Aburi: The “Sovereign National Conference That Got Away”.


Aburi: The “Sovereign National Conference” That Got Away
By Max Siollun
Published 05/21/2007
Nigeria Matters
Unrated


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After Nigeria was dragged to the brink of the abyss by two military coups in 1966, its military leaders met to try to bring the country back from the brink. The meeting evolved into perhaps the best documented constitutional debate of all time which touched upon fundamental concepts regarding the balance of power between the central government and federating regions in a federation and professional soldiers’ outlook to military coups and seniority. It was a potential breakthrough occasion. Between January 5th and 7th 1967, the members of Nigeria's then ruling military junta, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), met for the first time at Aburi in Ghana under the auspices of the Ghanaian Head of State: Lt-General Joe Ankrah. Ankrah was no stranger to coup plots as he had become Ghana’s first military Head of State after Ghana’s first President Kwame Nkrumah was deposed in a coup while Nkrumah was abroad visiting China. Ankrah was later forced to resign in April 1969 after admitting his role in a bribery scandal. Ankrah had served in the Congo during the UN peace-keeping mission there in the early 1960s and it is likely he personally knew the Nigerian soldiers (including Ironsi, Fajuyi, Ojukwu and Gowon) who served in the same mission. The meeting at Aburi was the first official meeting of all members of that SMC. Following a second bloody army coup in July 1966, the Military Governor of the eastern region of Nigeria: Lt-Colonel 'Emeka' Ojukwu had refused to attend any SMC meeting outside the eastern region of Nigeria due to concerns over his safety. The massacre of tens of thousands of Igbos in northern Nigeria only heightened Ojukwu's sense of isolation and insecurity. In turn, Ojukwu's public belligerence towards the SMC (whom he suspected of tacitly supporting, or having a hand in the massacres) served to antagonise the SMC, who began to suspect that Ojukwu was planning the secession of the eastern region from the rest of Nigeria.
 
The fashionable political theory being bandied about in Nigeria today is that a "Sovereign National Conference" (SNC) should be held to resolve the country’s constitutional problems and coup plotting culture. Many do not realise that Nigeria has already had half a dozen constitutional debates - none of which has ever resolved the nagging problems which have dogged Nigeria from independence till today. Nigeria has wasted billions of Naira on constitutional debates and constitutions that are no longer in use, and a future SNC is unlikely to discuss anything that has not already been covered in the previous constitutional debates. Ironically the best recorded of these constitutional debates was never implemented, and Nigeria has been paying the price since. To plan for the future Nigeria might do well to go back into its archives and learn from the "SNC" which it has already had.


BETWEEN ONE AMBITIOUS MAN AND THE REST OF THE COUNTRY
 
In the months preceding Aburi the SMC and Ojukwu had engaged in a war of words with the two sides trading multiple accusations and blaming each other for causing or exacerbating the crisis. The Military Governor of the north: Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina dismissed Ojukwu's confident and eloquent public statements on the crisis as attempts by Ojukwu "to show how much English he knows". As far as Katsina was concerned, Nigeria's problem was a stand-off "between one ambitious man and the rest of the country". Throughout the six months following the coup of July 29th 1966, Ojukwu repeated his mantra that "I, as the Military Governor of the east cannot meet anywhere in Nigeria where there are northern troops". That virtually ruled out an SMC meeting inside Nigeria's borders. Ojukwu had even turned down offers to attend an SMC meeting on board a British (whom Ojukwu, and Igbos in general did not entirely trust) naval ship, and at Benin, but was finally convinced to attend in the neutral territory of Aburi in Ghana. Ojukwu's aides were not without doubt. Some warned him that the Aburi meeting could be a trap set by anti-Igbo members of the Federal Government to arrest or kill him. Ojukwu brushed aside their concerns by pointing out that he had received a guarantee of safe passage from Lt-Colonel Gowon, and that he had to trust Gowon's word as an officer and a gentleman. Virtually everything discussed at that Aburi conference is relevant till today. So much so that a reader would be tempted to believe that the discussion was on Nigeria's current problems, rather than over 40 years earlier, in 1967. It is probably the best recorded constitutional debate in history. Aware that something momentous was occurring, the Ghanaians had the conference tape recorded. The tape of the discussions was later released by Ojukwu as a series of six long playing gramophone records. In attendance on the Federal Military Government (FMG) side were:


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NAME
POSITION

Lt-Colonel Yakubu Gowon
Head of the SMC*

Commodore Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey
Head of the Nigerian navy

Colonel Robert Adeyinka Adebayo
Military Governor of the western region

Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina
Military Governor of the northern region

Lt-Colonel David Akpode Ejoor
Governor of mid-west region

Major Mobolaji Johnson
Military Governor of Lagos

Alhaji Kam Selem
Inspector-General of Police

Timothy Omo-Bare
Police

 
*Head of the SMC as Ironsi’s whereabouts were “unknown”.

Ojukwu was in attendance as the eastern region's Military Governor. The FMG delegation arrived "wreathed in smiles"[1] and anxious to mollify their former brother-in-arms Ojukwu. Colonels Adebayo and Gowon even offered to embrace Ojukwu. However Ojukwu was still stung by the terrible massacres of his Igbo kinsmen in northern Nigeria the previous year and was in no mood to embrace his former colleagues. The contrast in the demeanour of the participants was in itself a microcosm of what took place over the course of the next two days. While the federal delegation behaved as if the Aburi conference was a social gathering to reunite former friends who had fallen out in a social tiff, Ojukwu saw the conference for what it really was: a historic constitutional debate that would determine Nigeria's future social and political structure.
 
Typically, western perspective was focused on image, rather than on the genuine problems of the protagonists. Secret diplomatic dispatches later declassified by the United States State Department depicted the FMG-eastern region stand-off as a personality clash between Ojukwu and Gowon. According to the American perspective: "many Americans admire Ojukwu. We like romantic leaders, and Ojukwu has panache, quick intelligence and an actor's voice and fluency. The contrast with Gowon - troubled by the enormity of his task, painfully earnest and slow to react, hesitant and repetitive in speech - led some Americans to view the Nigerian-Biafran conflict as a personal duel between two mismatched individuals".[2] As they were busy fighting in Vietnam and fighting a "cold war" against the USSR, the Americans did not become militarily or politically involved in the dispute. Instead, treating the conflict as one falling within Britain's sphere of influence.
 
THE REUNION
 
The Ghanaian host Lt-General Ankrah made a few introductory remarks and reminded his guests that "the whole world is looking up to you as military men and of there is any failure to reunify or even bring perfect understanding to Nigeria as a whole, you will find that the blame will rest with us through the centuries". Ankrah added that although he understood that the eastern region/rest of Nigeria stand-off was an internal matter for Nigerians, they should not hesitate to ask him for any help should they feel the need. Although Commodore Wey played an avuncular role, the discussion revolved around the younger Colonels: Adebayo, Ejoor, Katsina, Ojukwu and Gowon. Ojukwu showed from the beginning that he was prepared for serious business. He arrived at the conference armed with notes, and an army of secretaries. The extent of Ojukwu’s pre-preparation is shown by the fact that he gave the other debaters copies of documents he had prepared in advance, which enunciated his ideas. The other debaters should have realised at this point, that something serious was going to occur. After the hostility and bitterness that preceded the Aburi meeting, the civilian observers were stunned at the camaraderie displayed by the military officers. The debaters threw off formality and addressed each other by their first names: "Emeka", "Bolaji", "Jack" (nickname of Lt-Colonel Gowon) were thrown around as if addressing each other in at a social gathering. One of Ojukwu’s secretaries was amazed to observe that “the meeting went on in a most friendly and cordial atmosphere which made us, the non-military advisers, develop a genuine respect and admiration for the military men and their sense of comradeship. The meeting continued so smoothly and ended so successfully…..that I for one, was convinced that among themselves, the military had their own methods”.[3]
 
Ojukwu decided to show his good faith, and to test the good faith of the others by asking all present to renounce the use of force to settle the crisis. Ojukwu's motion was accepted without objection. While this request by Ojukwu may sound very noble, he was in fact playing a cunning soldier-politician. Ojukwu (despite his boasts of the eastern region's military prowess) realised that he could not succeed in a military campaign against the far more heavily armed FMG. By getting them to renounce the use of force, Ojukwu was trying to negate the FMG's military advantage. For he knew that if the political situation eventually got out of control, the FMG would find it difficult to resort to a military campaign having already given their word that they would not use force. This may have been an influential factor in Gowon's subsequent reluctance to engage the eastern region in a fully fledged war.
 
POLITICIANS
 
The assembled military officers struck a chord in unison on the subject of politicians. All of them voiced their contempt for the behaviour of civilian politicians whom they blamed for the wholesale bloodletting of the previous years (ignoring the fact that more Nigerian civilians had been murdered by politically motivated violence, in the one year of military rule so far, than in the preceding five years of civilian democratic rule). Commodore Wey slammed the point home rather forcefully when he declared that "Candidly if there had ever been a time in my life when I thought somebody had hurt me sufficiently for me to wish to kill him it was when one of these fellows [politicians] opened his mouth too wide".
 
IRONSI’S FATE
 
Despite Ironsi’s murder six months earlier, no public announcement regarding his death had been made and his whereabouts were still presumed unknown, although most of the SMC definitely knew he was dead. Gowon’s regime had eerily repeated the mistake made by Ironsi himself: failing to publicly acknowledge the army officers killed in a coup d’etat. By not announcing Ironsi’s death, Gowon also made his own position tenuous and gave Ojukwu the opportunity to reason that since the Supreme Commander Ironsi was “missing”, only the officer directly behind Ironsi in army seniority could replace him as Supreme Commander. Major Mobolaji Johnson encapsulated the issue that the east was steadfastly refusing to recognize Gowon as Head of State while the other regions accepted him (albeit tentatively in the case of the west): “The main problem now is that as far as the east is concerned, there is no central government. Why? This is what we must find out. …..For all the east knows the former Supreme Commander [Ironsi] is only missing and until such a time that they know his whereabouts they do not know any other Supreme Commander. These are the points that have been brought out by the east.” Ojukwu demanded that Gowon make a categorical public statement on the fate of Ironsi. Ejoor supported this by flatly requesting “we want to know what happened to Ironsi and Fajuyi”. Despite Ojukwu’s request for an announcement, most, if not all the participants already knew that Ironsi had been murdered. Gowon was informed of the death of Ironsi and Fajuyi not long after they had been killed. Gowon’s ADC Lt William Walbe was one of the junior northern soldiers that led Ironsi and Fajuyi into a bush alongside Iwo road outside Ibadan and murdered them there. Colonel Adebayo had ordered a search for their bodies, which were eventually discovered by the police. The head of the police Kam Selem would have been informed when his men discovered the bodies. Although Ojukwu was several hundred miles away in the east when Ironsi and Fajuyi were murdered, he likely would have had the story of their death relayed to him by one of Ironsi’s ADCs Captain Andrew Nwankwo who was captured along with Ironsi and Fajuyi but managed to escape moments before they were shot. Nwankwo eventually managed to find his way back to the east. Commodore Wey acknowledged that all the debaters already knew what happened to Ironsi. Ojukwu simply wanted Gowon to publicly acknowledge what the SMC members already knew: that Ironsi was dead. Ojukwu later acknowledged that “I heard the rumour that he [Ironsi] had been assassinated, so I began making contacts because I wanted to force them out in the open so that we could start dealing with the real situation.”[4] Gowon agreed to make a public announcement, and Kam Selem concurred, although he counselled that “the statement should be made in Nigeria so that the necessary honour can be given”.
After the soldiers agreed to make a public statement formally announcing Ironsi’s death shortly after they returned to Nigeria, the microphones were switched off and the civilians were asked to leave the room. Gowon then narrated the grisly tale of how Ironsi and Fajuyi had been abducted from State House in Ibadan by junior northern soldiers (including Gowon’s ADC Lt Walbe), driven out to an isolated bush outside Ibadan and shot there.




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COUP PLOTTERS: OJUKWU'S PROPHECY
 
When Ojukwu expressed his disgust over the murder of Igbo army officers by their northern colleagues in July 1966, Lt-Colonel Katsina interjected by asking Ojukwu why he had not reacted with the same revulsion when senior northern military officers were murdered by Igbo soldiers seven months earlier. Ojukwu reasoned that in January 1966, soldiers from every region of the federation (Nzeogwu: Mid-West, Ifeajuna-East, Ademoyega: West, Kpera: North) had staged a coup in which soldiers and politicians from every region of the federation (Akintola: West, Balewa: North, Unegbe: East, Okotie-Eboh: Mid-West) were also killed. Whereas when northern soldiers staged a revenge coup in July, soldiers from one region of the federation only (North: Danjuma, Murtala, Martin Adamu et al) singled out soldiers from one region in the federation as their targets (East: Okoro, Ironsi etc). Katsina took this opportunity to remind Ojukwu of the effort he had put in to prevent the murder of Igbos. Katsina told Ojukwu that "If you know how much …we have tried to console the people to stop all these movements and mass killings, you will give me and others a medal tonight."
 
Despite agreeing to attend the conference, Ojukwu was still refusing to recognize Lt-Colonel Gowon as Nigeria's Head of State. Ojukwu had defiantly continued to address Gowon as the "the Chief of Staff (Army)" (the post which Gowon occupied before the July counter-coup) in his public statements. Ojukwu was alarmed at the ascension of Gowon to the highest office in the land despite the presence of several other officers who were more senior than him (Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe, Commodore J.E.A. Wey, Colonel Adebayo, Lt-Colonels Hilary Njoku, Phillip Effiong, George Kurubo, Ime Imo, Conrad Nwawo and Lt-Colonels Ejoor and Ojukwu who were promoted to Lt-Colonel in the same week as Gowon). Ojukwu almost prophetically warned that allowing a middle ranking officer backed by coup plotters to become the Head of State irrespective of seniority would create a dangerous precedent which Nigeria would find difficult to emerge from. He told Gowon that "any break at this time from our normal line would write in something into the Nigerian army which is bigger than all of us and that thing is indiscipline.....How can you ride above people's heads purely because you are at the head of a group who have their fingers poised on the trigger? If you do it you remain forever a living example of that indiscipline which we want to get rid of because tomorrow a Corporal will think....he could just take over the company from the Major commanding the company…". Ojukwu's warning was of course not heeded and his prediction that junior officers would in future overthrow their superior officers proved prophetic. The NCOs and Lieutenants that shot Gowon to power graduated into the Colonels that overthrew him exactly nine years later. As Brigadiers, they overthrew the elected civilian government of Shehu Shagari on the last day of 1983, and removed Major-General Buhari from power in 1985. Ojukwu's impassioned monologue at Aburi could serve as an anti coup plotter thesis. He continued to Gowon "you announced yourself as Supreme Commander. Now, Supreme Commander by virtue of the fact that you head or that you are acceptable to people who had mutinied against their commander, kidnapped him and taken him away? By virtue of the support of officers and men who had in the dead of night murdered their brother officers, by virtue of the fact that you stood at the head of a group who had turned their brother officers from the eastern region out of the barracks they shared?".
 
THE STAR OF THE SHOW
 
It was obvious to the non military observers of the Aburi conference that Ojukwu "was clearly the star performer. Everyone wanted to please and concede to him".[1] On the federal side, only the Military Governor of the Northern Region: Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina, seemed to realize the significance of what was going on. Anxious not to allow Ojukwu's domination of the proceedings to continue for too long, he at one point dared Ojukwu to "secede, and let the three of us (West, North, Mid-West) join together". Alarmed by talk of a possible break-up of Nigeria, Ankrah quickly interjected and told his guests that "There is no question of secession when you come here [Ghana]". Although the FMG delegation was keen to mollify and make concessions to Ojukwu, Lt-Colonel Katsina was blunter than his other colleagues. He declared matter of factly to Ojukwu: "You command the east, if you want to come into Nigeria, come into Nigeria and that is that".
 
THE CONSTIUTIONAL DEBATE
 
Back then as now, each region of Nigeria was petrified of domination by other regions. No region of the federation was keen to adopt a course which would concentrate too much power at the hands of Nigeria's central government. Even Gowon acknowledged this (and unwittingly played into Ojukwu's hands) by admitting that he would "I would do away with any decree that certainly tended to go towards too much centralisation". Ojukwu pounced on the central powers theme and remarked that "Centralisation is a word that stinks in Nigeria today. For that 10,000 people have been killed” (this figure was later revised up to 30,000, and then 50,000). The clash, and ill defined relationship between Nigeria's central and regional governments has been the greatest source of political bloodletting in the country's history. It led indirectly to the gruesome "religious" clashes that resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians over the introduction of Sharia law in some northern states in 2000. It led to the civil war in which over a million civilians died. It led to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa after he agitated for greater self determination for his Ogoni people.





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Using his "skilful histrionics and superior intellectual adroitness",[1] Ojukwu managed to get the other Colonels to understand, and share his reasoning: that in order to keep Nigeria together as one nation, its constituent regions first had to move a little further apart from each other. Ojukwu used a metaphor to explain his reasoning: “It is better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we move closer and perish in the collision.” This may have been a paradox, but the Colonels accepted the logic of Ojukwu's argument. The problem then (as it still is in Nigeria today) is that Nigeria is so large, diverse and unwieldy that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find a leader who can elicit popularity and a following throughout, or most of the country. Amazingly Gowon accepted Ojukwu's thesis without really understanding the constitutional implications of what he was agreeing to. Gowon was effectively sanctioning measures which would paralyse his own powers. Lt-Colonel Katsina and Colonel Adebayo also agreed and were attracted to the concept of regional autonomy. Adebayo agreed so enthusiastically that he advocated a “repeal [of] those Decrees that were passed after 15th January, 1966 but I think we should revert to what the country was as at 14th January, 1966, that is regional autonomy”. Ojukwu envisaged a titular Head of State that would act only with the concurrence of the various regional governments: "what I envisage that whoever is at the top is a constitutional chap - constitutional within the context of the military government. That is, he is a titular head, but he would only act where, say when we have met and taken a decision". Having got what he wanted Ojukwu was not content with the agreement to be an oral one (even though it had been taped). He insisted that “we must write it down in our decisions quite categorically that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government shall be vested in the Supreme Military Council because previously it had been vested in the Supreme Commander”. The reason for this nuanced request from Ojukwu is that Gowon was now the Supreme Commander. By vesting official authority in the SMC (of which Ojukwu was a member) rather than the Supreme Commander Gowon, Ojukwu could ensure that no official decisions could be taken without his consent. To signify the limited powers that would be exercised by the Head of State envisaged, Ojukwu proposed that the diluted phrase "Commander-in-Chief" should be used to address the Head of State as opposed to "Supreme Commander" (a phrase signifying immense power). The title "Commander-in-Chief" has been employed by every Nigerian Head of State subsequent to Aburi.
 
While the other delegates arrived at Aburi with a simple, but unformulated idea that somehow, Nigeria must stay together, "Ojukwu was the only participant who knew what he wanted, and he secured the signatures of the SMC to documents which would have had the effect of turning Nigeria into little more than a customs union".[2] Ojukwu managed to get virtually everything he wanted, and was so pleased by his success that he even declared that he would serve under Gowon if he (Gowon) kept to the agreements reached. At that point, Gowon arose from his table position and embraced Ojukwu.
 
The fulcrum of the agreement at Aburi was that each region would be responsible for its own affairs, and that the FMG would be responsible for matters that affected the entire country: a simple enough concept. Afterwards the officers toasted their reconciliation and agreement with champagne. The federal delegation's jubilation was such that on his plane flight home, Ojukwu asked one of his secretaries whether the federal delegation had fully understood the implications of what had been agreed. Hindsight tells us that no one at Aburi (other than Ojukwu) really understood the constitutional implications of what had been agreed. Ojukwu was obviously delighted with this - hence why he was in such a hurry to implement the decisions taken, and why the Federal Government had to renege on them. Some have argued that Ojukwu took the SMC for a ride by using his superior intelligence to trap the SMC officers into an agreement they did not understand. Ojukwu was engaged in a constitutional debate by himself against five military officers, and two police officers, yet still got his way. He can hardly be faulted for outwitting opponents that outnumbered him by seven to one. Questions might be asked of the other SMC members of greater numerical strength who allowed Ojukwu to extract such substantial concessions from them.
 
A CONSTITUTION IN WAITING
 
By failing to implement the Aburi decisions, Nigeria missed a golden opportunity to find a constitutional arrangement acceptable to all of its constituent parts. Had even half of the Aburi accords being ratified, Nigeria may have saved itself a substantial amount of the subsequent bloodshed that ensued over the next four decades. It is a sad commentary on the lack of progress that Nigeria has made since Aburi that the issues discussed then (over 40 years ago years ago) are still being argued over today. Back in 1967, the Aburi decisions were not implemented for one primary reason: oil. Nigeria's greedy power brokers did not want a loose constitutional arrangement that would deprive them of the vast revenues which Nigeria earns from its crude oil exports. Hence Nigeria is glued together under a powerful central government of a type more suitable to a country with contiguous ethnicity. Nigeria is quite simply too large, too diverse, and too fractious a country to have an all powerful central government of the type it has today. Across Nigeria, there are groups agitating for greater devolvement of federal power to the regions. Although the mantra of these groups is "restructuring" of the Nigerian federation - what they really intend is what Ojukwu wanted to achieve at the Aburi conference in 1967: a constitutional arrangement that would devolve so much power to the regions that the entity known as Nigeria would exist in name only.
 
Rather than engaging in another constitutional drafting/conference exercise at which will waste more taxpayers' money, and serve as a means for corrupt "big men" to get even richer, Nigeria would do well to dip into its archives and review the transcript of the debate at Aburi which is gathering dust in the national archives. The debate transcript is sufficiently detailed to serve as a constitution in waiting. To learn from the debates and mistakes of the past may ensure a better future for Nigeria. What Nigeria needs is a "constitutional chap" of the type envisaged by Ojukwu back at Aburi. As Ojukwu said “It is better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we move closer and perish in the collision.”
 
 
*The above article is an extract from a forthcoming book by the author.

I copied this from a file on my computer. I'm still looking for the online link. I'll post it as soon as I find it.

At the Silverbird Man of The Year awards a few weeks ago, General Gowon stated that he went to Aburi with the intention of giving Ojukwu whatever he wanted, so long as it would bring peace (I wish I had a tape of that awards ceremony).

Below is the point at which state governors stoppped being members of the SMC (the July 29th 1975 coup against Gowon)

The three officers who jointly announced the identities and jobs of the proposed triumvirate in the coffee room at Dodan Barracks were Colonel JN Garba (the main spokesperson), Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed, and Lt. Col. SM Yar’Adua.  These officers explained that although Brigadier Murtala Mohammed (from Kano in the core north) was militarily junior to Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo (from Abeokuta in the southwest), “real politik” made it necessary to offer the position of Head of State to Mohammed.  Obasanjo quickly accepted to serve under his junior, Murtala Mohammed, as long as his new job – as Chief of Staff, SHQ - carried real power and responsibilities.  Danjuma was offered the position of Chief of Staff (Army), which he later clarified was now to be called Chief of Army Staff – an important distinction. 

 

The putschists nominated Air Force Colonel John Yisa Doko of the Military Airlift Command as the new Air Chief and Navy Commodore Michael Ayinde Adelanwa of the Western Naval Command as the new Chief of Naval Staff.  Both men were civil war front-line combat veterans.  They nominated MD Yusuf, (Gowon’s Chief Security Officer) as the new Inspector General of Police.  This nomination met with resistance from Brigadier Mohammed but he eventually agreed to it in deference to the weight of opinion in the room.  As far as most were concerned, MD Yusuf had “handled himself well” during the preceding 48 hours. 

 

The putschists then demanded that Military Governors no longer be members of the Supreme Military Council.   In response, Obasanjo suggested the creation of a new body to be known as the “National Council of States” to which the Governors should belong.  Lastly, the putschists made it clear that what they wanted was power sharing, not one-man rule.    They proposed that two-thirds majority of the SMC could overrule the Head of State.   According to Garba and Obasanjo, Mohammed’s opposition to this demand was fiery. 

 

Garba wrote:

 

‘When I finished my talk, Murtala burst out, “To hell with all of you!  I have said I don’t want to be anybody’s Head of State. But if you’re inviting me to be one, I’m not going to allow you to tie my hands behind my back. I must have executive authority and run the country as I see best.”  I tried to reason with him, but twenty minutes later he was still arguing.’

 

With other senior officers – including Yar’Adua’s Boss, Brigadier Godwin Ally of the Lagos Garrison Organization - getting uncomfortable about the delay and wondering what was going on behind the closed doors, Garba asked Murtala Mohammed to step out of the coffee room.  The leadership position was then offered, first to Obasanjo, and then to Danjuma but both declined, pleading with the younger officers to keep up the persuasion pressure on Mohammed.   Garba invited Mohammed back into the room and asked him if he had reconsidered, to which Mohammed again said no. He wanted absolute power. 

 

At this point Garba explains that he was very tired and getting angry.  He had been awake for two straight days and nights under “inconsiderable pressure.”  It is very plausible that he suffered many anxieties, misleading Gowon with a straight face, handling the airport departure of the General with external calm but internal eruption, and co-opting fellow Guards Brigade officers – who were sworn to defend the General - into the plot, for example. He also helped deal with emergencies such as when arrangements had to be made – through Taiwo and Ochefu - to recruit an Army accomplice in Kano to address the Hassan Katsina problem, and secure Danjuma’s cooperation – through Taiwo - rather than risk arresting or shooting him.   But by far his greatest scare was the rumored return of General Gowon on July 28.  When the executive jet was approaching the airport in Lagos it was not immediately apparent that Lt. Col. Walbe was the only passenger.  Air Force officers alerted Garba that the plane was inbound.  Alarmed, he desperately sought Yar’Adua to update him on the development and come up with a plan of action.  Yar’Adua was playing a game of billiards (and chain smoking) when Garba charged into the mess, wired up.  When Muktar Mohammed detained the aircraft it became apparent that Walbe was alone, considerably reducing tension.  But then Garba later had to confront Walbe – an officer and former classmate at the NMS – who had been sent to assist him to put down a coup, which he was actually in the process of organizing.  That done he had to be on the lookout for any last minute reactions from the Guards Brigade.  Any one of the soldiers who was upset enough could have walked up to him and shot him.  With all of this at the back of his mind, tearing at the foundations of his sense of integrity, he was in no mood for Mohammed’s theatrics. 

 

At this point, Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed, Director of Military Intelligence, took over.  Based on Garba’s recollection he made the following appeal to Mohammed:

 

“Brigadier Muhammed, when we were planning this coup, we assessed all the senior officers in the Army, and we decided that you were the best man to lead the country. We also agreed on some fundamental changes in how our new government should work.  Garba has explained this to you. If you do not accept it, we cannot force you.  But we happen to know that you have a large following in the Army and in the country at large. If we appoint someone else as Head of State instead of you, there are those who will wonder why, and they may create problems for us.  We can appoint another man if we have to, but to pre-empt these your admirers, before doing so, we will first tell the whole nation about this meeting, and pour conditions and the fact that you refused them. Once more, I am going to explain to you what it is we are asking of you.“

 

Following Abdullahi Mohammed’s repeated explanation, Garba explains that Murtala Mohammed 

 

“…..exploded, shouting, ‘This is blackmail!  I am not going to have you blackmailing me…’”

 

But Garba astutely observed that,

 

“We could see behind this somewhat theatrical outburst that he would give in, but not gracefully. Then, he said, but protesting all the while, that all this should have been explained to him before. He then accepted our terms. Thus we had a new Head of State.”

http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui46.htm

I wish there was a way we could either get back the Aburi Accord or Decree 8 again. With either of those, Nigeria would most likely have been developed today.

I've always been an advocate of true federalism. Every part of this country has enough natural resources to be successful and of course, they can invest in their human resource.

All problems are local and therefore, it's better if solutions originate from the locality, rather than waiting for some mandarin in Lagos or Abuja.

Because of this forced unitary system, our blessings have become curses. Cattle rearing, which should have been a great source of income for the north (if governments of the region had put in place grazing areas, ranches, agricultural extension and research systems, etc) has become a curse. Oil is another blessing that has become a curse.

You'll be shocked when I post excerpts from the 1960 and '63 constitutions.

naptu2: I've always been an advocate of true federalism. Every part of this country has enough natural resources to be successful and of course, they can invest in their human resource.

All problems are local and therefore, it's better if solutions originate from the locality, rather than waiting for some mandarin in Lagos or Abuja.

Because of this forced unitary system, our blessings have become curses. Cattle rearing, which should have been a great source of income for the north (if governments of the region had put in place grazing areas, ranches, agricultural extension and research systems, etc) has become a curse. Oil is another blessing that has become a curse.

You'll be shocked when I post excerpts from the 1960 and '63 constitutions.

I'm waiting patiently, your posts are highly educational.

In 2004/2005 I wrote a paper on derivation, resource control, etc. I planned to adapt it and post it here, but it's taking too much time. I will cannibalise it and post excerpts here.

I also plan to post comparisons between the Constitution of The Federation of Nigeria (I.e 1960) and The Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. That will also take time, but I'll post a significant difference right now.

Read both excerpts and note the difference in the revenue sharing formula.

Constitution of The Federation of Nigeria

Mining royalties and rents
 
134. (1) There shall be paid by the Federation to each Region
 
a sum equal to fifty per cent. of-
 
(a) the proceeds of any royalty received by the Federation in
 
respect of any minerals extracted in that Region; and
 
(b) any mining rents derived by the Federation during that year
 
from within that Region.
 
(2) The Federation shall credit to the Distributable Pool Account
 
a sum equal to thirty per cent.
 
(a) the proceeds of any royalty received by the Federation in
 
respect of minerals extracted in any Region; and
 
(b) any mining rents derived by the Federation from within any
 
Region.
 
(3) For the purposes of this section the proceeds of a royalty
 
shall be the amount remaining from the receipts of that royalty after
 
any refunds or other repayments relating to those receipts have been
 
deducted therefrom or allowed for.
 
(4) Parliament may prescribe the periods in relation to which the
 
proceeds of any royalty or mining rents shall be calculated for
 
purposes of this section.
 
(5) In this section "minerals" includes mineral oil.
 
(6) For the purposes of this section the continental shelf of a
 
Region shall be deemed to be part of that Region.
 
Distribution of funds in Distributable Pool Account
 
135. There shall be paid by the Federation to the Regions at the.
 

Page 82

end of each quarter sums equal to the following fractions of the
 
amount standing to the credit of the Distributable Pool Account at
 
that date, that is to say--
 
(a) to Northern Nigeria, forty ninety-fifths;
 
(b) to Western Nigeria, twenty-four ninety-fifths;
 
(c) to Eastern Nigeria, thirty-one ninety-fifths.

Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999


(2) The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly proposals for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take
into account, the allocation principles especially those of population,
equality of States, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as
well as population density;
Provided that the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in
any approved formula as being not less than thirteen per cent of the
revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural
resources.
(3) Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be
distributed among the Federal and State Governments and the local
government councils in each State on such terms and in such manner as may
be prescribed by the National Assembly.
(4) Any amount standing to the credit of the States in the Federation
Account shall be distributed among the States on such terms and in such
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.
(5) The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the
Federation Account shall also be allocated to the State for the benefit of
their local government councils on such terms and in such manner as may be
prescribed by the National Assembly.
(6) Each State shall maintain a special account to be called "State Joint
Local Government Account" into which shall be paid all allocations to the
local government councils of the State from the Federation Account and
from the Government of the State.
(7) Each State shall pay to local government councils in its area of
jurisdiction such proportion of its total revenue on such terms and in
such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.
( The amount standing to the credit of local government councils of a
State shall be distributed among the local government councils of that
State on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the House
of Assembly of the State.
(9) Any amount standing to the credit of the judiciary in the Federation
Account shall be paid directly to the National Judicial Councils for
disbursement to the heads of courts established for the Federation and the
States under section 6 of this Constitution.
(10) For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, "revenue" means
any income or return accruing to or derived by the Government of the
Federation from any source and includes -
(a) any receipt, however described, arising from the operation of any
law;
(b) any return, however described, arising from or in respect of any
property held by the Government of the Federation;
(c) any return by way of interest on loans and dividends in respect of
shares or interest held by the Government of the Federation in any
company or statutory body.

Note that in the 1960 constitution, the continental shelf of a region is deemed as part of the region. That phrase was deleted in the 1999 constitution. This is the cause of the onshore-offshore problem.

Thank you so much for these brilliant contributions naptu2.
I have been studying the events sorrounding the civil war in the past week. You are a veritable treasure trove and it is encouraging to learn that you have actually written papers on our various constitutions. You can bet I will always be on the lookout for you on NL, to pepper you with the odd question or two!

According to senator David Dafinone, the governors of the 17 southern states define resource control as, 1“the practice of true federalism and natural law in which the federating units express their rights to primarily control the natural resources within their borders and make agreed contribution towards maintenance of common services at the center”. However senator Dafinone contends that, “this dogma is not true in its entirety as the individual and not the state is the final repository of this General Will”. Victor B.E Abia defines resource control as, “2the right of a community of people to a measure of control of its natural endowments”. Explaining further he says, “Thus, it is not intended for the control of oil resource to the exclusion of tin, groundnuts, kaolin, iron ore, coal, gold, clay, bitumen, etc. It is the right of every group or state to have a measure of control of whatever resource is its natural endowments”. Governor Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State put it succinctly. According to him, 3“resource control means that if I as a Bini man go to Kebbi State and find gold, the resource should belong to me and not the state or federal government. All I owe the federal government is to pay taxes and royalties. The same principle should apply if a Kano man comes to Edo, Delta, or Bayelsa and strikes oil. He only pays royalties and taxes to the state or the federal government”.


The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines derive as, 4“to get or obtain something from something”. It further defines derivation as, “the development or origin”. Derivation percentage is therefore the percentage of revenue, accruing from a particular resource that is remitted to the state where that resource originates.
Revenue allocation on the other hand is defined by Victor B.E. Abia as, 5“a scientific and systematic determination of fiscal arrangement within a given political system”.


6 The history of revenue allocation in Nigeria dates back to October 10, 1957 when the fiscal commission was set up on the recommendation of the London constitutional conference to specifically examine revenue allocation and the problem of taxation in Nigeria. The commission in its report recommended that, “Mining and mineral royalties and rents should be shared between the regions of their origin, the Federal government and all the regions together, the least by way of a distributable pool. The proportions in which these royalties and rents should be divided are respectively 50%, 20% and 30% and the considerations of these proportions subject to fiscal review”. This is reflected in The Constitution Of The Federation Of Nigeria 1960, section 134, which states as follows: -


7 “134. (1) There shall be paid by the Federation to each Region a sum equal to fifty percent of-


(a) The proceeds of any royalty received by the Federation in respect of any minerals extracted in that Region; and


(b) Any mining rents derived by the Federation during that year from within that Region.


(2) The Federation shall credit to the Distributable Pool Account a sum equal to thirty per cent.

A) The proceeds of any royalty received by the Federation in respect of minerals extracted in any Region; and
B) Any mining rents derived by the Federation from within any Region”.
Section 134 (6) states further: -

“(6) For the purposes of this section the continental shelf of a Region shall be deemed to be part of that Region”.


According to professor Itse Sagay, 8“Under the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, a true federal system of strong States or Regions and Central or Federal ‘state’ with limited powers, was instituted. Both the 1960 (Independence) constitution and the 1963 (Republican) constitution were the same. The only differences were the provisions for ceremonial President (1963) in place of the Queen of England (1960) and the judicial appeals system, which terminated with the Supreme Court (1963) rather than the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council (1960)”


However section 162 (2) of The Constitution Of The Federal Republic Of Nigeria, 1999 states as follows: -



9 “162 (2) The president, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly proposals for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation principles especially those of population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density:
Provided that the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than thirteen per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources”.












The data provided in the table below shows graphically the change in the derivation percentage: -
10Table 1: Federal - State percentage share in petroleum proceeds
Years
Producing State (%)
Federal Government (%)
Distributable Pool (%)

1960-67
50
20
30

1967-69
50
50
-

1969-71
45
55
-

1971-75
45 minus off-shore proceeds
55 plus off-shore proceeds
-

1975-79
20 minus off-shore proceeds
80 plus off-shore proceeds
-

1979-81
-
100
-

1982-92
1 and half
98 and half
-

1992-99
3
97
-

1999-
13
87
-

Source: Sagay, 2001

The decrease in the derivation percentage from fifty percent in the 1960 constitution to “at least thirteen percent” in the 1999 constitution and the omission of the phrase, “continental shelf of a state” has caused both the derivation percentage crisis and the “on-shore, off-shore dichotomy” crisis respectively.

Some people advocate that the Federal Government should control the resources and get the larger share of the revenue accruing from the resources for the following reasons: -
1)The redistributive role of the Federal Government: - According to Victor Abia, 11“A common characteristic of the allocation of fiscal powers in nearly all federations is that the majority of revenue sources have been assigned to the Federal Government”. He states two factors responsible for this trend and according to him, “One is the concentration of resources in the Federal Government, considered necessary if it is to perform the redistributive role expected of it”. Natural resources are not equally distributed across the country. While some states and communities are seen as being richly endowed with natural resources, others lack such resources. It is feared by some that, should the resources be controlled by the states and communities from which they are derived and these states and communities are allowed to retain the larger share of the revenue from such resources, then the states which lack such resources would be left in abject poverty. Therefore, they believe that the government needs to use the money gotten from natural resources to ensure that all parts of the country are equally developed. This is viewed in similar terms with the government’s redistributive role among citizens. The government collects taxes from the rich and employed and uses the money to implement policies such as the poverty alleviation program for the poor. Therefore, the government uses the money gotten from the natural resources to build and equip schools, hospitals, police stations etc. in poor areas.


2)The huge responsibilities of the federal government: - The Federal Government has huge responsibilities to undertake and these require funds. These funds are gotten from the large share of the revenue from natural resources that the Federal Government gets. For example, the Federal Government is the only organ authorized to carry out police services, provide electricity, defend the nation-state and manage the air and seaports. In order to effectively carry out these responsibilities, the armed forces must be equipped with expensive, sophisticated and modern tanks, warships and planes; the police force must have adequate transport, modern communication equipment and superior fire power and there must be functioning transformers and power lines with which electricity is provided. All these cost money, which is sourced from the revenue derived from natural resources.


However, these arguments are countered by people who state that the Federal Government should not control
the natural resources and retain a large share of the revenue derived for the following reasons: -


1) Hinders competition and encourages a mono-product economy: - Even though the Federal Government has a
redistributive role, according to Professor Ben E. Aigbokhan, this can be achieved by allowing the states to retain the larger share of the revenue, 12“but utilize special grants or equalization grant systems to reduce any fiscal imbalance”. Furthermore, there is nowhere in the world where all states are equal. States are not equally endowed. Those that are more endowed will necessarily be more developed (e.g. California in the U.S which has the 6th largest economy in the world). However, when the 1960 constitution was in operation, the Regions retained 50% of the revenue from resources and competed with each other for the tag of the most developed region. During this period the Western Region was able to establish the first television station in Africa with the revenue it derived from cocoa, the Eastern Region was able to develop itself with the revenue it derived from palm-oil and coal and the Northern Region was able to develop itself with the revenue it derived from groundnuts and kola nuts. All these sources of revenue have declined in recent years because the state governments know that no matter the amount of effort they put into developing these resources, all they would get is a paltry thirteen percent of the revenue derived. The state governors have therefore become lazy, preferring to sit and wait for allocations from the federation account, which requires little or no effort, than to develop the resources in their areas. In this way, allocating the larger share of the revenue to the Federal Government hinders competition.


Allocating the larger share of revenue to the Federal Government also encourages a mono-product economy. Nigeria depends on crude oil for about ninety-five percent of her revenue. This is dangerous for her economic security. As I have said earlier, where the states retain the larger share of the revenue from resources, they would be eager to develop these resources thereby deepening the revenue base and pushing up GNP. For example, uranium has been discovered in the north of the country, but it is not being developed. Niger republic, which borders northern Nigeria, has made a lot of money from uranium, which is used for making nuclear bombs and generating nuclear power. They were even suspected to have sold some uranium to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. There was also a report in the business day newspaper last week that the price of cocoa produced in Nigeria has fallen below the price of cocoa produced in Ghana, because the cocoa produced in Nigeria is believed to be inferior. This is because scientific methods have not been employed to improve Nigerian cocoa, because the state governments are sitting back waiting for oil money to come from the Federal Government. What happens when the oil dries up? Besides, where there is competition, the states do not need natural resources to develop themselves. They can follow the example of the island of Singapore, which has no natural resources, but is a developed country. This it achieved by developing its ultimate resource, the human resource, to produce computer chips. Today it is the largest chipmaker in the world.


2)The Federal Government shoulders too many responsibilities: - According to Honourable Anselm Eyo, 13“There should be a strong fiscal policy. The Exclusive Legislative list should be reduced. Residual issues should be left with the state”. I see no reason why the Federal Government should saddle itself with issues such as; electricity generation, police services and fire fighting services. These are better handled by the states and the private sector. In the United States of America for example, the local government provides fire and police services. This is because they are closer to the people and more responsive to the people’s needs. According to Professor Ben E. Aigbokhan, 14“The decentralization theorem suggests that local provision of service allows greater responsiveness to the preferences and needs of the local people. Business activities such as provision of telecommunication and electricity are more efficiently and better handled by the private sector.


3 Fiscal Federalism: - I would say that federalism is a system of government in which there are different tiers of government, each with its own jurisdiction and powers enshrined in the constitution, which enjoy a level of autonomy as no tier is seen as superior to the other. In order for the states to enjoy a level of autonomy, they would need to have financial autonomy. This is not possible in a situation where the Federal Government is the agency that distributes revenue and where the Federal Government takes the larger share of the revenue.


My suggestions


Senator David Dafinone poses these interesting questions, 15“Who owns the land? In many of the oil communities in the Niger-Delta, the activities of exploration and exploitation have killed fishes and destroyed the ecosystem. Who bears the pain of exploitation? Is it only the Federal, the State government, the multinationals, or the communities that are directly affected?”
I suggest that the resource should be controlled by the individual on whose land it is found. The government should only collect taxes from him/her. The revenue from that tax should be shared in accordance with the 1960 constitution; with the state getting 50%, the Federal Government getting 20% and 30% going into a distributable pool account to be shared by all the states. The revenue derived from export tax should be shared between the Federal Government and the states from which the goods originated in a ratio of 50:50%.
The state governments should not control the resources and neither should the community, because they would just replicate the mistakes of the Federal Government, by allowing the oil companies to pollute the land, just for the sake of the revenue they would derive.

To those who argue that the indigenes are illiterate, drunk and naïve people, who can be easily tricked and who won’t know what to do with the money, I say educate the people, provide a good system in which ownership of land is recorded and verified and regulate the relationship between the oil companies and the land owners. . The role of the government should be to regulate environmental practices and not to act as an oil company.

Check out this thread for Nigeria's constitutions from 1960-1999 https://www.nairaland.com/979547/constitution-federation-nigeria-1960-other#11300904

Just from section 4 & 5 and it's clear that Ojukwu was definitely going to reject that decree.

ojukwu rejected decree 8 because of his perfidy and ambition to rule over his empire called biafra.

he was a tyrant par excellence and dragged this country through a bloody civil war for his own selfish ambition.


he was a criminal that should have been shot.

Beaf:


That is the general concesus of legal minds according authoritative litterature out in the wild.
Tell us what you have against the decree.

this was true federalism not confederacy. I guess those so-called legal minds are primary school mind

When Nairaland was educating and exciting and

Totally agree with you. Gowon is a perpetual ACCORD BREAKER!

PointB:
Decrees are just what they are - whims and caprices of some power drunk men.

Which means, the fellow who issues a degree can effectively abrogate such degree if it is evident that it may not be favourable to his intended design.

To hinge your hope on a decree issued by a man who will not honour an agreement, is not in my opinion, pragmatic. Decree 9, 10, or 11 can effectively erode the supposed benefit of decree 8.

People should not be rule by decree, not matter how 'well-meaning' they might initially sound.