Biden’s overall goal of putting allies and partners at the center of his foreign policy is evident in Southeast Asia. A string of senior U.S. officials visited the region; Secretary of State Blinken held video talks with ASEAN foreign ministers; Blinken and Defense Secretary Austin hosted some Southeast Asian colleagues in Washington; Deputy Secretary of State Sherman met with the ambassadors of the ten ASEAN countries to the United States. Perhaps most importantly, Biden attended the U.S.-ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit via video — reversing years of the U.S. offending regional leaders by sending lower-level officials to the meetings. The Biden administration has also dialed back some tough language on competition with China. In February, Biden said Washington was in "fierce competition" with Beijing. But ahead of Sherman's visit to China in July, she said she was looking for potential areas for cooperation and called for "guardrails" to be installed in the U.S.-China relationship to prevent both sides from unnecessarily escalating the situation. This change of tone has been welcomed across Southeast Asia. Relatedly, the Biden team has made it clear that Southeast Asian countries are not needed to align themselves with the United States. This has worked well in Southeast Asia, where countries certainly don't want to be forced to side with Washington or Beijing, which could lead to retaliatory actions from the other side. Another positive trend is that U.S. relations with Southeast Asian countries under Biden are about more than just China. The U.S. government has a broad international agenda that includes many points, including climate change, global supply chains and post-pandemic recovery.
Still, Biden’s decision not to engage in bilateral dialogue with any Southeast Asian leader in his first year in office is troubling. By contrast, Biden has met at the White House with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and India to emphasize the importance of the so-called "Indo-Pacific region." Interlocutors from Southeast Asian countries did not know why they did not even receive calls. Likewise, the fact that Blinken has just made his first trip to the region sends another signal that Southeast Asian countries are low on the list of priorities. In a regrettable episode, a technical glitch prevented Blinken from participating in a video meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in May, reportedly infuriating her Indonesian counterpart who refused to turn on her video. ASEAN countries are very sensitive to being ignored or marginalized. Separately, the so-called "Democracy Summit" hosted by the Biden administration in December reinforced Washington's stance on who it intends to put first. Only three ASEAN members - Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines - attended the meeting, with key US allies and partners Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam being excluded.

On top of that, Washington still lacks an “Indo-Pacific strategy,” running counter to the Biden administration’s repeated calls for the “Indo-Pacific” as its priority region and sowing confusion among Southeast Asian officials. The "Interim National Security Strategy Guidance" released in March this year covers the "Indo-Pacific region", but key details are missing. When Blinken delivered a speech in Jakarta, Indonesia, on the 14th, he only talked about the "vision" of the region rather than the "strategy", which further exacerbated the continued disappointment among Southeast Asian countries. Without a serious, carefully crafted strategy, Southeast Asian countries are unsure what to expect from Washington’s future presence in the region. There is also widespread concern among Southeast Asian countries about extra-regional alliances that could threaten ASEAN's centrality - its desire to act as a unified bloc - not to mention peace and stability. For example, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. So far, no ASEAN member has joined the bloc, and no country has explicitly supported it. Likewise, a new security agreement between Australia, Britain and the United States has received a cold reception in Southeast Asia. The agreement will initially provide Canberra with nuclear-powered submarines and improve trilateral military interoperability. Indonesia and Malaysia have raised concerns, while Singapore - a key US partner - and Vietnam have provided "implicit support". As a treaty ally of the United States, Thailand has remained silent. Generally, ASEAN will criticize any further militarization of the region.
Finally, the Biden administration still has no regional economic or trade policy to speak of. Since the Trump administration withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the United States has failed to come up with a viable alternative, whether due to lack of capacity, reluctance, or both. The successor trade deal, now renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), excludes the United States but includes several Southeast Asian countries. At the same time, China has joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) led by ASEAN, of which Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and 10 ASEAN countries are members. Beijing is also leveraging its economic power through its Belt and Road Initiative, a global investment and infrastructure plan that is well suited to Southeast Asia's needs. Washington appears to have no realistic idea of ​​countering this initiative.