The Tragic Crash of Air France Supersonic Concorde Flight 4590

On the 25th of July 2000, travelers at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris watched in horror as a supersonic Concorde lifted off the runway in flames. Faced with a raging fire and two failing engines, the pilots fought to keep their unwieldy airplane aloft, hurtling along just above the ground in a desperate race against time.

It was a race they could not possibly win. Less than one minute after takeoff, Air France flight 4590 stalled, spun, and crashed into a hotel in the Paris suburb of Gonesse, killing all 109 people on board as well as four on the ground.

The sudden and dramatic loss of a Concorde shocked the world. The iconic supersonic airliner had flown for 24 years without a single accident, inspiring countless millions with its beautiful shape and its Mach 2 cruising speed. That this plane, in the 21st century, should crash just moments after takeoff seemed unfathomable.

Investigators would find a chain of errors that led to the disaster, from its inception weeks earlier and an ocean away aboard a Continental Airlines DC-10, to the last-minute calculations of the aircraft’s weight, to the split-second decisions made by the crew as they lifted their burning airplane off the runway, a sequence that culminated in 46 desperate seconds that would change aviation forever.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the world assumed that the nascent jet age would be little more than a stepping stone on the way to something far greater: the age of supersonic transport. Jets had cut air travel times in half, but if airliners could break the sound barrier and cruise in the zone of optimum efficiency which lay beyond it, those times could be halved again.

Major governments began to explore the development of such aircraft as early as the 1950s, and manufacturers expected that within fifteen years, “supersonic transports,” or SSTs, would come to dominate the market. Boeing even designed the 747 with cargo operations in mind, expecting that it would soon become obsolete in passenger service due to the arrival of the SSTs.

But it was not to be. The engineering was sound the basic principles of how to make an SST were already known, but the biggest barrier proved to be practicality. SSTs needed enormous runways, and they needed to fly most of their routes over water, because sonic booms over populated areas tended to cause widespread damage and popular discontent.

As the number of feasible supersonic transport routes narrowed, governments and manufacturers began to lose interest, until only one Western SST remained in development: the joint British-French project known as Concorde.

Concorde was indeed much faster than regular jets, but it never achieved the main goal of the SST, which was to be not only faster but more efficient as well. Limited to a few transatlantic routes, plagued by maintenance issues, and banned from going supersonic over inhabited areas

British Airways and Air France, the only airlines that ended up buying the Concorde found that it was much more effective as a status symbol than as a means of transport. Concorde represented a triumph of British and French engineering and a milestone of human technological achievement, never mind that tickets were too expensive for ordinary people; the planes spent more time in maintenance than they did in the air; and all the orders from independent airlines were cancelled before it even went into service.

But as soon as one caught sight of Concorde’s sleek, white form streaking overhead, all criticism melted away: the plane was beautiful, it was awe-inspiring, it was magnificent. To fly Concorde was the dream of every aspiring pilot; for prospective passengers, just being on it was enough to elicit childlike excitement.

It didn’t much matter that its cabin was cramped, that its windows were tiny, or that its high-speed takeoffs and landings induced emotions ranging from mild alarm to outright terror. What did any of that mean if you could come back home and tell your friends that you flew aboard Concorde at twice the speed of sound?

Despite the terrifying thought of something going wrong at Mach 2, Concorde was much like other planes in that takeoffs and landings were by far the most dangerous part of each flight. The plane was designed to fly at high altitudes at great speed; that was where it was at home. But on the approach to an airport, or right after takeoff, it felt and looked more like a fish trying to make its way on land.

Its massive, sweeping delta wings were optimized for supersonic flight but were inefficient at low speed. its long, aerodynamic nose had to be lowered out of the way during taxiing so that pilots could see where they were going. Furthermore, every Concorde flight required another Concorde to be on standby in case a problem arose with the first one, which happened frequently. After all, the passengers had paid for the specific privilege of flying on Concorde, and could not be placed on a normal alternative flight.

Despite all these difficulties, by the year 2000, Concorde had been in service for more than 24 years without any serious safety issues. The idea that one could simply fall from the sky was, to most, unthinkable.

On the 25th of July 2000, one hundred passengers gathered at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, ready to board Air France flight 4590, a chartered Concorde service from Paris to New York. At Concorde’s cruising speed, they could expect to arrive in New York in a little over three hours, twice as fast as a regular commercial flight.

But Concorde was often delayed, and today was no exception: boarding occurred 45 minutes late in order to allow mechanics time to fix a broken thrust reverser. Nor could Air France have used the standby plane, because this was already the standby plane, the original having been pulled from service due to an unrelated mechanical problem.

The passengers were almost all German tourists who had purchased a package tour including a Concorde flight to New York, followed by a cruise to Ecuador. Some had coughed up the extremely expensive tickets without a second thought, but for others, this was a dream that had been years in the making; one couple, a pair of school teachers, had saved for two decades to afford the trip.

In command that day was Captain Christian Marty, who was in every way a remarkable man. Marty was not just a Concorde pilot, but also an extreme athlete; most notably, in 1982 he became the first person ever to windsurf across the Atlantic Ocean.

Flying Concorde was the next logical step for the ambitious 53-year-old father of two, and he had accumulated around 317 hours on the supersonic jet since upgrading in August 1999. Joining him that day were 50-year-old First Officer Jean Marcot, who had more than 10,000 flying hours, including 2,700 on Concorde; and 58-year-old Flight Engineer Giles Jardinaud, a seasoned crewmember who had been operating Concorde systems since 1997.

On flight 4590, the crew and their dispatchers faced a difficult logistical puzzle. The plane was completely full with 100 passengers, nine crewmembers, a large load of baggage, and 95,000 kilograms of fuel, enough to fill every tank to capacity. Some wrangling of the numbers had to be performed in order to get the plane under its maximum takeoff weight of 185,070 kilograms, but even after the pilots concluded that they were within limits, a number of discrepancies remained.

Nineteen bags were loaded into the aft baggage compartment without being added to the load sheet, and the pilots counted on burning the Air France standard of 2,000 kilograms of fuel during taxi, which turned out to be unrealistically high. Even without accounting for these faulty assumptions, the pilots concluded that they would take off at the structural limits of the airplane.

Expert calculations would later show that the plane was in fact operating outside its approved envelope. The real weight of the plane was at least 700 kilograms more than the maximum takeoff weight under the conditions, and the center of gravity was at least 54.2% aft, farther back than the maximum of 54%.

And these were the conservative estimates the actual exceedances might have been considerably greater. Of course, these limits are not a hard line beyond which the plane will not fly, but by going over them, the crew of flight 4590 stripped away a significant portion of the margin of error protecting their plane against unexpected events during takeoff.

No doubt with some small flicker of pride, First Officer Marcot asked the controller for permission to use the entire 4.2-kilometer-long runway 26 Right. As the plane lined up for takeoff at 16:40, Flight Engineer Jardinaud commented that they had used 800 kilograms of fuel, less than the 2,000 allotted for taxiing. Given that they were already at their max takeoff weight even without this extra fuel, the pilots should have sat at the threshold and burnt the remaining 1,200 kilograms. But instead Captain Marty simply replied, “We haven’t left yet, have we?”

After finishing up a few final checklist items, the crew received takeoff clearance at 16:42. Captain Marty advanced the throttles to takeoff power, and the four Rolls Royce Olympus engines roared to life. Passengers felt themselves pressed back against their seats as the incredible acceleration picked up the plane and hurled it down the runway. Heads turned all over the airport at the sound of that deep, earth-shaking bellow, the unmistakable sound that told everyone within several kilometers that Concorde was on the roll.

Twenty-three seconds into the takeoff run, First Officer Marcot called out, “One hundred knots,” followed nine seconds later by “V1,” the highest speed at which the takeoff could be aborted. And then, at 16:43 and 10 seconds, disaster struck.

Traveling at immense speed, the inner front tire on Concorde’s left main landing gear ran over a metal strip lying edgewise on the runway. The strip instantly sliced deep into the highly pressurized tire, causing it to disintegrate with enormous violence. Within a fraction of a second, chunks of rubber and metal began to fly in every direction, ripping through wires, damaging the landing gear doors, and smashing into the underside of the wing. Fuel immediately began to stream from a hole in fuel tank #5, streaking back in front of the engine intakes and the landing gear bays, where a short-circuiting wire, damaged by flying debris, immediately set it alight.

As a huge plume of flame erupted beneath the left wing, the ingestion of fuel and turbulent air caused both engines on that side to lose power. Violent surges rocked engines one and two as highly pressurized air from the combustion chambers forced its way back out through the inlets. The plane started to veer to the left, the asymmetric thrust and damaged left gear dragging it away from the runway centerline.

Just ahead of Concorde, stopped on a taxiway off the left side of runway 26R, was a fully loaded Boeing 747 containing French President Jacques Chirac, who had just returned from a trip to Japan. As the crippled Concorde veered toward the 747, First Officer Marcot shouted, “Watch out!”

Captain Marty, knowing that the plane would not become airborne and would likely strike the 747 if it went into the grass, jammed the rudder hard to the right and raised the nose for liftoff. The plane was still 11 knots below its normal rotation speed, but Marty felt that he had no choice. Flight Engineer Jardinaud, aware that the plane would be in serious trouble if it took off with two dying engines, said “stop,” but his exclamation was drowned out by a message from air traffic control: “Concorde four five nine oh, you have flames behind you!”

While passengers aboard Chirac’s 747 watched in horror, the burning Concorde ran over several runway edge lights and then lurched into the air, streaking past the cockpit as the pilots looked on in stunned disbelief. In the passenger cabin, someone snapped photographs of the fiery takeoff, immortalizing the moment on film. Aboard Air France flight 4590, Flight Engineer Jardinaud announced, “Failure eng… failure engine two!” One second later, a fire alarm bell sounded as the heat of the blaze triggered the #2 engine fire warning circuit. “Shut down engine two!” he said. “Engine fire procedure!” said Captain Marty.

Jardinaud immediately pulled the fire extinguisher handle. Simultaneously, the #1 engine, which had begun to recover from the initial surges, started to lose power again as pieces of the burning wing fell back into the engine intake and damaged the compressor blades. Their speed began to drop as the heavy airplane struggled to stay airborne with only two properly working engines. “Watch the airspeed,” First Officer Marcot shouted, “the airspeed, the airspeed!”

Over the air traffic control frequency, the pilot of another aircraft said, “It’s really burning, eh?” A few seconds later someone added, “It’s really burning and I’m not sure it’s coming from the engines.” In order to reduce drag and increase airspeed, Captain Marty ordered, “Gear on retract!”

“Gear! Jardinaud said.

“Four five nine oh, you have strong flames behind you!” said the controller.

“Yes, roger,” said Marcot.

“The gear, Jean!” said Jardinaud. “Gear!”

“So, do as you wish,” said the controller, “you have priority to return to the field.”

https://blog.rebellionresearch.com/blog/crash-of-air-france-supersonic-concorde-flight-4590?fbclid=IwAR3KwFh1iQK_wP2iShuNclHdtc7dcxynf2grbmV3nT8oHUOnI3bGQ-XRj0I_aem_AQapO04O-OGWSIXwc3LSznXvcR1zWQuNX4De7_IXYvFJN8OVv6gWPDF8qslUXwDyaDtrHjXd4eEOZtiYP84SS9jQ


-Picture 1: In a photo taken from on board a nearby 747, Concorde can be seen taking off in flames. (Toshihiko Sato/AP)

-Picture 2: F-BTSC, the aircraft involved in the accident. (Michel Gilliand)

I still remember this disaster. I was in the University then. It was a news the world watched in horror. It is understandable that air disasters are always catastrophic and fatal.

What a terrible end for the doomed passengers watching themselves helplessly to their own deaths because of pilots errors. Worst is the pilot should have listened to his first Officer and abort the takeoff.

A Concorde that never had any fatality over 20 years of its beautiful existence suddenly had one! And that kill the future prospect & advancement of aviation science in that line. What a sad end for the Concorde.

Abeg let the indomie generation here learn history and the future pilots to be learn a thing or two so that lives will be preserved.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6yABdjYzLk?si=IFaOmBHfwg5s_AZY

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zeDsSJmcpM?si=U1WPmmOrtyZpGnve
Though the primary cause of that unfortunate crash was a piece of metal strip the crew of 4590 stepped on while taxing to lift up, but how on earth did they stupidly neglect this key weight calculation?

This simply increase the drag of the plane hence stalling despite the captain increasing power to ensure they lift up and perhaps pray for a chance to level up and then make an emergency landing. However, it contributed to the unstable centre of gravity of the plane and its eventual doom. What a costly mistake.

Concorde. Funny looking plane. Super fast but certainly not worth the risk

May God save us tragic death.

Remind me of sosoliso and belview with Dana air crash era

A painful end to a great engineering feat. The Concoord supersonic was so fast, loud and expensive to fly in those years.

We pray against this kind of occurrence in our air space and beyond.

Hmm

Memorable incidence. May the souls of the lost ones rest on.

It was just too advance for it's time. The engineering expensive for commercials.

Beautiful thread.

One of my greatest regrets.
Never got to fly Concorde like my dad did.
Missed it by a few years.

Okay

Still the safest means to travel. AIR

sad

Racoon:
Though the primary cause of that unfortunate crash was a piece of metal strip the crew of 4590 stepped on while taxing to lift up, but how on earth did they stupidly neglect this key weight calculation?

This simply increase the drag of the plane hence stalling despite the captain increasing power to ensure they lift up and perhaps pray for a chance to level up and then make an emergency landing. However, it contributed to the unstable centre of gravity of the plane and its eventual doom. What a costly mistake.

Reviewed the tragedy time and again but I still insist the pilot should never have taken off despite reaching V1.

There is no way on earth he could have made it back to land. Just no way. I would have thrown it into reverse immediately, deployed the drogue and applied full brakes even if it meant overshooting.

I will have slammed that plane into the ground hard.

A burning aircraft in the air is finished. A delta winged burning plane is finished. A delta winged plane with that much fuel on board is finished.

And there are fewer people to kill in the ground within an airport than outside.

Na so I take miss my chance to fly concorde

Racoon:
Though the primary cause of that unfortunate crash was a piece of metal strip the crew of 4590 stepped on while taxing to lift up, but how on earth did they stupidly neglect this key weight calculation?

This simply increase the drag of the plane hence stalling despite the captain increasing power to ensure they lift up and perhaps pray for a chance to level up and then make an emergency landing. However, it contributed to the unstable centre of gravity of the plane and its eventual doom. What a costly mistake.

The plane have suffered mishap right from design. It was expensive to maintain and run. It wasn't just meant for the commercial space.

When the commercial engineering for these kinds of speed is properly addressed you won't see failures like this.

Damnit

Brb

Some people come here come dey lie anyhow

Rip to our fallen heroes.

A real engineering master piece...I hope it returns to the runaway soon

Please Tinibu should step down to avoid disgrace