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Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance - Politics - Nairaland

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Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by Nobody: 3:25pm On Mar 01, 2012
By an act of the British Parliament, Nigeria became an independent country within the Commonwealth on October 1, 1960. Azikiwe was installed as governor general of the federation and Balewa continued to serve as head of a democratically elected parliamentary, but now completely sovereign, government. The governor general represented the British monarch as head of state and was appointed by the crown on the advice of the Nigerian prime minister in consultation with the regional premiers. The governor general, in turn, was responsible for appointing the prime minister and for choosing a candidate from among contending leaders when there was no parliamentary majority. Otherwise, the governor general's office was essentially ceremonial.

The government was responsible to a parliament composed of the popularly elected 312-member House of Representatives and the 44-member Senate, chosen by the regional legislatures.

In general, the regional constitutions followed the federal model, both structurally and functionally. The most striking departure was in the Northern Region, where special provisions brought the regional constitution into consonance with Islamic law and custom. The similarity between the federal and regional constitutions was deceptive, however, and the conduct of public affairs reflected wide differences among the regions.

In February 1961, a plebiscite was conducted to determine the disposition of the Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons, which were administered by Britain as United Nations Trust Territories. By an overwhelming majority, voters in the Southern Cameroons opted to join formerly French-administered Cameroon over integration with Nigeria as a separate federated region. In the Northern Cameroons, however, the largely Muslim electorate chose to merge with Nigeria's Northern Region.

Politics in the Crisis Years

During the first three years after independence, the federal government was an NPC-NCNC coalition, despite the conflicting natures of the two partners. The former was regionalist, Muslim, and aristocratic; the latter was nationalist, Christian, and populist. Moreover, the NCNC supported opponents of the NPC in regional elections in the Northern Region. Although a more natural ideological alignment of the Action Group and the NCNC was called for by some Action Group leaders, it held no attraction for the NCNC as long as the NPC was assured of a parliamentary majority.

Domination of the Northern Region by the NPC and NCNC control of the Eastern Region were assured. Action Group control of the Western Region, however, was weakened and then collapsed because of divisions within the party that reflected cleavages within Yoruba society. This loss of stability in one region gradually undermined the political structure of the whole country.

The leadership of the Action Group, which formed the official opposition in the federal parliament, split in 1962 as a result of a rift between Awolowo and Akintola, prime minister of the Western Region. Awolowo favored the adoption of democratic socialism as party policy, following the lead of Kwame Nkrumah's regime in Ghana. The radical ideology that Awolowo expressed was at variance with his earlier positions, however, and was seen as a bid to make the Action Group an interregional party that drew support across the country from educated younger voters, whose expectations were frustrated by unemployment and the rising cost of living. Akintola, in reaction, attempted to retain the support of conservative party elements who were disturbed by Awolowo's rhetoric. He called for better relations with the NPC and an allparty federal coalition that would remove the Action Group from opposition and give its leaders greater access to power.

Awolowo's radical majority staged the expulsion of Akintola from the party. The governor of the Western Region demanded Akintola's resignation as prime minister (although he had not lost a vote of confidence in the regional legislature) and named a successor recommended by the Action Group to head the government. Akintola immediately organized a new party, the United People's Party, which pursued a policy of collaboration with the NPC-NCNC government in the federal parliament.

Akintola's resignation in May 1962 sparked bloody rioting in the Western Region and brought effective government to an end as rival legislators, following the example in the streets, introduced violence to the floor of the regional legislature. The federal government declared a state of emergency, dissolved the legislature, and named a federal administrator for the Western Region. One of his first acts was to place many Action Group leaders under house arrest.

Investigations by the federal administrator led to accusations of criminal misuse of public funds against Awolowo and other Action Group leaders. A special commission found that Awolowo had funneled several million pounds from public development corporations to the Action Group through a private investment corporation when he was prime minister of the Western Region in the 1950s. The regional government seized the corporation's assets and pressed legal claims against the Action Group.

In the course of the financial investigation, police uncovered evidence linking Awolowo with a conspiracy to overthrow the government. With a number of other Action Group leaders, he was arrested and put on trial for treason. Authorities charged that 200 activists had received military training in Ghana and had smuggled arms into Nigeria in preparation for a coup d'�tat. Awolowo was found guilty, along with seventeen others, and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Anthony Enahoro, Awolowo's chief lieutenant who had been abroad at the time of the coup, was extradited from Britain and also was convicted of treason and imprisoned.

In the meantime, the state of emergency was lifted and Balewa, determining that Akintola had been improperly dismissed, obtained his reinstatement as prime minister of the Western Region at the head of a coalition between the NCNC and the United People's Party. The Action Group successfully contested the legality of this action in the courts, but a retroactive amendment to the Western Region's constitution that validated Akintola's reappointment was quickly enacted. As Balewa told parliament, the legalities of the case "had been overtaken by events."

Later in 1963, Nigeria became a republic within the Commonwealth. The change in status called for no practical alteration of the constitutional system. The president, elected to a five-year term by a joint session of the parliament, replaced the crown as the symbol of national sovereignty and the British monarchy as head of state. Azikiwe, who had been governor general, became the republic's first president.

New State Movements

After independence the attitudes of the major parties toward the formation of new states that could accommodate minority aspirations varied widely. The NCNC espoused self-determination for ethnic minorities but only in accordance with its advocacy of a unitary state. The Action Group also supported such movements, including the restoration of the northern Yoruba area (Ilorin) to the Western Region, but as part of a multistate, federal Nigeria. The NPC steadfastly opposed separatism in the Northern Region and attempted with some success to win over disaffected minorities in the middle belt.

Proposals were introduced for the creation of three states as a means of restructuring the regions along ethnic lines. The most extensive revision sought the separation of the middle belt from the Northern Region, a move the United Middle Belt Congress promoted. Serious riots in Tivland in 1960 and 1964 were related to this agitation. Another plan was put forward by the Edo and western Igbo to create the Midwestern Region by separating the whole tract adjacent to the Niger River from the Yoruba-dominated Western Region. At the same time, Ijaw and Efik-Ibibio ethnic groups proposed that the coast between the Niger Delta and Calabar become a new region in order to end Igbo dominance in that area. At this time, however, only the Midwestern Region achieved formal approval, despite opposition of the Action Group. The creation of the region was confirmed by plebiscite in 1963.

The creation of the Midwestern Region reopened the question of the internal restructuring of Nigeria. One motive for a more drastic restructuring was the desire to break up the Northern Region. That region, having more than half the country's population, controlled a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. There was also the fear that the Igbo-dominated NCNC would gain control of the Midwestern legislature and thereby become even more powerful. A new political coalition, the Midwest Democratic Front (MDF), was formed by leaders of the Action Group and the United People's Party to contest the Midwestern Region election with the NCNC. During the campaign, the conservative United People's Party accepted support from the NPC, a fact that NCNC candidates stressed in their call to keep northern influence out of the region. Many Action Group workers withdrew support from the MDF in protest, and some allied themselves with the NCNC. In the 1964 elections, the NCNC won by a landslide.

The Census Controversy

Because seats in the House of Representatives were apportioned on the basis of population, the constitutionally mandated decennial census had important political implications (see Population , ch. 2; The First Republic , ch. 4). The Northern Region's political strength, marshaled by the NPC, had arisen in large measure from the results of the 1952-53 census, which had identified 54 percent of the country's population in that area. A national campaign early in 1962 addressed the significance of the forthcoming census. Politicians stressed the connection between the census and parliamentary representation on the one hand, and the amount of financial support for regional development on the other. The 1962 census was taken by head count, but there was evidence that many enumerators obtained their figures from heads of families, and many persons managed to be counted more than once.

Southern hopes for a favorable reapportionment of legislative seats were buoyed by preliminary results, which gave the south a clear majority. A supplementary count was immediately taken in the Northern Region that turned up an additional 9 million persons reportedly missed in the first count. Charges of falsification were voiced on all sides and led to an agreement among federal and regional governments to nullify the count and to conduct a new census.

The second nationwide census reported a population of 60.5 million, which census officials considered impossibly high. A scaled-down figure of 55.6 million, including 29.8 million in the Northern Region, finally was submitted and adopted by the federal government, leaving legislative apportionment virtually unchanged.

Demographers generally rejected the results of the 1963 census as inflated, arguing that the actual figure was as much as 10 million lower. Controversy over the census remained a lively political issue. NCNC leaders publicly charged the Northern Region's government with fraud, a claim that was denied by Balewa and by Bello, the regional prime minister.

Popular Disillusionment and Political Realignment

The conspiracy trials that led to the conviction of two of the country's most dynamic politicians, Awolowo and Enahoro, severely weakened public confidence in the political and judicial systems. Abuses were widespread, including intimidation of opponents by threats of criminal investigation, manipulation of the constitution and the courts, diversion of public funds to party and private use, rigging of elections, and corruption of public officials whose political patrons expected them to put party interests ahead of their legal responsibilities. Popular disillusion also intensified because politicians failed to produce benefits commensurate with constituents' expectations.

The volatile political scene leading up to elections in 1964 was ominous. The Action Group virtually disappeared from the federal parliament as a result of the Awolowo affair, thereby fundamentally altering political alignments at the national level. By early 1964, therefore, the federal parliament no longer had a recognized opposition. Akintola's party, which was renamed the Nigerian National Democratic Party in an effort to attract more support, now dominated the Western Region. The federal government nominally consisted of a consensus of the ruling parties of all four regions, but it was a fragile alliance at best and had emerged as a result of heavy-handed tactics. The NCNC had strengthened its position by gaining firm control of the Midwestern Region, so that it dominated two of the four regions. Akintola managed to undermine the NCNC in the Western Region, even though nationally he was pledged to an alliance with the NCNC. For its part, the NCNC denounced Akintola's party as a "tool of the NPC" and allied itself with remnants of the Action Group.

Political realignment was deceptive, however, because the basic divisions within the country remained unaltered. The NPC was reasonably secure in the Northern Region, despite the presence of minor parties, but it could not govern Nigeria alone, and alliances with any of the southern parties were ideologically incompatible and very tenuous. The NPC continued its dominance because of the inability of the other parties to find common ground among themselves and with northern progressives. Awolowo's pointed remarks in 1963 that democracy could be secured only if the Action Group and the NCNC could reach an accommodation that would remove the deadweight of the NPC from power fueled NPC concerns. The detention of Awolowo prevented that alliance from maturing, but it did not result in greater political stability. Indeed the alliance between the NPC and NCNC, which had dominated federal politics and destroyed the Action Group, now fell apart.

The 1964-65 Elections

The federal parliamentary election campaign in December 1964--the first since independence--was contested by two political alliances incorporating all the major parties. The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) was composed of the NPC, Akintola's Western-based Nigerian National Democratic Party, and opposition parties representing ethnic minorities in the Midwestern and Eastern regions. It was opposed by the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), which joined the NCNC and the remnants of the Action Group with two minority-based northern allies, the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the United Middle Belt Congress.

Not surprisingly, the NNA adopted a platform that reflected the views of the northern political elite and, hence, was an attempt by the NPC to gain firmer control of federal politics through an alliance with the Western Region. Its appeal to voters outside the north was based essentially on the advantages to be gained from associating with the party in power. The NNA preyed on Yoruba fears of Igbo domination of the federal government. The UPGA was employed in an attempt by the NCNC to use the two regional governments that it controlled as a springboard to domination of the federal government. Strategically it offered a reformist program, combining a planned economy that endorsed increased public spending while also encouraging private enterprise. The UPGA proposed to divide the country into states that reflected ethnicity. Its proposals were intended to undermine the existing regional basis of political power by creating a sufficient number of states in each region so that none of the mayor ethnic groups--Hausa, Yoruba, or Igbo--could dominate region. The UPGA presented itself as an alternative to northern and, more specifically, to Hausa-Fulani domination of the federal government. Convinced that it would win if the election were held in an atmosphere free from interference by ruling parties in the Northern Region and the Western Region, the UPGA spent most of its efforts denouncing what it regarded as NNA intentions to rig the election in those regions.

The election was postponed for several weeks because of discrepancies between the number of names on voting rolls and on census returns. Even then the UPGA was not satisfied and called on its supporters to boycott the election. The boycott was effective in the Eastern Region, where polling places did not open in fifty-one constituencies that had more than one candidate running for office. In other constituencies in the region, UPGA candidates ran unopposed. Nationwide, only 4 million voters cast ballots, out of 15 million who were eligible. The NNA elected 198 candidates, of whom 162 represented the NPC, from the 261 constituencies returning results. After an embarrassing delay, President Azikiwe agreed to ask Balewa to form a government with the NNA majority. The boycott had failed to stop the election, and in March 1965 supplementary elections were held in those areas in the Eastern Region and in Lagos where the boycott had been honored. UPGA candidates were elected in all these constituencies, bringing the NCNC-dominated coalition a total of 108 seats in the House of Representatives. The UPGA became the official opposition.

After this decisive defeat, the UPGA prepared for the November 1965 legislative election in the Western Region in an attempt to gain control of the three southern regions and the Federal Territory of Lagos, the region surrounding the capital. If successful, the NPC-dominated NNA still would have controlled the House of Representatives, but it would have given the predominantly southern UPGA a majority in the Senate, whose members were chosen by the regional legislatures.

Once more NCNC strategy failed. Amid widespread charges of voting irregularities, Akintola's NNDP, supported by its NPC ally, scored an impressive victory in November. There were extensive protests, including considerable grumbling among senior army officials, at the apparent perversion of the democratic process. In the six months after the election, an estimated 2,000 people died in violence that erupted in the Western Region. In the face of the disorders, the beleaguered Balewa delegated extraordinary powers to the regional governments to deal with the situation. By this time, Azikiwe and the prime minister were scarcely on speaking terms, and there were suggestions that Nigeria's armed forces should restore order.

In January 1966, army officers attempted to seize power. In a well-coordinated action, the conspirators, most of whom were Igbo, assassinated Balewa in Lagos, Akintola in Ibadan, and Bello in Kaduna, as well as senior officers of northern origin. In a public proclamation, the coup leaders pledged to establish a strong and efficient government committed to a progressive program and eventually to new elections. They vowed to stamp out corruption and to suppress violence. Despite the bloody and calculated character of the coup, these sentiments appealed directly to younger, educated Nigerians in all parts of the country.

The army's commander in chief, Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, quickly intervened to restore discipline within the army. In the absence of Azikiwe, who was undergoing treatment in a London hospital, Balewa's shaken cabinet resigned, leaving the reins of authority to the armed forces. Ironsi, also an Igbo, suspended the constitution, dissolved all legislative bodies, banned political parties, and as an interim measure formed a Federal Military Government (FMG) to prepare the country for a return to civilian rule at an unspecified date. He appointed military governors in each region and assigned officers to ministerial positions, instructing them to implement sweeping institutional reforms.

Ironsi and his advisers favored a unitary form of government, which they thought would eliminate the intransigent regionalism that had been the stumbling block to political and economic progress. A decree issued in March abolished the federation and unified the federal and regional civil services. Civilian experts, largely Igbo, set to work on a new constitution that would provide for a centralized unitary government such as the NCNC had favored since the 1950s.

Although the decree contained a number of concessions to regional interests, including protection of northerners from southern competition in the civil service, Ironsi's action showed dangerous disregard for the nuances of regional politics and badly misjudged the intensity of ethnic sensitivities in the aftermath of the bloody coup. The failure of the military government to prosecute Igbo officers responsible for murdering northern leaders stirred animosities further. Igbo civil servants and merchants residing in the north made the situation even worse through their triumphant support for the coup. Furthermore, Ironsi was vulnerable to accusations of favoritism toward the Igbo. The coup was perceived not so much as an effort to impose a unitary government as a plot by the Igbo to dominate Nigeria. Likewise, many Muslims saw the military decrees as Christianinspired attempts to undermine emirate government.

Troops of northern origin, who made up the bulk of the infantry, became increasingly restive. Fighting broke out between them and Igbo soldiers in garrisons in the south. In June mobs in the northern cities, abetted by local officials, carried out a pogrom against resident Igbo, massacring several hundred people and destroying Igbo-owned property. Some northern leaders spoke seriously of secession. Many northerners feared that Ironsi intended to deprive them of power and to consolidate further an Igbo-dominated centralized state.

In July northern officers and army units staged a countercoup, during which Ironsi and a number of other Igbo officers were killed. The Muslim officers named thirty-one-year- old Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, a Christian from a small ethnic group (the Anga) in the middle belt, as a compromise candidate to head the FMG. A young and relatively obscure officer serving as army chief of staff, Gowon had not been involved in the coup, but he enjoyed wide support among northern troops who subsequently insisted that he be given a position in the ruling body. His first act was to repeal the Ironsi decree and to restore federalism, a step followed by the release of Awolowo and Enahoro from prison.(Culled from the U.S. Library of Congress)
Re: Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by Odutodaiwa: 8:57pm On Mar 01, 2012
Even though I do not 100% agree with the choice of some languages used in the article. The article is clear enough that Awo preferred to work with Zik led NCNC but because Zik felt it was better to work NPC a possible Southern Alliance that would have saved all of us the headache of resource control & federalism that we shout today was frustrated by Zik himself. When go no go and Akintola provided the North led NPC the support needed, Igbo soldiers choose to scatter everything via a coup which eventually led to the war. Anything different from that is revisionism according to Igbology.

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Re: Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by DuduNegro: 9:50pm On Mar 01, 2012
. . . this is why I continue to believe that Zik had knowledge of the Jan66 coup beore it was executed. I won't be surprised that he bankrolled it! He had by all indications and spirit insistent on getting and running a nationalist government. . . .by law or by crook.

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Re: Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by abadaba(m): 10:26pm On Mar 01, 2012
Negro, though you are deeply concerned about Fulani antics in Yorubaland. I think you should call the attention of Yorubas to the evil menance of Fulanis currently in Yorubaland instead of Igbo this and that everyday.
Re: Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by DuduNegro: 11:37pm On Mar 01, 2012
Thank you for this good feedbback. Anywhere I see "Yoruba" my attention is drawn to it. Can you tell your fellas in East to not open topics or post comments that draw my attention? Thank you! grin
Re: Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by Nobody: 1:57am On Mar 02, 2012
The North is barely doing anything at this point.

Its the igbos/ Yorubas doing the harm. The North are just killing anybody their hands can get on.
Re: Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by SamIkenna: 3:06am On Mar 02, 2012
Ileke-IdI:

The North is barely doing anything at this point.

Its the igbos/ Yorubas doing the harm. The North are just killing anybody their hands can get on.

Where did you pull this from? I haven't stopped laughing after reading this.
Re: Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by aljharem(m): 3:12am On Mar 02, 2012
OP the north is not doing anything, It is the Igbos that are doing it themselves

Read this

[size=13pt]YORUBA AND IGBO MUST REMAIN DIVIDED TO KEEP NIGERIA ONE[/size]

When Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was taken to task to explain why he passed on Awolowo's offer to become the Prime Minister. He simply said it might have led to the breakup of Nigeria if the North was isolated. Either by design or omission, the logic still stands today but the reasoning and supporters of that logic may have changed. Actually Tafawa Balewa was unmoved by the so called Southern union, vowing to be Opposition Leader.

There has to be some positive spin to the division in the South. There is also division in the North but it is not as pronounced. No matter how you take it, no part of the Country can clearly delineate agreeable people within one region. Biafra has other ethnic groups that do not consider themselves part of the Nation. The same is true of the North Central. The Hausa that form the majority in the North are controlled by minority Fulani.

Even the Yoruba, in spite of common lingua-franca, can only boast of Diaspora union.

Therefore, as long as the Country stands as Nigeria, Yoruba and Igbo will always fight for political dominance and the Hausa will always come to their rescue so that they do not destroy our Country. Whenever you hear intellectuals and theorists debate about separation as a mere geographical expression; amuse yourselves. Listen if you can with guguru and epa to grace your precious time. They cannot agree on their base, yet they want Nigeria to split. Split into what?

If you are one of the frequent visitors to internet sites, you get some of the point here. We have young men and women born after the War going mercilessly at one another as if they were there. Even more disturbing, some of these young people have never been on the Nigerian soil. Needless to say, you know who is feeding them with venom about the Country on different version of their novel history.

The Igbo are well known for their adventures within the Country into various ethnic groups. You cannot but wonder why many call for separate nations more than others as if they would rather ask for visas into these separate nations in Nigeria. But we need to understand their frustration if at any little provocation in the North, they get the worst brunt of the mayhem. Indeed, they are safer in other parts of Nigeria.

Igbo in other parts of Nigeria have called on those in the North to come home or stop going back to the North after each clash. It is very difficult to heed such calls unless the foot is in the other shoe. No one wants to start all over after spending so much of their effort building a comfortable nest outside. The same is true of other ethnic group in the North as the Yoruba and others refused to come back home. Actually some of the ethnic groups within the North have no other home. So why call on Igbo?

The Hausa recently told Boko Haram to go to blazes, they are not moving out of Lagos. Every ethnic group feels comfortable in Lagos, some as a second home and others as the only home they known. So why would anyone in his right mind leave Lagos where they make their money and live peacefully to go anywhere else in Nigeria they do not feel as safe beats anyone's imagination.

It will be hypocrisy if the feelings of other ethnic groups regarding settling amongst the Igbo are not shared here. Some think they are not as tolerable as they demand from others outside their base. May be if the gesture of tolerance is reciprocated in Igbo land, we will see more accommodation in the Country as a whole. It may be wishful thinking. But it is better to separate than kill off one another living together. Except that we cannot. So after each crisis, Nigerians will always return to where they can make a living.

Igbo also have their grievances against “Yoruba diplomacy”. They claim you cannot hold Yoruba to a deal without expecting them to betray you. So the suspicion is mutual on both sides. No matter how we view the suspicion, it has served Nigeria well and held the whole Country together. Imagine the Yoruba and the Igbo as political ally, they would oppress the rest of Nigerians; and where is the President going to come from?

Let us be fair, Yoruba and Igbo do not always go after one another's chin. After all, they dine, play, work and sleep together. But when it comes to politics, it is a no-go area. Their most recent encounter was the leadership of the House. As usual, they contested for it until the North came to the rescue. Some level headed people from each ethnic group have wondered if the Yoruba would support the Igbo for presidency in 2015.

Of course some Yoruba would support Igbo for presidency. Whether they are going to get majority of the Yoruba support is sheer speculation at this point. There is time to kiss and make up. Some Igbo have even said it publicly that they would cross that river when they get there and there is nothing to be worried about right now. Whatever each ethnic group can get right now is fair political game. After all, they always fight and make up.

However, some Nigerians are wondering if it makes any sense to be rotating presidency between North and South. They postulate that we should allow the most competent man rule, no matter where he comes from. By now, we have had every region in the Country rule by hook or crook, by coup or militia. So do not be surprised to see potential presidential candidates coming out from every party regardless of their regions vying to be the Vagabond In Power. They are not different once in office.

Don't you forget, the incumbent have not made any concrete promise to any party, region or cabal that he was not going to seek a second term as a matter of right. Nigeria is not the same country as South Africa and what may hold in that country does not necessarily hold in Nigeria. Indeed, some members of MEND are already warning others to stay clear. What we cannot predict is if Ebele will get votes from every region as he did before.

http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/84106/1/yoruba-and-igbo-must-remain-divided-to-keep-nigeri.html
Re: Why The North Will Do Everything To Frustrate An Igbo/Yoruba Alliance by Anchorra: 3:22am On Mar 02, 2012
The British were was very smart in trusting the Northeners.
They are more trustworthy than other parts of Nigeria.
The East and the West do not need help.
They are already frustrated in themselves and by themselves.
Mu he he he he he he

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