A jihadist insurgency in Nigeria is turning into a regional conflict.



DEFLECTING blame is a skill prized by politicians the world over. Many could, however, still learn a thing or two from Goodluck Jonathan, the president of Nigeria, who has found no end of scapegoats for Boko Haram, a vicious insurgent group in the north-east of Africa’s most populous country. Mr Jonathan’s most common evasion is that Boko Haram is a regional problem that cannot be solved by Nigeria alone.

His excuses seem, unfortunately, to be metamorphosing into fact. Boko Haram is now spreading its poison into neighbouring states. The kidnapping of about 80 Cameroonians from villages near the border with Nigeria has shone a light on its growing clout throughout the countries around Lake Chad.

Further north in Niger, in the once-sleepy fishing village of Kirikiri, makeshift huts are crammed with refugees who have fled Boko Haram, which loosely translates as “western education is forbidden”. Every day dozens more wade off boats, their few possessions held high over their heads. Security is deteriorating fast. Shortly after your correspondent’s arrival on a visit last year, armed guards became nervous, urging the party to move on in case it became a target. In the nearby hospital in Diffa, Nigerian soldiers lay three to a bed, bleeding through their bandages, after retreating across the border.



Boko Haram, which has killed thousands in its fight to establish a “caliphate”, has seldom shown much regard for national boundaries. It readily retreats across them when threatened, or crosses into neighbouring states to recruit and train disaffected young men, as it has recently been doing in Diffa.

Yet it had not previously nursed the same apocalyptic ambitions in neighbouring countries as it does in Nigeria. That may be changing. Many experts now think it hopes to replicate the ancient Kanem-Bornu Empire that once spanned bits of Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
So far, Cameroon has been the worst afflicted of Nigeria’s neighbours. Kidnappings on its soil have become ever more audacious over the past year. The government has responded by deploying troops to the northern borders, prompting reprisals from the militants. In December, Boko Haram briefly overran a military base in Cameroon and attacked five villages. With the situation spiralling, pressure is mounting on regional governments to respond, but their efforts have been ineffectual. Last year the Lake Chad countries agreed to deploy a multinational task force to fight the insurgency; several countries pledged to send 700 soldiers each. But plans have stalled as they bicker over details, including the right of hot pursuit.

A meeting beginning in Niger on January 20th was supposed to set wheels in motion, though at the time The Economist went to press little appeared to have been agreed on. Other initiatives also appear to have floundered. A French plan to set up an intelligence fusion centre was left with little intelligence to fuse when most of those taking part neglected to send liaison officers.

The regional economic grouping, ECOWAS, says it may also request an African Union force to tackle the problem. Whether that is likely to materialise is another question. AU troops are already stretched across the continent—in Somalia, Central African Republic and Mali, among other places—and may not have the resources to respond, says Ryan Cummings of red24, a crisis management group.

Nigeria’s prickly government would, moreover, probably reject the notion of foreign forces fighting on its soil. Yet there is little left to justify its pride. Nigeria’s army suffers from weak morale—at least 66 soldiers are on death row over their refusal to fight last year—and its units have often fled (the army calls it tactical manoeuvring) before the militants.

Western countries appear to be losing patience. Relations with America have cooled noticeably since revelations of the Nigerian army’s abuses of human rights. In response, Nigeria cancelled a programme under which American soldiers trained Nigerian ones. American is now offering help to Cameroon instead.

Chad, which has so far escaped the escalating crisis, recently began the deployment of 2,000 soldiers to assist Cameroon on the Nigerian border. Its army has a good track record against insurgents, most recently in Mali in 2013. Yet Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader, seems unconcerned. He declared in a recent video: “The kings of Africa, you are late. I challenge you to attack me even now.”

But for all the spillover, the problem is largely a Nigerian one. With elections approaching on February 14th, many politicians are focused more on their campaigns than on fighting the insurgency. Until Nigeria’s leaders show that they can take the war as seriously as they do politicking, it will be impossible to curb Boko Haram—even with regional forces to help.

[url]http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21640440-jihadist-insurgency-nigeria-turning-regional-conflict-africas?fsrc=rss%7Cmea[/url]

The same people have been killing Nigerians as terrorists or Janjaweeed party leaders.

The mode of operation of boko haram is mainly terrorizing, and it's not so easy to tackle like conventional confrontation, therefore the Nigerian Army cannot go all out when you consider war crimes.

This is why many believe there will hardly be any headway without intervention and assistance from the locals and traditional rulers.

Sadly, dialogue has been rejected be the group because they are just fanatics, having no clear purpose why they destroy people and properties, and anyone comparing them to the Niger-Delta militants is just fooling him or herself.