Data boi you are writing with thesame data boi of your coven. What should be the difference of opinion since Bwala exposed the situation of those in that coven
lexylaw09: SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THIS MAP: THE 5 IGBO STATES VS THE OLD EASTERN REGION
THE 5 IGBO-DOMINATED STATES AND THE MINORITY QUESTION
No abuse. No name-calling. No ethnic insults.
Just look at the map and make your observation.
On this map, there are 5 States that are clearly and homogeneously Igbo: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo.
That is the undisputed Igbo homeland. Everyone agrees on that.
But the map of the territory declared as Biafra on May 30, 1967 was far larger. It was the entire former Eastern Region. That territory included what is today Rivers State, Bayelsa, Cross River, Akwa Ibom, and parts of Delta State — lands of the Ijaw, Efik, Ibibio, Annang, Ogoni, Ogoja, and many other distinct peoples.
Here is my own question as a student of history:
How could a Biafran Republic realistically have been declared over territories inhabited by numerous minority ethnic groups who had already expressed fears of political domination within the former Eastern Region — even before the Civil War began?
The issue was not invented in 1967.
1. The Willink Commission of 1958: This Commission was specifically established by the colonial government to investigate the fears and grievances of Nigeria’s minorities. In the Eastern Region, minority groups including the Efik, Ibibio, Ijaw, and the peoples of the Ogoja and Rivers areas appeared before the Commission to express fears of domination by the Igbo majority. This is on record.
2. The COR State Movement: Long before the war, there was a strong movement for a separate Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) State, precisely because these minorities wanted their own political identity outside the Eastern Region.
3. Isaac Adaka Boro's Revolt: In February 1966, three months before the first military coup and 15 months before Biafra was declared, Isaac Adaka Boro declared a Niger Delta Republic. His revolt was against what he saw as marginalization of the Ijaw and Niger Delta peoples within the Eastern Region.
So here is my genuine, respectful question:
If some of the peoples within the proposed Biafran territory did not accept Igbo political domination and had already demanded separate states for themselves, what was the constitutional and political basis for incorporating their territories into Biafra without their consent or a plebiscite?
If Biafra had succeeded, how would the minority question inside Biafra have been resolved? Would we not have simply replaced one majority-minority problem with another?
I ask this with no hate for my Igbo brothers, whom I respect greatly. I ask as a Nigerian who believes history must be discussed truthfully.
Please educate me. Let us discuss the history — not attack one another.
Rev. Julius Afolalu
This is the job they assigned to you from the WhatsApp coven of mandate snatchers and grabbers around this election period to go all out on our neigbours from the East. Ok
Real me will oblige your gaslighting thread.
As löng as the Mods and seun allows you data boiz of a faaaake certttifficcate hollldderr, real nigg...s.dey kampe
lexylaw09: THE REIGN OF IGBOS IN 1966: When Power Rotates Only Among Igbos
Why The North Called It "Igbo Coup" - The Power Rotation That Shocked Nigeria
History does not lie. It remembers.
Keep this fact always in mind: Emmanuel Ifeajuna started the coup and carried it mid-way; Aguiyi-Ironsi took over and carried it to conclusion. It was not planned that way, but that is how it worked out. It is like a relay race. Ifeajuna ran well; but the success of the race depended on the finisher. The finisher was Ironsi.
Ironsi acquired power through shady business.
And as if he lacked accurate knowledge of the history of this country, one of his first steps amounted to rotation of power within the Igbo enclave, right before the watching eyes of the aggrieved North.
When the coup was executed, they said it was in national interest. The North, which was worst hit - lost its Premier, lost its Prime Minister, lost its top officers - took it in good faith, but maintained a "let's wait and see" posture. Ironsi was tragically unaware that his government was on probation.
Now watch the selfish rotation of power:
To start with, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was first President of the Nigerian Senate (1959-1960). At independence on October 1, 1960, he became first Governor-General until 1963, then first President when Nigeria became a Republic on October 1, 1963.
When Azikiwe left the Senate Presidency, who took over? Dr. Abyssinia Nwafor Orizu, of Igbo origin, became Nigeria's second Senate President on November 16, 1960 - a post he held until the January coup.
Then Azikiwe, allegedly tipped off, left the country in late 1965 - first to Europe, then on a cruise to the Caribbean on a so-called health trip. Under parliamentary law, the Senate President becomes Acting President. So Orizu - another Igbo - now had all the powers of the President.
On the night of the coup, who was in total command of the entire Northern Region? Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. Remember, his family were immigrants from Muomake quarters in Obodogwu village, Okpanam, Asaba Division, Igbo-speaking Bendel State. Though born in Kaduna and fluent in Hausa, he was nevertheless an Igbo man.
So in January 1966, Nigeria had: An Igbo President, an Igbo Acting President, an Igbo man in total control of the North, and then Orizu hands over power to... an Igbo General.[Azikiwe][Orizu][Nzeogwu][Ironsi]
On Sunday 16 January 1966, 11:50pm, Orizu made a nationwide broadcast, reading a military-prepared speech, announcing the cabinet's "voluntary" decision to hand over administration to the armed forces. Ironsi then accepted the "invitation."
Voluntary? Richard Akinjide, who was part of Tafawa Balewa's government, later revealed:
"Well, I have read in many books saying that we handed over to the military. We did not hand-over. Ironsi told us that 'you either hand over as gentlemen or you hand-over by force'. These were his words. Is that voluntary hand-over?"
On January 17, Ironsi established the Supreme Military Council and suspended the constitution with Decree No.1. Later that day, Nzeogwu negotiated a conditional surrender - Ironsi agreed NOT to bring the mutineers to military trial. Nigeria's first democratic experiment was over.
Now tell me, if you were a Northerner watching this film, what would you call it?
Azikiwe to Orizu to Nzeogwu to Ironsi. Power rotating inside one enclave while the rest of Nigeria watched.
This is why Northern Nigerians called January 1966 the "IGBO COUP." It does not necessarily mean only Igbos planned it - non-Igbos participated - but it means Igbos were the chief, indeed sole beneficiaries. For 6 months of Ironsi's reign, Obafemi Awolowo, the Yoruba leader, remained in prison. Not released.
In appearance, it was an Igbo coup. It was for them to enjoy and reign in power. And that appearance is what cost Nigeria everything that followed.
History is a mirror. If we don't look at it honestly, we will crash again.
What do you think? Was 1966 an Igbo Coup or a National Coup? Drop your comment below. Let's debate without insult.
A consolation thread for the data boiz of a faaaake certttifficcate hollldderr
Picture of a kriminal on a Bus in Bayelsa, the home stste of our son GEJ who was insulted and abused by thesame fraudulent data boiz and their faaake messiah
That picture of the clueless Baron always remind the ND's what treatment should be melted out to this kriminal
They want my people to snatch and grab for them. We are eating enough cakes from the Bullion vans that was brought to us to motivate us into snatching and grabbing for a krook.
In 2015 sane Nigerians rejected this coven of mandate snatchers and grabbers
But some people somewhere in Nigeria said iz wasn't Bad enough and decided to go all the way to snatch and grab for a faaake certttifficcate hollldderr who is well known to have got himself involved in Narcotics.
The problem I have here is how the h. thesame people are today going all out to defend this fsilures. You don't even need this report to know that the country under this kriminal is a monumental dizazter with widespread daylight corruption and looting
What makes this types of creatures for heaven sake
Justiceleague1: And the likes of biodun556 is busy with his Jan to Dec same story of you is greater that 5 eastern states just like #1000 is bigger than a single $1
rossipki: Why is that whenever somebody tells you the Truth on this forum, you start calling me?
I feel honoured actually, because it means I say the right thing when necessary, unlike you people that lack objectivity and base your views on primitive ethnic sentiments.
You need to join the modern world and stop being so primitive in your outlook on life.
Which truth and which somebody. You switch moniker writing epistles and you think you will get away with it.
See a data defending a kriminal and talking about modern and primitive
You know the last word describes someone who claims to be educated and sophisticated but clapping hands for a drugg Baron that has made his country worse than he met.
People like you don't deserve to live among humans. Your dwelling should be where the Sun never shines
Which road BATIFIED2023, are you talking about the Coastal highway to fraud that has been abandoned to Land Highway into Ogun and Ondo state. That is a tribal move.
Despite the fraudulent exposure you are still gaslighting yourself into believing a fraud. This is how you switch faaake Christian moniker to a faaaake muslim handle to decieve yourself
Kushites: FEMI FALANA, THE EMPTY-HEADED VILLAGE LAWYER, COME AND READ THIS AI ANALYSIS INSTEAD OF DISGRACING YOURSELF BY INSINUATING THE GOVT STOLE THE ''N15 TRILLION'' FOR THE PROJECT.
...............
AI ANALYSIS OF THE LAGOS-CALABAR COASTAL HIGHWAY PROJECT AND RECENT DETOUR ANNOUNCEMENT
The ongoing storm of public debate surrounding the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway project highlights a recurring challenge in national governance: balancing lofty, popular expectations with the hard, unyielding realities of engineering science and fiscal responsibility.
While critics and displaced interest groups have quickly accused the Federal Ministry of Works of “abandoning” the coastal corridor, a closer inspection of the data tells a completely different story.
The decision to redesign the route—redirecting it inland through Edo State to align with the flood-prone East-West Road—is not an act of political trickery or a retreat.
It is a brilliant masterstroke of engineering necessity and economic self-preservation.
A great road cannot simply be willed into existence based on a lines-on-a-map drawing.
Comprehensive geotechnical and soil investigations along the initial shoreline routing, particularly around sections in Ondo State, exposed insurmountable natural barriers.
The original seaside alignment crossed treacherous terrain marked by deep swamp pits, weak peat soils, and a massive 100-metre-deep refuse layer that completely halted initial mobilization.
Forcing heavy infrastructure over these subterranean hazards would require endless seaside bridges, expensive deep-piling techniques, and continuous variation orders. To build a standard, 6-lane reinforced concrete expressway over such a foundation would destroy the project’s original budget blueprint, burdening the national debt to satisfy a sentimental attachment to the shoreline.
Furthermore, climate change and seasonal flooding along the lower Niger Delta basin have rendered sections of the pure coastal corridor a severe engineering risk. Rather than ignoring nature, the government heeded it.
By using the new directive to absorb and reconstruct 400 kilometres of the existing East-West Road, the Ministry of Works is executing an incredibly efficient allocation of resources.
While the original outline map relied on a continuous shoreline route that faced high risks of deep-swamp failures and multi-trillion budget overruns, the current realignment strategy merges with the existing road network. It diverts inland onto stable foundations and safeguards the project budget cap.
Instead of funding two massive, separate infrastructure headaches, the government is utilizing a single budget to achieve a dual objective of delivering a high-speed Lagos-to-Calabar economic corridor and overhauling, raising, and reinforcing the damaged, flood-prone East-West federal road system. This is not abandonment; it is the ultimate optimization of public funds. It delivers massive relief to millions of commuters trapped by failing infrastructure right now, while securing the future transit line.
While the internet remains loud with political theories, the physical construction on the ground remains unbothered. The Ministry of Works has proved its commitment across multiple sections.
Section One, spanning 47.47 kilometres in Lagos, has its pavement fully completed and is ready for commissioning. On Section Two, which covers 55 kilometres, concrete laying is scheduled for completion shortly, seamlessly accounting for subsoil adjustments and the intense weight requirements of heavy trucks serving the Dangote Refinery.
On the eastern ends of the project, over 40% of the Calabar end is already finished, with Section Five in Akwa Ibom crossing the 20% mark in record time.
Infrastructure development is defined by adaptability, not rigid stubbornness. True wisdom dictates that you build the road where people actually live, raise it above catastrophic floods, bypass crippling regional traffic bottlenecks, and safely reach your final destination.
By altering the layout to dodge fiscal ruin and engineering failure, the administration has saved the coastal highway from becoming just another abandoned, half-finished monument in Nigeria's history. The highway is alive, moving forward, and firmly anchored in reality.
Explaining the ₦15 Trillion Issue
The ₦15 trillion budget for the 700-kilometre highway has become the biggest lightning rod for controversy in this project. To understand why it is such a massive issue, you have to look at the math, the financing, and the competing national priorities:
• The Cost Per Kilometre: The government estimated that each kilometre of the road costs roughly ₦7.5 billion. The administration defends this price by pointing out they are building a 6-lane highway using reinforced concrete rather than standard asphalt. While concrete is far more expensive upfront, the government argues it will last for decades without needing costly repairs, making it cheaper over its entire lifespan.
• Not a Single Lump Sum:A common misunderstanding is that ₦15 trillion was taken out of the national treasury all at once. In reality, this is a projected estimate for an 8-year construction timeline. The money is meant to be released gradually in phases through annual budgets, international loans, and partnership funds.
• The Core Argument: Critics argue that Nigeria—which is currently battling a massive budget deficit, high inflation, and heavy debt—cannot afford to tie up ₦15 trillion in a single new megaproject. They believe it makes more sense to spread a fraction of that money across the entire country to patch up dozens of broken existing highways, rather than spending it all on one new corridor.
The core counter-argument is that patching up old asphalt roads is a short-term trap that merely manages decay, whereas investing in a brand-new concrete super-corridor actively generates long-term national wealth.
Proponents argue that standard maintenance consumes trillions of naira every few years with nothing to show for it due to frequent road failures. By spending a premium on a durable, reinforced concrete highway, the government is building an entirely new economic engine designed to last up to a century, unlock isolated coastal trade zones, and accommodate future high-speed rail lines.
Furthermore, because this megaproject relies on specialized international loans and private partnership funds tied specifically to toll-earning assets, this capital cannot simply be repurposed to fix scattered regional roads. In short, while repairing old roads keeps the country moving today, the coastal highway is what will expand the economy for tomorrow.
• Why Rerouting Mattered: The ₦15 trillion calculation was based on stable ground. When engineers hit deep swamps, forcing the original route would have triggered massive "extra costs," blowing way past the ₦15 trillion cap. By rerouting the highway inland and merging it with the East-West Road, the government argues they are saving the ₦15 trillion budget from collapsing, effectively fixing two massive road systems for the price of one.
-AI
Rossik, this is what your faaake pan Afrcanism brought upon you.
It tjis how to acheive your fathom Pan Africanism by defending failures and kriminals?
Kushites: FEMI FALANA, THE EMPTY-HEADED VILLAGE LAWYER, COME AND READ THIS AI ANALYSIS INSTEAD OF DISGRACING YOURSELF BY INSINUATING THE GOVT STOLE THE ''N15 TRILLION'' FOR THE PROJECT.
...............
AI ANALYSIS OF THE LAGOS-CALABAR COASTAL HIGHWAY PROJECT AND RECENT DETOUR ANNOUNCEMENT
The ongoing storm of public debate surrounding the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway project highlights a recurring challenge in national governance: balancing lofty, popular expectations with the hard, unyielding realities of engineering science and fiscal responsibility.
While critics and displaced interest groups have quickly accused the Federal Ministry of Works of “abandoning” the coastal corridor, a closer inspection of the data tells a completely different story.
The decision to redesign the route—redirecting it inland through Edo State to align with the flood-prone East-West Road—is not an act of political trickery or a retreat.
It is a brilliant masterstroke of engineering necessity and economic self-preservation.
A great road cannot simply be willed into existence based on a lines-on-a-map drawing.
Comprehensive geotechnical and soil investigations along the initial shoreline routing, particularly around sections in Ondo State, exposed insurmountable natural barriers.
The original seaside alignment crossed treacherous terrain marked by deep swamp pits, weak peat soils, and a massive 100-metre-deep refuse layer that completely halted initial mobilization.
Forcing heavy infrastructure over these subterranean hazards would require endless seaside bridges, expensive deep-piling techniques, and continuous variation orders. To build a standard, 6-lane reinforced concrete expressway over such a foundation would destroy the project’s original budget blueprint, burdening the national debt to satisfy a sentimental attachment to the shoreline.
Furthermore, climate change and seasonal flooding along the lower Niger Delta basin have rendered sections of the pure coastal corridor a severe engineering risk. Rather than ignoring nature, the government heeded it.
By using the new directive to absorb and reconstruct 400 kilometres of the existing East-West Road, the Ministry of Works is executing an incredibly efficient allocation of resources.
While the original outline map relied on a continuous shoreline route that faced high risks of deep-swamp failures and multi-trillion budget overruns, the current realignment strategy merges with the existing road network. It diverts inland onto stable foundations and safeguards the project budget cap.
Instead of funding two massive, separate infrastructure headaches, the government is utilizing a single budget to achieve a dual objective of delivering a high-speed Lagos-to-Calabar economic corridor and overhauling, raising, and reinforcing the damaged, flood-prone East-West federal road system. This is not abandonment; it is the ultimate optimization of public funds. It delivers massive relief to millions of commuters trapped by failing infrastructure right now, while securing the future transit line.
While the internet remains loud with political theories, the physical construction on the ground remains unbothered. The Ministry of Works has proved its commitment across multiple sections.
Section One, spanning 47.47 kilometres in Lagos, has its pavement fully completed and is ready for commissioning. On Section Two, which covers 55 kilometres, concrete laying is scheduled for completion shortly, seamlessly accounting for subsoil adjustments and the intense weight requirements of heavy trucks serving the Dangote Refinery.
On the eastern ends of the project, over 40% of the Calabar end is already finished, with Section Five in Akwa Ibom crossing the 20% mark in record time.
Infrastructure development is defined by adaptability, not rigid stubbornness. True wisdom dictates that you build the road where people actually live, raise it above catastrophic floods, bypass crippling regional traffic bottlenecks, and safely reach your final destination.
By altering the layout to dodge fiscal ruin and engineering failure, the administration has saved the coastal highway from becoming just another abandoned, half-finished monument in Nigeria's history. The highway is alive, moving forward, and firmly anchored in reality.
Explaining the ₦15 Trillion Issue
The ₦15 trillion budget for the 700-kilometre highway has become the biggest lightning rod for controversy in this project. To understand why it is such a massive issue, you have to look at the math, the financing, and the competing national priorities:
• The Cost Per Kilometre: The government estimated that each kilometre of the road costs roughly ₦7.5 billion. The administration defends this price by pointing out they are building a 6-lane highway using reinforced concrete rather than standard asphalt. While concrete is far more expensive upfront, the government argues it will last for decades without needing costly repairs, making it cheaper over its entire lifespan.
• Not a Single Lump Sum:A common misunderstanding is that ₦15 trillion was taken out of the national treasury all at once. In reality, this is a projected estimate for an 8-year construction timeline. The money is meant to be released gradually in phases through annual budgets, international loans, and partnership funds.
• The Core Argument: Critics argue that Nigeria—which is currently battling a massive budget deficit, high inflation, and heavy debt—cannot afford to tie up ₦15 trillion in a single new megaproject. They believe it makes more sense to spread a fraction of that money across the entire country to patch up dozens of broken existing highways, rather than spending it all on one new corridor.
The core counter-argument is that patching up old asphalt roads is a short-term trap that merely manages decay, whereas investing in a brand-new concrete super-corridor actively generates long-term national wealth.
Proponents argue that standard maintenance consumes trillions of naira every few years with nothing to show for it due to frequent road failures. By spending a premium on a durable, reinforced concrete highway, the government is building an entirely new economic engine designed to last up to a century, unlock isolated coastal trade zones, and accommodate future high-speed rail lines.
Furthermore, because this megaproject relies on specialized international loans and private partnership funds tied specifically to toll-earning assets, this capital cannot simply be repurposed to fix scattered regional roads. In short, while repairing old roads keeps the country moving today, the coastal highway is what will expand the economy for tomorrow.
• Why Rerouting Mattered: The ₦15 trillion calculation was based on stable ground. When engineers hit deep swamps, forcing the original route would have triggered massive "extra costs," blowing way past the ₦15 trillion cap. By rerouting the highway inland and merging it with the East-West Road, the government argues they are saving the ₦15 trillion budget from collapsing, effectively fixing two massive road systems for the price of one.
-AI
Data boi, does it not make sense to repair existing roads which such an amount than embarking on a delusional Coastal highway to fraud ?
Kushites: FEMI FALANA, THE EMPTY-HEADED VILLAGE LAWYER, COME AND READ THIS AI ANALYSIS INSTEAD OF DISGRACING YOURSELF BY INSINUATING THE GOVT STOLE THE ''N15 TRILLION'' FOR THE PROJECT.
...............
AI ANALYSIS OF THE LAGOS-CALABAR COASTAL HIGHWAY PROJECT AND RECENT DETOUR ANNOUNCEMENT
The ongoing storm of public debate surrounding the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway project highlights a recurring challenge in national governance: balancing lofty, popular expectations with the hard, unyielding realities of engineering science and fiscal responsibility.
While critics and displaced interest groups have quickly accused the Federal Ministry of Works of “abandoning” the coastal corridor, a closer inspection of the data tells a completely different story.
The decision to redesign the route—redirecting it inland through Edo State to align with the flood-prone East-West Road—is not an act of political trickery or a retreat.
It is a brilliant masterstroke of engineering necessity and economic self-preservation.
A great road cannot simply be willed into existence based on a lines-on-a-map drawing.
Comprehensive geotechnical and soil investigations along the initial shoreline routing, particularly around sections in Ondo State, exposed insurmountable natural barriers.
The original seaside alignment crossed treacherous terrain marked by deep swamp pits, weak peat soils, and a massive 100-metre-deep refuse layer that completely halted initial mobilization.
Forcing heavy infrastructure over these subterranean hazards would require endless seaside bridges, expensive deep-piling techniques, and continuous variation orders. To build a standard, 6-lane reinforced concrete expressway over such a foundation would destroy the project’s original budget blueprint, burdening the national debt to satisfy a sentimental attachment to the shoreline.
Furthermore, climate change and seasonal flooding along the lower Niger Delta basin have rendered sections of the pure coastal corridor a severe engineering risk. Rather than ignoring nature, the government heeded it.
By using the new directive to absorb and reconstruct 400 kilometres of the existing East-West Road, the Ministry of Works is executing an incredibly efficient allocation of resources.
While the original outline map relied on a continuous shoreline route that faced high risks of deep-swamp failures and multi-trillion budget overruns, the current realignment strategy merges with the existing road network. It diverts inland onto stable foundations and safeguards the project budget cap.
Instead of funding two massive, separate infrastructure headaches, the government is utilizing a single budget to achieve a dual objective of delivering a high-speed Lagos-to-Calabar economic corridor and overhauling, raising, and reinforcing the damaged, flood-prone East-West federal road system. This is not abandonment; it is the ultimate optimization of public funds. It delivers massive relief to millions of commuters trapped by failing infrastructure right now, while securing the future transit line.
While the internet remains loud with political theories, the physical construction on the ground remains unbothered. The Ministry of Works has proved its commitment across multiple sections.
Section One, spanning 47.47 kilometres in Lagos, has its pavement fully completed and is ready for commissioning. On Section Two, which covers 55 kilometres, concrete laying is scheduled for completion shortly, seamlessly accounting for subsoil adjustments and the intense weight requirements of heavy trucks serving the Dangote Refinery.
On the eastern ends of the project, over 40% of the Calabar end is already finished, with Section Five in Akwa Ibom crossing the 20% mark in record time.
Infrastructure development is defined by adaptability, not rigid stubbornness. True wisdom dictates that you build the road where people actually live, raise it above catastrophic floods, bypass crippling regional traffic bottlenecks, and safely reach your final destination.
By altering the layout to dodge fiscal ruin and engineering failure, the administration has saved the coastal highway from becoming just another abandoned, half-finished monument in Nigeria's history. The highway is alive, moving forward, and firmly anchored in reality.
Explaining the ₦15 Trillion Issue
The ₦15 trillion budget for the 700-kilometre highway has become the biggest lightning rod for controversy in this project. To understand why it is such a massive issue, you have to look at the math, the financing, and the competing national priorities:
• The Cost Per Kilometre: The government estimated that each kilometre of the road costs roughly ₦7.5 billion. The administration defends this price by pointing out they are building a 6-lane highway using reinforced concrete rather than standard asphalt. While concrete is far more expensive upfront, the government argues it will last for decades without needing costly repairs, making it cheaper over its entire lifespan.
• Not a Single Lump Sum:A common misunderstanding is that ₦15 trillion was taken out of the national treasury all at once. In reality, this is a projected estimate for an 8-year construction timeline. The money is meant to be released gradually in phases through annual budgets, international loans, and partnership funds.
• The Core Argument: Critics argue that Nigeria—which is currently battling a massive budget deficit, high inflation, and heavy debt—cannot afford to tie up ₦15 trillion in a single new megaproject. They believe it makes more sense to spread a fraction of that money across the entire country to patch up dozens of broken existing highways, rather than spending it all on one new corridor.
The core counter-argument is that patching up old asphalt roads is a short-term trap that merely manages decay, whereas investing in a brand-new concrete super-corridor actively generates long-term national wealth.
Proponents argue that standard maintenance consumes trillions of naira every few years with nothing to show for it due to frequent road failures. By spending a premium on a durable, reinforced concrete highway, the government is building an entirely new economic engine designed to last up to a century, unlock isolated coastal trade zones, and accommodate future high-speed rail lines.
Furthermore, because this megaproject relies on specialized international loans and private partnership funds tied specifically to toll-earning assets, this capital cannot simply be repurposed to fix scattered regional roads. In short, while repairing old roads keeps the country moving today, the coastal highway is what will expand the economy for tomorrow.
• Why Rerouting Mattered: The ₦15 trillion calculation was based on stable ground. When engineers hit deep swamps, forcing the original route would have triggered massive "extra costs," blowing way past the ₦15 trillion cap. By rerouting the highway inland and merging it with the East-West Road, the government argues they are saving the ₦15 trillion budget from collapsing, effectively fixing two massive road systems for the price of one.
-AI
Have you abandoned the faaake Pan Africanism you were engaged in to divert the failures of your tin demigod?
CharlesCNG: WHAT EXACTLY IS THE OPPOSITION BRINGING TO THE TABLE? SEGUN SHOWUNMI’S BRUTAL QUESTION FOR 2027
Segun Showunmi’s strongest criticism of Nigeria’s opposition was not that its leaders lack popularity. It was worse. He questioned whether they have built enough POLITICAL MACHINERY AROUND THEIR POPULARITY.
He used Peter Obi as his exhibit. Showunmi said Obi could have been a serious alternative. “Maybe Peter. We could support Peter. Why not?” Then came the knife: “Peter should have made up his mind what the party will be, maybe like 2024 max.”
Why? Because presidential politics is not a motivational seminar. It requires structure. Candidates. Ward organisations. State leadership. Polling agents. Senatorial candidates. House candidates. A recognisable symbol. Time.
Showunmi’s metaphor was excellent: A POLITICAL PARTY IS A TRAIN.
The states and local structures are the coaches. But: “If you don’t pack the head train very powerfully, it cannot pull us.”
That is his central warning to the anti-Tinubu coalition. You cannot build everything around one presidential candidate and assume the machinery will magically assemble underneath him. And Showunmi was speaking from experience.
On presidential election day, Senate and House contests are moving simultaneously. Weeks later come governorship contests. If the presidential “engine” collapses, he argues, politicians immediately begin renegotiating loyalties.
His wonderfully Nigerian formulation: “I’M AN EXPERIENCED DOG IN THIS GAME.” This criticism became more interesting when you consider that Peter Obi eventually moved into the NDC, while Atiku Abubakar emerged as ADC presidential candidate with Rotimi Amaechi as running mate.
Yet opposition-unity discussions have continued even after the parties selected competing presidential arrangements. That is almost exactly the structural problem Showunmi was describing.
And then there is policy. His challenge to opposition politicians was essentially:
Before asking Nigerians to replace something, SHOW THEM THE SOMETHING YOU ARE REPLACING IT WITH.
On subsidy? What exactly is the fiscal model? On foreign exchange? What replaces the market-reflective regime? On infrastructure? Which projects continue, which stop and what replaces them? On policing? Federal-only or state police? On federalism? Do states receive more responsibility or less?
Nigeria does not merely need: ANTI-TINUBU. It needs an answer to the question that eventually destroys every opposition built principally around anger: AFTER “TINUBU MUST GO” — THEN WHAT?
A coalition can unite against a man. A government has to unite around a programme. CharlesCNG
You like to gaslight yourself writing worthless epistles to make the opposition look bad while at thesame time promoting a failed kriminal
Politics › Re: Biafra: Arthur Nzeribe: Reportedly Supplied Arms And Egyptian Pilots To Nigeria by DatNiggaDaz: 9:50am On Oct 15
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