₦airaland Forum

U.S. President, Jimmy Carter & General Olusegun Obasanjo (during Carter's visit to Nigeria)

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US President Jimmy Carter at Dodan Barracks, inspecting a gaurd of honour, mounted by officers and men of the Gaurds Brigade, during his state visit to Nigeria in April 1978.

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www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/1978/d040378t.pdf

Olusegun Obasanjo, Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida & Saninegeria Abacha

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Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State of Nigeria), Mr Andrew Young (American ambassador @ the UN) and Major General Joseph Nanven Garba (foreign minister of Nigeria)

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Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State of Nigeria) & Jimmy Carter (President of the United States).

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(L-R) Vice Admiral Michael Adelanwa (Chief of Naval Staff), Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters), General Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State & Commander in Chief), Lieutenant General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (Chief of Army Staff), Air Vice Marshall John Yisa Doko (Chief of Air Staff) and Alhaji Muhammed Dikko Yusuf (Inspector General of Police).

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On the morning of the 13th of January 1976 General Murtala Ramat Muhammed was assassinated when a hit squad submachine gunned his Mercedes Benz Limousine as it slowed down at the junction of Bank Rd and Ikoyi Rd. Other hit teams simultaneously went after other key functionaries of the regime's troika, namely the Chief of Staff, SHQ, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. T. Y. Danjuma. The Military Governors of Kwara and Oyo States, Colonels Ibrahim Taiwo and David Jemibewon, respectively, were also targeted.

Taiwo, who had been the national coordinator of the July 1975 coup that brought Mohammed to power, was abducted and killed by a team led by Major K. K. Gagara. Jemibewon, whose name had been added to the list of targets by Lt. Col T. K. Adamu, merely because Adamu "did not like his face", escaped.

General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) has written that he was late in leaving home that day on account of a visit by Brigadier Olu Bajowa to get a name for his new baby. When it became apparent that there was trouble, Obasanjo executed an escape and evasion manoeuvre, spent most of the day at the house of a civilian friend in Ikoyi monitoring the situation by telephone, but later emerged to become the Head of State. His would be assassins mistook then Colonel Dumuje for him along Awolowo road in Lagos, seriously wounding that officer.

That morning, General Danjuma followed his usual route at the usual time, 7:30 a.m., which route consisted of leaving his home by car for the Chief of Naval Staff’s Jetty at Queen’s Drive, where he would board a launch which would take him to the Ministry of Defence Jetty at the Marina. From there he would usually walk across the road into his office in Army Headquarters.

On this morning he found Col. Bali and the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Adelanwa, awaiting him at Queens Drive. They rode together to the Marina without incident and reached their offices without any sign of unusual movements.

He was busy reading his newspapers in the office at a few minutes past eight when Col. Bali came in and asked him if he had heard what happened. When he said he had not, Col. Bali then told him that there had been a voice over the radio announcing that there had been a coup. The first thing that General Danjuma asked for was a radio, since he did not usually keep one in his office. A radio was brought in and a number of other officers came in to the office to listen. As soon as he heard the announcement he sent for then Col. Ibrahim Babangida. Ibrahim Babangida and Domkat Bali were two particularly efficient officers who had served with General Danjuma during the war.

General Danjuma told Col. Babangida who was commanding the Recce Squadron to get to Ikeja where his armoured cars were parked and secure his unit as swiftly as he could. As he was about to leave, General Danjuma further suggested to him that he should go on a motorcycle, since the roads were said to be clogged with traffic. This instruction had another tactical advantage in that any of the coup participants looking out for loyal soldiers would hardly have expected to find them on the pillion seats of motorcycles.

After Babangida left, General Danjuma received a phone call from Col. Muhammadu Buhari, the Governor of Bornu State. Col. Buhari was trying to call the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, General Obasanjo, but he had been put on to the wrong office. General Danjuma asked him if he had heard what had happened and he replied that he had not. General Danjuma briefed him on what he had heard on the radio and also told him that he had rung Dodan Barracks and discovered that General Muhammed had not reached his office, even though he had ascertained from General Muhammed’s wife that he had left home. Col. Buhari’s only comment was “I hope they haven’t killed him”. General Danjuma instructed him to contact the Brigade Commander in his area immediately and secure loyalty there and make sure that no one left the barracks in the town.

The next phone call that came into his office was from General Bisalla. He asked General Danjuma if he had heard what had happened. General Danjuma said that he had heard, but that all would soon be under control. General Bisalla simply hung up the phone. It was later learnt that on replacing the phone he turned to a top civil servant who was standing next to him and commented, “So this is how people ruin one’s career”. His office was just above General Danjuma’s in the Ministry of Defence Building.
Immediately after this call, General Danjuma, on the advice of Colonel Bali, moved his headquarters to Bonny Camp.

Colonel Babangida got to Ikeja Cantonment and secured his armoured vehicles. Supported by these vehicles he proceeded to Radio Nigeria, where he had a conversation with his close friend Dimka. Dimka's initial reaction to Babangida's arrival was to ask him if he came to play "Chukwuma and Nwawo" with him; drawing a historical parallel with the negotiations between Colonel Conrad Nwawo (on behalf of Ironsi) and Major Patrick Nzeogwu in Kaduna in January 1966. However, Dimka got concerned with the presence of armored vehicles in the background and asked them to be withdrawn.

But it turns out that Babangida's orders had not been to negotiate a surrender or other outcome, but to stop the broadcast - by any means necessary - including destruction by shelling. When he made contact with Bonny Camp to report his activities at the radio station, this order was reiterated to him by General Danjuma, incredulous that a conversation with Dimka had even occurred and that the radio station was still playing Dimka's broadcast. A brief but fierce fire fight (reportedly led by Major Chris Ugokwe) subsequently dislodged the coup plotters from the station.

When shooting started Dimka simply walked away, past all the soldiers surrounding the building as well as driving through numerous checkpoints on his way, first to Jos and then eventually to Abakaliki where he was captured by Police in the company of a woman of easy virtue.

Murtala Muhammed's limousine (National Museum, Onikan, Lagos).

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[size=14pt]Video: "Dimka's Confession".[/size]

Watch on computer http://­www.facebook.com/­video/­embed?video_id=102009­54389125674


Download on mobile phone www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=1848574137813

The video begins with a shot of the Council. Chambers building at State House Dodan Barracks. There are soldiers in Land Rovers in front of the Council Chambers building. Then a sign is shown, which reads "SUPREME HEADQUARTERS DODAN BARRACKS".

Lieutenant Colonel Suka Bukar Dimka is seated and surrounded by journalists and security operatives. They are all listening to an audio tape being played on a reel to reel tape machine.

We hear Dimka's voice on the tape. He says, "but at least I. . . . .I want to talk. What ever is going to happen to me, I mean, let it happen to me, but I want. . . . . .I wanted to brief you myself. There was just some. . . .some" (inaudible), "Well I didn't have to know" (inaudible). "I thought at this initial stage, I'll continue to allow him to" (inaudible). "Anyway I. . . . .I thank you very much, actually, for having come". "In fact, if there's anybody that enjoys any. . . .any" (inaudible).

Dimka is speaking in the next clip. He says, "Of course, being a soldier, I made it a point of duty that I own. . . I mean, I have an honour to maintain and I believe I have no reason at this stage to lie. So all that you have heard has been my recording. . .personal recording."

The next clip shows a convoy of military trucks arriving the beach. Armed soldiers are seen milling around an armoured car. There's a huge crowd of civillians. Stakes have been erected at the beach in preparation for the executions. A black maria brings the prisoners to the beach. Dimka and the other prisoners are seen as they are being tied to the stake. The video ends.

Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa

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Just prior to this broadcast, then Head of State, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, along with his ADC (Lt. Akinsehinwa), Orderly and driver, had been assassinated on his way to work in a thin skinned black Mercedes Benz car without escorts. The unprotected car had slowed down at the junction in front of the Federal Secretariat in Ikoyi, Lagos, when a hit team which allegedly included Lt. William Seri and others, casually strolled up and riddled it with bullets.

Murtala Muhammed

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Just before 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 1976, the following curious announcement was heard on Radio Nigeria:

"Good morning fellow Nigerians,

This is Lt. Col. B. Dimka of the Nigerian Army calling.
I bring you good tidings. Murtala Muhammed's deficiency has been detected. His government is now overthrown by the young revolutionaries. All the 19 military governors have no powers over the states they now govern. The states affairs will be run by military brigade commanders until further notice.

All commissioners are sacked, except for the armed forces and police commissioners who will be redeployed.

All senior military officers should remain calm in their respective spots. No divisional commanders will issue orders or instructions until further notice.

Any attempt to foil these plans from any quarters will be met with death.
You are warned, it is all over the 19 states.
Any acts of looting or raids will be death.

Everyone should be calm.
Please stay by your radio for further announcements.
All borders, air and sea ports are closed until further notice.

Curfew is imposed from 6am to 6pm.

Thank you. We are all together."

Murtala Muhammed

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Murtala Mohammed & Professor Bolaji Akinyemi.

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General Murtala Ramat Muhammed.

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Murtala Muhammed swears in members of the SMC/delivers first speech @ Dodan Barracks


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6CKWGJOGgM

Oops! I forgot to list the names of the Idejo families (who refused to sign the Lagos Treaty of Cessation) and the parts of Lagos they owned.

The Idejo families include

Oniru - they owned Iru (present day Victoria Island & Maroko)

Onikoyi - they owned Ikoyi

Ojora - they owned Ijora

Oluwa - they owned Oluwa (present day Apapa)

Oloto - they owned Oto

Onitolo & Aromire families - together they owned Idumota

Onisiwo _ they owned Tarkwa Bay & Ogogoro village

Will go back and modify that post.

Morning break.

General Yakubu Gowon (Head of State & Commander in Chief)

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In his independence day speech, General Yakubu Gowon announced that his promised hand over date of October 1st 1976 was no longer feasible. This along with tensions between the war time commanders, who felt they had not benefited much from Gowon’s regime and the “political” soldiers, particularly the governors, who were seen as corrupt, led to the coup that was to remove General Gowon from power.

The coup was led by Colonel Joseph Nanven Garba, Lieutenant Colonel Shehu Musa Yar’Adua and Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed. Colonel Garba was critical to the success of the coup. He was close to Gowon & was the Commander, Brigade of Guards. Many sources claim that Colonel (later Major General) Joseph Nanven Garba (deceased) was distantly related to Gowon maternally. However, while Garba acknowledged the fact that his maternal grandfather originated from a village two miles from Gowon’s aboriginal village in Angas, then Benue-Plateau State, he never – according to him - actually confirmed the said relationship. On his father’s side, he was Langtang, also from then Benue-Plateau State. As a lieutenant in November 1964, Garba was originally handpicked (by then Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon) from the 4th battalion in Ibadan, to the Federal Guards Company where he became the second-in-command to Major Donatus Okafor. He later left the Federal Guards, but was reposted there as second in command, after the January 1966 coup, when northern soldiers refused to accept the authority of Major B. Ochei, a Midwest Igbo-speaking officer. After the July 29, 1966 coup, Garba assumed the command of the unit formally (on August 16th). The Federal Guards became the Brigade of Guards and Colonel Garba became one of the officers principally responsible for General Gowon’s security. He was instrumental (along with then Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed) in selecting the former residence of the late first republic Defence Minister, Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu, as the new residence of the new C-in-C within the Dodan Barracks perimeter. It would have been difficult for any coup to succeed without the coupists infiltrating the Brigade of Guards.

The coup plotters decided that they were not going to take control of government, but rather, they would rather hand over power to the trio of Brigadier Murtala Muhammed (commissioner for communications), Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo (commissioner for works) and Brigadier T.Y Danjuma (G.O.C. 3rd Division).

Joseph Garba and Shehu Musa Yar’Adua convinced Brigadier Muhammed to support the coup.

According to late Major General JN Garba:

‘Lieutenant Colonel Shehu Yar’Adua and I went to his house one evening to talk to him about it, and found him reciting Koranic verses to the accompaniment of tapes pre-recorded for the purpose. He was in the middle of one of them and barely acknowledged our presence. We waited in silence for some forty minutes, until the tape had finished. I had not been to his house for a long time, indeed, not since 1969. And even though I had been responsible for reconciling him with General Gowon in 1972, which led subsequently to his appointment as Commissioner of Communications in the 1974 cabinet reshuffle, he and I maintained only a correct relationship, despite our having been very close in the days leading to the July 1966 coup. He and Shehu Yar’Adua, however, had a closer relationship, and I therefore left the talking to Shehu.’

"When Yar’Adua finished speaking, I interjected a few words in amplification. He looked at us steadily for some moments, and then said,

“I have no intention of taking up arms for Nigeria again. Gowon is too far gone, and I would as soon let him stew in his own juice. If you boys want to stage a coup, which I agree is long overdue, I will not stop you. However, I reject your offer to be Head of State. Indeed, I refuse to have anything to do with it. But since I believe your motives are correct, the only undertaking I will give you is, should you fail, and anyone wants to execute you, I would do my utmost to save your necks.”

With that he went back to reading his Koran. After some moments we left, Yar’Adua saying to me not to worry; he would try to make him come around. He must have done a good job, because eventually Murtala gave his tacit approval, wanting, however, to be distant from the events. Though he was told all of the details and time, etc, he arranged to be out of the country, and was thus in London when the coup actually took place. The only aircraft we allowed to land on that morning was the one carrying him back to Lagos via Kano where he deplaned.’

Colonel Taiwo went to Danjuma’s house in Jos on July 28, catalogued a long list of complaints, particularly Gowon’s alleged chronic vacillation, and concluded:
“Sir, we have decided to take over the Government.”
He then named the officers involved in the plot and assured the Brigadier that there would be no bloodshed. The three pillars upon which plotters based their confidence that there would be no bloodshed were that
General Gowon was outside Nigeria,
Colonel JN Garba, Commander, Brigade of Guards was in the plot, and
Brigadier TY Danjuma, GOC, 3rd Division, civil war hero, one of the doyens of the middle belt officer corps and one of the three musketeers of July 1966 (Mohammed, Danjuma, Adamu) would not oppose the coup.
As Taiwo put it,
“Sir, we don’t want you to do anything but we do not want you to go against us because we are sure that the moment it is announced that you are not with us there will be trouble.”
Danjuma’s primary concerns - driven by his unpleasant experiences in July 1966 and thereafter - were that there should be no bloodshed by those executing the coup and, importantly, he would not personally take operational part in it.
While Taiwo was still chatting with the Brigadier, Colonel JN Garba phoned from Lagos to confirm that Taiwo had indeed notified Danjuma of the coup, scheduled to begin in a matter of hours. The following conversation occurred:
Danjuma: ‘Make sure there is no bloodshed. Let me make this clear, I will do nothing to stop you, but I will not join you.’

Garba: ‘Sir, we do not need your help, all that we want is for you to do nothing.’
The coupists then recruited key personnel that would be needed in staging their coup. Shehu Musa Yar’Adua was particularly effective in this.

For example, Gowon’s Chief Security Officer at the time (and Deputy Inspector General of Police in charge of E Department “Special Branch), Alhaji MD Yusuf recalls that:

“You know, Shehu (Yar’Adua) would talk to you for two hours, beating about the bush, going around, unless you know exactly what he is doing it is only after his departure, when you put it altogether, that you discover what he is trying to say. He never came out openly to say we are planning a coup and could you help us. No, only, this is going on, going round and round. And this is what all of them were saying. “

However, when recruitment began, information about the coup leaked. The coupists had to adopt extra security measures and also planted their own fake coup stories in order to confuse General Gowon.

When, about two weeks before General Gowon left for the OAU summit in Kampala, MD Yusuf approached him again with very specific and credible information about Colonel JN Garba, Yusuf recalls that Gowon said,

'Look, have you joined this group of coup scares and all that?'

In the opinion of the veteran Special Branch officer, Gowon reacted in this manner,

“Because he obviously had heard this over and over again. And he believed that it was a coup story and that I had joined. I said 'No, it would have been alright for me but Garba, who is your real guard, is right in it. So that is why I am telling you.'

But MD Yusuf had good reason to be very concerned. In addition to his civilian sources, one or more of the military planners had directly approached him to say that a coup was in the offing. He did not know what to make of such a blatant leak, except to conclude that it may have been a sentinel warning to Gowon, for old time’s sake, to make what changes were necessary to avert the putsch. The other possibility, ofcourse, is that one or more of the plotters was making contingency plans in case the coup failed. In that scenario the plotter could always claim to have reported the plot. Yusuf mentioned it to then Federal Commissioner for Works, then Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo, who, after an FEC meeting, apparently crosschecked with Gowon to see if he had heard the story. According to Obasanjo, Gowon reassured him that he had the situation under control.

MD Yusuf did not stop at that. Before Gowon left for Kampala he approached him again with a suggestion:

“I tried to get him to do something before he left. One of the complaints was lack of promotion. A lot of officers. And at that time they had already decided who to promote, to go ahead with the promotions. I went to him, I said I have heard you have promoted - release the list, at least it will buy you time, it will disrupt these coup plotters and lift those who are making it to gain promotion, will feel 'look I have got promotion now, should we really go along?' Just to buy time. But he said no, there was a procedure which we do. And that was it.”

MD Yusuf also volunteered to confront Colonel JN Garba personally about the plot, so as to convince Gowon to take action. But Gowon opted to do so himself. Hence, before leaving for Kampala on July 27th, he asked Garba about it directly and Garba, once again, denied. In response Gowon reportedly told him:

“If you are plotting, let it be on your conscience and let it be without bloodshed. I must go to Kampala anyway.”

On July 25th, the first lady, Mrs. Victoria Gowon left Nigeria for London. Her husband had not wanted her to leave until he returned from Kampala but she insisted, fearing that she might miss the summer sales at upscale London stores. In that era, as it remains to this day, many members of Nigeria’s consumerist elite routinely traveled to the UK on “summer holidays.” Before Mrs. Gowon left, Army Chief of Staff Major General DA Ejoor also left the country on vacation, as did a few military Governors, including Brigadier Samuel Ogbemudia of the Midwest who cited medical reasons. While Ejoor was away, Brigadier Martin Adamu - one of the three musketeers of July 1966 - acted in his stead.
On July 27, 1975, General Gowon discovered at the Ikeja airport in Lagos that he had forgotten an important briefcase containing documents relevant to the OAU conference at hand. His initial desire was to have his ADC, Lt. Col. William Godang Walbe, return to Dodan Barracks to pick it up prior to departure for Kampala. But the Chief of Staff, SHQ, Vice Admiral Wey, advised against any delays that might violate protocol. Plans were made, therefore, for Walbe to return to Nigeria from Uganda after dropping the General off, ostensibly to pick it up. But, as will be evident later on, there was more in Gowon’s mind than merely picking up a briefcase.
Following departure ceremonies, General Gowon’s executive aircraft, piloted by Nigeria Airways Captains Thahal and Nnaji taxied to take position for take-off. He had no idea that it would be very many years before he would return to his homeland. He had believed Colonel JN Garba’s denials but still felt there was something to the coup rumour and privately considered options for a quick return from Kampala to crush any attempt.

Nevertheless, because Gowon did not share his internal anxieties with others, key elements of his regime were not forewarned to be in a coup-busting mood. He did not contact GOCs in other parts of the country, did not confine soldiers to barracks, and gave no clear-cut instructions about what various officers and formations should do in the event of a coup attempt. Not long after Gowon’s aircraft left, a large delegation of senior officers, led by Major General Hassan Katsina, deputy Chief of Staff SHQ, departed for Kano to take part in a Polo tournament. Among the officers concerned were at least two State Governors, Brigadiers Johnson and Rotimi of Lagos and Western State respectively.

According to Alhaji MD Yusuf,
“I knew what they were doing, who they were using. They said they were going to do it tonight. But at about three or four o'clock, I got wind of it. So I told Garba, 'Look if you are going to make a coup, don't just say you are going to do it at this and this hour. I know.' Later on, he kept asking me, how did I know. And I told him: "I have no authority to investigate the army under our code. But I told you, if you talk to one civilian, then I will know. And that is what happened. You spoke to a civilian. And that is how I know. “
But unknown to Yusuf at the time, something else happened at about 3 pm that day. The executive jet that had taken General Gowon to Kampala the day before flew back into the country and landed at Ikeja airport with one passenger – Lt. Col. WG Walbe - Gowon’s ADC. He supposedly had come to fetch the so-called brief case Gowon allegedly forgot. But in Walbe’s possession was a letter from General Gowon to Vice Admiral Wey, written on an East African Airways Letterhead:
“Just to let you know that we arrived safely and we had a good journey right through and we also had a great welcome from Field Marshall Idi who was openly delighted to see us.

I forgot my briefcase and I am sending William to fetch it. If you therefore have any message please send it through him.

My regards to all other colleagues.

Yours Aye,

Y. Gowon (sgd)”
What Gowon actually intended was for Walbe to sneak into Lagos, lie low, get information about any impending putsch from Wey, and then return quickly to Kampala to fetch him if there was trouble. But, the time factor aside, perhaps illustrative of the fatal flaw in Gowon’s contingency plan, Walbe was supposed to help Garba contain any such coup – confirming that Gowon was totally taken in by Garba’s pledge of loyalty. Walbe, nonetheless, unaware of the true seriousness of the coup rumors went to play tennis upon arrival in Lagos – even though something quite strange had transpired at the airport when he arrived. Lt. Col. Muktar Mohammed of the NAF ordered the executive jet parked and secured by Air Police in the air force area of the airport instead of the VIP tarmac. This action was in furtherance of the coup, which had practically begun. Not long after, unsurprisingly, both Garba and Ochefu became aware of Walbe’s presence in the country.

Extra security was provided at the home of Brigadier Murtala Mohammed in Ikoyi. At dawn, a special aircraft would be dispatched from Lagos carrying NAF Colonel Dan Suleiman, NAF Lt. Col. Muktar Mohammed, and Army Colonel Inua Wushishi first to Kano to bring General Hassan Katsina and other Gowon regime personalities back to Lagos from the Polo tournament. Then, subsequently, the same aircraft was to fly around the country to pick up senior military officers from various formations for a planned meeting later that afternoon in Lagos where the new triumvirate was to be anointed by the putschists.
Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed, who also contacted Brigadier Murtala Mohammed in London to confirm that he would be on the next flight home, formally notified Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo of the putsch. It would appear that he was a major source of information on events of that night – and perhaps even before then - for the Police Special Branch. MD Yusuf recalled that,
‘That night, one of the plotters told me, 'Look, I'm going to [speak with] Murtala. We are going to ask Murtala to take over. But if he refuses, we are going to ask Obasanjo. And I am going to Obasanjo now to tell him our plans. This was the actual night of the coup after Gowon had gone.‘
Meanwhile Obasanjo has confirmed that Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed, Director of Military Intelligence, did in fact come to see him at about 10:45 pm. and said,
“Sir, there will be a coup tonight.”
Obasanjo says he replied,
‘Please endeavour to make it bloodless, disrupt normal life for the public as little as possible and let General Gowon return home after the whole thing has died down, if he so desires.’
But after Abdullahi Mohammed left, a jittery Obasanjo quickly drove to the house of MD Yusuf ostensibly to report the visit of Colonel Mohammed to whom he had just offered ideas on how the coup should be carried out. He met a small group of federal civil servants there. It later became apparent to Obasanjo that it was actually MD Yusuf, Gowon’s Chief Security Officer, who gave Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed - one of the putschists - Obasanjo’s phone number and even described the way to his house!
Meanwhile Garba and Ochefu returned to Garba’s house to meet Walbe and clarify the purpose of his return to Nigeria. It was the moment of truth. According to Elaigwu, Garba formally notified Walbe that ‘he no longer had anything to do with Gowon and that he was not ready to have himself killed because of General Gowon.’ At that point Garba wanted to place Walbe under arrest but was dissuaded from doing so by Ochefu. Instead Garba told Walbe that he would visit him at his home later. Walbe, therefore, left and went home. Once home he called Brigadier Martin Adamu, acting Army Chief of Staff, to report what he had just heard. Adamu’s reaction was to advise him to call back when Garba showed up.
However, when Garba showed up just before midnight he was with three Landrover loads of soldiers in full combat outfit. He walked into Walbe’s home armed and lay his gun down on the carpet. According to reports, he may have been tipsy, having fired himself up for the night’s operations. He reminded Walbe of their long years of association together going all the way back to the Nigerian military school (NMS) in the late fifties. Then, in the presence of Walbe’s spouse, he asked Walbe to abandon Gowon and join the conspiracy.
Walbe reacted incredulously, accusing Garba of betrayal. ‘If our friendship goes all the way back to NMS why did you need to bring your weapon into my living room?’ (Other sources claim that Garba had heard an unconfirmed rumor that Walbe had signed for a weapon when he arrived earlier that day from Kampala). Walbe then told Garba that the situation ‘was like a man’s wife waiting for him to go into the shower and then with his back turned, fully naked, and the water running she shows up with a gun aimed at him.’ ‘Why’, Walbe asked, ‘did you not try this when we were in town? ‘ Evidently, the conversation was going nowhere, and so Garba left for a rendezvous with Ochefu. Meanwhile putschists had cut selected telephone lines at midnight and Walbe found that he could no longer get Martin Adamu on the phone. Shortly thereafter, Garba returned to invite Walbe to the Officers Mess for a purported meeting with Martin Adamu, TY Danjuma, Ochefu and other prominent middle belt officers who allegedly either signed or were not planning to resist the coup. This confused Walbe because the kind of names that were being dropped were, in his view then, unlikely to be involved but if involved would portend an army-wide exercise. So he went along for the ride. On arrival at the Mess, he was detained. Ochefu was the only officer there. Walbe had been tricked.

In Kampala, Ugandan President Idi Amin called Gowon to the high table and gave him a note, which contained the news that he had been deposed in a coup. Gowon reportedly read the note and, in response to an inquiry from Amin, said the situation would become clearer as the day wore on. Apparently, this initial note did not specify the identity of the radio announcer in Lagos. Privately, Gowon was still thinking Colonel Garba was on his side and that no coup would succeed without fierce resistance from the elite brigade of guards. He was wrong.

He returned to his seat (next to Alhaji Usman Faruk). Gowon then quietly told the Governor, in Hausa,

“Abinde mu ka jin soro, ya faru agida”

This means, in English,

“What we have been afraid of at home, has happened.”

He then consoled Faruk, who was shattered by the news, saying,

“I have a clear conscience. There is nothing to worry about.”
Later, a presidential aide wearing agbada entered the conference center via a side-door, made his way to the General and whispered some information into his ears. It was at that point that Gowon got up, acknowledged the Chairman (Idi Amin), and departed from the conference room, straight for his hotel room. It was apparent by now that the officer who announced that he had been deposed was none other than Colonel JN Garba himself, Commander, Brigade of Guards, who repeated his pledge of loyalty just before Gowon left the country. Clearly, things were a lot more complicated than he had thought.

In his hotel room, General Gowon asked if the announcement from Lagos was the only announcement from Nigeria.

“What about Kaduna?”

“What about Ibadan?”

“What about Jos?”

The answer was the same. No counter-announcement was heard from any of the headquarters (at that time) of the Army’s Infantry Divisions. There was no news of fighting.

In the meantime, although all airports were closed, a commercial aircraft carrying Brigadier Murtala Mohammed back from London was allowed to land at the Kano International Airport.

Confident that the putsch had succeeded nationwide – and that no negative reaction was forthcoming from the Guards Brigade - Colonels Garba and Ochefu released Lt. Col Walbe from Dodan Barracks. They – along with other putschists - then turned their attention to the next phase of the operation – incorporating a wider swath of officers in the military and public servants in the unarmed segments of the bureaucracy. To do this, they sent signals declaring their intention to summon what can best be described as a “military convention” in Lagos at which the new leadership – supposedly excluding themselves – would presumably be chosen.
At 0900 hours, therefore, an aircraft left Lagos to bring senior officers (including service chiefs) to Lagos. It hopped from airport to airport gathering officers all over the country. Meanwhile Garba listened to himself on radio repeatedly and drove around Lagos inspecting points of deployment. He returned to the Radio Station several times – at one point engaging one of the young officers there in conversation about the officer’s concern that there were too few soldiers on guard at the station. This officer, then 2/Lt. Garba Ismaila, (who was not from the middle belt) having finally realized what he had been “innocently” deployed to the radio station to do became alarmed at the prospect of counter-attack. Colonel JN Garba, who had more inside information about the big picture, was not too concerned – or did not appear so in the adrenergic state he was in. Lt. Col. Ibrahim Babangida had deployed additional Armoured vehicles from Ikeja to Dodan Barracks in expectation of the arrival of senior officers. And Radio Nigeria was just across the road.

Meanwhile, then Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo had lost his appetite. According to him,

“I sent for newspapers and I kept myself busy by reading every print including the small advertisements.”

Obasanjo kept checking in with MD Yusuf about the security situation in the country and was re-assured - repeatedly - that the nationwide deployment of soldiers overnight had been peaceful. At 1500 hours (3 pm), Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed and Lt. Col. Shehu Yar’Adua, two of the original “three musketeers of July 1975”, (the third being Colonel Taiwo), walked into Obasanjo’s house. They invited him for the planned meeting of senior officers scheduled for 1600 hours (4 pm) at Dodan Barracks – but took some time to sound him out on his views about the situation in the country. Col. Abdullahi Mohammed made a slip of tongue and told Obasanjo to “help us put some of these ideas into practice” which prompted Yar’Adua to interrupt him. The plan had not been to betray any specifics about the proposed new leadership. Such information in the wrong hands at the wrong time could spell trouble. (Not even Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, who had been tapped in April as the new leader was told of certain intended changes in the way the country was to be run after the coup).

Nevertheless, Obasanjo, wearing mufti, drove himself unarmed in his private vehicle to Dodan Barracks. According to him there were some officers there before him and “Nobody asked the other any question on what had happened but the atmosphere was jovial, cordial and tension-free.”

(L-R) Col U.J Esuene (Governor, South Eastern State), Navy Capt Alfred Diette-Spiff (Governor, Rivers State), Col David Bamigboye (Governor, Kwara State), Gen Yakubu Gowon (Head of State & Commander in Chief) during Gowon's visit to Kwara in 1973

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General Yakubu Gowon commissioning the Kainji Dam in 1969. Behind him are Vice Admiral Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters) & Justice (Sir) Adetokunboh Ademola (Chief Justice of Nigeria).

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Vice Admiral Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters)

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General Yakubu Gowon & General Philip Effiong (the last Head of State of Biafra) shake hands @ Dodan Barracks.

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End of the civil war

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Surrender @ Amichi. General Philip Effiong (Head of State of Biafra)takes a piece of kolanut

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The surrender @ Amichi. 2nd left is General Philip Effiong (Head of State of Biafra), 3rd left is Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo (GOC 3rd Marine Commando).

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Yakubu Gowon

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2nd anniversary of Biafra's independence. 4th left is Philip Effiong, 5th left is Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.

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Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu

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Gowon @ Dodan Barracks with a map of Nigeria, telling foreign reporters that the war will be over in 4-6 weeks

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The Black Scorpion

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"....We shoot at everything that moves and when our troops march into the centre of Ibo territory, we shoot at everything, even at things that do not move... "

Benjamin Adekunle

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“…let me look for an animal that is wicked but at the same time looks very human and the animal that occurred to me then was an Octopus. Octopus will be sucking your blood and at the same time shedding tears for you. While it has all his arms round you, shedding tears and sucking the whole of the blood and yet you find that it is oozing you bit by bit. The Octopus became the insignia of the Division, which is still being maintained today. It was the European journalists at Port Harcourt who mistook the Octopus for Scorpion. That was how the name "Black Scorpion" originated."

Brigadier Benjamin Adekunle (The Black Scorpion) 

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The sign hanging from the door of his office read "ENTER UNDER PAIN OF DEATH". It was written in... was it red ink, or was it blood?

David Ejoor (Mid-Western Region Governor)

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Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu being sworn in as Head of State of Biafra by Justice (Sir) Louis Mbanefo (Chief Justice of Biafra)

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Gowon and Ojukwu @ Aburi


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKXK2Er8UZk


Aburi: The “Sovereign National Conference That Got Away”.


Aburi: The “Sovereign National Conference” That Got Away
By Max Siollun
Published 05/21/2007
Nigeria Matters
Unrated


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After Nigeria was dragged to the brink of the abyss by two military coups in 1966, its military leaders met to try to bring the country back from the brink. The meeting evolved into perhaps the best documented constitutional debate of all time which touched upon fundamental concepts regarding the balance of power between the central government and federating regions in a federation and professional soldiers’ outlook to military coups and seniority. It was a potential breakthrough occasion. Between January 5th and 7th 1967, the members of Nigeria's then ruling military junta, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), met for the first time at Aburi in Ghana under the auspices of the Ghanaian Head of State: Lt-General Joe Ankrah. Ankrah was no stranger to coup plots as he had become Ghana’s first military Head of State after Ghana’s first President Kwame Nkrumah was deposed in a coup while Nkrumah was abroad visiting China. Ankrah was later forced to resign in April 1969 after admitting his role in a bribery scandal. Ankrah had served in the Congo during the UN peace-keeping mission there in the early 1960s and it is likely he personally knew the Nigerian soldiers (including Ironsi, Fajuyi, Ojukwu and Gowon) who served in the same mission. The meeting at Aburi was the first official meeting of all members of that SMC. Following a second bloody army coup in July 1966, the Military Governor of the eastern region of Nigeria: Lt-Colonel 'Emeka' Ojukwu had refused to attend any SMC meeting outside the eastern region of Nigeria due to concerns over his safety. The massacre of tens of thousands of Igbos in northern Nigeria only heightened Ojukwu's sense of isolation and insecurity. In turn, Ojukwu's public belligerence towards the SMC (whom he suspected of tacitly supporting, or having a hand in the massacres) served to antagonise the SMC, who began to suspect that Ojukwu was planning the secession of the eastern region from the rest of Nigeria.
 
The fashionable political theory being bandied about in Nigeria today is that a "Sovereign National Conference" (SNC) should be held to resolve the country’s constitutional problems and coup plotting culture. Many do not realise that Nigeria has already had half a dozen constitutional debates - none of which has ever resolved the nagging problems which have dogged Nigeria from independence till today. Nigeria has wasted billions of Naira on constitutional debates and constitutions that are no longer in use, and a future SNC is unlikely to discuss anything that has not already been covered in the previous constitutional debates. Ironically the best recorded of these constitutional debates was never implemented, and Nigeria has been paying the price since. To plan for the future Nigeria might do well to go back into its archives and learn from the "SNC" which it has already had.


BETWEEN ONE AMBITIOUS MAN AND THE REST OF THE COUNTRY
 
In the months preceding Aburi the SMC and Ojukwu had engaged in a war of words with the two sides trading multiple accusations and blaming each other for causing or exacerbating the crisis. The Military Governor of the north: Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina dismissed Ojukwu's confident and eloquent public statements on the crisis as attempts by Ojukwu "to show how much English he knows". As far as Katsina was concerned, Nigeria's problem was a stand-off "between one ambitious man and the rest of the country". Throughout the six months following the coup of July 29th 1966, Ojukwu repeated his mantra that "I, as the Military Governor of the east cannot meet anywhere in Nigeria where there are northern troops". That virtually ruled out an SMC meeting inside Nigeria's borders. Ojukwu had even turned down offers to attend an SMC meeting on board a British (whom Ojukwu, and Igbos in general did not entirely trust) naval ship, and at Benin, but was finally convinced to attend in the neutral territory of Aburi in Ghana. Ojukwu's aides were not without doubt. Some warned him that the Aburi meeting could be a trap set by anti-Igbo members of the Federal Government to arrest or kill him. Ojukwu brushed aside their concerns by pointing out that he had received a guarantee of safe passage from Lt-Colonel Gowon, and that he had to trust Gowon's word as an officer and a gentleman. Virtually everything discussed at that Aburi conference is relevant till today. So much so that a reader would be tempted to believe that the discussion was on Nigeria's current problems, rather than over 40 years earlier, in 1967. It is probably the best recorded constitutional debate in history. Aware that something momentous was occurring, the Ghanaians had the conference tape recorded. The tape of the discussions was later released by Ojukwu as a series of six long playing gramophone records. In attendance on the Federal Military Government (FMG) side were:


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NAME
POSITION

Lt-Colonel Yakubu Gowon
Head of the SMC*

Commodore Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey
Head of the Nigerian navy

Colonel Robert Adeyinka Adebayo
Military Governor of the western region

Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina
Military Governor of the northern region

Lt-Colonel David Akpode Ejoor
Governor of mid-west region

Major Mobolaji Johnson
Military Governor of Lagos

Alhaji Kam Selem
Inspector-General of Police

Timothy Omo-Bare
Police

 
*Head of the SMC as Ironsi’s whereabouts were “unknown”.

Ojukwu was in attendance as the eastern region's Military Governor. The FMG delegation arrived "wreathed in smiles"[1] and anxious to mollify their former brother-in-arms Ojukwu. Colonels Adebayo and Gowon even offered to embrace Ojukwu. However Ojukwu was still stung by the terrible massacres of his Igbo kinsmen in northern Nigeria the previous year and was in no mood to embrace his former colleagues. The contrast in the demeanour of the participants was in itself a microcosm of what took place over the course of the next two days. While the federal delegation behaved as if the Aburi conference was a social gathering to reunite former friends who had fallen out in a social tiff, Ojukwu saw the conference for what it really was: a historic constitutional debate that would determine Nigeria's future social and political structure.
 
Typically, western perspective was focused on image, rather than on the genuine problems of the protagonists. Secret diplomatic dispatches later declassified by the United States State Department depicted the FMG-eastern region stand-off as a personality clash between Ojukwu and Gowon. According to the American perspective: "many Americans admire Ojukwu. We like romantic leaders, and Ojukwu has panache, quick intelligence and an actor's voice and fluency. The contrast with Gowon - troubled by the enormity of his task, painfully earnest and slow to react, hesitant and repetitive in speech - led some Americans to view the Nigerian-Biafran conflict as a personal duel between two mismatched individuals".[2] As they were busy fighting in Vietnam and fighting a "cold war" against the USSR, the Americans did not become militarily or politically involved in the dispute. Instead, treating the conflict as one falling within Britain's sphere of influence.
 
THE REUNION
 
The Ghanaian host Lt-General Ankrah made a few introductory remarks and reminded his guests that "the whole world is looking up to you as military men and of there is any failure to reunify or even bring perfect understanding to Nigeria as a whole, you will find that the blame will rest with us through the centuries". Ankrah added that although he understood that the eastern region/rest of Nigeria stand-off was an internal matter for Nigerians, they should not hesitate to ask him for any help should they feel the need. Although Commodore Wey played an avuncular role, the discussion revolved around the younger Colonels: Adebayo, Ejoor, Katsina, Ojukwu and Gowon. Ojukwu showed from the beginning that he was prepared for serious business. He arrived at the conference armed with notes, and an army of secretaries. The extent of Ojukwu’s pre-preparation is shown by the fact that he gave the other debaters copies of documents he had prepared in advance, which enunciated his ideas. The other debaters should have realised at this point, that something serious was going to occur. After the hostility and bitterness that preceded the Aburi meeting, the civilian observers were stunned at the camaraderie displayed by the military officers. The debaters threw off formality and addressed each other by their first names: "Emeka", "Bolaji", "Jack" (nickname of Lt-Colonel Gowon) were thrown around as if addressing each other in at a social gathering. One of Ojukwu’s secretaries was amazed to observe that “the meeting went on in a most friendly and cordial atmosphere which made us, the non-military advisers, develop a genuine respect and admiration for the military men and their sense of comradeship. The meeting continued so smoothly and ended so successfully…..that I for one, was convinced that among themselves, the military had their own methods”.[3]
 
Ojukwu decided to show his good faith, and to test the good faith of the others by asking all present to renounce the use of force to settle the crisis. Ojukwu's motion was accepted without objection. While this request by Ojukwu may sound very noble, he was in fact playing a cunning soldier-politician. Ojukwu (despite his boasts of the eastern region's military prowess) realised that he could not succeed in a military campaign against the far more heavily armed FMG. By getting them to renounce the use of force, Ojukwu was trying to negate the FMG's military advantage. For he knew that if the political situation eventually got out of control, the FMG would find it difficult to resort to a military campaign having already given their word that they would not use force. This may have been an influential factor in Gowon's subsequent reluctance to engage the eastern region in a fully fledged war.
 
POLITICIANS
 
The assembled military officers struck a chord in unison on the subject of politicians. All of them voiced their contempt for the behaviour of civilian politicians whom they blamed for the wholesale bloodletting of the previous years (ignoring the fact that more Nigerian civilians had been murdered by politically motivated violence, in the one year of military rule so far, than in the preceding five years of civilian democratic rule). Commodore Wey slammed the point home rather forcefully when he declared that "Candidly if there had ever been a time in my life when I thought somebody had hurt me sufficiently for me to wish to kill him it was when one of these fellows [politicians] opened his mouth too wide".
 
IRONSI’S FATE
 
Despite Ironsi’s murder six months earlier, no public announcement regarding his death had been made and his whereabouts were still presumed unknown, although most of the SMC definitely knew he was dead. Gowon’s regime had eerily repeated the mistake made by Ironsi himself: failing to publicly acknowledge the army officers killed in a coup d’etat. By not announcing Ironsi’s death, Gowon also made his own position tenuous and gave Ojukwu the opportunity to reason that since the Supreme Commander Ironsi was “missing”, only the officer directly behind Ironsi in army seniority could replace him as Supreme Commander. Major Mobolaji Johnson encapsulated the issue that the east was steadfastly refusing to recognize Gowon as Head of State while the other regions accepted him (albeit tentatively in the case of the west): “The main problem now is that as far as the east is concerned, there is no central government. Why? This is what we must find out. …..For all the east knows the former Supreme Commander [Ironsi] is only missing and until such a time that they know his whereabouts they do not know any other Supreme Commander. These are the points that have been brought out by the east.” Ojukwu demanded that Gowon make a categorical public statement on the fate of Ironsi. Ejoor supported this by flatly requesting “we want to know what happened to Ironsi and Fajuyi”. Despite Ojukwu’s request for an announcement, most, if not all the participants already knew that Ironsi had been murdered. Gowon was informed of the death of Ironsi and Fajuyi not long after they had been killed. Gowon’s ADC Lt William Walbe was one of the junior northern soldiers that led Ironsi and Fajuyi into a bush alongside Iwo road outside Ibadan and murdered them there. Colonel Adebayo had ordered a search for their bodies, which were eventually discovered by the police. The head of the police Kam Selem would have been informed when his men discovered the bodies. Although Ojukwu was several hundred miles away in the east when Ironsi and Fajuyi were murdered, he likely would have had the story of their death relayed to him by one of Ironsi’s ADCs Captain Andrew Nwankwo who was captured along with Ironsi and Fajuyi but managed to escape moments before they were shot. Nwankwo eventually managed to find his way back to the east. Commodore Wey acknowledged that all the debaters already knew what happened to Ironsi. Ojukwu simply wanted Gowon to publicly acknowledge what the SMC members already knew: that Ironsi was dead. Ojukwu later acknowledged that “I heard the rumour that he [Ironsi] had been assassinated, so I began making contacts because I wanted to force them out in the open so that we could start dealing with the real situation.”[4] Gowon agreed to make a public announcement, and Kam Selem concurred, although he counselled that “the statement should be made in Nigeria so that the necessary honour can be given”.
After the soldiers agreed to make a public statement formally announcing Ironsi’s death shortly after they returned to Nigeria, the microphones were switched off and the civilians were asked to leave the room. Gowon then narrated the grisly tale of how Ironsi and Fajuyi had been abducted from State House in Ibadan by junior northern soldiers (including Gowon’s ADC Lt Walbe), driven out to an isolated bush outside Ibadan and shot there.




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COUP PLOTTERS: OJUKWU'S PROPHECY
 
When Ojukwu expressed his disgust over the murder of Igbo army officers by their northern colleagues in July 1966, Lt-Colonel Katsina interjected by asking Ojukwu why he had not reacted with the same revulsion when senior northern military officers were murdered by Igbo soldiers seven months earlier. Ojukwu reasoned that in January 1966, soldiers from every region of the federation (Nzeogwu: Mid-West, Ifeajuna-East, Ademoyega: West, Kpera: North) had staged a coup in which soldiers and politicians from every region of the federation (Akintola: West, Balewa: North, Unegbe: East, Okotie-Eboh: Mid-West) were also killed. Whereas when northern soldiers staged a revenge coup in July, soldiers from one region of the federation only (North: Danjuma, Murtala, Martin Adamu et al) singled out soldiers from one region in the federation as their targets (East: Okoro, Ironsi etc). Katsina took this opportunity to remind Ojukwu of the effort he had put in to prevent the murder of Igbos. Katsina told Ojukwu that "If you know how much …we have tried to console the people to stop all these movements and mass killings, you will give me and others a medal tonight."
 
Despite agreeing to attend the conference, Ojukwu was still refusing to recognize Lt-Colonel Gowon as Nigeria's Head of State. Ojukwu had defiantly continued to address Gowon as the "the Chief of Staff (Army)" (the post which Gowon occupied before the July counter-coup) in his public statements. Ojukwu was alarmed at the ascension of Gowon to the highest office in the land despite the presence of several other officers who were more senior than him (Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe, Commodore J.E.A. Wey, Colonel Adebayo, Lt-Colonels Hilary Njoku, Phillip Effiong, George Kurubo, Ime Imo, Conrad Nwawo and Lt-Colonels Ejoor and Ojukwu who were promoted to Lt-Colonel in the same week as Gowon). Ojukwu almost prophetically warned that allowing a middle ranking officer backed by coup plotters to become the Head of State irrespective of seniority would create a dangerous precedent which Nigeria would find difficult to emerge from. He told Gowon that "any break at this time from our normal line would write in something into the Nigerian army which is bigger than all of us and that thing is indiscipline.....How can you ride above people's heads purely because you are at the head of a group who have their fingers poised on the trigger? If you do it you remain forever a living example of that indiscipline which we want to get rid of because tomorrow a Corporal will think....he could just take over the company from the Major commanding the company…". Ojukwu's warning was of course not heeded and his prediction that junior officers would in future overthrow their superior officers proved prophetic. The NCOs and Lieutenants that shot Gowon to power graduated into the Colonels that overthrew him exactly nine years later. As Brigadiers, they overthrew the elected civilian government of Shehu Shagari on the last day of 1983, and removed Major-General Buhari from power in 1985. Ojukwu's impassioned monologue at Aburi could serve as an anti coup plotter thesis. He continued to Gowon "you announced yourself as Supreme Commander. Now, Supreme Commander by virtue of the fact that you head or that you are acceptable to people who had mutinied against their commander, kidnapped him and taken him away? By virtue of the support of officers and men who had in the dead of night murdered their brother officers, by virtue of the fact that you stood at the head of a group who had turned their brother officers from the eastern region out of the barracks they shared?".
 
THE STAR OF THE SHOW
 
It was obvious to the non military observers of the Aburi conference that Ojukwu "was clearly the star performer. Everyone wanted to please and concede to him".[1] On the federal side, only the Military Governor of the Northern Region: Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina, seemed to realize the significance of what was going on. Anxious not to allow Ojukwu's domination of the proceedings to continue for too long, he at one point dared Ojukwu to "secede, and let the three of us (West, North, Mid-West) join together". Alarmed by talk of a possible break-up of Nigeria, Ankrah quickly interjected and told his guests that "There is no question of secession when you come here [Ghana]". Although the FMG delegation was keen to mollify and make concessions to Ojukwu, Lt-Colonel Katsina was blunter than his other colleagues. He declared matter of factly to Ojukwu: "You command the east, if you want to come into Nigeria, come into Nigeria and that is that".
 
THE CONSTIUTIONAL DEBATE
 
Back then as now, each region of Nigeria was petrified of domination by other regions. No region of the federation was keen to adopt a course which would concentrate too much power at the hands of Nigeria's central government. Even Gowon acknowledged this (and unwittingly played into Ojukwu's hands) by admitting that he would "I would do away with any decree that certainly tended to go towards too much centralisation". Ojukwu pounced on the central powers theme and remarked that "Centralisation is a word that stinks in Nigeria today. For that 10,000 people have been killed” (this figure was later revised up to 30,000, and then 50,000). The clash, and ill defined relationship between Nigeria's central and regional governments has been the greatest source of political bloodletting in the country's history. It led indirectly to the gruesome "religious" clashes that resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians over the introduction of Sharia law in some northern states in 2000. It led to the civil war in which over a million civilians died. It led to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa after he agitated for greater self determination for his Ogoni people.





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Using his "skilful histrionics and superior intellectual adroitness",[1] Ojukwu managed to get the other Colonels to understand, and share his reasoning: that in order to keep Nigeria together as one nation, its constituent regions first had to move a little further apart from each other. Ojukwu used a metaphor to explain his reasoning: “It is better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we move closer and perish in the collision.” This may have been a paradox, but the Colonels accepted the logic of Ojukwu's argument. The problem then (as it still is in Nigeria today) is that Nigeria is so large, diverse and unwieldy that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find a leader who can elicit popularity and a following throughout, or most of the country. Amazingly Gowon accepted Ojukwu's thesis without really understanding the constitutional implications of what he was agreeing to. Gowon was effectively sanctioning measures which would paralyse his own powers. Lt-Colonel Katsina and Colonel Adebayo also agreed and were attracted to the concept of regional autonomy. Adebayo agreed so enthusiastically that he advocated a “repeal [of] those Decrees that were passed after 15th January, 1966 but I think we should revert to what the country was as at 14th January, 1966, that is regional autonomy”. Ojukwu envisaged a titular Head of State that would act only with the concurrence of the various regional governments: "what I envisage that whoever is at the top is a constitutional chap - constitutional within the context of the military government. That is, he is a titular head, but he would only act where, say when we have met and taken a decision". Having got what he wanted Ojukwu was not content with the agreement to be an oral one (even though it had been taped). He insisted that “we must write it down in our decisions quite categorically that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government shall be vested in the Supreme Military Council because previously it had been vested in the Supreme Commander”. The reason for this nuanced request from Ojukwu is that Gowon was now the Supreme Commander. By vesting official authority in the SMC (of which Ojukwu was a member) rather than the Supreme Commander Gowon, Ojukwu could ensure that no official decisions could be taken without his consent. To signify the limited powers that would be exercised by the Head of State envisaged, Ojukwu proposed that the diluted phrase "Commander-in-Chief" should be used to address the Head of State as opposed to "Supreme Commander" (a phrase signifying immense power). The title "Commander-in-Chief" has been employed by every Nigerian Head of State subsequent to Aburi.
 
While the other delegates arrived at Aburi with a simple, but unformulated idea that somehow, Nigeria must stay together, "Ojukwu was the only participant who knew what he wanted, and he secured the signatures of the SMC to documents which would have had the effect of turning Nigeria into little more than a customs union".[2] Ojukwu managed to get virtually everything he wanted, and was so pleased by his success that he even declared that he would serve under Gowon if he (Gowon) kept to the agreements reached. At that point, Gowon arose from his table position and embraced Ojukwu.
 
The fulcrum of the agreement at Aburi was that each region would be responsible for its own affairs, and that the FMG would be responsible for matters that affected the entire country: a simple enough concept. Afterwards the officers toasted their reconciliation and agreement with champagne. The federal delegation's jubilation was such that on his plane flight home, Ojukwu asked one of his secretaries whether the federal delegation had fully understood the implications of what had been agreed. Hindsight tells us that no one at Aburi (other than Ojukwu) really understood the constitutional implications of what had been agreed. Ojukwu was obviously delighted with this - hence why he was in such a hurry to implement the decisions taken, and why the Federal Government had to renege on them. Some have argued that Ojukwu took the SMC for a ride by using his superior intelligence to trap the SMC officers into an agreement they did not understand. Ojukwu was engaged in a constitutional debate by himself against five military officers, and two police officers, yet still got his way. He can hardly be faulted for outwitting opponents that outnumbered him by seven to one. Questions might be asked of the other SMC members of greater numerical strength who allowed Ojukwu to extract such substantial concessions from them.
 
A CONSTITUTION IN WAITING
 
By failing to implement the Aburi decisions, Nigeria missed a golden opportunity to find a constitutional arrangement acceptable to all of its constituent parts. Had even half of the Aburi accords being ratified, Nigeria may have saved itself a substantial amount of the subsequent bloodshed that ensued over the next four decades. It is a sad commentary on the lack of progress that Nigeria has made since Aburi that the issues discussed then (over 40 years ago years ago) are still being argued over today. Back in 1967, the Aburi decisions were not implemented for one primary reason: oil. Nigeria's greedy power brokers did not want a loose constitutional arrangement that would deprive them of the vast revenues which Nigeria earns from its crude oil exports. Hence Nigeria is glued together under a powerful central government of a type more suitable to a country with contiguous ethnicity. Nigeria is quite simply too large, too diverse, and too fractious a country to have an all powerful central government of the type it has today. Across Nigeria, there are groups agitating for greater devolvement of federal power to the regions. Although the mantra of these groups is "restructuring" of the Nigerian federation - what they really intend is what Ojukwu wanted to achieve at the Aburi conference in 1967: a constitutional arrangement that would devolve so much power to the regions that the entity known as Nigeria would exist in name only.
 
Rather than engaging in another constitutional drafting/conference exercise at which will waste more taxpayers' money, and serve as a means for corrupt "big men" to get even richer, Nigeria would do well to dip into its archives and review the transcript of the debate at Aburi which is gathering dust in the national archives. The debate transcript is sufficiently detailed to serve as a constitution in waiting. To learn from the debates and mistakes of the past may ensure a better future for Nigeria. What Nigeria needs is a "constitutional chap" of the type envisaged by Ojukwu back at Aburi. As Ojukwu said “It is better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we move closer and perish in the collision.”
 
 
*The above article is an extract from a forthcoming book by the author.