Karm16's Posts
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ilovetheline:You sound confused. Keep blaming Yorubas as if you're enslaved to them. |
Tabletop1:She looks young. When she married Ojukwu, were's they like 33 years apart? That's ped.ophilia. |
FFK will be proud. |
ilovetheline:Story for the gods. You're talking about back then and we talking about now. Biafrans of ND Terrorist branch have renewed their effort because of the Biafran agitation. They're even supported largely by Ibo Christians. |
ilovetheline:You Ibo Christians are the ones sounding confused. 1) You praised them when they started bombing 2) You yabbed Yorubas about SS/SE biafran division when they demanded Kanu's release 3) You lots claimed that Biafran is Ibo, Niger deltans, and other SS groups inclusive. So why are you now foaming in the mouth to deny Biafrans of ND Terrorist branch? |
ilovetheline:They're Biafrans. Why are you sounding confused. |
BekeeBuAgbara:They're both corrupt. |
ilovetheline:Instead of spitting at me, tell me why you think ND Terrorists arent Biafrans. |
ilovetheline:Are you okay? Last time, y'all said Biafra was SS/SE. Stop choosing and picking when to join with SSners. ND militants are Biafran terrorists, they've even demanded the release of Nnamdi Kanu's (a Biafran extremist). |
Some ignorant Nigerians will soon come and praise corrupt wall street.
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Wall St is America's problem [size=18pt]Theft of Your Money on Wall Street: Another GAO Report Won’t Help[/size] It was considered big news last week that House members Maxine Waters of the Financial Services Committee and Al Green of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations have requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) launch an investigation of “regulatory capture” on Wall Street. That news broke on Friday, one day after Senator Elizabeth Warren grilled the head of a Wall Street self-regulatory agency in a Senate hearing on a new study showing that stockbrokers with serial records of misconduct are allowed to remain in the industry. Warren also cited another recent study showing that even when investors prevail in arbitrations against bad brokers, they may never get paid. According to the study, over $60 million in fines owed to investors have not been paid since 2013. The individual that Senator Warren was grilling is Richard Ketchum, head of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory body financed by Wall Street that oversees brokerage firms and has a division that runs a private justice system known as mandatory arbitration that hears all claims against bad brokers. FINRA was previously known as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) but its reputation became so damaged as a self-regulator that it changed its name to FINRA. (Like that was really going to help.) What the public doesn’t know is that for over 30 years, the GAO has been investigating these identical problems on Wall Street and making recommendations for cleaning up the mess. After 30 years, it should be abundantly clear that reading GAO reports and shaking one’s head isn’t getting the job done. Serious, radical reform of Wall Street is necessary and that means eliminating crony regulators and the entire self-regulatory system. As far back as 1978, the GAO published the results of an investigation into the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight of the self-regulatory actions of the NASD. The report found flaws in the NASD’s examinations of brokerage firms and that the SEC had “not dealt aggressively enough with inspection oversight problems.” Again in 1994, the GAO looked into unscrupulous broker activity on Wall Street. The study found that there was the perception that the SEC and NASD were “lenient” in disciplinary actions and that some brokers that had been barred from keeping a license to make securities transactions were entering other sectors of the financial services industry. By July 17, 1996, this egregiously flawed system of oversight led to the U.S. Justice Department charging the largest firms on Wall Street with price fixing on the electronic stock market known as Nasdaq, while the self-regulator, the NASD, was aware of the problems but simply ignored them. The Justice Department findings made it clear that the price fixing had been taking place for more than a decade. (The more recent cartel activity of rigging Libor and rigging foreign currency markets by Wall Street banks is simply an extension of what was transpiring in 1996.) The outrage was so widespread in 1996 that the trade magazine, Registered Representative, ran a cover story titled “How the NASD Was Corrupted.” The magazine cover included this assessment: “The SEC’s investigation of the NASD uncovered a self-regulatory system corrupted by the influence of powerful market making firms. Top NASD officials knew about problems and chose to look the other way. NASD staff went along. Even the SEC had plenty of clues that something was amiss.” By 2003, Wall Street was reeling from news coverage of how regulators had allowed Wall Street stock research to become corrupted in order for the banks to get investment banking deals. The PBS program, Frontline, aired a program on May 8, 2003 titled “The Wall Street Fix.” Correspondent Hedrick Smith tells viewers: “It’s a story of pervasive corruption here on Wall Street, how brokers and analysts shaped and hyped the telecom boom, pocketed enormous profits and then took millions of ordinary investors on a catastrophic ride, $2 trillion in losses on WorldCom and other telecom stocks.” A year earlier, BusinessWeek had asked this simple question on its cover: “Wall Street: How Corrupt Is It?” with a snake curled around the street sign suggesting the answer. As for the regulators and Congress tolerating investors being victimized twice – first by the unscrupulous broker and then when their arbitration award is not paid – (should the investor be so lucky to have his or her case heard before non conflicted arbitrators), the GAO has been investigating unpaid awards for almost two decades with nothing to show for it. In a report titled “Securities Arbitration: Actions Needed to Address Problem of Unpaid Awards,” the GAO found that 49 percent of the arbitration awards to investors were not paid at all in 1998 and 12 percent were only partially paid. GAO said it “estimated that the amount of unpaid awards was about $129 million, or 80 percent of the $161 million awarded to investors during 1998.” And here we are, 18 years later, with Senator Warren asking the head of NASD’s successor, FINRA, what he plans to do about $60 million in unpaid awards to investors dating back to 2013. FINRA also likes to brag about how much it has done to help investors by setting up BrokerCheck, where investors can check to see if their stockbroker has a disciplinary history. But the problems here are myriad. We put in a broker’s name whom we know was licensed and employed at Smith Barney as a retail broker over a long period. The broker doesn’t even exist in the database. Nor does he exist in the Investment Advisor lookup. He just doesn’t exist. Brokers with five, six and even seven arbitration claims against them are still employed at the same firm. But you wouldn’t know that from the BrokerCheck system which shows serial employer name changes when it is actually the same firm. So the uninitiated at the GAO or SEC might assume that the broker is being fired for misconduct and moving to a new firm when he is actually sitting in the same seat for three decades without any serious disciplinary measures being taken because he is producing large commissions for his firm. Another problem is that FINRA’s arbitrators allow Wall Street firms to agree to settle arbitrations and have the matter expunged from the broker’s record. Reuters reported in 2013 that “Brokers succeeded 96.9 percent of the time between mid-2009 and the end of 2011 in expunging details about cases brought by investors against their firms that were later settled, according to the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association, a trade group for lawyers representing investors.” In one instance, according to the Reuters article, one broker “requested expungement 40 times – and was granted relief by arbitration panels for 35 of the requests.” Congress has known for decades that self-regulation doesn’t work. And installing Wall Street’s former lawyers or Wall Street executives at the SEC doesn’t work either. Tolerating the systemic conflicts of interest at the New York Fed, the sole regulator of Wall Street bank holding companies, has been catastrophic to the U.S. economy. Congress fully understands what’s causing regulatory capture; it just doesn’t have the guts to do anything about it but kick the can down the road to the GAO. As far as electing another U.S. President whose campaign has been financed by Wall Street and expecting a different outcome, let’s hope and pray most Americans are smarter than that. http://wallstreetonparade.com/2016/03/theft-of-your-money-on-wall-street-another-gao-report-wont-help/ |
lol Wall Street is even more corrupt than Nigerian politicians. [size=18pt]After the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 Wall Street bankers were jailed. [/size] e in the United States,” she said. “Today’s action makes clear that this Department of Justice intends to end any such corrupt practices, to root out misconduct, and to bring wrongdoers to justice.” Lost in the hoopla surrounding the event was a depressing fact. Lynch and her predecessor, Eric Holder, appear to have turned the page on a more relevant vein of wrongdoing: the profligate and dishonest behavior of Wall Street bankers, traders, and executives in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. How we arrived at a place where Wall Street misdeeds go virtually unpunished while soccer executives in Switzerland get arrested is murky at best. But the legal window for punishing Wall Street bankers for fraudulent actions that contributed to the 2008 crash has just about closed. It seems an apt time to ask: In the biggest picture, what justice has been achieved? Since 2009, 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) In early 2014, just weeks after Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, settled out of court with the Justice Department, the bank’s board of directors gave him a 74 percent raise, bringing his salary to $20 million. After the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers were jailed. The more meaningful number is how many Wall Street executives have gone to jail for playing a part in the crisis. That number is one. (Kareem Serageldin, a senior trader at Credit Suisse, is serving a 30-month sentence for inflating the value of mortgage bonds in his trading portfolio, allowing them to appear more valuable than they really were.) By way of contrast, following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions. At an event at the National Press Club last February, Holder said the virtual absence of convictions (or even prosecutions) this time around did not result from a want of trying. “These are the kinds of cases that people come to the Justice Department to make,” he said. “The inability to make them, at least to this point, has not been as a result of a lack of effort.” Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, made a similar argument to me. The evidence, he said, does not show clear misconduct by individuals. It’s possible that Bharara is correct about that: Wall Street bankers make it their daily business to figure out ways to abide by the letter of the law while violating its spirit. And to be sure, much of the behavior that led to the crisis involved recklessness and poor judgment, not fraud. But even so, in light of various whistle-blower allegations—and the size of the settlements agreed to by the banks themselves—this explanation strains credulity. The Justice Department’s ethos regarding Wall Street, and the way the department went about its business, appear to be a large part of the story. Any narrative of how we got to this point has to start with the so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. In the aftermath of the crash, the Justice Department did not refrain from prosecutions altogether. In 2009, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York tried two Bear Stearns hedge-fund managers—Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin—who had effectively run their $1.6 billion fund into the ground in the spring of 2007, an event that many believe was the canary in the coal mine of the financial crisis. But a jury acquitted the two men in November 2009. Added to the general fear that the economy was extraordinarily fragile, the unexpected acquittal seemed to put a deep freeze on Wall Street prosecutions for close to three years. A serious national investigation of the practices of Wall Street’s pre-crash mortgage-banking activities did not begin in earnest until mid-2012—at least five years after the worst of the bad behavior had occurred—following President Obama’s call to action in the State of the Union address that January and the issuance of subpoenas to Wall Street’s biggest banks. The five-year statute of limitations for ordinary criminal fraud charges had passed while the Justice Department dithered, but civil prosecution of banks and individual bankers, which has a 10-year statute of limitations under a particular banking law, was still a possibility. Holder gave his various U.S. attorneys around the country responsibility for investigating. A team led by Benjamin Wagner, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of California, investigated alleged wrongdoing at JPMorgan Chase, for instance. In many ways, Wagner’s investigation was typical of the Justice Department’s approach: hoover up hundreds of thousands of pages of e-mails and documents, interview current and former employees about their business practices, and use the findings as a cudgel to extract a financial settlement. Wagner and his team drafted—but did not file—a complaint against the firm in September 2013 that reportedly detailed how JPMorgan Chase itself (not merely Bear Stearns or Washington Mutual, two banks that it bought at the height of the crisis) knowingly packaged shoddy mortgages into securities that did not meet its credit standards and then sold them off to investors. As part of its investigation, Wagner’s team had deposed Alayne Fleischmann, a JPMorgan Chase banker turned whistle-blower, who’d told the team about what was going on. She had also detailed how, before the crash, her warnings about continuing to package up the bad mortgages into securities and sell them off as investments had gone unheeded by her superiors. After sharing her concerns with her boss in a 13-page letter, Fleischmann had been marginalized and then fired. (Disclosure: JPMorgan Chase also fired me, as a managing director, in 2004, and I am in litigation with the bank resulting from a soured investment I made in 1999.) In November 2013, as part of a deal that kept Wagner’s complaint from becoming public—and the specifics of Fleischmann’s revelations from being widely disseminated—JPMorgan Chase agreed to a $13 billion settlement with various federal and state agencies, then the largest of its kind. Holder heralded the settlement as an important moment of accountability for Wall Street. But extracting large settlements paid with shareholders’ money is not the same as bringing alleged wrongdoers to justice. Instead of presenting a detailed picture of JPMorgan Chase’s misdeeds—as would have happened had Wagner’s complaint been filed and the matter adjudicated in court—the government and the bank negotiated an anodyne 11‑page “Statement of Facts” that glossed over many of the details of the behavior Fleischmann was trying to stop, and did not name any JPMorgan Chase bankers. The Justice Department reached agreements with other Wall Street banks, among them Citigroup and Bank of America, using a similar playbook: Threaten public disclosure of behavior that looks criminal and then, in exchange for keeping it sealed, extract a huge financial settlement. No one individual, or group of individuals, is held accountable. No predawn raids of Park Avenue apartments are made. No one gets arrested. No one gets publicly shamed. In february, shortly before Lynch succeeded him, Holder gave federal attorneys and their staffs a deadline: they had 90 days to bring any new prosecutions against individual bankers, traders, or executives on Wall Street before probes against them would be closed. That deadline came and went in May. Lynch, since her elevation, has been largely silent about Wall Street misconduct leading up to the crash; certainly she’s said nothing, in a major public forum, that’s comparable to the zeal and determination she expressed in her statement about bringing fifa executives to justice. But in fairness, it’s not clear how much she could do anyway: the peak of bad behavior on Wall Street seemed to occur in 2005 and 2006, about 10 years ago, meaning the statute of limitations is just about up. And new cases take time to make. Holder, meanwhile, along with his old colleague Lanny Breuer, has returned to the white-shoe law firm that he left in order to join the Justice Department—Covington & Burling, which counts among its clients Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo. (The firm reportedly kept his office for him.) The sums Holder exacted from Wall Street banks earned him plenty of praise in the media. But without holding real people on Wall Street accountable for their wrongdoing in the years leading up to the financial crisis, the message that their behavior was unacceptable goes undelivered. Instead a very different message is being sent: for financiers, justice is just a check someone else has to write. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/how-wall-streets-bankers-stayed-out-of-jail/399368/ |
diablos:That title goes to GEJ |
bigass123:Type in Ibo please. Stop this rubbish. |
These Biafran terrorists just want money |
Etinosajay:Pele. Not going to bother reading that rant. What is the meaning of Ogun in Edo? Edo people being stealing Yoruba culture since.... |
Bingo where are you? I hope you're having a long discussion with your father about your name right now. The thing be like film, to find out that your name is Yoruba ![]() |
benom:Don't be a coward. No need to be coming at one person with multiple IDs. |
shogz89:I'm honestly crying for the foolish boy. Even his people would rather sing in Yoruba to make money. |
Etinosajay:You tried. You're whack. Go copy a funny line from a Yoruba dictionary abeg. Seems like your local cheerleaders left you to your demise. Stop spitting at me, foolish boy. What does Ogun mean in Edo? |
shogz89:Just refer the ignorant Edo kid to Google Yoruba - Eglish translator to translate Eti Osa. I pity Edo youths. They're too ignorant of their Yoruba acclimation. |
Etinosajay:Son come back here because the way the dude is pummeling you, I doubt you'll have any dignity left to wipe your face. What does Ogun mean in Edo? What does Ogunsuyi mean? So y'all agree that Ogun is Yoruba, but Ogunsuyi is not? I've never met a people so confused and ignorant of the culture they're copying. |
Etinosajay:Bingo, do you own that Benom ID abi name that flat.head Ibo own am? What does Ogun mean in Edo? |
benom:Double ID. Does it pain you that much that you're now logging in since Feb? You guys aren't as smart as I thought. If you're correct, why do you need to sign in with multiple IDs to display sheer ignorance? |
russello:Where did you see abuse? I'm trying to educate you here, so listen and pay attention. You sound like a young child. Probably 15-18? Am I correct? Ogunsuyi, Oguntope, Oguntola etc are all Yoruba names. Edos have been adopting Yoruba names and culture since immemorial. We get it, you look up to your big brothers, but don't start stealing from your big brother. |
aim5:Yorubas claim from who? Lol. Edo people wey dey use Yoruba names like Ogunsuyi, Modupe, Tola etc? |
aim5:Lol who sabi una since your empire fell. Never compare yourself to Yorubas ever. I'm telling you, if una no follow Biafra, the pepper wey Yorubas go show una sef. We'll get rid of them yeye Edo obas. ![]() Ooni of Ife the world sabi..... Tell us yours ![]() |
aim5:Many Edo chicks still dress in Yoruba attire. |
Etinosajay:Look at this retard, what does Ogun mean in Edo? Ogunorobo ko ogunorobokibo ni. ![]() Edos been claiming Yoruba language since 1800s |



