Stoopid policy. It will affect Naija. AirFrance -Abj bound flights stop over in Niamey for refueling and passenger drop off and pickup before landing in Abj .. or they takeoff in Abj, land in Niger and then straight to France.

A military government is not a legitimate government because it is usually self imposed and not optional or put in place by the people and therefore, it would generally not have many advantages from the side of popular opinion. A few of the advantages of a military government are;

a. Absence of bureaucracy: bureaucracy or bottle neck administration is a concept in the civil service which usually refers to frustration of projects and assignments in plain language. In a democracy or other system of government where there is seperation of powers which is accompanied by checks and balances, there are usually a lot of processes to go through to successfully carry out a project as their is need for approval from the various units, but in a military system where the powers are mostly centralized, decision on projects and policies are made faster thereby saving time.

b. Cost effective: flowing from the discussion of the point given above, in a military dispensation, there is the absence of duplication of offices which is prevalent in a democracy ( a system of government which is a direct opposite of the military dictatorship) and this effectively saves the administration money which could be used in paying the various officers especially in a coutry like Nigeria where the salary and allowances of the various government officials are on the high side.
c. Merit: one of the reasons why the military government came into play in Nigeria was the level of tribalism and nepotism in the country which caused a serious lack of disloyalty to the government at the central but in the advent of the military dictatorship, the problem of tribalism was handled to an extent as appointments where given out to people on merit.

d. Challenge: civilians who witness a military dictatorship would not want a repeat of it and are therefore challenged to do their best when the power returns to civilians so that the military will not be given another reason to want to return to power. In essence after a military dispensation, the next civilian government tends to do well to avoid the situation from arising again.

The average number of coups a year in Africa fell by half following the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s, sparking optimism that a new international “anti-coup” norm would bring an end to military regimes.

In these heady days, the hope was that the Lome Declaration of 2000, and the promise of the African Union and regional bodies such as ECOWAS to reject unconstitutional changes of government, meant that civilian rule was here to stay.
The costs and benefits of coups in Africa are no longer an academic question. Following a spate of military interventions, first in Zimbabwe in 2017, and then in Chad, Mali and Guinea this year, (a coup was also narrowly averted in Niger in March), there are a host of recent examples to look at.

This trend has triggered an urgent discussion about the nature of coups in the African context that has focussed on two main issues. First, why are coups back on the agenda and will the three this year encourage further military intervention? Second, do coups actually deliver better government?
A lot has been written about the first issue, including a number of blogs that have argued that if military leaders realise they can take power with minimal consequences, “there will be more coups before the decade is out”. Others have cautioned that this trend is likely to be limited to those countries that have history of military interventions. The countries that have experience coups recently represent less than 10% of all African states, and – with the notable exception of Zimbabwe – have suffered coups before. Many other states have never experienced army rule, including Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, and there is no reason why military takeovers thousands hundreds of miles away should dramatically change that.
Much less has been said whether coup actually “work”. The best way to answer this question is to review the impact of coups over the past 80 years.
Sadly, whether we look at the Democratic Republic of Congo or Nigeria – or Guinea, Mali and Zimbabwe themselves – there is a little evidence that coups deliver anything that citizens actually want. Although they are often hugely popular to begin with, coups beget more coups, not economic growth and democracy.

What is a good coup?
There are many ways that we could define a good coup. Given the range of options available – stability, jobs, GDP per capita, quality of democracy – it is perhaps best to evaluate coup leaders on their own terms.

When I was researching Democracy in Africa, I read as many of the statements that coup leaders made just after taking power as I could get my hands on. Most justified their actions on the basis of the need to protect the country from some form of threat – often said to be the former civilian government itself, which had become corrupt and divisive while failing to deliver development and stability. In some cases, coup leaders explicitly argued that they had intervened to save democracy from itself.

While there was considerable variation in the language and priorities of these statements, there were also some common themes, the most notable of which included:

Restoring the rule of law and “discipline”.
Rehabilitating national pride and unity.
Strengthening national infrastructure and the economy.
And in most cases, a promise to restore democracy in a short (though tellingly usually unspecified) amount of time.
So if we evaluate coups on the basis of these promises, has Africa seen many “good coups”?

In search of a good coup
Let’s start with the most obvious point. Countries rarely experience just one coup.

Look at Benin. Following an initial coup in 1963, shortly after independence, the country went on to see four more successful coups before 1972, after which there appear to have been no less than five unsuccessful attempts. Burkina Faso has a similar story to tell, with a first successful coup in 1966 and then further coups in 1980 1982, 1983, and 1987.
Other countries to have witnessed multiple coups include Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Togo.

You might think this is just a feature of a more authoritarian and less stable past, but the pattern also holds true for the countries that experienced coups this year. The most recent coup in Guinea overthrew President Alpha Condé.

What many of those who posted online to celebrate the coup conveniently omitted was that Condé had come to power in elections in 2010 organised by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, who had himself taken power in a coup in 2008. Similarly the most recent coup in Mali served to bring power back to Colonel Assimi Goïta – the same man who had removed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in a coup just one year earlier.


Is there such a thing as a good coup?
Ten years ago this was a fairly academic question. The average number of coups a year in Africa fell by half following the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s, sparking optimism that a new international “anti-coup” norm would bring an end to military regimes.

In these heady days, the hope was that the Lome Declaration of 2000, and the promise of the African Union and regional bodies such as ECOWAS to reject unconstitutional changes of government, meant that civilian rule was here to stay.
The costs and benefits of coups in Africa are no longer an academic question. Following a spate of military interventions, first in Zimbabwe in 2017, and then in Chad, Mali and Guinea this year, (a coup was also narrowly averted in Niger in March), there are a host of recent examples to look at.

This trend has triggered an urgent discussion about the nature of coups in the African context that has focussed on two main issues. First, why are coups back on the agenda and will the three this year encourage further military intervention? Second, do coups actually deliver better government?
A lot has been written about the first issue, including a number of blogs that have argued that if military leaders realise they can take power with minimal consequences, “there will be more coups before the decade is out”. Others have cautioned that this trend is likely to be limited to those countries that have history of military interventions. The countries that have experience coups recently represent less than 10% of all African states, and – with the notable exception of Zimbabwe – have suffered coups before. Many other states have never experienced army rule, including Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, and there is no reason why military takeovers thousands hundreds of miles away should dramatically change that.

Much less has been said whether coup actually “work”. The best way to answer this question is to review the impact of coups over the past 80 years.
Sadly, whether we look at the Democratic Republic of Congo or Nigeria – or Guinea, Mali and Zimbabwe themselves – there is a little evidence that coups deliver anything that citizens actually want. Although they are often hugely popular to begin with, coups beget more coups, not economic growth and democracy.

What is a good coup?
There are many ways that we could define a good coup. Given the range of options available – stability, jobs, GDP per capita, quality of democracy – it is perhaps best to evaluate coup leaders on their own terms.

When I was researching Democracy in Africa, I read as many of the statements that coup leaders made just after taking power as I could get my hands on. Most justified their actions on the basis of the need to protect the country from some form of threat – often said to be the former civilian government itself, which had become corrupt and divisive while failing to deliver development and stability. In some cases, coup leaders explicitly argued that they had intervened to save democracy from itself.

While there was considerable variation in the language and priorities of these statements, there were also some common themes, the most notable of which included:

Restoring the rule of law and “discipline”.
Rehabilitating national pride and unity.
Strengthening national infrastructure and the economy.
And in most cases, a promise to restore democracy in a short (though tellingly usually unspecified) amount of time.
So if we evaluate coups on the basis of these promises, has Africa seen many “good coups”?

In search of a good coup
Let’s start with the most obvious point. Countries rarely experience just one coup.

Look at Benin. Following an initial coup in 1963, shortly after independence, the country went on to see four more successful coups before 1972, after which there appear to have been no less than five unsuccessful attempts. Burkina Faso has a similar story to tell, with a first successful coup in 1966 and then further coups in 1980 1982, 1983, and 1987.
Other countries to have witnessed multiple coups include Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Togo.

You might think this is just a feature of a more authoritarian and less stable past, but the pattern also holds true for the countries that experienced coups this year. The most recent coup in Guinea overthrew President Alpha Condé.

What many of those who posted online to celebrate the coup conveniently omitted was that Condé had come to power in elections in 2010 organised by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, who had himself taken power in a coup in 2008. Similarly the most recent coup in Mali served to bring power back to Colonel Assimi Goïta – the same man who had removed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in a coup just one year earlier.
In other words, most coups do not serve to draw a line in the sand and usher in a new period of stability and prosperity. In almost none of the countries mentioned above did coups actually restore the rule of law, strengthen infrastructure, and introduce democracy – at least for any significant period of time. Instead, coup leaders often proved to be just as self-interested, irresponsible and corrupt as the regimes they had replaced.

The best case scenarios
This is not to say that coups never create opportunities for more effective government. There have been some coup leaders who, like Captain Camara, removed abusive presidents and delivered on their promises.

In my next column, I will look at the some of the best candidates for a “good coup”, including the removal of President Hilla Limann by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in Ghana in 1981 and the overthrow long-term dictator President Moussa Traoré by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali in 1991.


Is there such a thing as a good coup?
Ten years ago this was a fairly academic question. The average number of coups a year in Africa fell by half following the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s, sparking optimism that a new international “anti-coup” norm would bring an end to military regimes.

In these heady days, the hope was that the Lome Declaration of 2000, and the promise of the African Union and regional bodies such as ECOWAS to reject unconstitutional changes of government, meant that civilian rule was here to stay.
The costs and benefits of coups in Africa are no longer an academic question. Following a spate of military interventions, first in Zimbabwe in 2017, and then in Chad, Mali and Guinea this year, (a coup was also narrowly averted in Niger in March), there are a host of recent examples to look at.

This trend has triggered an urgent discussion about the nature of coups in the African context that has focussed on two main issues. First, why are coups back on the agenda and will the three this year encourage further military intervention? Second, do coups actually deliver better government?

A lot has been written about the first issue, including a number of blogs that have argued that if military leaders realise they can take power with minimal consequences, “there will be more coups before the decade is out”. Others have cautioned that this trend is likely to be limited to those countries that have history of military interventions. The countries that have experience coups recently represent less than 10% of all African states, and – with the notable exception of Zimbabwe – have suffered coups before. Many other states have never experienced army rule, including Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, and there is no reason why military takeovers thousands hundreds of miles away should dramatically change that.

Much less has been said whether coup actually “work”. The best way to answer this question is to review the impact of coups over the past 80 years.
Sadly, whether we look at the Democratic Republic of Congo or Nigeria – or Guinea, Mali and Zimbabwe themselves – there is a little evidence that coups deliver anything that citizens actually want. Although they are often hugely popular to begin with, coups beget more coups, not economic growth and democracy.

What is a good coup?
There are many ways that we could define a good coup. Given the range of options available – stability, jobs, GDP per capita, quality of democracy – it is perhaps best to evaluate coup leaders on their own terms.

When I was researching Democracy in Africa, I read as many of the statements that coup leaders made just after taking power as I could get my hands on. Most justified their actions on the basis of the need to protect the country from some form of threat – often said to be the former civilian government itself, which had become corrupt and divisive while failing to deliver development and stability. In some cases, coup leaders explicitly argued that they had intervened to save democracy from itself.

While there was considerable variation in the language and priorities of these statements, there were also some common themes, the most notable of which included:

Restoring the rule of law and “discipline”.
Rehabilitating national pride and unity.
Strengthening national infrastructure and the economy.
And in most cases, a promise to restore democracy in a short (though tellingly usually unspecified) amount of time.
So if we evaluate coups on the basis of these promises, has Africa seen many “good coups”?

In search of a good coup
Let’s start with the most obvious point. Countries rarely experience just one coup.

Look at Benin. Following an initial coup in 1963, shortly after independence, the country went on to see four more successful coups before 1972, after which there appear to have been no less than five unsuccessful attempts. Burkina Faso has a similar story to tell, with a first successful coup in 1966 and then further coups in 1980 1982, 1983, and 1987.
Other countries to have witnessed multiple coups include Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Togo.

You might think this is just a feature of a more authoritarian and less stable past, but the pattern also holds true for the countries that experienced coups this year. The most recent coup in Guinea overthrew President Alpha Condé.

What many of those who posted online to celebrate the coup conveniently omitted was that Condé had come to power in elections in 2010 organised by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, who had himself taken power in a coup in 2008. Similarly the most recent coup in Mali served to bring power back to Colonel Assimi Goïta – the same man who had removed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in a coup just one year earlier.

In other words, most coups do not serve to draw a line in the sand and usher in a new period of stability and prosperity. In almost none of the countries mentioned above did coups actually restore the rule of law, strengthen infrastructure, and introduce democracy – at least for any significant period of time. Instead, coup leaders often proved to be just as self-interested, irresponsible and corrupt as the regimes they had replaced.

The best case scenarios
This is not to say that coups never create opportunities for more effective government. There have been some coup leaders who, like Captain Camara, removed abusive presidents and delivered on their promises.

In my next column, I will look at the some of the best candidates for a “good coup”, including the removal of President Hilla Limann by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in Ghana in 1981 and the overthrow long-term dictator President Moussa Traoré by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali in 1991.
Even in some of these cases, however, it is clear that coups generated as many problems as they solved. Take the Malian coup of 1991, where a short transition led to multiparty elections and the emergence of a political system that delivered some of the highest levels of civil liberties on the continent.

This was a boon for democracy. However, the fact that the dictatorship was removed by the army and not a popular uprising led by civilian leaders meant that a strong connection between political parties and the citizenry was never formed. Partly as a result, Malian democracy rested on the weakest of foundations, which facilitated its later collapse.

adebayo987:
Niger Republic heavily depend on Nigeria for electricity, petroleum, and foods. Suffering is about to kill them if they don't bow to pressure. The problem with these Niger Republic coup guys is that they didn't consult the Oracle before taking over the government. In fact, Niger Republic will suffocate without Nigeria in a week.

And you think a coup plotter won't think of this before striking? They have plenty uranium and last I checked France is buying plenty, have you heard France decision on the matter?

Curse777:



Niger will see shege...

Tinubu would use Economic warfare to force them to surrender

Niger is Landlocked... No seaport
A no fly zone means nothing goes in or out

Let's give them a week when hunger bites hard, and they run out of basic supplies especially petroleum products.. they would run to Abuja to discuss as they always do


Niger : 12,000 active service men Military and Paramilitary

Nigerian Army alone 230,000 Service men




.

Nigeria army that bokoharam is using to do target practice or are you referring to the old Nigeria army of babangida time?

During military rule, the structure is very simple and the highest military officer usually receives the highest position in the state. Therefore, the distribution of power is controlled by the military ranks. The higher your military rank, the more power you have. No respect for the rule of law: The rule of law is the supremacy of the law over any machine or government person, and this essential component of any existing government is completely absent in any military government, because from the way the head of state takes power, it is obvious that it is above the law. In the south, however, the local government was not well established and was very attached to the apron cords of the regional government, as Sam C. Ukabi in his book “Strands in Nigerian Military History” stated that local government in the hands of the government of the region in question has become an obedient tool. There have been several failed coups. The first took place in 1986, just one year after Ibrahim Babangida was sworn in, Major General Mamman Vatsa led a coup to overthrow president Babangida`s government, but that coup failed. This led to the execution of Mamman Vatsa and 10 other military officers in the same year. General Ibrahim Babangida was appointed President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and established the Government Council of the Armed Forces.

His reign was the longest in peacetime and his government was typical of the military dictatorships of the 20th century. Babangida promised a return to democracy when he took power, but he ruled Nigeria for eight years when he temporarily handed over power to interim head of state Ernest Shonekan in 1993. Most military juntas emerge after a coup. Military leadership can gradually restore the mechanism of civilian rule to the lower level of society. Nevertheless, the military dictatorship receives the highest legal authority. There is hardly a sector in the country where corruption is not an integral part of the country. This was not the case in the military era, when corruption was not widespread. Since the end of the Second World War, military rule has prevailed almost exclusively in so-called developing countries. Modernization theorists, influential in the 1950s and 60s, were initially confident that the newly independent nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (as well as Latin America) would evolve into capitalist democracies with civilian control over the military. These expectations were dashed by a wave of military coups that culminated in the 1960s and 70s.

National integration also received a lot of attention during the military regime in Nigeria. To this end, Gowon founded the National Youth Service Cops (NYSC). This innovation has allowed many graduates to serve in regions outside their own state and has consequently led to greater national awareness among young people. For me, NYSC is also one of the achievements of the military in Nigeria. In foreign policy, a considerable and lasting effect was achieved during the military regime. In the first republic, Nigerian foreign policy focused on Britain and the wealth of Africa. In fact, it is fair to say that the Nigerian government at the time was pro-Western and anti-communist. To provide food in large quantities to feed Nigeria`s teeming population, the military launched Operation Feed the Nation in 1976, which turned yellow under the Second Republic. No checks and balances: In a military dictatorship, there is usually no separation of powers between the executive, judiciary and legislative, so all powers are centralized at the top, which is the highest authority and power of the state. He can do whatever he wants, without resistance or control, because it is said that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The municipal reform of 1976 is apparently also one of the achievements of the military regime in Nigeria.

Prior to January 1966, different regions of Nigeria had different systems of government at the local level. One of the coup survivors, Olusegun Obasanjo, succeeded Muritala Mohammed, and he immediately established a civilian government, and the situation was maintained until 1983. Thus, between 1976 and 1983, there was a break with the military regime. That is why all development plans within the framework of the army have been designed to achieve this goal. The army vigorously pursued the idea adopted in the development plan in all areas of its development programme. Nevertheless, Nigeria`s foreign policy became weak after the military intervention and lacked momentum. Indeed, the period was marked by political crisis and instability. But in the 1967 civil war, Nigeria pursued a genuine policy of non-alignment. Every military leader is a strong leader. It is usually people with charismatic personalities who can reach this position in society; In this way, leaders usually remain unchallenged.

Curse777:



Niger will see shege...

Tinubu would use Economic warfare to force them to surrender

Niger is Landlocked... No seaport
A no fly zone means nothing goes in or out

Let's give them a week when hunger bites hard, and they run out of basic supplies especially petroleum products.. they would run to Abuja to discuss as they always do


Niger : 12,000 active service men Military and Paramilitary

Nigerian Army alone 230,000 Service men




.

talk is cheap

Though I knew coup has it own bad side, but for now, African nations need it since our democratically elected leaders keep failing us.
I first came across Singh’s book via a post he wrote for The Monkey Cage last summer. He penned a response to a post of mine about a failed coup attempt in Lesotho. In my original post, I asserted a future coup in Lesotho would be unlikely, drawing largely from public opinion data showing that an overwhelming majority of Lesotho’s citizens strongly rejected military rule and instead supported democracy. Singh’s polite response notwithstanding, I was totally wrong to think that public opinion about military rule in some earlier period should predict later public support for a military coup (the example he gave of Mali is particularly illustrative).
The argument Singh makes in his book is simple and compelling: Coup attempts are best understood as coordination games, or “situations in which each individual has an incentive to do what others are doing, and therefore each individual’s choices are based on his or her beliefs about the likely actions of others.” Instead of thinking about coups as battles (e.g., the side with the greatest military power will win) or coups as elections (e.g., the side with the most public support will win), Singh pushes us to think of coup success as being driven by coup-makers’ ability to get others to believe that their coup attempt will be successful.

How do coup-makers convince others their coup attempt will be successful? They convince military actors that the success of the coup has the support of almost everybody in the military and that any possible resistance is minor. One way coup makers have done this is by seizing the main radio broadcast facility.

Singh’s book is an informative read – even if you’re not planning a coup. Singh points out how important it is to understand coups given “coup attempts are the basic mechanism for most of the regime change and irregular leadership removal in the world.” According to Singh’s research, 80 percent of sub-Saharan African countries, 67 percent of Latin American countries, and 50 percent of Asian countries experienced at least one coup attempt between 1950 and 2000. Coups are not just a threat to democracy but also a prevalent form of removing dictators from office.
My favorite part of Singh’s book is his beautifully narrated accounts of coups in Ghana. I could actually imagine Ghanaian Major Abubakar Sulemana in a sleeveless T-shirt and shorts jumping out his window and spraining his ankle to escape being shot by coup-plotter — and later president — Jerry Rawlings. I learned a great deal about Ghana’s military and political history from the book. Although he doesn’t go into as great detail about the 1991 coup in the USSR, his chapter on that coup was also fascinating and richly sourced. Put another way, the book may be published by an academic press and start off talking about theories and cross-national data analysis, but it’s also a fun read for the non-specialist who might be interested in knowing more about coups and the conditions under which they are successful.

“Seizing Power” should also appeal to those interested in game theory. For example, if you liked Michael Chwe’s post about his book “Rational Ritual,” Singh’s book draws a good deal from Chwe’s work on common knowledge to make his argument about coups as coordination games.

Mossadd:
Nigeria soldiers are about to be disgraced in Niger😆 Nigeria soldiers that will take to their heel when they see bokoharam want to go and disgrace their ancestors by fighting Niger soldiers, this is what Tinubu want to waste money gotten from subsidy on,I kuku know that Ojuyobo na pure oloriburuku that will destabilise Nigeria and West Africa

fight them for what They never fit fight Cameroun that is grabbing their land front and back.

The recent rise in coups in Africa reflects a waning regional and international willingness to enforce anti-coup norms. Reversing the trend requires incentivizing democracy and consistently imposing real costs on coup makers.
The 82 coups Africa experienced between 1960 and 2000 were devastating for the continent—contributing to the instability, corruption, human rights abuses, impunity, and poverty that characterized many African countries during that era. Coups, moreover, are contagious. A successful coup significantly increases the probability of subsequent coups—in that country as well as its neighbors.

The recent spate of coups in Africa, therefore, is bad news. In the past two years there have been coups in Mali (twice), Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Tunisia, and, arguably, Algeria and Burundi—many of which were navigating democratic transitions. This variant of the coup bug can be traced back to the coups in Egypt and Zimbabwe a few years earlier. That means nearly 20 percent of African countries have succumbed to coups since 2013. The continent, thus, risks hurtling back to bad old days of military misgovernance—a period often remembered for its “lost decades.”

International Actors Failing to Uphold Norms around Coups
Coups are ultimately cold-eyed calculations of benefits vs. costs. The upsides are fabulous—power and unbridled access to state resources. The allure of a coup, consequently, will always exist. The potential downsides—failure or imprisonment—are likely viewed as manageable for unconstrained military actors under a civilian administration. Those who mount coups, in short, do so because they believe they can get away with it, with minimal costs.

Under the Organization of African Union’s policy of non-interference, coup plotters didn’t need to worry about external costs. The plethora of coups during this era demonstrates the open invitation to military takeovers created by this posture. The African Union’s shift to a policy of non-indifference at its creation in 2000 fundamentally altered this calculation, subjecting a junta to potential suspension, sanctions, and the threat of intervention. These costs were further amplified by penalties from Western democracies and international organizations.
The recent rise in coups in Africa (a pattern not observed in other regions) reflects a waning in regional and international actors’ willingness to enforce anti-coup norms in Africa. This is a result of a confluence of factors, including a regional democratic recession, an inclination by regional bodies to negotiate compromises with coup leaders, reticence to mount military interventions, and distractions of international actors with internal crises and the pandemic, among others.

This pattern underscores the critical role that regional and international actors play in mitigating coups. What is a coup, after all, but some military actors claiming that they are the sovereign representatives of that state? To be sustained, coups need to be recognized. If international actors refuse to do so, then the putschists are politically isolated—further compounded when they are denied access to a state’s sovereign financial accounts.

International actors, in short, have a critical role in validating coups. By treating coups as unfortunate but normal means of transferring power in Africa, international actors inadvertently provide coup leaders a helping hand across the finish line to consolidate their putsch.

[quote author=Confirmedzombie post=124762438][/quote]






Confirmedzombie

Coup Lords

The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have viewed African coups as a means of enhancing their regional ambitions. They have been actively sponsoring the Sudanese military’s bid to hold onto power. They have also been busy behind the scenes in emboldening and providing cover to Kais Saied’s auto-golpe in Tunisia. Preventing an Arab democracy from taking root also blunts any reformist momentum these Gulf states might face to open their own highly restrictive governance structures.

Russia has also been actively supporting coups in Africa. Often working through the Wagner mercenary group, Moscow has maintained a close relationship with the military throughout Sudan’s democratic transition and reportedly agitated for it to seize power. In exchange for its support, the Sudanese junta is likely to grant Russia naval port access to Port Sudan, giving Moscow a military foothold in the important Red Sea corridor. Wagner interests will also continue to operate in western Sudan in support of gold and other illicit trafficking through the Central African Republic.

In Mali, pro-Russian disinformation campaigns had disparaged the authority of democratically elected President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in the year preceding the August 2020 coup. This messaging contributed to the opposition protests against Keita that were used as a justification for the coup. Several members of the junta had previously studied in Russia.

To compensate for their lack of domestic legitimacy, coup makers crave international validation. This gives external authoritarian actors more leverage to compromise a state’s sovereignty. The coup in Mali, for example, has led the junta to consider inviting in Russian mercenaries, an action that would dramatically reshape Malian security and foreign policy. The effect of such a decision, taken by unelected military officers operating outside a constitutional framework and absent public accountability, wouldn’t be in the interests of Malian citizens, but it would enhance Russian leverage.

Ways International Democratic Actors Can Mitigate Coups
The most significant action the international democratic community can take to reverse the trend of coups in Africa is to incentivize democracy. African governments that commit to and uphold democratic practices should merit significantly greater diplomatic support, development and security assistance, and promotion of private investment. While Africa’s democratization wave of the 1990’s and 2000’s was led by domestic reformers, there were clear international incentives for adapting democratic norms. International democratic actors need to recommit themselves to these norms by building a more unified posture in sustaining opposition to coups
This diplomatic effort needs to actively engage the African Union and Regional Economic Communities, each of which have their own democracy charters, to affirm these norms. Much of the public reaction and coordination of international responses to a coup occurs through these regional bodies. If African regional institutions are clear in condemning a coup, it is far easier for the international democratic community to rally behind that position.

International democratic actors may rationalize that, once a coup has occurred, the best that can be done is to maintain engagement in the hope of encouraging gradual reform over time. The problem with this approach is that leaders who have come to power by breaking the rules—be it through coups or by evading term limits—tend not to moderate but to act with escalating impunity.

The flip side of providing incentives for Africa’s democratizers is the need to consistently impose real costs on coup makers. Those who seize power extralegally should not be recognized. Financial assistance and debt relief should be suspended. Coup leaders should have their assets frozen and denied access to the international financial system. Coup-installed governments should be denied access to sovereign accounts. The posture should be to first walk back the coup, then negotiate, not vice-versa.

By ensuring there are stringent costs on coup leaders, international democratic actors can also help balance the scales domestically. Protests and widespread civil disobedience from citizens who reject the unconstitutional seizure of power can escalate pressure on coup leaders. International democratic actors, therefore, must be careful they do not inadvertently undercut this domestic resistance by recognizing a coup, effectively providing legitimacy where it is otherwise absent.

External powers that are financially or politically propping up coup leaders must also face costs. In addition to blocking the democratic aspirations of millions of Africans, these actors are effectively undermining a rules-based international system while reaping the benefits from it. These costs should be reputational and financial. Naming and shaming can deepen antipathy towards these external spoilers and limit their regional influence. This should be accompanied by curtailed security cooperation, constrained access to Western markets and financial networks, and sanctions under the European or Global Magnitsky Acts and Global Fragility Act.

This is not just a moral stance but one that contributes to a more stable and prosperous Africa that can yield more reliable security and economic partners. Africa’s autocracies are responsible for over 75 percent of the continent’s conflicts, forced migration, and food crises. If the West wants to help stem the flow of these destabilizing forces, then it needs to be a steadfast champion of democracy in Africa.

There was a reason the international community broadly worked to eliminate coups in the post-Cold War period. The same rationale persists today. The question is whether international actors remember the script.

udemzyudex:


When he shutdown twitter people were using VPN, when you do a no flight zone oga things will still enter it will only be at a higher cost.

At the end of the day, they'll only negotiate for a new Democratic government, they can't invade Niger that's one thing I know for sure.

leave those mugu.

Six successful coups in the space of 11 months is highly unusual, but that is just what we saw between February 2021 and January 2022. This worrying trend elicits key questions. First and foremost is where might be next?

Our predictive State Instability Index provides a good starting point. Virtually every country that has experienced a successful putsch in the last five years featured in the top 40 of the index, which assesses the risk of a major destabilising event over the next 12 months, including a coup, a civil war, or genocide. The latest edition reveals that Africa currently accounts for 50% of the highest risk countries, followed by Asia with 30%.

However, to distinguish between destabilising events and to narrow the focus down to coups specifically, we’ve combined the State Instability Index with insight gathered from a selected range of our Social and Governance risk indices, together with qualitative analysis from our experts. In doing so, we’ve isolated a group of countries that share a set of characteristics that are predominantly present where military takeovers occur. Coups are, in general, rare events, so it’s important to stress that we’re not saying one will happen. But based on the structural factors we’ve identified, Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe are among the most vulnerable, although mitigating factors will likely prevent a coup in some of them.

Aside from the ‘where next’, there are two crucial aspects of military takeovers that are also worth exploring. Why do they happen? And importantly for investors, what happens once they occur? Perhaps unsurprisingly, our data shows that the investment landscape rarely, if ever, improves after a coup. In fact, it often gets worse: almost half of all coups since 2000 were repeats – one coup .

African region three times as likely to host the next coup
Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau are just the latest in a growing list of African countries that have witnessed a coup attempt in the last five years. Since the turn of the century, there has been on average a 1% probability that a coup will occur in any given country in a year. In Africa, however, this rate triples to over 3%

The countries most vulnerable to a coup in 2022

Based on both our State Instability Index and our social and governance indices, a number of countries share similar structural vulnerabilities to those that have experienced a coup. This includes Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe, each a nation with a rich history of coup attempts, or where an ageing autocrat allows factionalism to flourish.

Gabon, which saw a failed coup in January 2019, is a prime example. The Bongo family dynasty is clinging to power amid opposition from within the ruling party against President Ali Bongo’s heir apparent, Noureddin Bongo Valentin. In Zimbabwe, factionalism within the ruling ZANU-PF remains rife and poses a permanent threat to government stability. President Emmerson Mnangagwa de facto recognised this when he gave a prominent role to the military in his government to mitigate the risk of an overthrow.

Anatomy of a coup: Social and governance red flags common in vulnerable countries
Political Risk Outlook 2022
by Eric Humphery-Smith and Maja Bovcon, 1 June 2022

Six successful coups in the space of 11 months is highly unusual, but that is just what we saw between February 2021 and January 2022. This worrying trend elicits key questions. First and foremost is where might be next?

Our predictive State Instability Index provides a good starting point. Virtually every country that has experienced a successful putsch in the last five years featured in the top 40 of the index, which assesses the risk of a major destabilising event over the next 12 months, including a coup, a civil war, or genocide. The latest edition reveals that Africa currently accounts for 50% of the highest risk countries, followed by Asia with 30%.

However, to distinguish between destabilising events and to narrow the focus down to coups specifically, we’ve combined the State Instability Index with insight gathered from a selected range of our Social and Governance risk indices, together with qualitative analysis from our experts. In doing so, we’ve isolated a group of countries that share a set of characteristics that are predominantly present where military takeovers occur. Coups are, in general, rare events, so it’s important to stress that we’re not saying one will happen. But based on the structural factors we’ve identified, Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe are among the most vulnerable, although mitigating factors will likely prevent a coup in some of them.

Aside from the ‘where next’, there are two crucial aspects of military takeovers that are also worth exploring. Why do they happen? And importantly for investors, what happens once they occur? Perhaps unsurprisingly, our data shows that the investment landscape rarely, if ever, improves after a coup. In fact, it often gets worse: almost half of all coups since 2000 were repeats – one coup .

African region three times as likely to host the next coup
Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau are just the latest in a growing list of African countries that have witnessed a coup attempt in the last five years. Since the turn of the century, there has been on average a 1% probability that a coup will occur in any given country in a year. In Africa, however, this rate triples to over 3% (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Africa has become the world’s coup hotspot

Our Social and Governance risk indices reveal how high levels of poverty and unemployment, weak institutions, insecurity and strained public finances make governments more prone to experiencing a coup and less able to counter the instigators. Figure 2 shows that coup-affected countries face greater social and governance risks. In a set of indices that includes Government Stability, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Democratic Governance and Corruption, the difference in average score between countries that have experienced a coup and those that haven’t is highly significant. On our 0.00–10.00 risk scale, coup countries perform worse than their non-coup counterparts on each index. This gap in performance indicates the far higher average coup risk of countries in Africa and Asia, which also generally inhabit the worst-performing end of our State Instability Index.

Figure 2: Countries that experience a coup fair significantly worse on key indices

The countries most vulnerable to a coup in 2022
Based on both our State Instability Index and our social and governance indices, a number of countries share similar structural vulnerabilities to those that have experienced a coup. This includes Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe (see Figure 3), each a nation with a rich history of coup attempts, or where an ageing autocrat allows factionalism to flourish.

Gabon, which saw a failed coup in January 2019, is a prime example. The Bongo family dynasty is clinging to power amid opposition from within the ruling party against President Ali Bongo’s heir apparent, Noureddin Bongo Valentin. In Zimbabwe, factionalism within the ruling ZANU-PF remains rife and poses a permanent threat to government stability. President Emmerson Mnangagwa de facto recognised this when he gave a prominent role to the military in his government to mitigate the risk of an overthrow.

Africa and Asia most vulnerable to coups

The dynamics behind a successful coup are never simple though. Mitigating factors, including geopolitics, can play a role in offsetting the chances of a military takeover for some jurisdictions. For instance, despite a high-risk environment in Kyrgyzstan, the chance of a successful coup decreases due to significant security and economic support from its regional superpower Russia. We saw something similar in neighbouring Kazakhstan, where the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the Russian-led regional security bloc – was quick to intervene when it looked as though President Tokayev’s regime was ripe to be overrun in early 2022. French military presence also reduces the likelihood of a coup in Côte d’Ivoire, even though the country would otherwise provide fertile ground for a takeover, due to its rich history of coup attempts and the fact that President Ouattara is serving a contentious third term.

Anatomy of a coup: Social and governance red flags common in vulnerable countries
Political Risk Outlook 2022
by Eric Humphery-Smith and Maja Bovcon, 1 June 2022

Six successful coups in the space of 11 months is highly unusual, but that is just what we saw between February 2021 and January 2022. This worrying trend elicits key questions. First and foremost is where might be next?

Our predictive State Instability Index provides a good starting point. Virtually every country that has experienced a successful putsch in the last five years featured in the top 40 of the index, which assesses the risk of a major destabilising event over the next 12 months, including a coup, a civil war, or genocide. The latest edition reveals that Africa currently accounts for 50% of the highest risk countries, followed by Asia with 30%.

However, to distinguish between destabilising events and to narrow the focus down to coups specifically, we’ve combined the State Instability Index with insight gathered from a selected range of our Social and Governance risk indices, together with qualitative analysis from our experts. In doing so, we’ve isolated a group of countries that share a set of characteristics that are predominantly present where military takeovers occur. Coups are, in general, rare events, so it’s important to stress that we’re not saying one will happen. But based on the structural factors we’ve identified, Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe are among the most vulnerable, although mitigating factors will likely prevent a coup in some of them.

Aside from the ‘where next’, there are two crucial aspects of military takeovers that are also worth exploring. Why do they happen? And importantly for investors, what happens once they occur? Perhaps unsurprisingly, our data shows that the investment landscape rarely, if ever, improves after a coup. In fact, it often gets worse: almost half of all coups since 2000 were repeats – one coup .

African region three times as likely to host the next coup
Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau are just the latest in a growing list of African countries that have witnessed a coup attempt in the last five years. Since the turn of the century, there has been on average a 1% probability that a coup will occur in any given country in a year. In Africa, however, this rate triples to over 3% (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Africa has become the world’s coup hotspot

Our Social and Governance risk indices reveal how high levels of poverty and unemployment, weak institutions, insecurity and strained public finances make governments more prone to experiencing a coup and less able to counter the instigators. Figure 2 shows that coup-affected countries face greater social and governance risks. In a set of indices that includes Government Stability, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Democratic Governance and Corruption, the difference in average score between countries that have experienced a coup and those that haven’t is highly significant. On our 0.00–10.00 risk scale, coup countries perform worse than their non-coup counterparts on each index. This gap in performance indicates the far higher average coup risk of countries in Africa and Asia, which also generally inhabit the worst-performing end of our State Instability Index.

Figure 2: Countries that experience a coup fair significantly worse on key indices

The countries most vulnerable to a coup in 2022
Based on both our State Instability Index and our social and governance indices, a number of countries share similar structural vulnerabilities to those that have experienced a coup. This includes Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar and Zimbabwe (see Figure 3), each a nation with a rich history of coup attempts, or where an ageing autocrat allows factionalism to flourish.

Gabon, which saw a failed coup in January 2019, is a prime example. The Bongo family dynasty is clinging to power amid opposition from within the ruling party against President Ali Bongo’s heir apparent, Noureddin Bongo Valentin. In Zimbabwe, factionalism within the ruling ZANU-PF remains rife and poses a permanent threat to government stability. President Emmerson Mnangagwa de facto recognised this when he gave a prominent role to the military in his government to mitigate the risk of an overthrow.

Figure 3: Africa and Asia most vulnerable to coups

The dynamics behind a successful coup are never simple though. Mitigating factors, including geopolitics, can play a role in offsetting the chances of a military takeover for some jurisdictions. For instance, despite a high-risk environment in Kyrgyzstan, the chance of a successful coup decreases due to significant security and economic support from its regional superpower Russia. We saw something similar in neighbouring Kazakhstan, where the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the Russian-led regional security bloc – was quick to intervene when it looked as though President Tokayev’s regime was ripe to be overrun in early 2022. French military presence also reduces the likelihood of a coup in Côte d’Ivoire, even though the country would otherwise provide fertile ground for a takeover, due to its rich history of coup attempts and the fact that President Ouattara is serving a contentious third term.

Coups worsen operating and investment landscapes
Increasingly stringent ESG targets mean that countries that experience a coup face restricted access to international finance and are more likely than their peers to fall into a vicious cycle of instability and depressed economic development. Coup leaders often justify their seizure of power by pointing to the poor governance record of the overthrown regime. They also pledge to uphold democracy, but the hierarchical nature of the military – which does not tolerate dissent – makes this impossible. Indeed, performance on our social and governance indices more often than not deteriorates after a coup.

In Guinea, Mamady Doumbouya, the head of the special forces that deposed President Alpha Condé on 5 September 2021, denounced the Condé administration’s bad governance, corruption, and disregard for democratic principles. But in the months that followed, Doumbouya failed to live up to his promises, making no serious attempts to reform government or investigate allegations of corruption, much less commit to elections and a civilian transition within a quick timeframe. Indeed, we have seen virtually no improvement on our corresponding indices in the months following the coup.

In Sudan, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s military regime has stepped up the crackdown on pro-democracy movements, antagonising protestors. This chain reaction is reflected in the country’s scores on our Civil Unrest and Freedom of Opinion and Expression indices, both of which deteriorated following the coup.

Operational disruption and sanctions following a coup depress state revenues. We see this deterioration on our Public Debt and Fiscal Debt indices, prolonging sovereign default risks. In coup-affected countries, political and regulatory uncertainty also increase.

One silver lining for investors is that coup leaders do not generally have an increased appetite for resource nationalism. Scores on our Resource Nationalism Index one quarter before and after the coup remain on average unchanged, showing that coup leaders are aware of the need to reassure operators so that revenues continue to flow into state coffers.

Paying attention to the signals
Our data show that there are usually red flags well before coups occur. Treating these events as scenarios that can be anticipated and planned for is the best means to reduce the element of surprise. Savvy corporates and portfolio managers can employ predictive models and monitor the exposure of portfolios to S and G risks to develop robust mitigation strategies. However, as shown by our analysis, the complex and fast-moving signals that precede a coup still require detailed examination to find trigger points and connect the dots.

As the confluence of the global economic slowdown, inflationary pressures, and food shortages ignites popular dissatisfaction across the globe, it also increases the risk of governments succumbing to overzealous military leaders over the next year. Reading the signs now is more important than ever.

My message to African leaders:


CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
How to Prevent Coups d’État
Return to Home
In April 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s military collapsed within weeks. While the mismatch between the adversaries’ capabilities left little doubt about the eventual outcome of the war, the conflict was notable for the speed with which conventional military resistance fell apart. There was a reason for this. For most of his time in office, Saddam had divided the country’s coercive power into multiple, overlapping security and intelligence organizations— efforts to insulate his regime from coups d’état that also sapped morale within the armed forces and undermined military effectiveness. A decade later, following a multiyear, $20 billion effort to rebuild military capacity, it became clear that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had hobbled the reconstituted Iraqi army in similar ways. As a result, in the spring of 2014, when the Islamic State began capturing territory across northern Iraq, Maliki took much of the blame.

The dilemma Iraqi rulers have faced is hardly unique. How to build a military strong enough to defend the state against the threat of war and rebellion—but not so powerful as to undermine civilian rule—is a fundamental challenge for democratic and authoritarian rulers alike. For individual leaders, the decision to prioritize coup prevention is a rational one. The threat of a coup is more immediate and unpredictable than the threat posed by civil war or international conflict. The overwhelming majority of rulers removed from power via a coup face death, exile, or jail. In their efforts to prevent coups, rulers adopt a range of coup-proofing strategies that can hinder military effectiveness, reinforce ethnic and political divides, and drain financial resources. Some rulers artificially inflate defense budgets and salaries, while others take the opposite approach—keeping the size of the military small, restricting soldiers’ access to arms, or rotating officers frequently to prevent them from developing their own bases of power. Elsewhere, leaders manipulate recruitment and promotion within the military to surround themselves with loyal troops.

The threat of a coup is more immediate and unpredictable than the threat posed by civil war or international conflict.

The choices that Saddam and Maliki made are particularly common ones: counterbalancing the military with republican guards, militarized police, and other paramilitary forces is often a central feature of rulers’ coup-prevention strategies. From the praetorian guard in ancient Rome to the secret police in Soviet Russia and national militia in contemporary Venezuela, coercive institutions outside the regular military have long been used as a bulwark against coups. Yet despite the frequency with which counterbalancing is employed—and the ways in which it can weaken military capacity—we know little about whether and how it works. Is counterbalancing an effective way to prevent coups d’état?

This book demonstrates that the way rulers structure their coercive institutions can indeed have profound effects on the survival of their regimes. Drawing upon an original dataset of security forces in 110 countries, combined with careful process tracing in cases of individual coup attempts, it shows that counterbalancing the military with coercive institutions outside the regular military chain of command increases the risk that coup attempts will fail. The presence of additional security forces can make it more difficult for coup plotters to recruit among key units in advance. While a coup attempt is under way, counterbalancing creates incentives to resist the coup. Because the consequences for being on the losing side of a coup attempt can be dire, most officers remain on the sidelines until it is clear what the outcome of the coup will be. When rulers organize security forces outside of military command, however, it changes the calculus, increasing the costs of inaction and creating incentives for officers in such forces to defend the incumbent regime. Counterbalancing also complicates coup plotters’ efforts to monopolize information during a coup, increasing uncertainty about the outcome of the coup—and thus also the odds that at least some officers will resist. However, counterbalancing is not without risk for the leaders who adopt it. Where counterweights compete with the military for resources and recruits, resentment and fear about a decline in status among military officers can provoke new coup attempts, even as counterbalancing creates obstacles to their execution. Furthermore, the way in which counterbalancing works—by creating incentives for armed resistance—increases the risk that coup attempts will escalate to civil war.

Understanding how counterbalancing works can thus help us predict where coup attempts will occur, whether they will succeed, and how violent they are likely to be. Taken together, the arguments and evidence in this book suggest that while counterbalancing may prevent successful coups, it is a risky strategy to pursue—and one that may weaken regimes in the long term.

Between 2000 and 2019, soldiers in thirty-one different states attempted to seize power, staging more than fifty different coup attempts altogether. While coups are no longer as common as they once were, the threat of a coup thus remains a pressing one. Coups are the most common way dictatorships begin and end. They also remain common in many democracies. Newly democratizing regimes, which have not yet developed norms of civilian and democratic governance, are particularly vulnerable. Knowing what works, and what does not, in stopping coups is important because their outcomes can have alarming consequences.

About half of coup attempts succeed overall, and those staged against democratic regimes are more likely to succeed than those against dictatorships. In the past decade alone, newly elected rulers in Egypt, Honduras, and Thailand have fallen to coups. The 2013 coup in Egypt ousted Mohamed Morsi, the country’s first democratically elected leader, from power. In its aftermath, human rights organizations documented mass, arbitrary arrests; the detention of protestors and human rights workers; new restrictions on nongovernmental organizations; and a crackdown on political opposition.

To be sure, some successful coups do usher in more democratic regimes. In recent years, some observers have gone so far as to suggest that coups may be the most practical way to force long-entrenched dictators from power. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of so-called “good coups”—defined as those that are followed by competitive elections—has been on the rise. But more often than not, coups in authoritarian regimes still simply replace one dictator with another. Those coups that are followed by elections, moreover, typically revert to authoritarianism within a few years. In part, this is because many coup leaders receive support and protection from autocratic sponsors abroad. More generally, military intervention in politics undermines norms of civilian control that are a prerequisite for stable, democratic rule.

I

Finestgurlie:
mynd44 lalasticlala Seun Dominique nlfpmod Mukina2
Rule 2

. Is East started and finished in only a place you know?

Kukutente23:

Don't be ignorant. Libya borders Niger in the North. Mali, another military led country to the west. So how will ecowas blockade which is majorly to the south be effective?
Niger is not "landlocked" like you think. They have a lot of friendly neighbours outside Ecowas.
How effective was Ecowas sanctions on Mali?

Deep 🙄

Curse777:



Niger will see shege...

Tinubu would use Economic warfare to force them to surrender

Niger is Landlocked... No seaport
A no fly zone means nothing goes in or out

Let's give them a week when hunger bites hard, and they run out of basic supplies especially petroleum products.. they would run to Abuja to discuss as they always do


Niger : 12,000 active service men Military and Paramilitary

Nigerian Army alone 230,000 Service men




.

it will only affect the poor mostly. The generals will be so comfortable

Where BuharIDIOT go run go now?

slimthugchimee2:


Lol who would want to transport their goods off thousands of kms of the empty, insecure Sahara??

how is Nigerian oil being transported to Niger republic ,it's by road if you don't know ,from southern nigeria to Niger Republic is a long distance

They need to make sure that no goods from our ports make it to Niger.

The rail line to Niger should be dismantled, we have no need for it.

President Tinubu didn't even need to send soldiers to Niger.

Economic sanctions will do the work and hit them in the pockets and stomachs.

Curse777:



Niger will see shege...

Tinubu would use Economic warfare to force them to surrender

Niger is Landlocked... No seaport
A no fly zone means nothing goes in or out

Let's give them a week when hunger bites hard, and they run out of basic supplies especially petroleum products.. they would run to Abuja to discuss as they always do


Niger : 12,000 active service men Military and Paramilitary

Nigerian Army alone 230,000 Service men




.

BuhariCarryGo:

https://www.channelstv.com/2023/07/30/just-in-ecowas-imposes-no-flight-zone-on-niger-republic/

Truth needs to be spoken to power. What manner of leadership are Ecowas leaders providing in their countries? You don’t wield power just for the sake of it!

wowcatty:
They need to make sure that no goods from our ports make it to Niger.

The rail line to Niger should be dismantled, we have no need for it.

President Tinubu didn't even need to send soldiers to Niger.

Economic sanctions will do the work and hit them in the pockets and stomachs.

But its land mass is enormous! If the people don’t want the intervention a million soldiers will flee Niger with time!

ManirBK:
Good job

I'm loving this.

How would they do it? There are so many ways to get supplies into the country. They did that in Mali, it didn't work, same with Burkina Faso. If Russia gets involved it is game over for Ecowas. US and France are concerned about the uranium in Niger, but at the same time they are stretched in Ukraine war economically so they would rather use Ecowas to do their dirty jobs and use the instrument of blackmail for Ecowas leaders especially Tinubu to do that. Is it no coincidence that FBI refused to release details of Tinubu's drug trial and forfeiture till 2026? People should connect the dots.

Curse777:



Niger will see shege...

Tinubu would use Economic warfare to force them to surrender

Niger is Landlocked... No seaport
A no fly zone means nothing goes in or out

Let's give them a week when hunger bites hard, and they run out of basic supplies especially petroleum products.. they would run to Abuja to discuss as they always do


Niger : 12,000 active service men Military and Paramilitary

Nigerian Army alone 230,000 Service men




.

230k poorly equipped service men right. You forget that Niger and Chad have the most battle hardened soldiers in West Africa. Even BH dread them. Ecowas is simply being used by US and France just to protect the Uranium deposits from falling into Russian control. We know this game, US and France are stretched economically because of the Ukraine war and would risk opening another front, so they use their puppets in Africa by using blackmail and compromise. It is no coincidence that FBI refused to release Tinubu's trial case files concerning his forfeiture by stating that the circumstances are difficult that it can only be available by 2026.

triple996:
FG should also put no flight zone in the east. Make cannibals no finish people

You are not talking like someone who is not in control of his mental faculties.