack through the use of organic weapons and systems. The right of self-defense is inherent to all ROE and weapons control procedures.

which again in turn requires

(a) Determination Of Surveillance Coverage Areas. Defended airspace must be under continuous surveillance to facilitate early warning. The planner should use a combination of air-, surface-, and space-based detection assets to achieve this requirement. Adequate early warning of air and missile attacks provides the reaction time necessary for friendly forces to seek shelter or take appropriate action. Early warning of hostile air and missile attacks is vital for a layered defense.

(b) Development of the Active AMD(air and missile defense) Fire Plan. The objective is to provide the required level of protection specified in the critical asset list. Defense resources involve applying a mix of the following six employment guidelines, because not all may be required or possible to defend dependent upon the threat and defensive counter-air assets available:

1. Mutual Support. Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the adjacent weapon systems. For gun systems, this dead zone is usually small. For missile systems, the dead zone may be large and mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover non-operational units or units at lower states of readiness.

2. Overlapping Fires. Weapons are positioned so that their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes from which the enemy can attack or conduct surveillance operations, defense planners must apply mutual supporting and overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.

3. Balanced Fires. Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions. This is necessary for AD in an area where the terrain does not canalize the enemy or when the avenue of approach is unpredictable.

4. Weighted Coverage. Weapons are positioned to concentrate fires toward the most likely threat direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage in a more likely direction.

5. Early Engagement. Sensors and weapons are positioned to maximize early warning and to engage and destroy aircraft and missiles before they acquire and fire on or damage the defended asset.

6. Defense in Depth. AMD sensors and weapons are positioned to enable multiple engagement opportunities and deliver an increasing volume of fire as an enemy air or missile threat approaches the protected asset. Defense in depth reduces the probability that “leakers” will reach the defended asset or force.

again,

steps must be taken for reduction of Enemy targeting effectiveness of ur assets via

1.Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability by complicating enemy surveillance and reconnaissance efforts to pinpoint locations of targets. Mobility may be coupled with concealment to “hide” assets.

2.Deception. Deception misleads adversaries by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. Deception may be used to cause an enemy to waste munitions on false targets, deceive their combat assessment process, and falsely influence their decision makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information.Deception may deny the enemy the ability to gain correct tactical, operational, and strategic information when using their reconnaissance and surveillance systems.

3.Emission Control/Communications Security. Communications security and an emission control program for infrared, electromagnetic, and acoustic
signature reduction can deny the enemy sensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisition and ID of friendly target systems (eg C2 nodes).

4.Camouflage and Concealment. Practice visual signature reduction measures that can “hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets/target systems. These measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings. Timely intelligence concerning the overflight by enemy satellite and aircraft collection systems is important to the effort. Those measures also may be coupled with deception measures to
further complicate chances of effective enemy attacks.

5.Redundancy. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical nodes, capabilities, and systems that are particularly vulnerable to air and missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. Redundancy includes dual, contingency, or backup capabilities that can assume primary mission functions (in whole or in part) upon failure or degradation of the primary system. Of
primary concern are “soft” targets such as C2 nodes and sensors (antennae) and fixed sites such as airfields and ground stations for airborne sensors.

6.Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration and making a target system less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed.
etc

lionel4power:
but not the Gripen C/D?

to tell the truth , all these classification does not hold water because there is no set standard against which aircraft's can be judged

technology involved is the main rider here

1.relaxed static stability design
2.digital FBW
3.radar tech eg aesa
4.FADEC engine
5.composites
6.maintainability and BITE functionality
7.top of the line avionics
8.life support systems
9.EW suit eg based on aesa
10.optronics
11.sensor fusion
12.care free pilot handling characteristics
13.turnaround time
14.hot refueling ,mid air refueling capability
etc
etc

question is u can make a safe guess but can u make a correct guess

The Chadian Air Force have two things going for them. Early warning radar systems and Eastern European mercenary pilots very good at flying Fulcrums and the venerable SU-24 Frogfooth, thats basically a flying tank. What can Nigeria do? Our Tin Sheild radar systems are deployed around airbases and are too few to make any strategic sense. We have virtually no aur defense systems and we have failed to plug that air defense gap with a sensible number of interceptors. Even two squadrons of the F-7 Chenngdu Air Guard interceptor will at least give Nigeria the some modest ability to harass and intercept hosptile aircrafts...
But no.. we are just contented with having just 6 airworthy F-7N interceptors to protect 936,000 km of Nigeria's territory that holds one of the largest energy reserve and oil infrastructure known to man. Our leaders are either selfish, illiterates, or both with misplaced petty PDP,APC who defected to which party nonsense as priorities and we the Nigerian people will suffer unjustly from their greed and incompemtence.

lionel4power:
Bros... technically its an interceptor. (According to odunayaw) it should be able to hold its own against the MiGs, if the conditions are right.

optimally with GCI

nemesis4u:
optimally with GCI

I wouldn't know how the Nigerian Air Force would fare in an air combat. flying GCI would work if we had solid ground based air surveillance assets. right now, aerial warfare is not our strong suits.

nemesis4u:
to tell the truth , all these classification does not hold water because there is no set standard against which aircraft's can be judged

technology involved is the main rider here

1.relaxed static stability design
2.digital FBW
3.radar tech eg aesa
4.FADEC engine
5.composites
6.maintainability and BITE functionality
7.top of the line avionics
8.life support systems
9.EW suit eg based on aesa
10.optronics
11.sensor fusion
12.care free pilot handling characteristics
13.turnaround time
14.hot refueling ,mid air refueling capability
etc
etc

question is u can make a safe guess but can u make a correct guess

I'll take 3, 9 and 11 with a cup of coffee. thank you very much.

nemesis4u:
another post which i wrote long ago

you'll make a really bad car salesman.

. such long article.. sensory overload.

lionel4power:
I'll take 3, 9 and 11 with a cup of coffee. thank you very much.

unless u r planning on using a magical flying carpet

u will need

1, 2 ,4 ,7, 12,13 too

SSBN:
The Chadian Air Force have two things going for them. Early warning radar systems and Eastern European mercenary pilots very good at flying Fulcrums and the venerable SU-24 Frogfooth, thats basically a flying tank. What can Nigeria do? Our Tin Sheild radar systems are deployed around airbases and are too few to make any strategic sense. We have virtually no aur defense systems and we have failed to plug that air defense gap with a sensible number of interceptors. Even two squadrons of the F-7 Chenngdu Air Guard interceptor will at least give Nigeria the some modest ability to harass and intercept hosptile aircrafts...
But no.. we are just contented with having just 6 airworthy F-7N interceptors to protect 936,000 km of Nigeria's territory that holds one of the largest energy reserve and oil infrastructure known to man. Our leaders are either selfish, illiterates, or both with misplaced petty PDP,APC who defected to which party nonsense as priorities and we the Nigerian people will suffer unjustly from their greed and incompemtence.

maybe you should join politics.

nemesis4u:
unless u r planning on using a magical flying carpet
u will need
1, 2 ,4 ,7, 12,13 too

that's basically all what you're offering!! I'm going back to Russia.

lionel4power:
you'll make a really bad car salesman.


.
such long article.. sensory overload.

good things r best taken in small bites

lionel4power:
Bros... technically its an interceptor. (According to odunayaw) it should be able to hold its own against the MiGs, if the conditions are right.

Of course I know it's an interceptor .....

But can it stand a more superior fighter jets(Mig29).

SSBN:
The Chadian Air Force have two things going for them. Early warning radar systems and Eastern European mercenary pilots very good at flying Fulcrums and the venerable SU-24 Frogfooth, thats basically a flying tank. What can Nigeria do? Our Tin Sheild radar systems are deployed around airbases and are too few to make any strategic sense. We have virtually no aur defense systems and we have failed to plug that air defense gap with a sensible number of interceptors. Even two squadrons of the F-7 Chenngdu Air Guard interceptor will at least give Nigeria the some modest ability to harass and intercept hosptile aircrafts...
But no.. we are just contented with having just 6 airworthy F-7N interceptors to protect 936,000 km of Nigeria's territory that holds one of the largest energy reserve and oil infrastructure known to man. Our leaders are either selfish, illiterates, or both with misplaced petty PDP,APC who defected to which party nonsense as priorities and we the Nigerian people will suffer unjustly from their greed and incompemtence.

Well said mate.

bidexiii:
Of course I know it's an interceptor .....

But can it stand a more superior fighter jets(Mig29).

One on one nope. 4 F-7 on a Chad's Mig 29 won't be a fare fight. You can't chase the 4 jets together. Depending on tactics being used, if the Mig 29 has a lead on one but have 3 f-7 on its tail ready to fire?

bidexiii:
Of course I know it's an interceptor .....

But can it stand a more superior fighter jets(Mig29).

if some technica l conditions are set right then it should be able to hold ground against superior fighter jets.

bidexiii:
Yes they are installed at the Maiduguri and Yobe state respectively airforce base.

I need to know why you guys think it is wise to share this kind of info with foreigners?. Please let us stick to sharing only open source knowledge with non Nigerians. Even for open sourced knowledge there are updates that you use a clear risk matrix within your mind to determine whether to share or not.

lionel4power:
if some [i]technica[/i]l conditions are set right then it should be able to hold ground against superior fighter jets.

Any jet can shoot down a superior fighter in my opinion. Imagine a super Tucano with AAM. If the Tucano is able to stay in a right position ( at the back of a SU-35) and then fires and AAM, it's obviously a kill for the Tucano.


In as much as some parameters are being fulfilled, it's possible.

Adminisher:
I need to know why you guys think it is wise to share this kind of info with foreigners?. Please let us stick to sharing only open source knowledge with non Nigerians. Even for open sourced knowledge there are updates that you use a clear risk matrix within your mind to determine whether to share or not.

It's an opinion. The guys here are just giving their persona opinion. To me, their location might not be permanent at the AFB, they might be stationed outside the airbase at times.

Don't take it too serious.

lionel4power:
maybe you should join politics.

Why would i ever wanna do that?

SSBN:
Why would i ever wanna do that?

well... because you seem really angry at the way things are done in Nigeria.

Maybe you'll like to change things

Adminisher:
I need to know why you guys think it is wise to share this kind of info with foreigners?. Please let us stick to sharing only open source knowledge with non Nigerians. Even for open sourced knowledge there are updates that you use a clear risk matrix within your mind to determine whether to share or not.

nemesis4u:

Say that again

tdayof:
One on one nope. 4 F-7 on a Chad's Mig 29 won't be a fare fight. You can't chase the 4 jets together. Depending on tactics being used, if the Mig 29 has a lead on one but have 3 f-7 on its tail ready to fire?

One on one the probability of an F7 shooting down a Mig29 is very, very slim.


4F-7 on one Mig29.......

And what if two, three or more Mig's attacks from different direction, what will the airforce do with limited interceptors . Don't forget we av only six air worthy FN-7 . So u attack for F7 just to bring down a Mig29. That would result to a collateral lost.

The bottom line is that we don't av what it takes to defend our air space.

tdayof:
Any jet can shoot down a superior fighter in my opinion. Imagine a super Tucano with AAM. If the Tucano is able to stay in a right position ( at the back of a SU-35) and then fires and AAM, it's obviously a kill for the Tucano.


In as much as some parameters are being fulfilled, it's possible.

The probability is 50/50.