“For Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria who form the sub-regional Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) combating the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) across their common frontiers, there are lessons to be drawn from what has just transpired in south Asia. This also applies to Burkina Faso and Mali, both within the West African sub-region who are also countering dogma-inspired insurgencies on their territories.”

On Sunday 15th, August 2021, combatants fighting under the flag of the Taliban besieged Kabul, capital of Afghanistan and the following day, made a spectacular entry into the city. Before their rather unanticipated entry, President Ashraf Ghani had taken the wise decision to leave the country, lessening tensions and decreasing the chances of more bloodshed that could have occurred in the fight to both capture and defend him.
Before matters came to this point, the United States had invaded Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks visited on her major cities and the Pentagon by Al Qaeda on September 11 2001, in what many saw as a justifiable response, especially after the Taliban, then the de facto government of that country, had flatly refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden to Washington. While the US invasion, executed on the ground by elements of the Northern Alliance backed by CIA advisers and US Air Force bombers overhead succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban, the Americans never really dominated that country. The Taliban remained an ever-present threat and recent events only underscored that fact.
For Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria who form the sub-regional Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) combating the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) across their common frontiers, there are lessons to be drawn from what has just transpired in south Asia. This also applies to Burkina Faso and Mali, both within the West African sub-region who are also countering dogma-inspired insurgencies on their territories. First is the fact that the West could easily back out of a fight (just as easily as they got into it), and especially when it could be most crucial for the war effort. The Americans went into talks with the Taliban (hosted by Qatar) on their plans to withdraw without involving the government they had installed in Kabul! Talk of an infra dig! (Recall that ex-President Sarkozy of France never wanted to fight on the side of Mali against the Azawad insurgents at the onset of the crisis, but President Francois Hollonde who replaced him threw his hat into the ring in favour of the West Africans. This also illustrates the point being made here).
Secondly, the objective of the US in Afghanistan, with the benefit of hindsight, never seemed to have been the same as that of the government in Kabul. Else it would not have sidelined Ashraf Ghani to enter into direct talks with the Taliban. (Note that the US also unilaterally entered into talks with North Korea and without as much as carrying Seoul along). So, if push came to shove, could the West not enter into talks with the insurgents in the Sahel and around the Lake Chad too, sidelining the African allies it claimed to be supporting?

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