₦airaland Forum

EKONGKING:
Obi will get even less votes than last time . The fight is going to be between Tinubu and Atiku .

If u believe otherwise than ponzi schemes are best for you .

You are very correct. Obi will not win Osun, Obi will not win Lagos and he won't win the FCT. People who wanted to vote for Tinubu in the South East were intimidated in 2023 but the confidence of such people had grown. So more people in the East will vote for Tinubu this time

Kobojunkie:
Surat Yunus vs 93 - 104 are not in the Quran? Quran 7 vs 157 is not found in the Quran? Are we really playing this game now? 😒

The Quran mentions the Tawrah and Injeel several times, while it goes on to directly contradict both the Torah and Injeel over and over. It also contains stories that directly contradict the stories contained in the Tanakh and the Psalms.😒

So Surat is the Bible. You are quoting Al Quran, and you call it Bible. I don't seem to understand you

Kobojunkie:
1. I did that! 😒
2. I did that! Islamists claim their beliefs map to the Bible. The inventor of Islam literally made this claim in his Quran. 😒

This isn't true. The Muslims never gave any credibility to the Bible. They never made any references to the Bible in their teachings

Kobojunkie:
Islam literally pretends to reference the Torah and Injeel while at the same time fielding stories that directly contradict everything presented in both the Torah and Injeel.😒😒

. I asked you to mention any group aside from the Christians who base their beliefs on the Bible.

You didn't mention any group that believes based their beliefs on the Bible.

Are Muslims

Maximus692:
If that's how you want to put it at least we know Judas Iscariot betrayed Jesus for money which he never enjoyed.
That's the main point!

The question is never about "betrayed".

Is the Bible contradictory? Logically, you are saying yes! The Bible is contradictory.

Iif the Bible is contradicting, then, why should I trust it?

Dogalmighty17:
You'd need to know that none of the gospels were actually written by the apostles they were named after. And the earliest of them was written 70 years after the death of Jesus. It is hard remembering in detail incidents that happened decades ago. Even more so when the author didn't witness it but is writing based on narratives that were passed down.

The Bible is filled with such contradictions.

You are correct. Unfortunately, most Christians don't even know this

tunene66:
This is an interesting writeup that needs further discussion.
For me, we all can learn from one another.
GOD bless Nigeria

Only if we want and ready

One thing the real estate business does to you is that it makes you move around a lot.

You'll have to relate with area boys.

You'll learn to relate well with community leaders, village youths, owners of the land and everyone.

It means you'll be able to see a lot.

As an igbo guy I know we're hustlers.

Forget am, no one hustles more than us.

We have eyes to see opportunities and when we spot the opportunity we can market it to those who need it.

The goal is to secure the BAG.

That's our special gift.

Because of our culture which is "Aku ruo ulo" (wealth must be brought home for you to be honoured among your people), we have a business culture of chasing money to be honoured at home.

If you check you'll notice that most Igbomen you see out there are hustling hard because he must not be left behind at home.

The south East is highly competitive.

We have age grades and different platforms where people come to show they've arrived.

So for these reasons, the purpose of that his business is to earn him chieftaincy title, mansion built at home , enough wealth to be able to influence things at home and around his kinsmen.

So you'll notice that most of our businesses generate huge cash volumes but lack structure.

No organization that stays even after the man is old and dead.

Most times the moment the business helps him walk out of poverty and he's achieved recognition, he loses interest.

The business dies.

This is our weakness.

THE YORUBA BUSINESSES

Now the Yoruba businessman or woman doesn't hustle like us.

He or she doesn't have that energy.

He or she may not have the eyes to see the opportunities around like we do.

But something makes them different.

Organization .

They're organized.

I watched a video this morning where Chijioke Igwendu was interviewing an igbo Nollywood actor

He asked the Actor why the Yorubas have suddenly taken over the cinemas and Nollywood when it was Igbos who built Nollywood.

The actor said "Yorubas have taken over because they're organized."

That's very correct.

I will give you examples.

If you'll remember those sponsors of Nollywood movies did so because there was an opportunity to make money.

They cashed out and became rich.

The same igbo business approach I am talking about.

But they didn't have a structure that sustained their art even after cinemas and Netflix have come in.

We lost .

The Yoruba entrepreneurs are not interested in speed.

They're interested in longevity and sustainability.

Let me give you an example with real estate companies.

PWAN Group started like 13 years ago

An Igbo company.

Discovered a business model that enabled it to sell lands quickly more than others.

They introduced the network marketing system into selling lands.

They sold out so many estates all over Nigeria.

But they lacked that deep-rooted organizational structures and abilities to sustain the speed.

The same igbo business approach came to play again.

They were interested in the volume of sales and expansion but we're not interested in structure.

When the weight and speed got too much for the system, the company went down.

Now I watched other ones run by Yorubas start.

And how they're being run.

They're not interested in speed or high volumes.

They operate like any tech company in the country today.

The same organization and structures.

Some of them have survived turbulent economy and are still moving

For instance.

We know when Landwey and Redbrick Homes/Amen Estate came in.

I wasn't in real estate then but because I had interest in that sector I was following.

They were not selling as much as PWAN.

They were slow .

They had less sales people.

PWAN had hundreds of thousands because they gave more insensitives.

But Landwey and Redbrick Homes just continued to build on establishing structures and systems.

I remember visiting Landwey head office in 2019, it was like I was in a Typical tech environment.

The same thing with Amen Estate.

They didn't make attempts to spread offices all over Nigeria.

They stayed on one location and selling and developing one estate at a time.

Now you can see that Pwan that captured Lagos, Ibadan, South East and South South is down now

But these ones kept growing gradually and kept developing capabilities and capacities.

PWAN kept selling without giving allocation.

Landwey came in, started selling and allocating immediately and people began to build.

They didn't sell beyond what they couldn't handle.

BOTTOM LINE

This is one lesson I have learnt.

And it has to do with the culture of both ethnic groups.

In our culture you're in a haste to succeed because there is pressure from kinsmen.

The shame of being slow to succeed or failure wakes you up and makes you start looking for sharp alternatives or approaches that makes you arrive quickly.

In our culture your right to speak and your security is in how much influence you have.

Your influence depends on how rich you're.

The Yoruba person on the other hand is not under pressure.

His culture protects him from such pressure.

If he can feed his family and have a roof over his head and is wise, he will still command respect.

Yesterday I went to see the Baale of a community.

A major town in Lagos.

He's not rich.

His house is the poorest house in that area because so many Igbos have come there to build houses .

But the life of the people around there revolve around that small open house.

I just shook my head.

If it was in the East , such a man wouldn't be able to talk in his village.

Even if his father was an igwe and he the son is not rich enough to influence the continuation of the kingship, one rich guy will overthrow him.

And the community will back him up.

Money is your power and right to speak in igboland.

But it's not like that in Yoruba land.

So this lack of pressure gives them time, peace of mind and rest to patiently build businesses that survive times.

Today when you look around you'll notice that it's the Yorubas who build businesses that out-live the founders.

The biggest corporations in the country today are owned by them.

This is a lesson for us .

There is something to learn from the Igbo approach also.

There is something to learn from the Yoruba approach too

If we can combine the two approaches, imagine what businesses we'll build?

Ugoji Maximillian Teacher of systems. Translator of power. Builder of elite mindset. Speaker Author and Entrepreneur. MD, Greenfuture Investments LTD: a real estate investment company that supports Nigerians in the diaspora to make safe and profitable real estate investments.

Copied!

terrezo2002:
Thanks for sharing

👍

It cannot happen in a sane land - Obis

Imalwayshorny:
Peter obi might end up like that

😂

DNA AND OTHER IDENTIFICATION
The United States used multiple methods to establish the identity.
These included biometric comparison and DNA analysis.
The goal was to eliminate the possibility that the dead man was someone else.
The identification was eventually considered conclusive.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE BODY?
The United States faced another unusual problem.
What should be done with bin Laden's remains?
Officials wanted to avoid creating a physical shrine.
They also wanted to follow Islamic burial requirements as closely as possible.
The decision was therefore made to conduct a burial at sea.

1:00 AM EDT — BURIAL AT SEA
According to the CIA's reconstruction, bin Laden's body was buried at sea from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the North Arabian Sea.
This occurred approximately:
12:59 AM EDT, 2 May 2011.

The burial took place within roughly 24 hours of his death.
That ended the physical hunt.

11:35 PM EDT — OBAMA ADDRESSES THE WORLD
Before the burial, President Obama addressed the American people.
At approximately 11:35 PM EDT on 1 May, he announced that Osama bin Laden had been killed in Pakistan.

The announcement came after the United States had confirmed the identity and secured the operation.
The decade-long hunt was publicly over.
BUT THE STORY DIDN'T END THERE
This is often overlooked.
The raid didn't merely kill bin Laden.
It produced an enormous intelligence collection.
THE ABBOTTABAD DOCUMENTS
The United States recovered a huge amount of material.
The CIA later described bin Laden as still being an active leader of al-Qaeda.
He had not simply been sitting in the compound doing nothing.
The documents showed that he continued giving strategic and operational guidance to the organization.

The material was subsequently analyzed by a multi-agency task force.
The CIA later released hundreds of thousands of files recovered from the compound. In 2017 alone, it announced the release of nearly 470,000 additional files.

AN EXTRAORDINARY FINAL TWIST
Later analysis of the recovered documents revealed something remarkable.
Bin Laden was apparently planning to leave the Abbottabad compound.
A January 2011 letter showed that the brothers sheltering him were becoming exhausted by the burden of protecting him.
By February 2011, bin Laden had apparently agreed that the arrangement would eventually change.
The intended move was reportedly planned for September 2011.

That means the United States may have caught him during a relatively narrow window.
Had Obama delayed the operation for several more months, bin Laden might have moved.
The CIA itself has noted that a delay could have produced a very different outcome.

THE ENTIRE HUNT IN ONE CONTINUOUS CHAIN
The most fascinating way to understand the operation is to reduce the entire decade to a chain of intelligence problems:
9/11
↓
America identifies al-Qaeda and bin Laden as the central target.
↓
Afghanistan
↓
The United States invades and destroys the Taliban's control.
↓
Tora Bora
↓
Bin Laden is believed to be trapped.
↓
He escapes.
↓
Pakistan
↓
The direct trail disappears.
↓
Intelligence agencies begin rebuilding the network.
↓
They focus on bin Laden's couriers.
↓
One courier becomes particularly important:
Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti
↓
Years of intelligence collection identify him.
↓
His movements are tracked.
↓
His residence is located.
↓
Abbottabad
↓
The compound looks highly suspicious.
↓
Intelligence analysts conclude that the mysterious third-floor resident could be bin Laden.
↓
But there is no direct confirmation.
↓
Obama is briefed in August 2010.
↓
Months of analysis and surveillance.
↓
Military options are developed.
↓
Life-size replica of compound constructed.
↓
Repeated rehearsals.
↓
Obama weighs risks.
↓
29 April 2011: authorization
↓
1 May 2011: helicopters depart
↓
2 May Pakistan time: assault
↓
One helicopter crashes.
↓
The assault continues.
↓
Bin Laden located
↓
Bin Laden killed
↓
Body recovered.
↓
Identity confirmed.
↓
Intelligence material recovered.
↓
Force extracts.
↓
Body transported.
↓
Burial at sea
↓
Obama announces death
↓
The physical hunt ends.
THE 10-YEAR TIMELINE AT A GLANCE

Date of Major event
11 Sep 2001
9/11 attacks; full-scale hunt begins
12 Sep 2001 onward
CIA/FBI/NSA intensify worldwide search
7 Oct 2001
U.S.-led war in Afghanistan begins
Nov 2001
Kabul falls
Dec 2001
Tora Bora campaign
Dec 2001
Bin Laden escapes the immediate battlefield
2002–03
Hunt shifts toward al-Qaeda networks and couriers
2002 onward
Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti becomes an increasingly important intelligence lead
2004–09
Years of intelligence collection gradually identify the courier
2009–10
Courier's movements lead investigators toward Abbottabad
Aug 2010
Possible bin Laden compound identified and Obama briefed
Sep 2010 onward
Intensive compound analysis
Early 2011
Confidence in target increases; military planning intensifies
Apr 2011
Final planning and rehearsals
29 Apr 2011
Obama authorizes operation
1 May 2011, 1:25 PM EDT
Final execution approval
1:51 PM
Helicopters depart Afghanistan
~3:30 PM
Helicopters arrive at compound
~3:32 PM
White House receives live updates
3:39 PM
Bin Laden located and killed
3:53 PM
Initial positive identification
3:55 PM
Body secured
~4:10 PM
Assault force leaves compound
5:53 PM
Team returns to Afghanistan
7:01 PM
High-probability identification confirmed
11:35 PM
Obama addresses the world
12:59 AM, 2 May
Bin Laden buried at sea
The detailed raid chronology above comes principally from the CIA's later reconstruction.

THE FIVE PHASES OF THE MANHUNT
If you want to understand how America actually found him, rather than simply memorize dates, I would divide the entire operation into five phases.

PHASE 1 — Identification
11 September–October 2001
The U.S. establishes that bin Laden and al-Qaeda are responsible.
PHASE 2 — Battlefield pursuit
October–December 2001
Afghanistan → Taliban collapse → Tora Bora.
PHASE 3 — The disappearance
2002–2006
Bin Laden disappears into the Pakistan-Afghanistan border environment.
The hunt becomes predominantly an intelligence operation.
PHASE 4 — The courier
~2002–2010
The CIA gradually reconstructs the identity and movements of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.
This becomes the breakthrough.
PHASE 5 — Abbottabad
2010–2 May 2011
Courier → compound → intelligence assessment → surveillance → military planning → presidential authorization → raid → identification → burial.
That is the real architecture of the hunt.
The most important lesson
The dramatic part of the story is the 40-minute raid.
But that was actually the smallest part of the operation.
The decisive work happened in the years of intelligence collection and analysis beforehand.
The CIA describes the mission as the culmination of many years of intelligence work, and its later account specifically emphasizes the progression from a courier's pseudonym, to identifying the courier, to finding his residence, to recognizing the extraordinary characteristics of the Abbottabad compound.

In other words:
America didn't find Osama bin Laden by finding Osama bin Laden. It found the people around him, reconstructed his communications system, followed the weakest link in that system, and eventually discovered the physical location in which he had hidden.
And that is why the story is much more interesting than simply “the Navy SEALs raided a house and killed him.”
The raid was the final 40 minutes of a hunt that had begun 3,500+ days earlier

BIN LADEN'S FINAL MOMENTS
Later official accounts established that bin Laden was not carrying a firearm when he was killed, although he resisted the assault and there was a firefight elsewhere during the operation.

This corrected some of the first descriptions released immediately after the raid.
His wife was shot in the leg but survived.
Several other people were killed.

3:53 PM EDT — INITIAL IDENTIFICATION
The assault force had a body.
But the United States still needed to establish beyond reasonable doubt:
Is this actually Osama bin Laden?
The identification process began immediately.

3:55 PM EDT — BODY MOVED
The body was moved to the first floor and placed into a body bag.

The team also began collecting intelligence material from the compound.
This was extremely important.
The operation was no longer merely about killing bin Laden.
The building itself had become an intelligence treasure trove.

3:39–4:10 PM — EXPLOITING THE COMPOUND
During the operation, the assault team collected a substantial quantity of materials.
These included digital and written material that could reveal:
al-Qaeda's structure,
communications,
plans,
relationships,
leadership,
affiliates,
and future intentions.
The CIA later described the recovered material as one of the largest collections of intelligence ever recovered from a single al-Qaeda target.

The intelligence exploitation would continue for years.

4:05 PM — FIRST HELICOPTER DEPARTS
The first helicopter left the compound.

4:08 PM — DESTROYING THE DAMAGED HELICOPTER
Because one helicopter had been disabled, the Americans destroyed it before leaving.
This was intended to prevent sensitive equipment and technology from being left behind.
The remaining personnel moved to the other aircraft.

4:10 PM — EXTRACTION
The backup helicopter picked up the remaining assault team and intelligence materials.
The force left Abbottabad.
The mission had succeeded.

5:53 PM EDT — RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN
The helicopters returned to Afghanistan.
Admiral McRaven met the assault force.
At this point the United States had:
killed bin Laden,
recovered his body,
recovered a large quantity of intelligence,
and successfully extracted the assault force.
The CIA timeline records the return at approximately

5:53 PM EDT.
7:01 PM EDT — HIGH-PROBABILITY IDENTIFICATION
Additional confirmation of bin Laden's identity came in.
The CIA timeline records that Obama received confirmation of a high probability of positive identification at approximately 7:01 PM EDT.

The identification process involved multiple independent methods rather than relying on a single test.

1:51 PM EDT — HELICOPTERS DEPART
The helicopters departed from Afghanistan.
The assault team was heading toward Abbottabad.
The entire hunt had effectively reached its final phase.

THE WHITE HOUSE WATCHES
Inside the White House, Obama and senior officials gathered in the Situation Room.
The famous photograph of Obama, Biden, Hillary Clinton and other officials watching the operation was taken during this period.
Obama sat near Brigadier General Marshall "Brad" Webb, who was coordinating communications.
The room was unusually crowded.
Some officials had to stand.
The President was watching events unfold in real time.

APPROXIMATELY 3:30 PM EDT — THE HELICOPTERS ARRIVE
Pakistan time was approximately:
12:30 AM, 2 May 2011.
The helicopters reached the compound.
One helicopter experienced a serious problem and crashed inside the compound.
This could have destroyed the entire mission.
But the assault force continued.
The CIA's later account says the helicopter's loss did not stop the operation.

This was one of the biggest moments of uncertainty for the people watching from Washington.

3:32 PM EDT — OBAMA RECEIVES UPDATES
The President began receiving near-real-time reports from the operation.
The White House team did not have perfect visibility.
They were receiving fragmented information from the field.
This is why the famous photograph is so striking.
The people in that room were not watching a recorded event.
They were watching a live intelligence/military operation whose outcome was still unknown.
THE ASSAULT
The U.S. team moved through the compound.
There were multiple structures and several families living there.
The assault force encountered armed resistance.
Several adult males were killed.
There were also women and children present.
The official initial account was later corrected in some details as the administration reconstructed what happened. For example, early reports that a woman had been used as a human shield were subsequently clarified.

The operation was designed to capture or kill bin Laden while minimizing civilian casualties.

3:39 PM EDT — BIN LADEN IS FOUND
This is the moment the decade-long hunt effectively ends.
The assault team located bin Laden on the third floor.
He was killed.
According to the CIA's later timeline:
3:39 PM EDT — Osama bin Laden is found and killed.

The actual time inside the compound was only minutes.
The intelligence operation had taken approximately a decade.
The final physical encounter took minutes.

EARLY 2011 — INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE GROWS
By early 2011, analysts had accumulated enough evidence that some became highly confident that bin Laden was actually inside the compound.
But "high confidence" still wasn't the same thing as proof.
The CIA itself later described the intelligence case as strong circumstantial evidence but without direct confirmation.

That distinction is important.
Obama wasn't deciding whether to attack a building where they knew bin Laden was.
He was deciding whether to attack a building where the intelligence community believed, with substantial confidence, that bin Laden was hiding.

FEBRUARY–MARCH 2011 — MILITARY PREPARATIONS
The military began preparing possible raid scenarios.
The special operations community studied the compound.
A full-scale replica was constructed for training.
The CIA later confirmed that an exact life-size replica of the compound was built, with movable interior walls, allowing the operators to rehearse against different possible configurations.

This was an extraordinary step.
The operators weren't simply told:
"There's a building over there."
They were trained against a physical representation of the target.
They repeatedly rehearsed the mission.
The objective was to reduce uncertainty.

THE DECISION PROCESS
Obama repeatedly met with his national-security team.
The President asked difficult questions.
Among them:
How strong is the intelligence?
What happens if bin Laden isn't there?
What happens to civilians?
What happens if the helicopters fail?
What happens if Pakistani forces respond?
What happens if the team is trapped?
What happens if the target escapes?
What happens if the mission fails publicly?
The operation therefore involved two separate problems:
Intelligence problem
Is bin Laden actually there?
Operational problem
Can he be captured or killed without unacceptable losses?
Both had to be solved.

APRIL 2011 — THE FINAL STAGE
By April, the administration was moving toward a decision.
The CIA continued evaluating the intelligence.
Military planners refined the operation.
The President continued reviewing the evidence.
The operation had a code name:
Operation Neptune Spear.
The objective was to capture or kill bin Laden.

28 APRIL 2011 — FINAL PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
Obama held a major meeting with his national-security team.
The decision was approaching.
There was still disagreement over risk.
The intelligence was strong but not absolute.
The President ultimately decided that the opportunity was too important to ignore.

29 APRIL 2011 — THE ORDER
This is the decisive political moment.
President Obama authorized the operation.
The CIA later records the authorization as occurring on 29 April 2011.

The United States now moved from:
"Find bin Laden."
to:
"Execute the operation."

30 APRIL — FINAL PREPARATIONS
The assault force prepared.
The intelligence picture was updated.
The operators rehearsed.
Aircraft and support elements were positioned.
The White House remained closely involved.
Only a very small number of people knew the full details.
The United States deliberately did not inform Pakistan beforehand because of concerns that operational security could be compromised. Senior administration officials later explicitly stated that Pakistan had not been told.

1 MAY 2011 — THE DAY OF THE RAID
This is where the entire 10-year hunt converges.
It is important to remember the time-zone issue:
Washington, D.C.
Sunday, 1 May 2011
Pakistan
Early morning, 2 May 2011
Both dates refer to the same operation.

1:25 PM EDT — FINAL APPROVAL
According to the CIA's later reconstruction, President Obama, CIA Director Leon Panetta and Admiral William McRaven approved execution at approximately:
1:25 PM Eastern Daylight Time.
The operation was now underway.

AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 2010 — SURVEILLANCE
The compound became the subject of intensive intelligence analysis.
Analysts studied:
the building,
the people entering and leaving,
the families living there,
the courier,
the physical security,
the unusual behavior of the occupants,
and whether the compound matched what they knew about bin Laden's circumstances.
A particularly important question was:
Who is the mysterious third-floor occupant?
The Americans believed a man fitting bin Laden's physical profile might be living there.
But again:
No direct identification.

SEPTEMBER 2010 — OBAMA IS BRIEFED
The President began receiving repeated intelligence updates.
The White House established an intensive review process.
The administration now had to answer a completely different question:
What do we do if bin Laden is actually there?
Several options existed.
Broadly, the choices included:
Continue surveillance.
Attempt another intelligence operation.
Use a military strike.
Conduct a raid.
Take some other action.
Each option had enormous consequences.

WHY THIS WAS SO DIFFICULT
The compound was:
inside Pakistan,
near Islamabad,
in a populated area,
unusually secure,
and close to Pakistani military facilities.
A U.S. operation could therefore create an international crisis.
If bin Laden wasn't there, the United States could:
kill innocent people,
damage relations with Pakistan,
expose intelligence capabilities,
lose personnel,
and permanently lose the target.
If bin Laden was there and the United States did nothing, he might escape.
The President therefore had to make a decision under uncertainty
.
LATE 2010 — DEVELOPING THE OPTIONS
The CIA and military began planning possible courses of action.
This included studying:
the compound,
possible ways to approach it,
the likely occupants,
potential casualties,
possible reactions,
extraction,
intelligence exploitation,
and contingency plans.
The military option became increasingly serious.

2007–2009 — THE NET BEGINS TO CLOSE
Intelligence collection eventually connected the courier to a particular geographic area in Pakistan.
The investigators did not immediately know that this would lead to bin Laden.
They first wanted to locate the courier.
Then they wanted to determine:
Who was he working for?
Eventually, his location became increasingly clear.

2009–2010 — THE ABBOTTABAD COMPOUND
The courier's trail eventually led intelligence analysts to Abbottabad, Pakistan, approximately 35 miles north of Islamabad.
And then something extraordinary appeared.
A large compound.
It looked wrong.
Not necessarily because it was obviously a terrorist facility.
Rather because its characteristics didn't fit normal residential life.
The CIA later described several unusual characteristics:
very high walls,
barbed wire,
double gates,
opaque windows,
no obvious telephone or internet connection,
trash apparently burned rather than collected,
unusual security arrangements,
residents who maintained an unusually private existence,
and a residence apparently worth far more than the owners' visible means would suggest.
The intelligence community began asking:
Who lives here?

AUGUST 2010 — THE BREAKTHROUGH
This is arguably the single most important intelligence moment after Tora Bora.
In August 2010, U.S. intelligence briefed President Obama about a possible location of bin Laden.
Obama later recalled that he was presented with a possible lead involving a compound deep inside Pakistan.

But there was still a huge problem.
They did not have direct confirmation.
There was no:
"We have seen Osama bin Laden."
There was no photographic identification.
There was no certainty.
Instead, intelligence analysts had assembled a large body of circumstantial evidence.
The CIA later described this as a high-confidence assessment that the compound was probably hiding bin Laden.

2007–2009 — THE NET BEGINS TO CLOSE
Intelligence collection eventually connected the courier to a particular geographic area in Pakistan.
The investigators did not immediately know that this would lead to bin Laden.
They first wanted to locate the courier.
Then they wanted to determine:
Who was he working for?
Eventually, his location became increasingly clear.

2009–2010 — THE ABBOTTABAD COMPOUND
The courier's trail eventually led intelligence analysts to Abbottabad, Pakistan, approximately 35 miles north of Islamabad.
And then something extraordinary appeared.
A large compound.
It looked wrong.
Not necessarily because it was obviously a terrorist facility.
Rather because its characteristics didn't fit normal residential life.
The CIA later described several unusual characteristics:
very high walls,
barbed wire,
double gates,
opaque windows,
no obvious telephone or internet connection,
trash apparently burned rather than collected,
unusual security arrangements,
residents who maintained an unusually private existence,
and a residence apparently worth far more than the owners' visible means would suggest.
The intelligence community began asking:
Who lives here?

AUGUST 2010 — THE BREAKTHROUGH
This is arguably the single most important intelligence moment after Tora Bora.
In August 2010, U.S. intelligence briefed President Obama about a possible location of bin Laden.
Obama later recalled that he was presented with a possible lead involving a compound deep inside Pakistan.
whitehouse.gov
But there was still a huge problem.
They did not have direct confirmation.
There was no:
"We have seen Osama bin Laden."
There was no photographic identification.
There was no certainty.
Instead, intelligence analysts had assembled a large body of circumstantial evidence.
The CIA later described this as a high-confidence assessment that the compound was probably hiding bin Laden.

AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 2010 — SURVEILLANCE
The compound became the subject of intensive intelligence analysis.
Analysts studied:
the building,
the people entering and leaving,
the families living there,
the courier,
the physical security,
the unusual behavior of the occupants,
and whether the compound matched what they knew about bin Laden's circumstances.
A particularly important question was:
Who is the mysterious third-floor occupant?
The Americans believed a man fitting bin Laden's physical profile might be living there.
But again:
No direct identification.

2002–2003 — BUILDING THE COURIER PROFILE

This was one of the slowest parts of the hunt.
Investigators and intelligence analysts accumulated fragments.
A piece of information from one detainee.
Another report from another source.
A communication.
A relationship.
A location.
A description.
A name.
Then another name.
The problem was that al-Qaeda deliberately compartmentalized information.
Very few people knew exactly where bin Laden was.
The CIA later said that information from detainees, signals intelligence and clandestine sources was gradually combined to establish the courier's identity and location.

This is an important lesson in the hunt:
They did not find bin Laden by suddenly discovering his address.
They reconstructed his network.

2003–2004 — THE HUNT BECOMES AN INTELLIGENCE PUZZLE
The Americans increasingly focused on:
Bin Laden's family
Where were his wives and children?
His communications
How was he communicating?
His public statements
Could his recordings reveal clues?
His couriers
Who carried messages to and from him?
The first three avenues produced limited results.
The courier network eventually proved decisive.
CIA analysts increasingly concentrated on the people who could physically connect bin Laden to the outside world.

2004–2005 — IDENTIFYING THE IMPORTANT COURIER[
The name Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti became increasingly significant.
But there was a problem.
Was he really important?
Could he be a decoy?
Was he genuinely working for bin Laden?
Was he still active?
Was he even alive?
Intelligence agencies had to resolve these questions.
This took years.
The CIA later acknowledged that detainee reporting was important in helping establish the courier's role, although the agency also emphasized that significant information about him had been obtained independently of its detention-and-interrogation program.

2005–2006 — THE COURIER BECOMES THE KEY
The investigation increasingly focused on the courier.
Instead of asking:
"Where is bin Laden?"
the intelligence community was effectively asking:
"Where does the man who communicates with bin Laden live?"
This was a much more manageable intelligence problem.
Because bin Laden could disappear.
His courier couldn't disappear indefinitely.
Someone had to:
travel,
communicate,
meet people,
obtain supplies,
move between locations,
maintain relationships.
The courier therefore created a trail.

LATE DECEMBER 2001 — BIN LADEN DISAPPEARS

This is where the manhunt fundamentally changes.
The United States no longer had a reliable location for bin Laden.
He had crossed, or was believed to have crossed, into the Pakistan border region.
The mountains and tribal areas provided an enormous sanctuary.
The hunt therefore changed from a battlefield pursuit into a long-term intelligence problem.

2002 — THE TRAIL GOES COLD
Al-Qaeda leadership became increasingly difficult to locate.
Bin Laden was no longer making himself easily accessible.
He relied heavily on couriers.
And this eventually became the key to his downfall.
The CIA later explained that shortly after 9/11 it began systematically collecting information about people who supported or communicated with bin Laden. One particular courier eventually became central to the investigation.

The courier's operational name was:
Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.
But the Americans did not initially know exactly who he was.
They had a name.
They needed to determine:
Who is this man?

OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 2001 — THE TALIBAN COLLAPSES

American air power combined with Northern Alliance ground forces.
City after city fell.
Kabul fell in November.
Taliban forces began retreating.
But the most important target remained alive:
Osama bin Laden.
The United States was closing the physical space in which he could operate.
Bin Laden therefore moved toward the mountainous eastern part of Afghanistan.

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 2001 — THE TRAIL LEADS TO TORA BORA
The intelligence picture increasingly pointed toward the mountainous Tora Bora region near the Pakistan border.
This was potentially the decisive moment.
Bin Laden was believed to be there.
American and Afghan forces moved against al-Qaeda positions.
The terrain was extraordinarily difficult:
mountains,
caves,
narrow valleys,
limited roads,
and a porous border with Pakistan.
The United States now had its strongest opportunity since 11 September.


DECEMBER 2001 — TORA BORA
The battle for Tora Bora began.
Afghan forces, supported by American intelligence, Special Operations forces and air power, attacked al-Qaeda positions.
Bin Laden was believed to be in the area.
But he was not captured.
This became one of the great turning points in the entire hunt.
According to the 9/11 Commission, al-Qaeda elements fought at Tora Bora in December 2001, while many surviving al-Qaeda fighters eventually escaped toward Pakistan.

The hunt had gone from:
“We know generally where he is.”
to:
“We think we know approximately where he is — but he has disappeared.”

12 SEPTEMBER 2001

The United States formally began treating the attack as an act of war.
The CIA and other agencies intensified their efforts to locate al-Qaeda leadership.
The central strategic problem quickly became:
Bin Laden was in Afghanistan, protected by the Taliban, but the United States did not yet know exactly where he was.
Afghanistan therefore became the geographic center of the hunt.
13–18 SEPTEMBER
The intelligence picture rapidly solidified.
The FBI and CIA established that the hijackers were connected to al-Qaeda.
The United States began assembling an international coalition.
Diplomatic pressure was directed toward the Taliban:
Hand over bin Laden and dismantle al-Qaeda's sanctuary.
The Taliban did not comply.
Meanwhile, American intelligence agencies began preparing information that could support military operations inside Afghanistan

.LATE SEPTEMBER 2001 — THE HUNT BECOMES A WAR PLAN

The United States now had two connected objectives:

Objective 1
Destroy al-Qaeda's ability to operate.
Objective 2
Find and capture or kill bin Laden.

The CIA began expanding its covert and intelligence operations inside Afghanistan.
The United States also began working with the Northern Alliance, an Afghan opposition force fighting the Taliban.
This partnership would become enormously important.

7 OCTOBER 2001 — OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
The United States and Britain began military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
American aircraft struck Taliban and al-Qaeda targets.
At the same time, CIA officers and U.S. Special Forces were working with Afghan forces on the ground.
The CIA supplied:
intelligence,
communications,
money,
liaison,
operational support,
and targeting information.
The military supplied:
aircraft,
special operations forces,
firepower,
logistics,
surveillance,
and communications.
The two systems increasingly became integrated.
The 9/11 Commission later described the combination as a major factor in rapidly destroying the Taliban regime and disrupting al-Qaeda.

11 SEPTEMBER 2001 — DAY ZERO

Morning — America is attacked
On 11 September 2001, 19 al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial aircraft.
Two were flown into the World Trade Center towers.
One struck the Pentagon.
The fourth crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers fought back.
Nearly 3,000 people were killed.
The FBI immediately began the largest investigation in its history. Thousands of agents and support personnel were eventually assigned to the investigation known as PENTTBOM — Pennsylvania, Pentagon and Twin Towers Bombing.

But simultaneously, another process began:
The intelligence hunt for the person responsible.
11 September — first hours
The U.S. intelligence community began trying to answer several fundamental questions:

Who organized the attack?
Who financed it?
Who trained the hijackers?
Who communicated with them?
Where was the leadership?
Where was bin Laden?
Where were the surviving members of al-Qaeda?
Where could the United States strike?

The CIA began comparing information from existing intelligence files with the emerging evidence.
The FBI began reconstructing the hijackers' identities, movements and connections.
The NSA searched communications intelligence.
The military began preparing for the possibility that the United States would soon have to conduct combat operations.
This was not simply a police investigation.
It was becoming a global intelligence and military campaign.

THE BIN LADEN MANHUNT: 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 – 2 MAY 2011

PART I — THE HUNT BEGINS

Before 11 September 2001: why America already knew who bin Laden was
Bin Laden was not an unknown figure on September 11.
The United States had been pursuing him for years.
The FBI had linked al-Qaeda to the 7 August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. More than 200 people were killed and thousands injured. Bin Laden was indicted in November 1998 and placed on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list on 7 June 1999.

Then came the USS Cole attack on 12 October 2000. Seventeen American sailors were killed.
By 2001, the CIA had a dedicated counterterrorism effort focused on bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The 9/11 Commission records that George Tenet, then CIA director, was receiving regular briefings on bin Laden, and that more than 40 intelligence articles concerning bin Laden appeared in the President's Daily Brief between 1 January and 10 September 2001.

But the United States had not yet located bin Laden.
That distinction is crucial.
America knew who it was hunting.
It did not know where he would be when the decisive moment came.

The hunt for Osama bin Laden is best understood not as one continuous “manhunt,” but as a 10-year intelligence campaign that changed character several times: first identifying him as the central target, then trying to find him in Afghanistan, losing the trail after Tora Bora, rebuilding the trail through his courier network, locating the Abbottabad compound, and finally converting intelligence into a military operation.
I’ll give you the chronology from 11 September 2001 through the final disposition of his body, while also including the important pre-9/11 groundwork because otherwise several later steps make little sense.

One caveat: some operational details remain classified, and some early accounts of the 2011 raid were corrected as officials reconstructed events. I’ll distinguish established facts from later-revised details..

givedemwotowoto:
It will take APC a coalition of governors, Ciy Boy Movement, the Senate President, and Politicians issuing death threats, to mobilize this kind of crowd after spending over ₦50 billion

But they will still be defeated and disgraced.

You said the same thing in 2022.

IbnB:
Lol😆 y'all are so predictable...anyone who does not agree with APC's robbery of Lagos funds automatically becomes Ibo or 'settler'

Get a life bro

Okay, so 75% of igbos are in Lagos for the betterment of their life, that's wonderful. I heard that from you.

But please mention your village to us so that we can confirm how it had done better than Lagos that is under Tinubu's babariga.

The we can appreciate the freedom of your state

IbnB:
The only thing that changed was that democratic rule came, and an avaricious fellow like your incompetent idol was able to dip his larcenous paws into Lagos state treasury, where he has kept them since 1999 till date

You can't be wrong. From 1999 till date, more than 75% of your village people had migrated to leave in his state as they see it as their only way of making it

IbnB:
Lol

I had my own office in Lagos during Tinubu's governorship, when armed-robbers were laying siege to Lagos banks overnight...they would come with danfo loaded with oxyacetylene cylinders and spend several hours slicing the safe doors open

I bet you were still in pampers back then

You had your office in Lagos and you don't know what changed between 1999 and 2007? You are such a wonderful being!