Africa has long been a geopolitical battleground among the great powers, with the Cold War representing an especially intense round of this struggle. From the archives of Russia’s SVR comes an overview of the KGB First Chief Directorate’s intelligence, covert action, and political influence operations in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s.

In the postwar period, the USSR tasked the Soviet foreign intelligence in conducting operations in Africa, they had to work on an African continent almost unknown to it up to that time.

In the 1950s, Soviet intelligence’s interest in Africa was conditioned mainly by the acquisition of information on the plans and intentions of Western countries. At that time many air and naval bases of NATO member nations were situated in Africa. Their interest in the continent was rooted not only in strategic reasoning: Africa was rich in food and mineral resources, and her depths preserved deposits of materials necessary for modern industry, such as uranium, cobalt, wolfram, copper, nickel, oil, and many others.

To what measure did the NATO countries seek to use the African continent in their confrontation with the Soviet Union? Soviet intelligence service was looking for answers to that question. To meet these objectives it had earlier mainly utilized its possibilities in Western nations. In Africa itself, Soviet foreign intelligence’s positions were more than modest. There were small residencies only in Egypt and Ethiopia, and by the end of the 1950s, residencies had also opened in Sudan, Ghana, and Guinea.

Soviet intelligence began its real work in Africa starting in the year 1960, when the process of African countries’ decolonization began to gain strength. 17 independent states immediately appeared on the map of the African continent. The UN declared 1960 the Year of Africa.

Within Soviet intelligence there was established an African department. Its tasks could be summarized as the following:

-Facilitate the quickest liquidation of remnants of the colonial system.

-Help national liberation movements in remaining colonies.

-Track the policies of former and current colonizers: Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal;

-Make sense of US policy in relation to Africa;

-Analyze the situation in each African country – will it remain in the orbit of the old system or take a new path?

-Acquire friends and allies among Africans.

To that were added security issues for Soviet diplomatic colonies, embassies, and other Soviet institutions.

The 1960s proved themselves to be a “hot” decade both for young African nations and Soviet foreign intelligence. African countries that had just been liberated immediately encountered harsh confrontation with their former metropoles, who sought to maintain political and economic positions in their former colonies. In a number of cases this led to the emergence of crisis situations, such as in the former Belgian Congo, for instance.

Coups d’etat that occurred with the interference of Western powers and their intelligence services, accompanied by internecine conflicts, tribal feuds, and civil wars, became a habitual phenomenon.

In every concrete situation, information from Soviet intelligence was required on who came to power, what forces carried out the coup, and along which path they were intending to lead the country. To answer all these questions was not easy. At times the participants in the events themselves didn’t know.

Soviet African operational stations, just formed and usually composed of young officers, couldn’t give exhaustive answers to all these questions. But in good faith they sent information directly from the scene of events, information that was useful to Moscow since it allowed the leadership to see and evaluate events more clearly.

But then complications in reaching mutual understanding with Africans turned out to be a complete surprise to the majority of soviet intelligence officers. Africans had a totally different mentality, habits, and mores. Naiveté and the hope for quick assistance combined with irritability and distrust. Colonial times had accustomed them to not trust the white man, and deceiving him was considered merited. All these particularities of the post-colonial African character had to be overcome by our officers, and not without hard work.

The process of decolonization was a natural and historically inevitable phenomenon that depended little upon the will of the Soviet Union and Western colonial powers. However, in the conditions of the Cold War and confrontation between the two world blocs, this process itself became an object of the confrontation.


The loss of colonies weakened the bloc of Western powers. That answered to the interests of the Soviet Union and strengthened its foreign policy positions. The Soviet Union, therefore, supported African nations’ struggle for their own political and economic independence.

The United States and colonial countries, in their turn, sought to hinder this process by any means, including the use of their intelligence services. In such a manner, the African continent turned into an arena of ideological and political confrontation for the two blocs.

And so the African peoples’ struggle for their liberation became an object of great-power rivalry. Such was the logic of the Cold War era.

Soviet intelligence conducted work in government and political circles of young African countries with a progressive orientation with great caution, limiting matters, as a rule, to confidential relationships. Therein was one of the most important particularities of its work in Africa: it wasn’t directed against African countries, but rather, was objectively answering to the interests of fighting to strengthen their own political and economic independence and their sovereignty. The interests of African nations liberated from colonial dependence and those of the Soviet Union coincided on these questions.

Soviet foreign intelligence were made to search out new techniques and methods of work. Processing open-source information such as various publications, directories, the press, radio and television, for example, acquired great significance. Of course the main weapon, however, remained confidential ties in political and social circles.

Such work demanded good political training, a knowledge of the problems, and great professional mastery. Political and social figures, government servants of various ranks, right up to the highest, all enthusiastically came to establish contacts. Usually these relationships were built and developed on a commonality of political or ideological interests. However, the intelligence officer’s art was to lend these relationships a certain direction, gradually, and in a natural way make them less noticeable to the surrounding public, bringing them to such a degree of privacy that one could count on receiving the confidential information required.

In a number of African countries viewed by the Soviet leadership as progressive in orientation, such as Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville), Somalia, Ethiopia and an whole set of others,soviet operational stations were tasked with a mission quite unique for intelligence – w[b]ith its specific assets, it was to facilitate the development and strengthening of these countries’ relations with the Soviet Union. [/b]

Diplomacy and intelligence operations conducted by world powers are usually used to undermine relations between world powers and African countries, it usually involves cultivating and buying off African leaders, use of intelligence agent networks, and disseminating disinformation that represented in distorted form the policy and intentions of world powers in Africa. Alongside that, of course, they used mistakes and miscalculations of each other to further their interest.

Soviet foreign intelligence subjected all circumstances connected to the problems of relations with African countries to thorough analysis, and then reported their proposals to the leadership in Moscow.

The Soviet leadership often used intelligence possibilities to convey intelligence of a delicate character to the leaders of African nations. And so, for example, the Soviet leadership informed Algerian president Boumediene through intelligence channels on the activity of Western agent networks in the highest echelons of the Algerian leadership.

KGB cooperation with the security services of a number of young African countries played an important role in the development of friendly relations between them and the Soviet Union and strengthening their sovereignty, with this partnership enacted mainly through foreign intelligence. This cooperation basically amounted to the exchange of information that presented a mutual interest, the short-term training of personnel in Moscow and locally, and assistance through operational hardware. Certain Soviet aid was also rendered in the structuring and organization of work for African countries’ security services. Advice and recommendations were given, but the Africans took decisions, which far from always corresponded with what was recommended by our advisors. Overall, cooperation between the security services of young African countries with the USSR’s special services helped them to build their state apparatus.

A very crucial function carried out by Soviet intelligence in Africa was to maintain ties with the liberation movements of countries not yet free from colonialism.

They were extended different types of assistance – political, financial, and political, as well as through training cadres and providing advisors and specialists. This help was directed along various channels: both through the state and social, humanitarian, and international organizations.

Assistance along intelligence lines was usually carried out clandestinely. And so the United States long managed to conceal their support for the Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA), headed by Holden Roberto, support that was realized through the CIA.

The majority of liberation movements were underground, and the intelligence services of the metropolitan countries worked actively against them. They tracked liberation organizations not only in their colonies, but also in third countries where they had their bases and representative offices, hunting down their leaders; executing terrorist acts; infiltrating their agents; intercepting communications channels; and detecting the contacts of these organizations with the outside world and their sources of obtaining support.

The CIA was also engaged in similar work on these organizations. The Americans sought to infiltrate the liberation movements and take them under their control in order to assert their positions in these young states after their liberation.

in general the leaders and representatives of the liberation movements were full of an earnest desire to wage the most decisive struggle for the liberation of their countries. Others were cautious and chose allies from the outside world while hedging their bets. The third group, oriented toward Western assistance, made contact with us to find out the Soviet position and tease out to whom, how, and through what channels the USSR was extending aid.

There were also those who played at politics; speculated on the liberation struggle; lived on the assistance provided to the liberation movements; acquired luxurious villas and automobiles; jetted around to international conferences and congresses; vacationed and went to hospitals on the invitation of foreign states; and gave an endless number of promises, thinking least of all about their country’s liberation struggle.

Soviet intelligence didn’t make a hard ideological choice among movements. It sought to encompass as wide a circle of liberation organizations as possible and analyze their real possibilities in the struggle for national liberation. And so in the Angolan liberation movement, along with Aghostino Neto’s MPLA, Soviet intelligence service attempted to arrange relations both with Holden Roberto’s Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA) and Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

analyzing the theories popular among the African intelligentsia, such as Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism, negritude, and the African socialism of Leopold Senghor. These leaders preached the uniqueness of the African people’s historical path of development and how common laws of historical development were inapplicable to Africa. Our liaisons wanted to know how correct these theories were and what we thought of them; we had to learn while improvising.

The anti-colonial liberation process in Africa was a historically inevitable phenomenon. The colonial powers didn’t want to lose their positions and defended them at first by force – through military or terrorist methods, and then, under the influence of events, in a growing measure through political means. They viewed Soviet policy in Africa as a threat to their interests, the USSR’s attempt to spread influence in Africa and a communist threat to the African continent. And on the African continent there were both objective and subjective underpinnings for a confrontation between intelligence services.

A good read.. will be back

RUSSIA'S CURRENT MOVE IN AFRICA

RUSSIA’S COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

Russia aspires to become a counterinsurgency leader in Africa. Since Russia embarked on its military intervention in support of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad in September 2015, the Kremlin has advertised its ‘Syrian model’ of counterinsurgency to African countries struggling with political violence.

This model emphasizes state-to-state cooperation between Russia and African governments and presents authoritarian stability as the most effective antidote to extremism. As the unilateralism that underpins US counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and Washington’s frequent attachment of human rights conditions for military assistance have frustrated African leaders, Russia’s alternative counterinsurgency model has become increasingly attractive in Africa.

In April 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Somalia desired Russian equipment to aid its counterterrorism operations and Somalia subsequently requested Moscow’s assistance in upgrading its military preparedness.

US wavering commitment to African security and France’s counterinsurgency struggles in the Sahel have increased the appeal of Russia’s counterterrorism model in West Africa.

Nigeria’s Ambassador to Russia Steve Ugbah argued in October 2019 that ‘We’re sure that with Russian help we’ll manage to crush Boko Haram’ and cited Russia’s defeat of the Islamic State in Syria as proof for this statement. In November 2019, large-scale anti-French and anti-UN protests erupted in Mali’s capital Bamako calling for Russia to vanquish Islamists in Mali like it did in Syria.

MERCENARIES AND MINERALS
Although Russia has touted its supposed attractiveness as a counterinsurgency partner as proof of its rising status in Africa and emphasized counterterrorism at the landmark October 2019 Russia–Africa Summit in Sochi, Moscow has been selective in its embrace of binding military commitments in Africa.

Russia has deployed Wagner Group private military contractors (PMCs) to Libya and Mozambique for ambiguously defined ‘counterterrorism purposes.’ However, Russian PMCs have struggled to turn the tide of Libya National Army chieftain Khalifa Haftar’s ill-fated offensive against Tripoli and succumbed to a calamitous Islamic State ambush in Mozambique in October 2019, which resulted in the deaths of 7 Russian personnel.

Russia also signed 19 military cooperation agreements with African countries between 2014–18. In the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, these agreements are strictly confined to counterterrorism training. Russia has notably refrained from deploying PMCs or active duty forces to the two African regions that are most severely impacted by transnational terrorism.

In spite of its military setbacks and cautious counterterrorism policy, Russia has capitalized on anti-Western sentiments and effective branding of its Syrian model of counterinsurgency to secure arms deals and economic contracts.

Russia is the leading arms vendor to Africa, as it supplied 49% of North Africa’s weapons and 28% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s weapons between 2014–18, and numerous African states struggling with insurgencies have requested Russian weaponry. After human rights concerns prevented the US from selling advanced aircraft to Nigeria in 2014, Abuja struck a deal with Moscow to purchase Mi-35 and Mi-17 fighter jets. Nigeria’s reliance on Russian aircraft in its struggle against Boko Haram resulted in its agreement to purchase another 12 Mi-35 fighter jets from Russia in October 2019. [/b]Russia has also supplied light weaponry to Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan, as all three countries grapple with varying degrees of isolation from international arms markets.

Russia has also presented itself as a counterinsurgency partner in order to expand its access to the continent’s mineral deposits. [b]Russia’s PMC deployments in support of Central African Republic’s President Faustin-Archange Touadera against Seleka rebels are closely intertwined with its desire to profit from the country’s vast diamond reserves. Russia has spearheaded efforts to lift export restrictions on diamond sales from the Central African Republic and leveraged its counterinsurgency campaign to profit Lobaye Invest, a mining company with close ties to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Russian media outlets and think tanks often assert that US and French counterterrorism campaigns in the Sahel are aimed at securing hegemony over the region’s vast uranium stockpiles.
However, Russia’s civilian nuclear energy giant Rosatom’s forays into Nigeria and aspirations to enter Niger’s uranium market are undoubtedly strengthened by the positive impact of counterinsurgency cooperation on Moscow’s bilateral relationships with West African countries.

THE LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE
Looking beyond economic factors, Russia’s rising profile in the counterinsurgency arena in Africa has strengthened its relationship with France but engendered potential tensions with China. In spite of its opposition to French proposals for tighter sanctions against Mali and competition with Paris for leverage in the Central African Republic,[b] France and Russia have bonded over their shared belief that authoritarian stability can rein in armed insurgencies. [/b]This common perspective has inspired Franco–Russian cooperation in support of Haftar in Libya and motivated Russia to secure military cooperation agreements with France’s authoritarian partners in the Sahel, such as Chad’s President Idriss Deby. Therefore, cooperation on West African security adds a marginal layer of depth to broader France–Russia outreach efforts.

Although Russia’s counterinsurgency campaigns ostensibly support China’s desire for stability near its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Africa, Moscow’s military interventions and PMC deployments to Africa could sharpen frictions with Beijing. former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso David Shinn argued that Wagner Group activities in Sudan and the Central African Republic could undermine Chinese interests. This conclusion is plausible as Russia’s resolute support for fragile authoritarian governments in Sub-Saharan Africa contrasts with China’s greater adaptability to regime changes on the continent.

In Libya, Russia’s support for the LNA’s purported counterterrorism efforts clashes with China’s desire to integrate the UN-recognised Government of National Accord into the BRI. These disagreements have not caused a major rift in Russia–China relations but could impede Moscow and Beijing’s prospective transition from tactical cooperation to strategic alignment in Africa.

Russia’s counterinsurgency strategy in Africa hinges on supporting fragile authoritarian regimes and selling its Syrian model to countries struggling with political violence. In spite of Russia’s ambiguous commitment to African security and poor track record of military success in Africa, Moscow will likely continue highlighting its counterinsurgency credentials to secure economic contracts, bolster its cooperation with France, and assert its great power status.

Africa though would be a good field for Russia but it is not sustainable for the Russia to pursue