Yakubu Gowon

The surrender @ Amichi. 2nd left is General Philip Effiong (Head of State of Biafra), 3rd left is Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo (GOC 3rd Marine Commando).

Surrender @ Amichi. General Philip Effiong (Head of State of Biafra)takes a piece of kolanut

End of the civil war

General Yakubu Gowon & General Philip Effiong (the last Head of State of Biafra) shake hands @ Dodan Barracks.

Vice Admiral Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters)

General Yakubu Gowon commissioning the Kainji Dam in 1969. Behind him are Vice Admiral Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters) & Justice (Sir) Adetokunboh Ademola (Chief Justice of Nigeria).

(L-R) Col U.J Esuene (Governor, South Eastern State), Navy Capt Alfred Diette-Spiff (Governor, Rivers State), Col David Bamigboye (Governor, Kwara State), Gen Yakubu Gowon (Head of State & Commander in Chief) during Gowon's visit to Kwara in 1973

General Yakubu Gowon (Head of State & Commander in Chief)





In his independence day speech, General Yakubu Gowon announced that his promised hand over date of October 1st 1976 was no longer feasible. This along with tensions between the war time commanders, who felt they had not benefited much from Gowon’s regime and the “political” soldiers, particularly the governors, who were seen as corrupt, led to the coup that was to remove General Gowon from power.

The coup was led by Colonel Joseph Nanven Garba, Lieutenant Colonel Shehu Musa Yar’Adua and Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed. Colonel Garba was critical to the success of the coup. He was close to Gowon & was the Commander, Brigade of Guards. Many sources claim that Colonel (later Major General) Joseph Nanven Garba (deceased) was distantly related to Gowon maternally. However, while Garba acknowledged the fact that his maternal grandfather originated from a village two miles from Gowon’s aboriginal village in Angas, then Benue-Plateau State, he never – according to him - actually confirmed the said relationship. On his father’s side, he was Langtang, also from then Benue-Plateau State. As a lieutenant in November 1964, Garba was originally handpicked (by then Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon) from the 4th battalion in Ibadan, to the Federal Guards Company where he became the second-in-command to Major Donatus Okafor. He later left the Federal Guards, but was reposted there as second in command, after the January 1966 coup, when northern soldiers refused to accept the authority of Major B. Ochei, a Midwest Igbo-speaking officer. After the July 29, 1966 coup, Garba assumed the command of the unit formally (on August 16th). The Federal Guards became the Brigade of Guards and Colonel Garba became one of the officers principally responsible for General Gowon’s security. He was instrumental (along with then Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed) in selecting the former residence of the late first republic Defence Minister, Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu, as the new residence of the new C-in-C within the Dodan Barracks perimeter. It would have been difficult for any coup to succeed without the coupists infiltrating the Brigade of Guards.

The coup plotters decided that they were not going to take control of government, but rather, they would rather hand over power to the trio of Brigadier Murtala Muhammed (commissioner for communications), Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo (commissioner for works) and Brigadier T.Y Danjuma (G.O.C. 3rd Division).

Joseph Garba and Shehu Musa Yar’Adua convinced Brigadier Muhammed to support the coup.

According to late Major General JN Garba:

‘Lieutenant Colonel Shehu Yar’Adua and I went to his house one evening to talk to him about it, and found him reciting Koranic verses to the accompaniment of tapes pre-recorded for the purpose. He was in the middle of one of them and barely acknowledged our presence. We waited in silence for some forty minutes, until the tape had finished. I had not been to his house for a long time, indeed, not since 1969. And even though I had been responsible for reconciling him with General Gowon in 1972, which led subsequently to his appointment as Commissioner of Communications in the 1974 cabinet reshuffle, he and I maintained only a correct relationship, despite our having been very close in the days leading to the July 1966 coup. He and Shehu Yar’Adua, however, had a closer relationship, and I therefore left the talking to Shehu.’

"When Yar’Adua finished speaking, I interjected a few words in amplification. He looked at us steadily for some moments, and then said,

“I have no intention of taking up arms for Nigeria again. Gowon is too far gone, and I would as soon let him stew in his own juice. If you boys want to stage a coup, which I agree is long overdue, I will not stop you. However, I reject your offer to be Head of State. Indeed, I refuse to have anything to do with it. But since I believe your motives are correct, the only undertaking I will give you is, should you fail, and anyone wants to execute you, I would do my utmost to save your necks.”

With that he went back to reading his Koran. After some moments we left, Yar’Adua saying to me not to worry; he would try to make him come around. He must have done a good job, because eventually Murtala gave his tacit approval, wanting, however, to be distant from the events. Though he was told all of the details and time, etc, he arranged to be out of the country, and was thus in London when the coup actually took place. The only aircraft we allowed to land on that morning was the one carrying him back to Lagos via Kano where he deplaned.’

Colonel Taiwo went to Danjuma’s house in Jos on July 28, catalogued a long list of complaints, particularly Gowon’s alleged chronic vacillation, and concluded:
“Sir, we have decided to take over the Government.”
He then named the officers involved in the plot and assured the Brigadier that there would be no bloodshed. The three pillars upon which plotters based their confidence that there would be no bloodshed were that
General Gowon was outside Nigeria,
Colonel JN Garba, Commander, Brigade of Guards was in the plot, and
Brigadier TY Danjuma, GOC, 3rd Division, civil war hero, one of the doyens of the middle belt officer corps and one of the three musketeers of July 1966 (Mohammed, Danjuma, Adamu) would not oppose the coup.
As Taiwo put it,
“Sir, we don’t want you to do anything but we do not want you to go against us because we are sure that the moment it is announced that you are not with us there will be trouble.”
Danjuma’s primary concerns - driven by his unpleasant experiences in July 1966 and thereafter - were that there should be no bloodshed by those executing the coup and, importantly, he would not personally take operational part in it.
While Taiwo was still chatting with the Brigadier, Colonel JN Garba phoned from Lagos to confirm that Taiwo had indeed notified Danjuma of the coup, scheduled to begin in a matter of hours. The following conversation occurred:
Danjuma: ‘Make sure there is no bloodshed. Let me make this clear, I will do nothing to stop you, but I will not join you.’

Garba: ‘Sir, we do not need your help, all that we want is for you to do nothing.’
The coupists then recruited key personnel that would be needed in staging their coup. Shehu Musa Yar’Adua was particularly effective in this.

For example, Gowon’s Chief Security Officer at the time (and Deputy Inspector General of Police in charge of E Department “Special Branch), Alhaji MD Yusuf recalls that:

“You know, Shehu (Yar’Adua) would talk to you for two hours, beating about the bush, going around, unless you know exactly what he is doing it is only after his departure, when you put it altogether, that you discover what he is trying to say. He never came out openly to say we are planning a coup and could you help us. No, only, this is going on, going round and round. And this is what all of them were saying. “

However, when recruitment began, information about the coup leaked. The coupists had to adopt extra security measures and also planted their own fake coup stories in order to confuse General Gowon.

When, about two weeks before General Gowon left for the OAU summit in Kampala, MD Yusuf approached him again with very specific and credible information about Colonel JN Garba, Yusuf recalls that Gowon said,

'Look, have you joined this group of coup scares and all that?'

In the opinion of the veteran Special Branch officer, Gowon reacted in this manner,

“Because he obviously had heard this over and over again. And he believed that it was a coup story and that I had joined. I said 'No, it would have been alright for me but Garba, who is your real guard, is right in it. So that is why I am telling you.'

But MD Yusuf had good reason to be very concerned. In addition to his civilian sources, one or more of the military planners had directly approached him to say that a coup was in the offing. He did not know what to make of such a blatant leak, except to conclude that it may have been a sentinel warning to Gowon, for old time’s sake, to make what changes were necessary to avert the putsch. The other possibility, ofcourse, is that one or more of the plotters was making contingency plans in case the coup failed. In that scenario the plotter could always claim to have reported the plot. Yusuf mentioned it to then Federal Commissioner for Works, then Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo, who, after an FEC meeting, apparently crosschecked with Gowon to see if he had heard the story. According to Obasanjo, Gowon reassured him that he had the situation under control.

MD Yusuf did not stop at that. Before Gowon left for Kampala he approached him again with a suggestion:

“I tried to get him to do something before he left. One of the complaints was lack of promotion. A lot of officers. And at that time they had already decided who to promote, to go ahead with the promotions. I went to him, I said I have heard you have promoted - release the list, at least it will buy you time, it will disrupt these coup plotters and lift those who are making it to gain promotion, will feel 'look I have got promotion now, should we really go along?' Just to buy time. But he said no, there was a procedure which we do. And that was it.”

MD Yusuf also volunteered to confront Colonel JN Garba personally about the plot, so as to convince Gowon to take action. But Gowon opted to do so himself. Hence, before leaving for Kampala on July 27th, he asked Garba about it directly and Garba, once again, denied. In response Gowon reportedly told him:

“If you are plotting, let it be on your conscience and let it be without bloodshed. I must go to Kampala anyway.”

On July 25th, the first lady, Mrs. Victoria Gowon left Nigeria for London. Her husband had not wanted her to leave until he returned from Kampala but she insisted, fearing that she might miss the summer sales at upscale London stores. In that era, as it remains to this day, many members of Nigeria’s consumerist elite routinely traveled to the UK on “summer holidays.” Before Mrs. Gowon left, Army Chief of Staff Major General DA Ejoor also left the country on vacation, as did a few military Governors, including Brigadier Samuel Ogbemudia of the Midwest who cited medical reasons. While Ejoor was away, Brigadier Martin Adamu - one of the three musketeers of July 1966 - acted in his stead.
On July 27, 1975, General Gowon discovered at the Ikeja airport in Lagos that he had forgotten an important briefcase containing documents relevant to the OAU conference at hand. His initial desire was to have his ADC, Lt. Col. William Godang Walbe, return to Dodan Barracks to pick it up prior to departure for Kampala. But the Chief of Staff, SHQ, Vice Admiral Wey, advised against any delays that might violate protocol. Plans were made, therefore, for Walbe to return to Nigeria from Uganda after dropping the General off, ostensibly to pick it up. But, as will be evident later on, there was more in Gowon’s mind than merely picking up a briefcase.
Following departure ceremonies, General Gowon’s executive aircraft, piloted by Nigeria Airways Captains Thahal and Nnaji taxied to take position for take-off. He had no idea that it would be very many years before he would return to his homeland. He had believed Colonel JN Garba’s denials but still felt there was something to the coup rumour and privately considered options for a quick return from Kampala to crush any attempt.

Nevertheless, because Gowon did not share his internal anxieties with others, key elements of his regime were not forewarned to be in a coup-busting mood. He did not contact GOCs in other parts of the country, did not confine soldiers to barracks, and gave no clear-cut instructions about what various officers and formations should do in the event of a coup attempt. Not long after Gowon’s aircraft left, a large delegation of senior officers, led by Major General Hassan Katsina, deputy Chief of Staff SHQ, departed for Kano to take part in a Polo tournament. Among the officers concerned were at least two State Governors, Brigadiers Johnson and Rotimi of Lagos and Western State respectively.

According to Alhaji MD Yusuf,
“I knew what they were doing, who they were using. They said they were going to do it tonight. But at about three or four o'clock, I got wind of it. So I told Garba, 'Look if you are going to make a coup, don't just say you are going to do it at this and this hour. I know.' Later on, he kept asking me, how did I know. And I told him: "I have no authority to investigate the army under our code. But I told you, if you talk to one civilian, then I will know. And that is what happened. You spoke to a civilian. And that is how I know. “
But unknown to Yusuf at the time, something else happened at about 3 pm that day. The executive jet that had taken General Gowon to Kampala the day before flew back into the country and landed at Ikeja airport with one passenger – Lt. Col. WG Walbe - Gowon’s ADC. He supposedly had come to fetch the so-called brief case Gowon allegedly forgot. But in Walbe’s possession was a letter from General Gowon to Vice Admiral Wey, written on an East African Airways Letterhead:
“Just to let you know that we arrived safely and we had a good journey right through and we also had a great welcome from Field Marshall Idi who was openly delighted to see us.

I forgot my briefcase and I am sending William to fetch it. If you therefore have any message please send it through him.

My regards to all other colleagues.

Yours Aye,

Y. Gowon (sgd)”
What Gowon actually intended was for Walbe to sneak into Lagos, lie low, get information about any impending putsch from Wey, and then return quickly to Kampala to fetch him if there was trouble. But, the time factor aside, perhaps illustrative of the fatal flaw in Gowon’s contingency plan, Walbe was supposed to help Garba contain any such coup – confirming that Gowon was totally taken in by Garba’s pledge of loyalty. Walbe, nonetheless, unaware of the true seriousness of the coup rumors went to play tennis upon arrival in Lagos – even though something quite strange had transpired at the airport when he arrived. Lt. Col. Muktar Mohammed of the NAF ordered the executive jet parked and secured by Air Police in the air force area of the airport instead of the VIP tarmac. This action was in furtherance of the coup, which had practically begun. Not long after, unsurprisingly, both Garba and Ochefu became aware of Walbe’s presence in the country.

Extra security was provided at the home of Brigadier Murtala Mohammed in Ikoyi. At dawn, a special aircraft would be dispatched from Lagos carrying NAF Colonel Dan Suleiman, NAF Lt. Col. Muktar Mohammed, and Army Colonel Inua Wushishi first to Kano to bring General Hassan Katsina and other Gowon regime personalities back to Lagos from the Polo tournament. Then, subsequently, the same aircraft was to fly around the country to pick up senior military officers from various formations for a planned meeting later that afternoon in Lagos where the new triumvirate was to be anointed by the putschists.
Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed, who also contacted Brigadier Murtala Mohammed in London to confirm that he would be on the next flight home, formally notified Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo of the putsch. It would appear that he was a major source of information on events of that night – and perhaps even before then - for the Police Special Branch. MD Yusuf recalled that,
‘That night, one of the plotters told me, 'Look, I'm going to [speak with] Murtala. We are going to ask Murtala to take over. But if he refuses, we are going to ask Obasanjo. And I am going to Obasanjo now to tell him our plans. This was the actual night of the coup after Gowon had gone.‘
Meanwhile Obasanjo has confirmed that Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed, Director of Military Intelligence, did in fact come to see him at about 10:45 pm. and said,
“Sir, there will be a coup tonight.”
Obasanjo says he replied,
‘Please endeavour to make it bloodless, disrupt normal life for the public as little as possible and let General Gowon return home after the whole thing has died down, if he so desires.’
But after Abdullahi Mohammed left, a jittery Obasanjo quickly drove to the house of MD Yusuf ostensibly to report the visit of Colonel Mohammed to whom he had just offered ideas on how the coup should be carried out. He met a small group of federal civil servants there. It later became apparent to Obasanjo that it was actually MD Yusuf, Gowon’s Chief Security Officer, who gave Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed - one of the putschists - Obasanjo’s phone number and even described the way to his house!
Meanwhile Garba and Ochefu returned to Garba’s house to meet Walbe and clarify the purpose of his return to Nigeria. It was the moment of truth. According to Elaigwu, Garba formally notified Walbe that ‘he no longer had anything to do with Gowon and that he was not ready to have himself killed because of General Gowon.’ At that point Garba wanted to place Walbe under arrest but was dissuaded from doing so by Ochefu. Instead Garba told Walbe that he would visit him at his home later. Walbe, therefore, left and went home. Once home he called Brigadier Martin Adamu, acting Army Chief of Staff, to report what he had just heard. Adamu’s reaction was to advise him to call back when Garba showed up.
However, when Garba showed up just before midnight he was with three Landrover loads of soldiers in full combat outfit. He walked into Walbe’s home armed and lay his gun down on the carpet. According to reports, he may have been tipsy, having fired himself up for the night’s operations. He reminded Walbe of their long years of association together going all the way back to the Nigerian military school (NMS) in the late fifties. Then, in the presence of Walbe’s spouse, he asked Walbe to abandon Gowon and join the conspiracy.
Walbe reacted incredulously, accusing Garba of betrayal. ‘If our friendship goes all the way back to NMS why did you need to bring your weapon into my living room?’ (Other sources claim that Garba had heard an unconfirmed rumor that Walbe had signed for a weapon when he arrived earlier that day from Kampala). Walbe then told Garba that the situation ‘was like a man’s wife waiting for him to go into the shower and then with his back turned, fully naked, and the water running she shows up with a gun aimed at him.’ ‘Why’, Walbe asked, ‘did you not try this when we were in town? ‘ Evidently, the conversation was going nowhere, and so Garba left for a rendezvous with Ochefu. Meanwhile putschists had cut selected telephone lines at midnight and Walbe found that he could no longer get Martin Adamu on the phone. Shortly thereafter, Garba returned to invite Walbe to the Officers Mess for a purported meeting with Martin Adamu, TY Danjuma, Ochefu and other prominent middle belt officers who allegedly either signed or were not planning to resist the coup. This confused Walbe because the kind of names that were being dropped were, in his view then, unlikely to be involved but if involved would portend an army-wide exercise. So he went along for the ride. On arrival at the Mess, he was detained. Ochefu was the only officer there. Walbe had been tricked.

In Kampala, Ugandan President Idi Amin called Gowon to the high table and gave him a note, which contained the news that he had been deposed in a coup. Gowon reportedly read the note and, in response to an inquiry from Amin, said the situation would become clearer as the day wore on. Apparently, this initial note did not specify the identity of the radio announcer in Lagos. Privately, Gowon was still thinking Colonel Garba was on his side and that no coup would succeed without fierce resistance from the elite brigade of guards. He was wrong.

He returned to his seat (next to Alhaji Usman Faruk). Gowon then quietly told the Governor, in Hausa,

“Abinde mu ka jin soro, ya faru agida”

This means, in English,

“What we have been afraid of at home, has happened.”

He then consoled Faruk, who was shattered by the news, saying,

“I have a clear conscience. There is nothing to worry about.”
Later, a presidential aide wearing agbada entered the conference center via a side-door, made his way to the General and whispered some information into his ears. It was at that point that Gowon got up, acknowledged the Chairman (Idi Amin), and departed from the conference room, straight for his hotel room. It was apparent by now that the officer who announced that he had been deposed was none other than Colonel JN Garba himself, Commander, Brigade of Guards, who repeated his pledge of loyalty just before Gowon left the country. Clearly, things were a lot more complicated than he had thought.

In his hotel room, General Gowon asked if the announcement from Lagos was the only announcement from Nigeria.

“What about Kaduna?”

“What about Ibadan?”

“What about Jos?”

The answer was the same. No counter-announcement was heard from any of the headquarters (at that time) of the Army’s Infantry Divisions. There was no news of fighting.

In the meantime, although all airports were closed, a commercial aircraft carrying Brigadier Murtala Mohammed back from London was allowed to land at the Kano International Airport.

Confident that the putsch had succeeded nationwide – and that no negative reaction was forthcoming from the Guards Brigade - Colonels Garba and Ochefu released Lt. Col Walbe from Dodan Barracks. They – along with other putschists - then turned their attention to the next phase of the operation – incorporating a wider swath of officers in the military and public servants in the unarmed segments of the bureaucracy. To do this, they sent signals declaring their intention to summon what can best be described as a “military convention” in Lagos at which the new leadership – supposedly excluding themselves – would presumably be chosen.
At 0900 hours, therefore, an aircraft left Lagos to bring senior officers (including service chiefs) to Lagos. It hopped from airport to airport gathering officers all over the country. Meanwhile Garba listened to himself on radio repeatedly and drove around Lagos inspecting points of deployment. He returned to the Radio Station several times – at one point engaging one of the young officers there in conversation about the officer’s concern that there were too few soldiers on guard at the station. This officer, then 2/Lt. Garba Ismaila, (who was not from the middle belt) having finally realized what he had been “innocently” deployed to the radio station to do became alarmed at the prospect of counter-attack. Colonel JN Garba, who had more inside information about the big picture, was not too concerned – or did not appear so in the adrenergic state he was in. Lt. Col. Ibrahim Babangida had deployed additional Armoured vehicles from Ikeja to Dodan Barracks in expectation of the arrival of senior officers. And Radio Nigeria was just across the road.

Meanwhile, then Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo had lost his appetite. According to him,

“I sent for newspapers and I kept myself busy by reading every print including the small advertisements.”

Obasanjo kept checking in with MD Yusuf about the security situation in the country and was re-assured - repeatedly - that the nationwide deployment of soldiers overnight had been peaceful. At 1500 hours (3 pm), Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed and Lt. Col. Shehu Yar’Adua, two of the original “three musketeers of July 1975”, (the third being Colonel Taiwo), walked into Obasanjo’s house. They invited him for the planned meeting of senior officers scheduled for 1600 hours (4 pm) at Dodan Barracks – but took some time to sound him out on his views about the situation in the country. Col. Abdullahi Mohammed made a slip of tongue and told Obasanjo to “help us put some of these ideas into practice” which prompted Yar’Adua to interrupt him. The plan had not been to betray any specifics about the proposed new leadership. Such information in the wrong hands at the wrong time could spell trouble. (Not even Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, who had been tapped in April as the new leader was told of certain intended changes in the way the country was to be run after the coup).

Nevertheless, Obasanjo, wearing mufti, drove himself unarmed in his private vehicle to Dodan Barracks. According to him there were some officers there before him and “Nobody asked the other any question on what had happened but the atmosphere was jovial, cordial and tension-free.”

Morning break.

Oops! I forgot to list the names of the Idejo families (who refused to sign the Lagos Treaty of Cessation) and the parts of Lagos they owned.

The Idejo families include

Oniru - they owned Iru (present day Victoria Island & Maroko)

Onikoyi - they owned Ikoyi

Ojora - they owned Ijora

Oluwa - they owned Oluwa (present day Apapa)

Oloto - they owned Oto

Onitolo & Aromire families - together they owned Idumota

Onisiwo _ they owned Tarkwa Bay & Ogogoro village

Will go back and modify that post.

naptu2: Major Isaac Adaka Boro

My uncle, the Military-Minded Nigga .

Lesson: never be pals with people who have always wanted you dead from the very first instance. When they were done with him, they wasted him.

General Murtala Ramat Muhammed.



Murtala Muhammed swears in members of the SMC/delivers first speech @ Dodan Barracks


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6CKWGJOGgM

Murtala Mohammed & Professor Bolaji Akinyemi.

Murtala Muhammed

Murtala Muhammed



Just before 8:30 a.m. on February 13, 1976, the following curious announcement was heard on Radio Nigeria:

"Good morning fellow Nigerians,

This is Lt. Col. B. Dimka of the Nigerian Army calling.
I bring you good tidings. Murtala Muhammed's deficiency has been detected. His government is now overthrown by the young revolutionaries. All the 19 military governors have no powers over the states they now govern. The states affairs will be run by military brigade commanders until further notice.

All commissioners are sacked, except for the armed forces and police commissioners who will be redeployed.

All senior military officers should remain calm in their respective spots. No divisional commanders will issue orders or instructions until further notice.

Any attempt to foil these plans from any quarters will be met with death.
You are warned, it is all over the 19 states.
Any acts of looting or raids will be death.

Everyone should be calm.
Please stay by your radio for further announcements.
All borders, air and sea ports are closed until further notice.

Curfew is imposed from 6am to 6pm.

Thank you. We are all together."

Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa



Just prior to this broadcast, then Head of State, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, along with his ADC (Lt. Akinsehinwa), Orderly and driver, had been assassinated on his way to work in a thin skinned black Mercedes Benz car without escorts. The unprotected car had slowed down at the junction in front of the Federal Secretariat in Ikoyi, Lagos, when a hit team which allegedly included Lt. William Seri and others, casually strolled up and riddled it with bullets.

Murtala Muhammed's limousine (National Museum, Onikan, Lagos).



[size=14pt]Video: "Dimka's Confession".[/size]

Watch on computer http://­www.facebook.com/­video/­embed?video_id=102009­54389125674


Download on mobile phone www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=1848574137813

The video begins with a shot of the Council. Chambers building at State House Dodan Barracks. There are soldiers in Land Rovers in front of the Council Chambers building. Then a sign is shown, which reads "SUPREME HEADQUARTERS DODAN BARRACKS".

Lieutenant Colonel Suka Bukar Dimka is seated and surrounded by journalists and security operatives. They are all listening to an audio tape being played on a reel to reel tape machine.

We hear Dimka's voice on the tape. He says, "but at least I. . . . .I want to talk. What ever is going to happen to me, I mean, let it happen to me, but I want. . . . . .I wanted to brief you myself. There was just some. . . .some" (inaudible), "Well I didn't have to know" (inaudible). "I thought at this initial stage, I'll continue to allow him to" (inaudible). "Anyway I. . . . .I thank you very much, actually, for having come". "In fact, if there's anybody that enjoys any. . . .any" (inaudible).

Dimka is speaking in the next clip. He says, "Of course, being a soldier, I made it a point of duty that I own. . . I mean, I have an honour to maintain and I believe I have no reason at this stage to lie. So all that you have heard has been my recording. . .personal recording."

The next clip shows a convoy of military trucks arriving the beach. Armed soldiers are seen milling around an armoured car. There's a huge crowd of civillians. Stakes have been erected at the beach in preparation for the executions. A black maria brings the prisoners to the beach. Dimka and the other prisoners are seen as they are being tied to the stake. The video ends.

(L-R) Vice Admiral Michael Adelanwa (Chief of Naval Staff), Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters), General Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State & Commander in Chief), Lieutenant General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (Chief of Army Staff), Air Vice Marshall John Yisa Doko (Chief of Air Staff) and Alhaji Muhammed Dikko Yusuf (Inspector General of Police).



On the morning of the 13th of January 1976 General Murtala Ramat Muhammed was assassinated when a hit squad submachine gunned his Mercedes Benz Limousine as it slowed down at the junction of Bank Rd and Ikoyi Rd. Other hit teams simultaneously went after other key functionaries of the regime's troika, namely the Chief of Staff, SHQ, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. T. Y. Danjuma. The Military Governors of Kwara and Oyo States, Colonels Ibrahim Taiwo and David Jemibewon, respectively, were also targeted.

Taiwo, who had been the national coordinator of the July 1975 coup that brought Mohammed to power, was abducted and killed by a team led by Major K. K. Gagara. Jemibewon, whose name had been added to the list of targets by Lt. Col T. K. Adamu, merely because Adamu "did not like his face", escaped.

General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) has written that he was late in leaving home that day on account of a visit by Brigadier Olu Bajowa to get a name for his new baby. When it became apparent that there was trouble, Obasanjo executed an escape and evasion manoeuvre, spent most of the day at the house of a civilian friend in Ikoyi monitoring the situation by telephone, but later emerged to become the Head of State. His would be assassins mistook then Colonel Dumuje for him along Awolowo road in Lagos, seriously wounding that officer.

That morning, General Danjuma followed his usual route at the usual time, 7:30 a.m., which route consisted of leaving his home by car for the Chief of Naval Staff’s Jetty at Queen’s Drive, where he would board a launch which would take him to the Ministry of Defence Jetty at the Marina. From there he would usually walk across the road into his office in Army Headquarters.

On this morning he found Col. Bali and the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Adelanwa, awaiting him at Queens Drive. They rode together to the Marina without incident and reached their offices without any sign of unusual movements.

He was busy reading his newspapers in the office at a few minutes past eight when Col. Bali came in and asked him if he had heard what happened. When he said he had not, Col. Bali then told him that there had been a voice over the radio announcing that there had been a coup. The first thing that General Danjuma asked for was a radio, since he did not usually keep one in his office. A radio was brought in and a number of other officers came in to the office to listen. As soon as he heard the announcement he sent for then Col. Ibrahim Babangida. Ibrahim Babangida and Domkat Bali were two particularly efficient officers who had served with General Danjuma during the war.

General Danjuma told Col. Babangida who was commanding the Recce Squadron to get to Ikeja where his armoured cars were parked and secure his unit as swiftly as he could. As he was about to leave, General Danjuma further suggested to him that he should go on a motorcycle, since the roads were said to be clogged with traffic. This instruction had another tactical advantage in that any of the coup participants looking out for loyal soldiers would hardly have expected to find them on the pillion seats of motorcycles.

After Babangida left, General Danjuma received a phone call from Col. Muhammadu Buhari, the Governor of Bornu State. Col. Buhari was trying to call the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, General Obasanjo, but he had been put on to the wrong office. General Danjuma asked him if he had heard what had happened and he replied that he had not. General Danjuma briefed him on what he had heard on the radio and also told him that he had rung Dodan Barracks and discovered that General Muhammed had not reached his office, even though he had ascertained from General Muhammed’s wife that he had left home. Col. Buhari’s only comment was “I hope they haven’t killed him”. General Danjuma instructed him to contact the Brigade Commander in his area immediately and secure loyalty there and make sure that no one left the barracks in the town.

The next phone call that came into his office was from General Bisalla. He asked General Danjuma if he had heard what had happened. General Danjuma said that he had heard, but that all would soon be under control. General Bisalla simply hung up the phone. It was later learnt that on replacing the phone he turned to a top civil servant who was standing next to him and commented, “So this is how people ruin one’s career”. His office was just above General Danjuma’s in the Ministry of Defence Building.
Immediately after this call, General Danjuma, on the advice of Colonel Bali, moved his headquarters to Bonny Camp.

Colonel Babangida got to Ikeja Cantonment and secured his armoured vehicles. Supported by these vehicles he proceeded to Radio Nigeria, where he had a conversation with his close friend Dimka. Dimka's initial reaction to Babangida's arrival was to ask him if he came to play "Chukwuma and Nwawo" with him; drawing a historical parallel with the negotiations between Colonel Conrad Nwawo (on behalf of Ironsi) and Major Patrick Nzeogwu in Kaduna in January 1966. However, Dimka got concerned with the presence of armored vehicles in the background and asked them to be withdrawn.

But it turns out that Babangida's orders had not been to negotiate a surrender or other outcome, but to stop the broadcast - by any means necessary - including destruction by shelling. When he made contact with Bonny Camp to report his activities at the radio station, this order was reiterated to him by General Danjuma, incredulous that a conversation with Dimka had even occurred and that the radio station was still playing Dimka's broadcast. A brief but fierce fire fight (reportedly led by Major Chris Ugokwe) subsequently dislodged the coup plotters from the station.

When shooting started Dimka simply walked away, past all the soldiers surrounding the building as well as driving through numerous checkpoints on his way, first to Jos and then eventually to Abakaliki where he was captured by Police in the company of a woman of easy virtue.

Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State of Nigeria) & Jimmy Carter (President of the United States).

Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo (Head of State of Nigeria), Mr Andrew Young (American ambassador @ the UN) and Major General Joseph Nanven Garba (foreign minister of Nigeria)

www.nairaland.com/attachments/829717_Obasanjo_jpgc0f000b40b2a6c700ed35b4b1665a52e

nagoma:

How does a Nigerian look? What about Obasanjo ? Did he look Nigerian?

Obasanjo looks proper Nigerian, there's nothing more Nigerian than ninja turtle head shape, big ar.se nose, and big lips lol...

Ahmadu Bello on the other hand had a Tuareg look, he looked more like someone from Niger, Chad, or Mali(no pun intended)...

Olusegun Obasanjo, Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida & Saninegeria Abacha

US President Jimmy Carter at Dodan Barracks, inspecting a gaurd of honour, mounted by officers and men of the Gaurds Brigade, during his state visit to Nigeria in April 1978.




www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/1978/d040378t.pdf

My Nigerian heroes are:

- Obafemi Awolowo...
- Christopher Okigbo...
- Wole Soyinka...
- Kaduna Nzeogwu...
- Fela Kuti...
- Chief FRA Williams...
- Chief Anthony Enahoro...

Great men of honour!!!

U.S. President, Jimmy Carter & General Olusegun Obasanjo (during Carter's visit to Nigeria)

U.S. President, Jimmy Carter & (Nigerian) Brigade of Guard Commander, Colonel Mohammed Magoro. (Apapa Port, Lagos.April 1978)

naptu2: Oops! I forgot to list the names of the Idejo families (who refused to sign the Lagos Treaty of Cessation) and the parts of Lagos they owned.

The Idejo families include

Oniru - they owned Iru (present day Victoria Island & Maroko)

Onikoyi - they owned Ikoyi

Ojora - they owned Ijora

Oluwa - they owned Oluwa (present day Apapa)

Oloto - they owned Oto

Onitolo & Aromire families - together they owned Idumota

Onisiwo _ they owned Tarkwa Bay & Ogogoro village

Will go back and modify that post.

Oni is an Ijebu kingship title.

Is the Idejo family an Ijebu family??

Jimmy Carter



Jimmy Carter at Dodan Barracks in 1978 (video).

http://www.facebook.com/video/embed?video_id=10200843820721533

The first visit of a US president to Sub-Saharan Africa.

The video opens with a panoramic view of the grounds of State House Ribadu Road (aka Dodan Barracks) and the massed ranks of officers and men of the Brigade of Guards. You can see the real Dodan (army) Barracks in the distance (brown and white buildings).

The video shows President Carter arriving Dodan Barracks for the welcoming ceremonies.
Riding in the limousine with President and Mrs. Carter is General Joseph Garba. At that time, Joseph Garba was Nigeria’s foreign minister. After retiring from the army, General Garba would go on to serve as Nigeria’s representative at the United Nations. He served as President of the UN General Assembly in 1990.

General Garba previously served as Commander of the Brigade of Guards when General Gowon was Head of State.

President Carter is received by Lt Gen Obasanjo and introduced to Nigerian officials.

The two heads of state receive the 21 gun salute and the national salute (Star Spangled Banner and Arise O’ Compatriots). A line of Nigerian officials is shown during the rendition of the anthems. The officials include Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters), Lt Gen T.Y Danjuma (Chief of Army Staff), Vice Admiral Michael Adelanwa (Chief of Naval Staff), Air Vice Marshall John Yisa Doko (Chief of Air Staff) and Alhaji Muhammed Dikko Yusuf (Inspector General of Police).

President Carter, accompanied by his (US) ADC and the parade commander, inspects the troops.

Short clips of speeches by President Carter and Lt Gen Obasanjo.

There is then a very brief shot of the Council Chamber at State House Ribadu Road.

The US President is then shown at the Cenotaph at Tafawa Balewa Square. The guards play the Last Post and the President lays a wreath at the tomb of The Unknown Soldier.

Finally, there is a shot of Marina. President Carter stayed at State House Marina during his visit. It’s an interesting shot because you can see Marina before the Outer Ring Road was built. This was back when Marina had a sandy beach, instead of the concrete structures that are there at the moment. This was even before NECOM House (Net Building) was built.

Rosalyn & Amy Carter @ the National Museum, Onikan, Lagos.

Brigadier Muhammadu Buhari & Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo.

Olusegun Obasanjo (circa 1979)