LordReed:


Also why would this droplet in an infinite field want to pass through the arduous and risky process called birth?

I dont conceive of such an infinite field of potentialities as something that "wants to" do this or that. It is simply the latency of all potentials.

And the process to even get to that point is so random you essentially don't know what you'll get until the formation of a physical body is underway. Isn’t that just too haphazard a process for something that purportedly emanates from a field of infinite possibilities?

I think I mentioned that at any conceivable stretch of further evolution or gradations from latent potential, one could conceive of the birthing of extra-terrestrial beings who may be responsible for the instigation of Earth-Life as it is - and given that we (neither know this for certain or) do not know of the objectives of such beings, we are in no position to assess to what extent such objectives are being met. If, for example, Earth-Life was designed as a psycho-social experiment in consciousness, then no matter how Hobbesian it might be, it might be meeting its objectives.

And frankly, I am almost completely persuaded that it is an experiment of some sort. Something is being observed playing out, and methinks deliberately so.

DeepSight:
So LordReed / Diridiri/

Against my better judgment I am compelled to throw you guys a follow up question. Mark you, I only say "against my better judgment" on account that I believe it will be virtually impossible to achieve a meeting of minds on this subject - not on account that I consider either of you necessarily unreasonable, please. The follow up question is simple - does it not stand to reason that for an entity to "feel" anything (such as pain, the case in point) it has to be alive? That it must be a living thing? And the build-on to that is the question as to if machines / robots are or can be living things.

Embedded Assumption: With this question I am not contemplating a cloned biological creature, any other biological creature of any sort or a cyborg of any sort.

I gave a definition of pain that is firmly entrenched in the workings of the physical body but it seems you think pain is something more. What is your own definition of pain?

LordReed: BTW at what point does human foetus get a mind, immediately when the zygote starts dividing?

I dont know: however let me just say that I dont conceive of those droplets (of mind) as coming into being at physical birth. In my (admittedly fantastical) perception of things, its more like a drop of water from the ocean: It didnt come into existence when it was parted from the ocean. It was always there as part of the ocean - even if fluid and thus indistinguishable from the rest of the ocean. So maybe we can talk about the moment when a mind becomes individual, rather than a moment when it starts to exist.

LordReed: BTW at what point does human foetus get a mind, immediately when the zygote starts dividing?

And yet again, on this question. Perhaps you can rephrase it thus: when does the human infant become self conscious. Again, I dont know. If your worldview is correct, it gradually becomes self conscious as it grows. If mine is correct, it probably was self conscious on another dimension before it was born. And probably maintains a consciousness at other dimensions while it grows, even if such a consciousness is faint or strained.

But this question of yours deserves more, and I will come back to it: because it goes to the root of our discussion.

DeepSight:


I dont conceive of such an infinite field of potentialities as something that "wants to" do this or that. It is simply the latency of all potentials.



I think I mentioned that at any conceivable stretch of further evolution or gradations from latent potential, one could conceive of the birthing of extra-terrestrial beings who may be responsible for the instigation of Earth-Life as it is - and given that we (neither know this for certain or) do not know of the objectives of such beings, we are in no position to assess to what extent such objectives are being met. If, for example, Earth-Life was designed as a psycho-social experiment in consciousness, then no matter how Hobbesian it might be, it might be meeting its objectives.

And frankly, I am almost completely persuaded that it is an experiment of some sort. Something is being observed playing out, and methinks deliberately so.



I dont know.

Wait, you think otherwordly beings are injecting these "latency of all potentials" into physical bodies?

LordReed:


I gave a definition of pain that is firmly entrenched in the workings of the physical body but it seems you think pain is something more. What is your own definition of pain?

Pain is something that hurts - a feeling of hurt - be it physical, mental, psychological or emotional. In the present discussion its key aspect is that the being experiences the hurt. With physical pain if you have an injury you experience the sensation of hurt. With emotional pain you experience the feeling of hurt. Neither of these is, to my mind, available to a robot. And for me its not a matter of future advancement in science unless the robot is no longer a robot but a being capable of the experience of feelings.

When you describe pain as a hyper-signal of adverse events, that doesnt come near to what we are discussing here. That is why I said that is akin to what Lawrence Krauss does with nothingness - simply redefine it as something else to make it suit what he is trying to say. If your definition held, we would have to consider that even a smart phone feels pain when its touch-sensitive screen is broken.

LordReed:


Wait, you think otherwordly beings are injecting these "latency of all potentials" into physical bodies?

Something akin to that, for the purpose of unknown scientific ends. I certainly consider it as a significant possibility in terms of whats going on on this planet. But I have to be careful and say that this is not quite what I think - its just close. Nor can a mere human physical shell carry "all potentials" per se.

If this seems confusing let me just rein it in by saying that I believe that this world is a school for consciousness.

DeepSight:


I think he was waaaaaaaay too sensitive there, but no matter.

I think a person's sensitivity should be respected by those who see deeply instead of labelling them so you don't need to bother.

Labelling just shows one is shallow hearing.

budaatum:


I think a person's sensitivity should be respected by those who see deeply instead of labelling them so you don't need to bother.

Which is why I explained to him that there were no ill intentions, by way of an apology.

Labelling just shows one is shallow hearing.

I doubt I labelled anyone.

DeepSight:


Pain is something that hurts - a feeling of hurt - be it physical, mental, psychological or emotional. In the present discussion its key aspect is that the being experiences the hurt. With physical pain if you have an injury you experience the sensation of hurt. With emotional pain you experience the feeling of hurt. Neither of these is, to my mind, available to a robot. And for me its not a matter of future advancement in science unless the robot is no longer a robot but a being capable of the experience of feelings.

When you describe pain as a hyper-signal of adverse events, that doesnt come near to what we are discussing here. That is why I said that is akin to what Lawrence Krauss does with nothingness - simply redefine it as something else to make it suit what he is trying to say. If your definition held, we would have to consider that even a smart phone feels pain when its touch-sensitive screen is broken.

That is the only definition that fit with the facts available to me so I am not merely redefining it. If according to you pain is something that is felt by the ghost in the machine you will have to provide the facts that fit with this definition.

LordReed:


That is the only definition that fit with the facts available to me so I am not merely redefining it. If according to you pain is something that is felt by the ghost in the machine you will have to provide the facts that fit with this definition.

We have to be careful here - because one is simply saying that a being capable of experience must exist in order for one to talk about feelings of any kind - and that machines are not such beings.

diridiri:


You say that it is as fundamental as the problem of time travel or teleportation or probing outside the universe. It isn't. Those three problems are very reasonably considered impossible. The topic of time travel is far beyond my depth as a non-physicist, the second is technically possible if you somehow copy every single molecule in a human being's body, and the third is also beyond my depth. What I am certain of, however, is that the supposed impossibility of three of those tasks rests on good justification.

Pardon my drawing you backwards, just a brief tangential question please: why do you think the assumed impossibility of probing outside the universe rests "on good justification" as opposed to merely being a thing which future advancement of science would render possible.

DeepSight:


Which is why I explained to him that there were no ill intentions, by way of an apology.

I doubt I labelled anyone.

I appreciate your 'sensitivity'. And the intelligence of this thread.

Hypocrite buda just labelled you. Twice.

budaatum:


I appreciate your 'sensitivity'. And the intelligence of this thread.

Hypocrite buda just labelled you. Twice.

DeepSight:


We have to be careful here - because one is simply saying that a being capable of experience must exist in order for one to talk about feelings of any kind - and that machines are not such beings.

Well I have said I can only work with the facts available to me, I have nothing else to go by. Postulating that some ghost in the machine is necessary for pain to be felt or experienced is not a fact that I can examine to take into consideration. Based on the facts available pain is an experience that can be foisted on a machine albeit that is not currently possible.

DeepSight:


We have to be careful here - because one is simply saying that a being capable of experience must exist in order for one to talk about feelings of any kind - and that machines are not such beings.

LordReed:

Well I have said I can only work with the facts available to me, I have nothing else to go by. Postulating that some ghost in the machine is necessary for pain to be felt or experienced is not a fact that I can examine to take into consideration. Based on the facts available pain is an experience that can be foisted on a machine albeit that is not currently possible.

A thermometer 'experiences' the temperature and 'talks' to you about its 'feelings'.

Consider.

DeepSight:
So LordReed / Diridiri/

Against my better judgment I am compelled to throw you guys a follow up question. Mark you, I only say "against my better judgment" on account that I believe it will be virtually impossible to achieve a meeting of minds on this subject - not on account that I consider either of you necessarily unreasonable, please. The follow up question is simple - does it not stand to reason that for an entity to "feel" anything (such as pain, the case in point) it has to be alive? That it must be a living thing? And the build-on to that is the question as to if machines / robots are or can be living things.

Embedded Assumption: With this question I am not contemplating a cloned biological creature, any other biological creature of any sort or a cyborg of any sort.

That depends on what you define as "feel".
The entire discourse with you reminds me of the common apologist argument (paraphrased) "Every building must have a builder, and therefore every creation must have a creator". The arguments presented by the article you forwarded myself and LordReed a few days ago do not explicitly confess to using this type of logic, but one gets the impression that this is the sort of logic being used to come to such conclusions.

On the builder argument, buildings are by definition built. Them being built is in the definition of a building. If there was a structure that looked like a building, but was actually naturally formed, it wouldn't be a building. One might call it a building due to simple pattern recognition, but they'd be incorrect, as it was in fact not built by anyone's hands. Similarly, if your definition of "feeling" carries the implicit assumption that it must be done by a living being, then you would quite obviously take it for granted that it must be undertaken by a living being. Making any conclusions with loaded assumptions or definitions will unavoidably lead to you begging the question: assuming in the premise what one sets out to prove.

If you wish to articulate why being capable of emotional experiences is exclusive to living things, you need to either prove that the definition necessarily implies that the process is being undertaken by a living being, or prove rigidly that non-living beings are restricted by some quality (or the lack of some quality) from being capable of it. Tempting as it might be to simply assume these things are true, reality need not conform to our beliefs.

The matter of consciousness and emotion are especially relevant to this point, since we are bound to view our subjective mental experiences in a, well, subjective manner. They are not things that we rationalize, but things we feel. We are ourselves chained by them. This can lead us to think more of them than we ought to - they dictate our very essence, after all. Eventually, however, this attitude must be judged as being fundamentally infantile and self-centred, and then discarded with the other archaic infantile beliefs. One must acknowledge that there is no rule under heaven that dictates that the nature of things be governed by our perspective.

In the first place, I don't see any significant difference (at least in the abstract sense) between a robot and a human being. They are both machines. With enough complexity, perhaps a robot with a brain perfectly resembling a human being's in its functionality could be made. I cannot see why this would be impossible. I definitely cannot see why this would require an immaterial being or essence to be accomplished.

To give a direct answer to your question: No, I don't see why it would stand to reason. Why would it? I am yet to see a convincing argument for this position. Not by you, necessarily, but in general. Never in my life have I heard a convincing response to this question. Most responses are either indirect to the point of irritation or desperate pleas by my interlocutor that I "open my eyes" and "just think about it".

DeepSight:


Pardon my drawing you backwards, just a brief tangential question please: why do you think the assumed impossibility of probing outside the universe rests "on good justification" as opposed to merely being a thing which future advancement of science would render possible.

The rate of expansion of the universe seems like a good reason to do so.
Not even considering the very reasonable impossibility of light speed travel, the edge of the universe is some 46.5 billion light years away. By the time you reached the edge, the universe would have surpassed you by a significant amount.

From what I've found out, there isn't even any consensus as to whether the universe HAS edges. Some opine that the universe is infinite.

diridiri:


The rate of expansion of the universe seems like a good reason to do so.
Not even considering the very reasonable impossibility of light speed travel, the edge of the universe is some 46.5 billion light years away. By the time you reached the edge, the universe would have surpassed you by a significant amount.

This is an excellent answer but my thinking was that if you are willing to say that scientific advancement may give us self conscious machines, you could also apply same to this question - you never can tell what sort of worm holes or as yet un-conceived method of trans-dimensional movement may be conceived in future could you?

From what I've found out, there isn't even any consensus as to whether the universe HAS edges. Some opine that the universe is infinite.

I believe there is an irresolvable contradiction inherent in this - in that I doubt matter could be infinite.

budaatum:




A thermometer 'experiences' the temperature and 'talks' to you about its 'feelings'.

Consider.

. . . And do touch-screens "experience" a sense of touch? In short, do machine sensors have sensations - or rather - can they.

DeepSight:


. . . And do touch-screens "experience" a sense of touch? In short, do machine sensors have sensations - or rather - can they.

The purpose of sensors is the sensing of the sensations they "experience".

No?

DeepSight:


This is an excellent answer but my thinking was that if you are willing to say that scientific advancement may give us self conscious machines, you could also apply same to this question - you never can tell what sort of worm holes or as yet un-conceived method of trans-dimensional movement may be conceived in future could you?

I believe I already explained in the comment you got the prompt from why I distinguish between these two. Although there are mechanistic reasons for being skeptical about exploring the edge of the universe, I have yet to receive any such reason as to why consciousness requires an immaterial component. It is not the doubt in itself that is critical but the reason behind that doubt.

DeepSight:

I believe there is an irresolvable contradiction inherent in this - in that I doubt matter could be infinite.

Well, that's the first impression I had as well when coming across this opinion. However, given that I am not an astrophysicist (or any kind of physicist), I believe that it is infinitely more likely that I simply lack the sufficient information to comprehend the statement fully than that it is untrue.

diridiri:


Although there are mechanistic reasons for being skeptical about exploring the edge of the universe, I have yet to receive any such reason as to why consciousness requires an immaterial component. It is not the doubt in itself that is critical but the reason behind that doubt.

I like this! On first read I saw:

I have yet to receive any such reason as to why consciousness requires a material component.

Then I critically looked at the 'material content' and found it was required if I wanted to understand instead of stupidly create crap in my head and believe it is what I saw.

First of yours i've read, I apologise. Will find time to read more.

diridiri:


That depends on what you define as "feel".
The entire discourse with you reminds me of the common apologist argument (paraphrased) "Every building must have a builder, and therefore every creation must have a creator". The arguments presented by the article you forwarded myself and LordReed a few days ago do not explicitly confess to using this type of logic, but one gets the impression that this is the sort of logic being used to come to such conclusions.

While I can see why you would make this comparison, I don't believe thats the argument being made either by myself or that article. It is a rather more nuanced point which devolves in the nature of experiencing itself. And the nature of consciousness which makes such possible.

If you wish to articulate why being capable of emotional experiences is exclusive to living things, you need to either prove that the definition necessarily implies that the process is being undertaken by a living being, or prove rigidly that non-living beings are restricted by some quality (or the lack of some quality) from being capable of it. Tempting as it might be to simply assume these things are true, reality need not conform to our beliefs.

The matter of consciousness and emotion are especially relevant to this point, since we are bound to view our subjective mental experiences in a, well, subjective manner. They are not things that we rationalize, but things we feel. We are ourselves chained by them. This can lead us to think more of them than we ought to - they dictate our very essence, after all. Eventually, however, this attitude must be judged as being fundamentally infantile and self-centred, and then discarded with the other archaic infantile beliefs. One must acknowledge that there is no rule under heaven that dictates that the nature of things be governed by our perspective.

I think what you need to be asking yourself is if a machine is capable of subjectivity. Because this may help unravel the knots here: experience is intrinsically subjective as you have acknowledged and a thing which is preprogrammed is intrinsically objective in nature as opposed to subjective. Every aspect of its nature is predefined and thus set within a given objective code or program.

Thus, a machine cannot have a subjective experience. Everything that could happen with it can be fully described in terms of the code or program language with which it is set up. A living being on the other hand, is capable of subjective experiences which are indescribable to the next person forever.

If you understand this, you should see that a machine could never be capable of subjectivity and thus could not be capable of experience.

This is actually something which should be self-evident, however cognizant of the chasm between our views, I will only hope that a little point here or there may eventually strike a chord, even if this is a most unlikely thing.

In the first place, I don't see any significant difference (at least in the abstract sense) between a robot and a human being.

Really. Thats . . . well, unfortunate. I have just pointed out one though - the capacity for subjectivity.
And here is one more thing you may want to contemplate about subjectivity - do you think robots can have opinions?
Dwell on this carefully, because I do not ask if robots can analyze a set of facts and arrive at a conclusion. I ask if they can have subjective opinions. Opinions on morality for example. Or on beauty.

Do you think robots can have differing opinions as well?
Can different "individuals" of the same type of robot, say, have different "tastes."
Or different worldviews.

Can robots properly be said to be capable of having opinions.

Opinions, not pre-programmed factors of analysis - such as the type which may be set to recognize fair skin and call it beautiful. I mean opinions in the proper sense.

In this, please try not to redefine the word "opinion" into something unrecognizable in order to be machine-compliant: because this has been happening here rather often with respect to the common understanding of words such as "pain" and "feelings" and "experience."

Most responses are either indirect to the point of irritation or desperate pleas by my interlocutor that I "open my eyes" and "just think about it".

Sadly, I can see why people would ask you to "open your eyes." However I agree that that's not a way to discuss anything - certainly not in discussions like this. Nonetheless, it sometimes really boils down to acknowledging the painfully obvious - which, I have to say, I have come to learn, can also be painfully disputed. Even to the point of irritation.

diridiri:


I believe I already explained in the comment you got the prompt from why I distinguish between these two. Although there are mechanistic reasons for being skeptical about exploring the edge of the universe,

Perhaps you have not grasped what I am driving at: if one leans upon the advancement of science in any matter, one will be opening a virtually limitless door of possibilities through which it would become possible to even illogically contest anything: so if I say that it is impossible for you to shapeshift into a cockerel: it may be answered that this is myopic and that sufficiently advanced science could accomplish this.

In fact as regards the universe, the area of quantum physics already presents scenarios to us that border on magic. So you cannot so lightly dismiss the comparison - and surely you should then see the problem with your answer to the effect that "there is no reason why science cannot accomplish this in the future."

Because I hope you know that it is said about time travel that we have not seen anything in the laws of physics to render it impossible. If you consider what I have set before you properly, you will find that this type of answer (that science might make something possible in the future) can be applied to every conceivable imagination. And this shows up the flaw with it.

I have yet to receive any such reason as to why consciousness requires an immaterial component.

Because it requires a self, and subjectivity.
But I know this means nothing to you as yet.

Well, that's the first impression I had as well when coming across this opinion. However, given that I am not an astrophysicist (or any kind of physicist), I believe that it is infinitely more likely that I simply lack the sufficient information to comprehend the statement fully than that it is untrue.

This is not a matter of being unable to comprehend on account of not being an astrophysicist: there is no human being who can comprehend infinity.

budaatum:


The purpose of sensors is the sensing of the sensations they "experience".

No?

Yeah, the question / problem is if they would feel a strike as pain for example.
Can a robot be heartbroken?

Bereaved? Experience grief?
Ecstasy?

Get high?

DeepSight:


I think what you need to be asking yourself is if a machine is capable of subjectivity. Because this may help unravel the knots here: experience is intrinsically subjective as you have acknowledged and a thing which is preprogrammed is intrinsically objective in nature as opposed to subjective. Every aspect of its nature is predefined and thus set within a given objective code or program.

Say a machine was programmed to feel pain and each time it feels pain it was programmed to scream, how would you be able to tell the difference between what the machine is undergoing from what a human undergoes? In other words are you saying that being able to measure something means it is no longer be subjectively experienced?

LordReed:


Say a machine was programmed to feel pain and each time it feels pain it was programmed to scream, how would you be able to tell the difference between what the machine is undergoing from what a human undergoes? In other words are you saying that being able to measure something means it is no longer be subjectively experienced?

Yes, to an extent (-you cannot measure a subjective thing in the true sense-) but it goes beyond the capacity to measure a thing. You can never know how exactly I feel about say, a woman I am in love with. It is impossible for you to know. Because it is a completely subjective feeling with its own subjective flavor different from how perhaps you feel if you are in love with a woman. However, with a machine, such a pre-programmed feeling can always be nailed down to its every exact detail and preprogrammed nuance.

Not that I agree a machine could feel at all, but there you go: if it could - it would not be something subjective. It would be something infused, exact and determinable. It would even be mathematically precise.

DeepSight:


Perhaps you have not grasped what I am driving at: if one leans upon the advancement of science in any matter, one will be opening a virtually limitless door of possibilities through which it would become possible to even illogically contest anything: so if I say that it is impossible for you to shapeshift into a cockerel: it may be answered that this is myopic and that sufficiently advanced science could accomplish this.

In fact as regards the universe, the area of quantum physics already presents scenarios to us that border on magic. So you cannot so lightly dismiss the comparison - and surely you should then see the problem with your answer to the effect that "there is no reason why science cannot accomplish this in the future."

Because I hope you know that it is said about time travel that we have not seen anything in the laws of physics to render it impossible. If you consider what I have set before you properly, you will find that this type of answer (that science might make something possible in the future) can be applied to every conceivable imagination. And this shows up the flaw with it.

Typically when one refers to something as "true" or "accurate" in science, one actually means that it is "true beyond reasonable doubt" in the sense that it so perfectly matches observations made about the universe that it makes little sense not to adhere to the model or theory in question. With this knowledge in mind, it becomes obvious why exactly one can dismiss a supposition even if future advancements remain uncertain. If a supposition seems to contradict too strongly to too much of the observations made, it is more likely to be false than true. With some suppositions, this likelihood is so biased towards falsehood that it is accurate to call it impossible.

This is the same line of reasoning used when referring to any impossibility (with the exception of logical impossibilities like "X is both X and not X". If someone told me that the real Barney visited their child, I would say it was impossible, but there still exists a slight chance that magic exists and Barney actually visited their child. It's just too ridiculous, unlikely, and out-of-left-field to even entertain.

Quantum Physics presents scenarios that border on magic? Well, I will concede that they might seem "magical" at a cursory glance, the same way that the concept of a Heliocentric universe might seem "magical" to one who was totally illiterate on the matter. "After all", they might say, "the sun very much APPEARS to rotate around the Earth, so why the over-complicated explanation over a seemingly simple matter?". The fact is that, unlike magic, the scenarios presented by these models were derived not by armchair thinking and idle presuppositions but by observations of the universe supported and corroborated by other observations. You then see why an understanding of the field in question is necessary: If you do not understand the reason why the "scenarios bordering on magic" are presented, you will forever see them as somewhat magical. It is only with adequate understanding in the field that you comprehend the necessity of such scenarios. This applies to EVERY dense field of knowledge.

DeepSight:


Because it requires a self, and subjectivity.
But I know this means nothing to you as yet.

It's not the self and subjectivity part I have a problem with, DeepSight.
My problem is the implicit assumption that such constructions are somehow immaterial and cannot be generated by natural systems. It's a completely baseless assumption.

DeepSight:



This is not a matter of being unable to comprehend on account of not being an astrophysicist: there is no human being who can comprehend infinity.

In what sense do you mean?
I can't comprehend what it would mean to experience infinity, but I can certainly comprehend the concept. I'm certain you can, too, or you would be utterly lost on the topic. Infinity just means endless, or at least approaching a value of endless magnitude. I might not be able to imagine an infinite substance, but I can express and understand the implications of the concept, the same way I can comprehend the concept of cold fire or eternal bliss, unimaginable as those two might be.

DeepSight:


Yeah, the question / problem is if they would feel a strike as pain for example.

Why must the "question / problem" be "feel a strike as pain for example" ? Why not just "feel a strike" ?

DeepSight:
Can a robot be heartbroken?

Bereaved? Experience grief?
Ecstasy?

Get high?

As in, feel emotions, as opposed to sensing the phenomena of an emotion?

I can not imagine how a robot can feel emotions, though they can be designed to sense a strike, and measure it too. But can you see how the question might not only be what you say it must be?

DeepSight:


While I can see why you would make this comparison, I don't believe thats the argument being made either by myself or that article. It is a rather more nuanced point which devolves in the nature of experiencing itself. And the nature of consciousness which makes such possible.

A nature, mind you, that the article does not support in any way whatsoever. One can only make such a logical leap if one presupposes that consciousness requires the immaterial. The article does not satisfactorily explain why this is the case, it just makes baseless assertions here and there. I notice you have not done so as well.

DeepSight:

I think what you need to be asking yourself is if a machine is capable of subjectivity. Because this may help unravel the knots here: experience is intrinsically subjective as you have acknowledged and a thing which is preprogrammed is intrinsically objective in nature as opposed to subjective. Every aspect of its nature is predefined and thus set within a given objective code or program.

Thus, a machine cannot have a subjective experience. Everything that could happen with it can be fully described in terms of the code or program language with which it is set up. A living being on the other hand, is capable of subjective experiences which are indescribable to the next person forever.

The first paragraph is pretty weird. It implicitly supposes that there exists some aspect of human nature that is not predefined or set within a given objective code or program. It also makes the claim that "a thing which is preprogrammed is intrinsically objective in nature as opposed to subjective". Yes, to the observer, anyway. But if the preprogrammed thing was capable of subjective mental processes, then that's a moot point. Even with regards to human beings, assuming that you were correct, there would still be facets of the human body that were completely objective, like how the immune system operates, for instance. So it is possible for things to be objective and subjective in different areas.

According to your second paragraph then, if the chemical and electrical reactions in the human brain could be mapped and analyzed in as much detail as a line of code or a circuit could, we would all magically cease to have a subjective experience? Or are you going to assert that such a thing is impossible?

DeepSight:


If you understand this, you should see that a machine could never be capable of subjectivity and thus could not be capable of experience.

This is actually something which should be self-evident, however cognizant of the chasm between our views, I will only hope that a little point here or there may eventually strike a chord, even if this is a most unlikely thing.

Interesting.
You are right in saying that such a scenario is unlikely, I'll give you that much.

DeepSight:


Really. Thats . . . well, unfortunate. I have just pointed out one though - the capacity for subjectivity.
And here is one more thing you may want to contemplate about subjectivity - do you think robots can have opinions?
Dwell on this carefully, because I do not ask if robots can analyze a set of facts and arrive at a conclusion. I ask if they can have subjective opinions. Opinions on morality for example. Or on beauty.

Do you think robots can have differing opinions as well?
Can different "individuals" of the same type of robot, say, have different "tastes."
Or different worldviews.

Can robots properly be said to be capable of having opinions.

Opinions, not pre-programmed factors of analysis - such as the type which may be set to recognize fair skin and call it beautiful. I mean opinions in the proper sense.

In this, please try not to redefine the word "opinion" into something unrecognizable in order to be machine-compliant: because this has been happening here rather often with respect to the common understanding of words such as "pain" and "feelings" and "experience."

As I have stated with every new iteration of this question, I do not see why not.
I am yet to be convinced that this is mechanistically impossible and requires assistance from the immaterial.

DeepSight:


Sadly, I can see why people would ask you to "open your eyes." However I agree that that's not a way to discuss anything - certainly not in discussions like this. Nonetheless, it sometimes really boils down to acknowledging the painfully obvious - which, I have to say, I have come to learn, can also be painfully disputed. Even to the point of irritation.

The reason why such pleas irritate me is because they come across as ignorant.
If it were so obvious and self-apparent, you would be able to explain it precisely and concisely. If I ask for a mechanistic failing of physical systems in simulating a "subconscious experience" that the immaterial can account for, one would typically expect a direct answer that does not rely on abstractions but a literal mechanistic failing of physical systems.

diridiri:


Typically when one refers to something as "true" or "accurate" in science, one actually means that it is "true beyond reasonable doubt" in the sense that it so perfectly matches observations made about the universe that it makes little sense not to adhere to the model or theory in question. With this knowledge in mind, it becomes obvious why exactly one can dismiss a supposition even if future advancements remain uncertain. If a supposition seems to contradict too strongly to too much of the observations made, it is more likely to be false than true. With some suppositions, this likelihood is so biased towards falsehood that it is accurate to call it impossible.

This is the same line of reasoning used when referring to any impossibility (with the exception of logical impossibilities like "X is both X and not X". If someone told me that the real Barney visited their child, I would say it was impossible, but there still exists a slight chance that magic exists and Barney actually visited their child. It's just too ridiculous, unlikely, and out-of-left-field to even entertain.

Quantum Physics presents scenarios that border on magic? Well, I will concede that they might seem "magical" at a cursory glance, the same way that the concept of a Heliocentric universe might seem "magical" to one who was totally illiterate on the matter. "After all", they might say, "the sun very much APPEARS to rotate around the Earth, so why the over-complicated explanation over a seemingly simple matter?". The fact is that, unlike magic, the scenarios presented by these models were derived not by armchair thinking and idle presuppositions but by observations of the universe supported and corroborated by other observations. You then see why an understanding of the field in question is necessary: If you do not understand the reason why the "scenarios bordering on magic" are presented, you will forever see them as somewhat magical. It is only with adequate understanding in the field that you comprehend the necessity of such scenarios. This applies to EVERY dense field of knowledge.

Hmm. Once again you have quite needlessly explained to me that which I (and I imagine everyone else) understand(s) and agree(s) with. Nevertheless, once again, thank you - for as I said - I like the meticulous.

To be clear - quantum physics does not seem "magical" to me - that is only a way of speaking, a sort of figure of speech, you might say. I am sure you have heard the quote - "any sufficiently advanced technology will be indistinguishable from magic." - Arthur C. Clarke.

Or what Einstein called "spooky action at a distance" - with respect to quantum entanglement.

The point rests in the simple illustration of the fact that one must be careful with deploying the "science may achieve that in future" response to certain questions. You seem to try to draw a line between something such as probing outside the universe and something such as making a robot experience subjectivity. You say the one is justifiably considered impossible while the other is not, for you - insisting that science might make the latter possible in future. If you have grasped the point about subjectivity you will see that this is a matter that goes to the root of logicality and is not a question of scientific advancement. I did ask you if a robot could be subjective in anything. This is what you need to dwell upon. It is frankly logically impossible because everything about a robot is preprogrammed. I could develop on this by asking if a robot can have opinions, and even freewill. These are questions you need to address yourself to in order to get to the root of this matter.

In what sense do you mean?
I can't comprehend what it would mean to experience infinity, but I can certainly comprehend the concept. I'm certain you can, too, or you would be utterly lost on the topic. Infinity just means endless, or at least approaching a value of endless magnitude. I might not be able to imagine an infinite substance, but I can express and understand the implications of the concept, the same way I can comprehend the concept of cold fire or eternal bliss, unimaginable as those two might be.

Let us be simple and clear: you mentioned infinity in a context. The context was the speculation that the universe could be infinite and as such there might be nothing like "outside the universe." You further responded that you may not be qualified to comment further as you are not an astrophysicist. With respect: there is no astrophysicist who can grasp the concept of infinity: and it is a contradiction in terms to say that material objects may be infinite.

I dont know if you notice a pattern developing here. You say, hey, science may do X in future. You also say hey, the universe may be infinite, but you cant discuss it because you are not qualified. In both scenarios you are implicitly introducing an escape hatch which locks away any examination of what you are saying. We cant examine the first because you have locked it away in the future. We cant examine the second because you have restricted it to astrophysicists. Even when no astrophysicist can grasp infinity.

All of this, without me even going into the fundamental problem I hinted at when you first stepped into the thread: do you realize that since you agree that we could never prove self-consciousness in a robot, then you are basically saying that science may be able to accomplish something which is impossible to prove has been accomplished.

Do you not see a major problem here?