Blyss:

Damn, those are females?

Yes, they are young African girls with short hair. Unlike Nigeria, we don't allow Brazilian weaves or vanity into our armed forces.

Getting top notch training from Americans.



[img]http://rickrozoff.files./2011/01/200510310934321.jpg[/img]

Not those who has the highest cars knows how to use it. Don't try to mess with Nigerian military or else you guys will regret it.

Abrantie: Humvees.. that's right! .. Direct from Yankee!

[img]http://74.54.19.227/news/174/17402403.full.jpg[/img]

Those are not Humvees , but Chinese Norinco copies of the humvee.

If this thread was meant to impress anyone, I'm afraid you failed woefully. As a matter of fact, you Ghanians ought to be embarrassed. You know why? Everyone's sending combat troops to Mali. Even little Togo and Bukina Faso deployed reasonable nos of combat troops. But what do we get from Ghana? A bunch of carpenters and masons armed with M-4s?

This is a clear indication that you guys don't take the Mali ops serious at all. As a matter of fact, this is just another repeat of ECOMOG ops in Liberia and Sierre-Leone were Ghanian troops, notorious for their cowardice, hid in the barracks, while Nigerian and Guinean soldiers fought the NPLF and the RUF in the jungles.

otumfour:




nigerian police! need I say more ?

An average Nigerian cop serving in any Mobile Police (MOPOL) squadron is experienced in internal security ops (including counter-insurgency), direct action ops, protection detail missions, and of course policing ops that involves the fights against armed robbers, smugglers, etc. Don't forget operations in Bakassi and Mogadishu.

The only major operation a soldier serving with the Ghanian army special forces has experienced is election duties.

So tell me, if a Nigerian MOPOL cop and a Ghanian soldier are put in a fight, who's going to get a$$-whooped big time?

Abrantie:

It's better to have air defense capabilities than to have none at all. After all, we don't foresee going to war with any advance nation. Our defense is geared towards weak countries like Mali, Togo, Benin and Nigeria . Even the US (and some of their European allies) still uses "hogs", which is like from the Vietnam era or ww2 or something like that.

A-10 Thunderbolt, aka "Hogs" (the deadliest lowest tech fighter on earth).

Geared towards Nigeria? Riiight........

You only have trainer jets, your ships combined aren't up to a single Nigerian Navy command fleet, and you think you can take on west Africa's sole super power? Keep dreaming.

if this guy wants to impress us with this azonto pics, then his has done a pooooor job.

I am not "trying" to impress. I have already impressed. For such a small West African nation, I think we are holding down our house pretty good. We present the facade of a docile peace-loving nation but at the same holding a big stick behind our back to whack the enemy. You mess with us we fvck you up!

I have more pix to post of our arsenal.

ocelot2006:


An average Nigerian cop serving in any Mobile Police (MOPOL) squadron is experienced in internal security ops (including counter-insurgency), direct action ops, protection detail missions, and of course policing ops that involves the fights against armed robbers, smugglers, etc. Don't forget operations in Bakassi and Mogadishu.

The only major operation a soldier serving with the Ghanian army special forces has experienced is election duties.

So tell me, if a Nigerian MOPOL cop and a Ghanian soldier are put in a fight, who's going to get a$$-whooped big time?

You are talking hypothetical rubbish. If your security forces are so efficient, how come you can't deploy them effectively against Boko Haram?

Face it, your defence forces are not better than ours. Sure, you may have a few more jet fighters or ships or soldiers, but that doesn't make your forces better than Ghana's. We trained your leaders in our military academies and schools. We are your masters in that regard. Just because you struck oil first and able to order more guns doesn't make your defence forces superior.

Heading to Mali to kill terrorists!

[img]http://beegeagle.files./2011/09/ghanaloading-ee9-cascavel.jpg[/img]

Abrantie:
You are talking hypothetical rubbish. If your security forces are so efficient, how come you can't deploy them effectively against Boko Haram?

Face it, your defence forces are not better than ours. Sure, you may have a few more jet fighters or ships or soldiers, but that doesn't make your forces better than Ghana's. We trained your leaders in our military academies and schools. We are your masters in that regard. Just because you struck oil first and able to order more guns doesn't make your defence forces superior.

No better than yours? Son, the Nigerian military is leagues ahead of lil Ghana in EVERY WAY (training, combat experience, firepower, professionalism). You guys can't even transport yourselves to Mali, yet our C-130s and G-222s have been flying transport sorties from day 1 without any help from anyone. And read about your countries past performance in military ops and you'll be deeply ashamed.

And you think our military isn't kicking Boko Haram ass? READ THE DAMN NEWS, SON. When last did you here about any major bomb attacks in Nigeria. So far it's all been stories of arrests and raids, because our Joint Task Force with help from our intelligence services have killed off or arrested BH leaders listed as High Value Targets, destroyed terror bases and training sites within and outside Nigeria, and siezed a lot of weapons.

Btw, yes our first military commanders trained in Ghana, but that's because we never had any military training institution for officers in Nigeria then. But right now, you can't even compare your training schools to ours. Go to our National War College Abuja, and see the number of foreign senior officers we train, yours inclusive. And your basic officer training school don't even come close to the Nigerian Defence Academy.

Finally, my comparison between a MOPOL cop and your special forces is based on FACTS. An average MOPOL squadron has seen combat within and outside Nigeria, and is involved in major COIN ops, protection detail ops. Keep in mind that operators for the Anti-Terror Squad are drawn from MOPOL.

But list just ONE major military operation that your newly formed army special forces has been involved in. Do you even think your soldiers can survive the first few days at the Nigerian Police Force's Mobile Police Training School in Guaza, Borno state? Yet you think they can take on MOPOL cops, talk less of soldiers? Keep smoking the chronic, dude.

Just face it, your country's military is just a parade ground military that spends more time looking "fly" rather than gaining combat experience.

Who these MOPOL cops? Are they some kind of speciol COIN unit.

andrewza: Who these MOPOL cops? Are they some kind of speciol COIN unit.

Yeah. The paramilitary wing of the Nigerian Police Force. Kinda similar to Russia's OMON.

ocelot2006:


No better than yours? Son, the Nigerian military is leagues ahead of lil Ghana in EVERY WAY (training, combat experience, firepower, professionalism). You guys can't even transport yourselves to Mali, yet our C-130s and G-222s have been flying transport sorties from day 1 without any help from anyone. And read about your countries past performance in military ops and you'll be deeply ashamed.


Just face it, your country's military is just a parade ground military that spends more time looking "fly" rather than gaining combat experience.

The war in Mali is an international affair. UK has its part to play, and that is, to transport troops and equipment to the battle ground. Why should we spend more money than necessary when that offer is available? Is it to show off like, "Hey look at my C-130... I don't have fuel for my generator back home but I've been able to get some for this plane".

Read and weep: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghana_Armed_Forces

[size=16pt]Peacekeeping[/size]

The Ghanaian military is recognised as one of the most professional and up-to-date armed forces in West Africa, and as Ghana itself is a peaceful nation, enjoying stable relations with its neighbours in West Africa, Ghana is free to commit a large proportion of its armed forces to international peacekeeping operations. Such operations are mainly conducted in Africa, while large Ghanaian forces are frequently posted across the world as elements of United Nations peacekeeping forces. The United Nations has often relied on Ghanaian forces to conduct peacekeeping operations, in countries as diverse as Rwanda, Kosovo, and Lebanon. Currently, Ghanaian forces are posted to United Nations peacekeeping missions as follows:

MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo) - 464
UNMIL (Liberia) - 852
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) - 782
UNIFIL (Lebanon) - 651

Ghana provided the first Force Commander of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo. Quainoo led the force from July 1990 to September 1990, before being superseded by a Nigerian officer in the aftermath of Liberian President Samuel Doe's death.

A few of our service women and men - UNMIL (Liberia)

Abrantie:









Heading to Mali to kill terrorists!

[img]http://beegeagle.files./2011/09/ghanaloading-ee9-cascavel.jpg[/img]

Did u know those armored cars were bought from South Africa its called the RATEL eventhough SA has replaced it with more modern ones its still a very good armored troop carrier by world and african standards

snydergp:

Did u know those armored cars were bought from South Africa its called the RATEL eventhough SA has replaced it with more modern ones its still a very good armored troop carrier by world and african standards

Is that a ratel? Somthing looks off about it.

ocelot2006:

Yeah. The paramilitary wing of the Nigerian Police Force. Kinda similar to Russia's OMON.

That is a diffrent level to regualer cops and even regualer infantry.

SA poliec task force(our swat teams) train to a simmaler level to our Army SF just with more focuse on saving lifes. But they sound closer to the old Koevoet unit of the border war. Cops who used RPG.s, MGL,s LMG,s and drove in MRAPs armend in one case with a 20mm auto canon(normal was a 12.7mm but was genraily upgraded in the field)

Abrantie:


The war in Mali is an international affair. UK has its part to play, and that is, to transport troops and equipment to the battle ground. Why should we spend more money than necessary when that offer is available? Is it to show off like, "Hey look at my C-130... I don't have fuel for my generator back home but I've been able to get some for this plane".

Read and weep: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghana_Armed_Forces

[size=16pt]Peacekeeping[/size]

The Ghanaian military is recognised as one of the most professional and up-to-date armed forces in West Africa, and as Ghana itself is a peaceful nation, enjoying stable relations with its neighbours in West Africa, Ghana is free to commit a large proportion of its armed forces to international peacekeeping operations. Such operations are mainly conducted in Africa, while large Ghanaian forces are frequently posted across the world as elements of United Nations peacekeeping forces. The United Nations has often relied on Ghanaian forces to conduct peacekeeping operations, in countries as diverse as Rwanda, Kosovo, and Lebanon. Currently, Ghanaian forces are posted to United Nations peacekeeping missions as follows:

MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo) - 464
UNMIL (Liberia) - 852
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) - 782
UNIFIL (Lebanon) - 651

Ghana provided the first Force Commander of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo. Quainoo led the force from July 1990 to September 1990, before being superseded by a Nigerian officer in the aftermath of Liberian President Samuel Doe's death.

@ bolded, talk abt hitting the nail

Abrantie:


The war in Mali is an international affair. UK has its part to play, and that is, to transport troops and equipment to the battle ground. Why should we spend more money than necessary when that offer is available? Is it to show off like, "Hey look at my C-130... I don't have fuel for my generator back home but I've been able to get some for this plane".

Read and weep: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghana_Armed_Forces

[size=16pt]Peacekeeping[/size]

The Ghanaian military is recognised as one of the most professional and up-to-date armed forces in West Africa, and as Ghana itself is a peaceful nation, enjoying stable relations with its neighbours in West Africa, Ghana is free to commit a large proportion of its armed forces to international peacekeeping operations. Such operations are mainly conducted in Africa, while large Ghanaian forces are frequently posted across the world as elements of United Nations peacekeeping forces. The United Nations has often relied on Ghanaian forces to conduct peacekeeping operations, in countries as diverse as Rwanda, Kosovo, and Lebanon. Currently, Ghanaian forces are posted to United Nations peacekeeping missions as follows:

MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo) - 464
UNMIL (Liberia) - 852
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) - 782
UNIFIL (Lebanon) - 651

Ghana provided the first Force Commander of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo. Quainoo led the force from July 1990 to September 1990, before being superseded by a Nigerian officer in the aftermath of Liberian President Samuel Doe's death.

Oh please spare me the damn excuses! Airlifting your own troops isn't about showing off. Little Togo airlifted its own troops. Even the Nigeriens and Chadians were able to deploy most of their troops on land. It's at least proof that you can deploy your resources independently. At least airlifting your own troops would have provided your military with some logistical experience and you pilots with same transport experience via logged hours during transport sorties.

And just 4 PEACEKEEPING mission?! You now know why the Ghanaian military is a parade ground military with little-to-zero combat experience? Even your own former commander lost Samuel Doe to Johnson's rebels, even though Doe was under the General's personal custody. That would NEVER have happened with the Nigerian contingent. Even during the military ops in Sierre Leone, Ghanians were NOTORIOUS for their cowardice, and never showed up in the battlefield. Even the Guineans had way more balls of steel!!

Oh btw, I don't have any power generator. I enjoy 24hrs of light in a North-Eastern state. Oh...you do know that's a state in the so-called "Boko Haram infested" region, right?

andrewza:

Is that a ratel? Somthing looks off about it.

Yes they are SA sold 39 to Ghana 26 of them are the 90mm version and the rest the 20mm light armed variant back in 2010 including a few Caspirs also.

why una dey even answer these ghanaians sef.

But lemme just comment on one thing i saw here. I am in a university, and i am not using gen. We have 24hrs power supply. This is becos, we have our own dam. We feed ourselves and we also give to the community around us. And guess what, this uni is the biggest uni in WA and has produced many great minds. Some of whom are manning our govt and private sector as well as international orgs. It is in the socalled violent north.

Mi-171Sh military transport helicopter



http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsghana-air-force-inducts-four-mi-171sh-helicopters

snydergp:

Yes they are SA sold 39 to Ghana 26 of them are the 90mm version and the rest the 20mm light armed variant back in 2010 including a few Caspirs also.

Knew about the sale. Just that AFV looks diffrent.
Probaly the camo then. All ways seen them in nutra brown. And I though they where to heavy to be air lifted in a C130.

@ocelot2006, please enlighten us -- besides your Biafra civil war, which non-peacekeeping wars has Nigeria's mighty army fought?

Has Nigeria ever been at war with ANY other country? Nope! So pray tell, which international war experience makes you more special than Ghana? What you have going is the size of your army. With 160 million people, there's a large pool of expendable human beings to push to the front lines wielding AK47s or bow and arrows.

** Breaking News ** Nigerian Troops In Mali Facing Hardships

https://www.nairaland.com/1195292/nigerian-troops-mali-facing-hardship

I have an idea, why don't they sell one of the C-130s and buy food!?

andrewza:

That is a diffrent level to regualer cops and even regualer infantry.

SA poliec task force(our swat teams) train to a simmaler level to our Army SF just with more focuse on saving lifes. But they sound closer to the old Koevoet unit of the border war. Cops who used RPG.s, MGL,s LMG,s and drove in MRAPs armend in one case with a 20mm auto canon(normal was a 12.7mm but was genraily upgraded in the field)

Yeah, I've read about Koeveot and their feats during the South African border war against SWAPO. I must admit that our own MOPOL squadrons don't even come close to those badass sons of nails. We could learn a thing or 2 from that legendary unit and the famous SADF 32 battalion.

snydergp:

Did u know those armored cars were bought from South Africa its called the RATEL eventhough SA has replaced it with more modern ones its still a very good armored troop carrier by world and african standards

That is definitely not a Ratel.

ocelot2006:


That is definitely not a Ratel.

It dose look off.

Abrantie: @ocelot2006, please enlighten us -- besides your Biafra civil war, which non-peacekeeping wars has Nigeria's mighty army fought?

Has Nigeria ever been at war with ANY other country? Nope! So pray tell, which international war experience makes you more special than Ghana? What you have going is the size of your army. With 160 million people, there's a large pool of expendable human beings to push to the front lines wielding AK47s or bow and arrows.

** Breaking News ** Nigerian Troops In Mali Facing Hardships

https://www.nairaland.com/1195292/nigerian-troops-mali-facing-hardship

I have an idea, why don't they sell one of the C-130s and buy food!?

ou sure you want that? Okay...let's dance ...

https://beegeagle./2011/08/26/chronicle-of-nigerian-military-engagements-1959-2011/


Alpha Jet of Nigeria’s ECOMOG Contingent at Lungi Airport near Freetown Sierra Leone, January, 1999


RBS Defender response boat manned by Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service commandos in the Niger Delta

On the evidence of its recorded engagements, it would be correct to state that the Nigerian military have comparatively been very active since the time of their transformation from a colonial military outfit to national armed forces.

Whereas most of these operations have centred on the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Civil War, the 15-year long expedition in the Bakassi Peninsula, ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the Niger Delta and in North-eastern Nigeria and the ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone have been coordinated tri-service operations, involving the Nigerian Army(NA), Nigerian Navy(NN) and Nigerian Air Force(NAF). The Nigerian Air Force similarly participated in Military Operations Other Than War(MOOTW) against Maitatsine elements in Kano and Maiduguri, against the Taliban in the Mandara Mountains and in Panshekara and are active with the Special Task Force – Operation Safe Haven on the Jos Plateau while the Nigerian Navy were deeply involved in the management of the Ijaw – Itsekiri crises in the Warri metropolitan area. Both services, where they maintain a presence, have over the course of several decades actively cooperated with the Nigerian Army in Internal Security Operations (ISOs) geared towards restoring peace to various parts of the volatile federation.

Broadly speaking, the levels of action and/or intervention undertaken by the Nigerian military since 1959-60 when Nigeria became self-governing and thereafter independent, can be broadly categorised as follows:

i. Civil War (internal)/Amphibious/Urban Counterinsurgency Operations – such as the unfortunate orgy of violence that was the Nigerian Civil War, the Niger Delta insurgency and the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast.

ii Civil War (external)/Amphibious/Urban Counterinsurgency Operations – such as the ECOMOG interventions in the Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Somali Civil Wars in the 1990s which involved fighting in the Fully Built-Up areas that are Monrovia, Freetown and Mogadishu, fighting in towns and villages in the hinterland and amphibious landings and operations in the marshes around Monrovia and Lungi.

iii. Military Operations Other Than War: These ordinarily ought to be classed as internal security operations but for the fact of their severity or long drawn-out nature.

Examples of MOOTW can be found in the sporadic Maitatsine uprisings of
1980-85, the most serious of which was the Kano episode thereof which lasted between 18 December 1980 and 3 January 1981 and led to the deaths of 4,177 persons. That uprising was put down by the 146 Battalion under the command of a certain Major (later Brigadier General) Haliru Akilu, himself a Kano native. The said 146 Battalion was itself a unit of Colonel (later Major General) Yohanna Yerima Kure’s 3 Mechanised Brigade. In the management of the Kano episode of the 1980s-era Maitatsine uprisings, the Nigerian Army and the Nigerian Air Force cooperated to bring the crisis in the inland city where the Navy maintain no presence, to a bloody conclusion.

In September 2004, the self-styled Taliban staged attacks against police personnel and installations in Northeastern Nigeria and attempted to establish a highland stronghold in the Mandara Mountains straddling the Nigeria-Cameroon frontier in the Far Northeast. It took military action, with NAF helicopter gunships in tow and the use of armour to neutralise the determined zealots after they had gained a foothold in the highlands.

Later in April 2007, elements of the 3 Motorised Brigade of the 1 Mechanised Infantry Division battled entrenched insurgents in the town of Panshekara near Kano where they had mounted a challenge against the authority of the State and instituted a brief reign of terror.

Another example of MOOTW – Nigerian style, can be found in the Boko Haram uprising across a 500-mile belt of Nigeria’s Far North in July 2009 which left an estimated 800 persons dead, spanned a period of one week and saw the airlift of crack troops from Jos and Calabar who formed the core assault group which flattened the Boko Haram stronghold and captured the leader of the group and handed him over to the Nigeria Police. Strange and unfortunate things happened to the enigmatic fellow thereafter, which really ought not to have happened.

Other examples of MOOTW include the Ijaw-Itsekiri conflict in Warri (1996-97 and 2002-3), Tiv-Jukun conflict in the eastern flank of Central Nigeria in the early 2000s and the ongoing Jos conflict which has seen rival ethnic militia using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and hand grenades and mounting hit-and-run/ride-by attacks against one another. All of these spanned or have dragged on for a minimum of two years.

iv. Internal Security Operations (ISOs): Within the context of our peculiar categorisation and weighed against the backdrop of Nigeria’s long history of insurgencies, ethnoreligious violence and inter-communal conflicts, these are more routine operations undertaken in aid to civil authorities but which have been typically very violent and have variously resulted in hundreds, sometimes thousands of deaths on account of mindless acts of violence and a total breakdown of law and order.

These include, but are not limited to, the Tiv and Western Nigeria crises of 1962-1965, the post-election violence of 1983 in Western Nigeria, Ife-Modakeke conflict of the late 1990s, the 2000 Sharia crisis in Kaduna which claimed thousands of lives. The Nigerian Army also had to intervene in Yelwa-Shendam, Jos and Kano in 2004 to restore peace after well over a thousand persons had been killed in ethnoreligious violence between Hausa muslims and indigenous Christian peoples in the central highlands and reprisal killings which followed in Hausa muslim-dominated Kano thereafter. So serious was the violence that a rare state of emergency was declared in Plateau State.

Some years later, serious ethnoreligious violence broke out and reprisal killings followed thereafter and across broad swathes of Northern and Eastern Nigeria in that order, occasioned by perceived indiscretion on the part of a Danish cartoonist in 2006. In 2011, post-election violence again broke out in some disaffected segments of Northern Nigeria leading to the deaths of over 800 deaths. It took the intervention of the Nigerian Army to restore normalcy to the restive parts of the federation.

These aforementioned MOOTW and ISOs have for good reason been differentiated from the Civil War and amphibious and urban counterinsurgency operations as represented by the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

As a prelude to the spotlight on foreign engagements, it might be necessary to state at this juncture that the Nigerian Army have since the country’s attainment of self-governing status in 1959 (prior to full independence in 1960) been very active in peacekeeping operations outside the country and more consequentially, in PEACE ENFORCEMENT which has typically implied fighting to win the peace.

Beginning in 1959, the NA (then known as the Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment – QONR) intervened to create a buffer zone and to secure the UN Trust Territory of British Southern Cameroons which was at the time administered in association with and as part of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria by the British.

According to “The Bakassi Story II” published by dawodu.com, “in October that year(1959), the Enugu based 1st Queens Own Nigeria Regiment (1QONR) was temporarily deployed to Southern Cameroons for “Training”. However, ‘Union des Populations Camerounaises’(UPC)sympathizers in Bamenda viewed this as a counter-insurgency deployment in support of the hated French colonial administration.

In early 1960, responding to more violence in the area, the 1QONR again returned to Bamenda area in full force, followed shortly thereafter by the 4QONR from Ibadan who were deployed further south to Kumba near the coast. The 5QONR and 3QONR later replaced both battalions respectively – followed later by the 2QONR. This show of military force did not endear Nigeria to certain opinion leaders in the local population.

Therefore, the Southern Cameroons (inclusive of the Bakassi Peninsula), which was now under separate direct British rule as a
trusteeship territory, asked Nigerian troops to leave. A British Battalion replaced them.

However, 1QONR, supported by the new recce unit of the newly-independent Nigerian Army were then deployed in an internal security precaution along the frontier to prevent spill-over of violence. The old Anglo-German border of 1913 was resurveyed at this time by Nigerian military foot patrols to confirm the location of old beacons and new Police Posts were constructed along it for clarity.

Writing in a 30th August, 2003 commentary in the British newspaper, “The Telegraph”, J.F Bailey, a former overseas civil servant who served with the Colonial Office in British Southern Cameroons wrote “when Cameroons suffered terrorism in the 1950s and 1960s, the Nigerian Army, the King’s Own Borderers and the Grenadier Guards sorted out the terrorists and maintained safety for the native people.”

Again commenting in a riposte titled “Cameroon Concerns” and published in the “Telegraph” edition of 31st August, 2003, Eric Cowell of Wicken, Cambs. wrote “The Cameroons were technically a UN trusteeship, administered by Britain through Nigeria. There were terrorists in the French Cameroon, and it certainly was the Nigerian Army that first arrived to deter terrorists from crossing into Southern Cameroon. The tented Nigerian Army camp was located on what was then the Bamenda Agricultural Showground and Race Track. The Nigerian soldiers were replaced by the King’s Own Royal Border Regiment, who were later replaced by the Grenadier Guards, who lost at least one man in a terrorist ambush.”

By a twist of fate, the Nigerian Army was to return to the same precincts several decades later, albeit as part of an independent La Republic du Cameroun, with the December 1993 invasion of the disputed Bakassi Peninsula. The NA remained on the Peninsula with its peak deployment reportedly put at 3,000 troops, until the 2008 withdrawal under the tenets of the Green Tea Agreement which awarded the territory to Cameroon.

Since the attainment of Nigerian independence in 1960, the QONR (as it remained until the attainment of republican status in 1963) in November 1960 deployed to Congo-Leopoldville as part of the UN mission and the nature of that intervention was largely that of peace enforcement as is the case with today’s MONUC in the DR Congo.

Indeed, in his book titled “Nzeogwu”, General Olusegun Obasanjo who served in Bukavu in Kivu Province and in the Katanga Province of the Congo, offers a narrative of military altercations which his unit had with Katangese gendarmes allied to the secessionist cause in Katanga. They had to fight to keep the peace. The NA remained in the Congo until 1964.

Some other famous Nigerian military officers who served in the Congo include but are not limited to Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (who led the first-ever Nigerian military coup d’etat in January 1966), Generals Murtala Muhammed and Sani Abacha (both former Nigerian military dictators) and General T.Y Danjuma, a former Nigerian Army chief and one-time Defence Minister.

It is interesting to note that during the Nigerian Civil War, the comparatively higher-level of professionalism in the operations of 1 Infantry Division was believed to have largely stemmed from the fact that the division had the thickest assemblage of veterans who saw action in World War II, Congo and in the British Cameroons. This reality set them apart from the mostly hastily-trained raw recruits in other army divisions who only gained combat experience as the Nigerian Civil War progressed grimly.

Peace enforcement/intervention missions as earlier on stated which, in effect, saw the NA being involved in full-blown combat operations include the ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 1990-2000 epoch and the UNOSOM II intervention which was led by the Americans in the 1992-94 era.

v. FOREIGN OPERATIONS:

Since the 1960s and after the expeditions to the British Cameroons and the ONUC intervention in the Congo in the 1960s which were variously of a counterinsurgency and peace enforcement nature and the 3-year long Nigerian Civil War which saw Nigeria’s emergence as the first African country to win a Civil War (a war which has been described as Africa’s first modern war), the Nigerian Army have deployed to numerous foreign theatres of operation for peacekeeping, observer missions and bilateral security operations as follows:

*BILATERAL SPECIAL TRAINING AND SECURITY MISSION IN TANZANIA – 1964

*BILATERAL SPECIAL PROTECTION FORCE IN SIERRA LEONE. 1991-97

*NIGERIAN NEUTRAL FORCE, CHAD (BILATERAL) 1979

*OAU PEACEKEEPING FORCE, CHAD 1981-82

* UNSF, NEW GUINEA – 1962-63

* UNIPOM, INDO-PAKISTAN 1965-66

* UNIFIL, LEBANON 1978-82

* UNIMOG, IRAN-IRAQ 1988-91

*UNTAG, NAMIBIA 1991

*UNAVEM 1, ANGOLA, 1991

*UNTAC, CAMBODIA 1992-93

*UNOSOM II, SOMALIA 1992

*UNPROFOR, YUGOSLAVIA 1992

*UNOMOZ,  MOZAMBIQUE 1992

*UNAVEM II & III, ANGOLA 1991-95

*UNASOG, AOUZOU STRIP (CHAD) 1994

*UNAMIR, RWANDA – 1993

*ECOMOG TASK FORCE IN SIERRA LEONE, 1997-99

*UNAMSIL – 1999-2004

*ECOMIL – LIBERIA 2003

*MONUC, DR CONGO, 2003-2005

*UNMIL – LIBERIA 2003 – DATE

*AFRICAN MISSION IN DARFUR – 2004-2008

*UN-AU MISSION IN DARFUR – 2008 TILL DATE

*UNMIS, SUDAN – 2005 – July 2011

*MINURCAT, CHAD-CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 2007 – DATE

*UNMISS, SOUTH SUDAN wef 2011

vi. STATE-ON-STATE MILITARY ACTION

In April 1983, elements of the Nigerian Army’s 21 Armoured Brigade of the 3 Armoured Division and the Nigerian Air Force’s Tactical Air Command stationed in the far northeastern city of Maiduguri launched combined military operations to dislodge units of the Chadian military who had invaded and occupied 19 Nigerian islands on the Lake Chad which straddles their common border. The Nigerians counterattacked and reclaimed all 19 islands and went further to occupy 32 islands on the Chadian side. Those Chadian islands were eventually given up by the Nigerians.

In May 1987, Cameroonian security forces similarly invaded and occupied sixteen Nigerian communities near their shared frontier. They were were ultimately beaten back by elements of the Nigerian Army’s 3 Armoured Division stationed in remote Borno and the affected territories repossessed.

In December 1993, elements of the 13 Amphibious Brigade of the Nigerian Army’s 82 Division, invaded the Bakassi Peninsula straddling their common frontier with Cameroon. Thus began a 15-year long militarily opposed occupation of what is now Cameroonian territory which ultimately ended in 2008.

At about the same time as Nigerian troops invaded the Bakassi Peninsula, thirty three(33) communities on the Cameroonian side of the Lake Chad to the Far North were occupied by as many as 70,000 Nigerian citizens who had emigrated from the Nigerian side of the frontier where the Lake Chad waters had receded and established 33 settlements on the Cameroonian side of the shared frontier. All attempts by Cameroonian forces, which peaked in 1994-5,which were aimed at reclaiming the said 33 communities were repulsed by elements of the 3 Armoured Division’s 21 Brigade. These communities only reverted to Cameroonian sovereignty under the terms of the Green Tea Agreement which settled the myriad of contentious issues between Nigeria and Cameroon.

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Read up, douche .

I'm not reading all that crap. On quick glance though, all those "wars" listed are peacekeeping missions.

Oh, don't forget to add the Niger-Delta and Boko Haram counter-insurgency operations.

Apparently you think posing with M-4/M-16 rifles automatically makes your military "deadly and brainy". What combat experience do they have? Can you even produce those same rifles (the Nigerian military produces the FN-FAL, H&K G-3, GPMGs, RPGs, and mortars locally)? How many gunboats have you produced? How about UAVs? "Deadly and Brainy" my foot

One more thing, stop peddling lies about the Nigerian military contingent in Mali. This is the correct story:

http://essor.ml/banamba-geste-de-bienvenue-aux-troupes-nigerianes.html

http://www.essor.ml/rubrique/actus/editoriaux

That's from the Malians themselves. Here's the translation (courtesy of beegeagle):

https://beegeagle./2013/02/14/governor-of-koulikoro-mayors-of-banamba-and-touba-on-solidarity-visit-to-nigerian-troops-present-gifts-of-food-items/
(Translated from French)

Banamba: WELCOME GESTURE

Nigerian troops of the authorities rural commune Duguwolonwila and circle Banamba offered to soldiers Nigerian contingent of 2 tonnes of rice and 1 ox valued at 960,000 FCFA to wish them welcome in the circle Banamba.

The official presentation of the donation took place Monday at the headquarters of the troops presence of the prefect circle Banamba, Boubacar Bagayoko, and the sub-prefect of Touba,Abdoulaye Dicko, as well as Mayor of Touba, Amara Sylla, and many political and administrative circle and common Duguwolonwila.

Mayor Duguwolonwila, Amara Sylla,
recalled the country’s tradition of
granting foreigners all the honors they
deserve. He prayed to the Almighty
these troops that fight enemies alongside our forces out victorious in this battle for freedom and human dignity.

In return, Major Alhassane Commander of the Nigerian contingent parked Banamba, said he was very affected by the visit of the authorities Touba and the local circle Banamba gesture which goes to the heart of his troops. He promised to report this mark of solidarity with his hierarchy.

The sub-prefect of Touba invited all
Malian sacred union and welcomed the
which brings us a quota testimony both fraternity and sacrifice for Mali in crisis
safe.

A. M Traore