[size=18pt]Slaving in the Middle Belt: origins and development [/size]

The earliest phase of slavery may have been simple raiding of unstructured and diverse ethnic groups. However, once even small-scale polities develop, then predatory raiding and economic gain for both sides enter the equation. Al-Yakūbī, writing about Sahelian polities such as Kawkaw and Ghana in AD 889, says ‘I have been informed that the kings of the Sūdān sell their people without any pretext or war’ (Levtzion and
Hopkins 1981 : 22).

Organised ‘long-distance’ slavery is likely to be associated with the rise of larger polities in the region (Brett 1969; Renault 1989). Historical records suggest that the first of these was the empire of Kanem-Borno, for which kinglists suggest an origin in the 11th century (Urvoy 1949; Palmer 1928a,b; 1929; Lange 1987). From an early period the Kanembu kings regarded raiding minority peoples as a significant source of income, both for domestic work and sale.

By the 16th century slaving had become an essential part of the economy of Borno, and Fisher & Fisher (1970) argue that domestic slaves were
common even among quite ordinary households. McLeod (1912:227) notes that even the Yedina [=Buduma] of Lake Chad, a scattered and acephalous people, were likely to own 2-3 slaves per household.

Further east, we are fortunate to have a descriptive account of commercial slaving in the early nineteenth century by another non-Arab group, the Fur (El-Tounsy 1851:466 ff.). Individual Fur could make up raiding parties, and then seek authorisation, salatyeh, from the Sultan. The principal exchange model was slaves for cloth and the merchants would sometimes accompany the ghazoua (raid) to obtain priority access to newly captured slaves (cf. also Fresnel 1849). Cordell (1977, 1985) describes the parallel trade routes leading from Wadai through Libya to the markets of North Africa.

The second historical phase was the rise of the Hausa States following the Jihad that began in 1804 (see, for example, Dunbar (1977) for Damagaram or East (1971) for Bauchi). Originally driven by Fulfulde-speaking reformers, it rapidly became transformed into an exercise in political and economic hegemony, spreading as far as Adamawa in Northern Cameroun (Burnham 1980; Morrissey 1984). Within a few decades, the original Fulɓe element had become transformed into an expansion of the Hausa states, with the more traditional patterns persisting only in Adamawa (Yola and eastward) (Strümpell 1912).

Later in the century, the Arab slaver Rabeh formed a short-lived empire based in Dikwa in NE Nigeria with a far more develop
military organisation than had previously existed in this region, with forts, cannons and carrier pigeons (Figure 5). Rabeh was only overthrown by French military action (Gentil 1902; Hallam 1977).

Apart from trading slaves across the desert, slaves were increasingly used on plantations intended to supply the ruling classes in the expanding cities (Sellnow 1964; Ayandele 1967; Tambo 1976; Lennihan 1982; Porter 1989).

Slavery was very wasteful in human terms; in meeting demand for eunuchs it was claimed that only one in ten victims survived the castration
operation (Ruelle 1904; Toledano 1984). Nachtigal (1879-89, III:72) estimated that for every slave arriving in Kuka, some 3-4 must have died en route.

The greater effectiveness of the slave-raiders was associated with the large-scale importation of horses into the Western Sudan (Law 1976; Inikori 1977; Gemery & Hogendorn 1978). Although ponies apparently arrived in the region much earlier, larger Maghrebin horses were being brought across the desert by the 16th century (Blench 1993). Indeed there was a rough equivalence in value between slaves and horses
(Meillassoux 1986: 268). The Kano Chronicle (Palmer 1928b: 111) records the mid-fifteenth century exchange of twelve eunuchs from Nupe for ten horses from Kano. The more specialised food requirements and higher maintenance costs of horses imply a state system with sufficient surplus labour to keep them alive. Horses are likely to have been an essential instrument of the slavers, making possible rapid deployment of the raiders and instilling fear into agricultural populations.

Goody (1971) draws out these consequences for Northern Ghana with the corresponding evolution of ‘anti-horse’ shrines among indigenous populations. The presence of ponies in local Nigerian polities meant that the slavers occasionally met some well-equipped and determined resistance (Morrison 1982). The Mwaghavul [=Sura] routed the forces of Yakubu, Emir of Bauchi, with their highly mobile ponies, while the Boze [=Buji] and Berom of Du ambushed the Bauchi army in 1873.

It seems that the states south of the desert first became familiar with firearms from the desert trade, as many Sahelian languages have a name for ‘gun’ based on Arabic al-bunduqqiya (e.g. Hausa bíndígà) which is in turn derived from the Arabic name for ‘Venice’. In the 1570s, Turkish musketeers were brought across the desert by Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu and used in his campaigns (Palmer 1926). Muskets were used in the
overthrow of the Songhai empire by the Moroccans in 1591 (Law 1976). Nonetheless, it seems that in practice the vast majority of guns came from the coastal trade and took a long time to penetrate the interior in quantities large enough to make a major difference to military tactics. Firearms were being imported on a large scale through southern ports by the nineteenth century and local blacksmiths learnt how to make copies
of the relatively simple flintlocks, locally known as ‘dane-guns’ (Inikori 1977). There is a strong argument for suggesting that this confluence of technology was responsible for ramping up the incidence of slaving in the Middle Belt.

What little evidence exists for the ethnic affiliation of slaves suggests that the earlier depredations were directed against more northern populations. Çelebi records two languages, Bornavi and Maiburni, both essentially Kanuri, from his Cairo informants. Seetzen was able to
record an entire grammar of Áffadéh [Kotoko on the Logone] from captives in North Africa (Vater 1816). Kanuri ‘islands’ resulting from the slave trade persisted in the Sahara until recent times (Fuchs 1983). However, with the rise of the Hausa states and the expansion of demand for slaves, the depredations spread further south, with a greater impact on what is now the Middle Belt of Nigeria and corresponding areas of
Cameroun and Chad.

Ironically, as demand began to ramp up in the early part of the 19th century, the two slave trades began to encounter one another and
compete. Sigismund Koelle, who collected linguistic data from freed slaves in Sierra Leone in the 1850s, recorded a significant number of Middle Belt languages (Hair 1965). Castelnau (1851) conducting interviews amongst slaves in Brazil, recorded vocabularies from
several Plateau languages as well as Hausa and Fulfulde.

Direct evidence does not really become abundant until the nineteenth century, when the first travellers (who were obliged to make use of the caravans mounted by the slavers) began crossing the desert to report on the kingdoms of the Sahel. A reconstruction of the biography of Madugu Mohamman mai Gashin Baki recorded by Eduard Flegel in the nineteenth century provides a firsthand account of a slaver comparable to Hamman Yaji in the 1920s (Flegel & Duffill 1985).

In the 1960s, Smith (1967) recorded the memories of Ali Eisami Gazirmabe of Bornu who had participated in the last days of the
trade. Images of slave raids such as that witnessed by Clapperton and the cruelties of the slave caravan excited popular sympathy with the abolitionist lobby in Europe.

The scale of internal slavery in the Sahel could be quite significant; figures given by Klein (1994) for some settlements in Francophone Africa estimate that some 40-50% could be of slave descent. Perbi (2004) records extensive internal slavery in Ghana from the 15th century onwards.

Nonetheless, slaves were predominantly for export to North Africa (Austen 1992; Lavers 1994; see the comparative estimates in
Wright 2007). The rise of the regency of Tunis in the late eighteenth century can be attributed to its direct control over the trans-Saharan trade and it links with Kanem-Bornu (Limam 1981).

It might be imagined that the conquest of Nigeria by Lord Lugard in 1901 would have led to the immediate and unconditional end to slavery, given the strong moral position taken by Britain a century previously . In reality, however, the British colonial authorities were compelled to develop the notion of ‘indirect rule’ which allowed them to govern this vast area with very limited troops and resources. There was, moreover, quite a strong element of fantasy in the notion of indirect rule, which in Lugard’s view amounted to little more than reforming the taxation system and allowing ‘native’ institutions to function.

However, this required the maintenance of an uneasy relationship with slaving culture, and the authorities both permitted the keeping of slaves taken in the pre-colonial era as well as taking no action on active slaving in remote and ‘unpacified’ regions. As Tibenderana (1987) points out, from the surrender of the Waziri of Sokoto in March 1903 to the 1930s, the British authorities regularly over-rode traditional kingmakers and appointed the Sultans, fearing Mahdist-inspired revolts, such as that at Satiru in 1906.

Indeed, Governor Hugh Clifford’s 1923 reference to ‘these days of Pan-Islamic propaganda’ has a curiously modern ring to it (quoted in
Tibenderana 1987:245). The most notorious example of this was the Fulɓe slaver Hamman Yaji, the Emir of Madagali, who was operating in the Adamawa area until 1927.

Unusually, Hamman Yaji left diaries, written in Arabic, which provide a striking insight into the mentality of these individuals (Vaughan
& Kirk-Greene 1995). There is a strong argument for saying that the move by the colonial authorities against Hamman Yaji was not motivated by any liberal abolitionist impulses, but by a very real, if probably unjustified fear of Mahdism. Vaughan & Kirk-Greene (1995:17) establish that he had ceased slaving some years before and the administration’s real motive may have been fear of his Mahdist sympathies.
Alternatively this was a cover for their embarrassment at not having taken action sooner.
.

seun, lalasticlala at least one nairaland written article a day.

[size=18pt]Consequences for distribution of population [/size]

Persistent slave-raiding had very significant consequences for the settlement patterns of the peoples living immediately due south of the Muslim polities all across the region into Central Africa (e.g. for Chad see Azevedo 1982). In describing the Nigerian Middle Belt, Wallace (1902) observes;

In Nassarawa country, a once fertile and populous province, one can only view the remains and ruins of large and totally deserted towns, bearing witness to the desolation wrought by 100 years of internecine strife and slave-raiding by the Fulani. - (W. Wallace [1902] quoted in Sciortino 1920:5)

Wilson-Haffenden (1930:45), commenting on the impact of slaving on plains settlements in Nassarawa Province, says;

The remaining inhabitants of such towns fled to the hills in all directions; those who approached the eastern and north-eastern confines of the Province, until they learned how to defend themselves, were further raided by the Headhunting tribes who inhabit these hilly localities. … Such was the state of the Province when the arrival of Sir Frederick Lugard put a stop to the slave-raiding, and evolved law and order out of chaos and ruin. - (Sciortino 1920:5)

The hill communities and their abandonment was the subject of some study at the end of the colonial era. Conant (1962) and Gleave (1965, 1966) described the ‘down from the Hills’ progression as it was in about 1960. Nonetheless the exact impact on population density remained controversial (Gleave & Prothero 1971 with reply by Mason also Mason 1969).

Communities such as the Kofyar, on the southern edge of the Jos escarpment, were still very much a hill people when described by Netting in the 1960s (Netting 1968). By the time Netting’s students came to restudy them in the 1980s, they had largely descended to the plain, and
radically changed their agriculture and settlement patterns (Stone 1996). The hill settlements retain considerable importance for many peoples, and the Tarok, for example still climb to their old settlements for the celebration of key annual rites. Mangut (1998) describes the structure of abandoned hill dwellings among the Ron people from an archaeological perspective.

Open country made a permanent relocation to the hills more difficult, and many peoples had to resort to hiding in caves to escape the mounted raiders. [size=18pt]In 1979, the Gbari peoples west of modern-day Suleja (previously Abuja and a notorious slaving centre) were still able to identify the caves formerly used a refuges in the slaving era.[/size]

Alternatively it was possible to protect settlements through concentrating houses in nuclei and surrounding the whole settlement with spiny ‘cactus’ (Euphorbia kamerunica). The poisonous sap of the euphorbia made attacks by horse-mounted raiders risky. The Berom of the Jos Plateau, for example, built compounds entered by passing through a maze of narrow tunnels, with blind alleys and misleading passages, enabling the inhabitants to attack horsemen (Denyer 1978:9).

Seignobos (1980) and Bah (2003) describe the complex systems of fortifications végétales built in northern Cameroun and Chad to frustrate Borno and Wandala slavers, which involved a whole variety of different plant species.

this is insightful article.

A related consequence of the slave trade was to establish outposts of Hausa traders in zongos all across the Middle Belt (James n.d.). Towns such as Keffi and Kontagora became important centres for the slavers and thus more general hubs of trade routes and so were eventually converted into chiefdoms (Hogben & Kirk-Greene 1966).

In Adamawa, the Fulɓe remained dominant in the towns while even Kanuri settlements such as Lafia were retained (Sciortino 1920). These in
turn became important economic centres, serving long-distance trade, increasingly foodstuffs, as the urbanisation following colonial rule increased demand from the cities.

Another aspect of the transformation of the Middle Belt was the establishment of rinji or slave settlements within the territories of the
indigenous populations (Hill 1976). These were inhabited by a core of Fulɓe and rumada or settled slaves (Bruce 1982). The rumada were slaves who no longer retained an ethnic identity and so were less likely to run away. Slave settlements could not be maintained without the consent of the local populations, since such villages would be too vulnerable to attack.

In the case of Gindiri, south of the Jos Plateau, the rinji became the focus of a trade between the local Fyem [=Pyem] people and the Hausa. More strikingly, an important source of the slaves was not raiding but purchases from other nearby ethnic groups.
Bruce (1982:193-194) cites examples of Ngas and Zaar [=Sayawa] men selling their daughters for cash to increase their social status. Males were not sold in this way, but the Fyem apparently engaged in the kidnapping of children on bush paths for transformation into slaves (see also Machunga n.d.).

[size=18pt] The end of slaving and the colonial re-adjustment [/size]

The embarrassing reality was that slavery in Nigeria underwent a ‘slow death’, to use the opportune term of Hogendorn and
Lovejoy (1993). Although Lugard’s pronouncements in the early post-conquest period seemed to suggest it would no longer be tolerated, it was evidently difficult to simply halt the process in northern Nigeria in view of how deeply it was embedded (Ubah 1991).

Moreover, and this is part of the ambiguity of the colonial attitude, it was necessary to keep traditional rulers on board as part of a longer term strategy to counter real or imagined radicalism. Klein (1998) records similar problematic attitudes in the Francophone regions of
West Africa. Even relative liberals such as Temple (1918) argued that the system of domestic slavery should not be summarily dismantled.

Slaves whose original ethnic identity had been abolished were still working within the Hausa system in the first quarter of the twentieth century (Figure 10). A decree finally abolishing slavery was only promulgated in 1936, although by this time, almost all those former slaves who
maintained an ethnic identity had left for their home area (Olusanya 1966).

At the same time, colonial policy promoted the use of Hausa and Islamic courts, which had the contrary effect of cementing the power of the former slavers . Indirect rule kept the Muslim rulers of outlying settlements such as Keffi and Ibi in place. Indirect rule also maintained these islands of Hausa dominance through the colonial era and preserved their authority through a court system controlled by Muslim qadis
even in rather marginal Islamic areas. Fulɓe pastoralists could count on the incursions of their cattle into fields of crops being subject to only minor penalties in the courts when they were opposed to non-Muslims. It also became advantageous for local rulers to either convert to Islam or adopt its outward form.

Turaki (1993:99) observes;

It can hardly be doubted that the practice of placing large numbers of pagans under Fulani District Heads and supporting the authority of these by the powers of government when and where necessary, led to an extension of Islam. … The pagan headman tended to start wearing Muslim dress especially when they were called to meetings at the District Headquarters and this donning of the garb of the Muslim often proved the first step to Islam. and their final subjugation [my words]

Dino Melaye dresses in Huasa Fulani attire
[img]http://1.bp..com/-g8a3TRqFy3s/Vo0yiKB1XcI/AAAAAAAAkqQ/D5n5O56bNuU/s640/IMG-20160104-WA0019-787736.jpg[/img]

This in turn has had a direct impact on issues such as the boundaries of post-colonial Nigerian states. The original Kaduna state, for example, was a long narrow strip that stretched from Katsina on the northern border down through Zaria. Kaduna included many of the communities in Southern Zaria that were subjugated by Zazzau in the slave-raiding era. Even when the Katsina Emirate became a separate state, the remaining rump of Kaduna State persisted with this awkward conjunction, binding together resentful minority communities, generally oriented towards Christianity, with their former antagonists from further north. Historically this has often been the source of conflict and this state of affairs is likely to continue.

[size=18pt]Restructured relations in the post-Independence era [/size]

After Nigerian Independence in 1960, a slow but ineluctable shift in power relations began. The anomaly of
Hausa/Fulani political and economic dominance in the Middle Belt became more apparent as more members of indigenous communities began to pass through the school system. The slow growth of representative elections to Local Government posts initiated a shift in power from a traditional Islamised elite to an ethnically diverse constituency (Ngu 1994).

Frequent periods of military rule had a tendency to freeze the political process, but gradually, as more minority populations became politically active, the inequities of minority power in the Middle Belt were more apparent (Aliyu & Koehn 1982). As a consequence, deferred resentment over the dislocations of the slaving era have intensified, culminating in communal riots, probably beginning with those in Kafanchan in 1987, in which indigenous populations attacked the Hausa trading community (Akinwumi 2004). The consequence has been that the Hausa (and indeed Muslims in general) have tended to leave these areas and retreat further north, just as attacks on Christians in northern towns,
accelerating in the 1990s, have reduced the resident southern communities and further polarised the opposition between them (cf. essays in Otite & Albert 1999; Bagudu 2004).

Factors leading To The resurgence of Jihad

The key process has been the gradual taking of power in Local Government by the minorities. Nigeria has a complex system of Local Government Areas (LGAs), which are in a constant state of fission (O’Donovan 1992). From only 140 in 1960, there are now 774, with unilaterally declared LGAs adding to the total. In governance terms, this is not cost-effective as expenditures on salaries and infrastructure eat into operational
funds. Yet they are highly satisfactory in political terms since they express clearly local conceptions of ethnicity or sub-ethnic units, such as clans. So power-brokers have gradually shifted away from the Hausa, Kanuri and Fulɓe to courting minority ethnic groups (Wunsch & Olowu 1996). At the same time, the court system has gradually shifted from Sharia to the national system; the justice it provides may be no more attractive to external observers but it signals a movement away from an increasingly alien system.

Sharia criminal law was introduced in 1999 in many northern States, including those with substantial nonMuslim populations, in direct conflict with Nigeria’s Federal constitution. Originally applied even to Christian/traditional communities, many states have had to backtrack, for example Borno and Kaduna, and allow the system of justice to be decided by individual local LGAs. The adoption of Sharia law can be interpreted as an attempt to seize back the political initiative from the increasingly assertive minorities.
Nonetheless, the intermingling of communities has created a rich vein of conflict which has several times surfaced in violence, especially in the ‘Plateau Crisis’ of 2001 where peoples such as the Berom and Irigwe rose up and expelled or killed northern migrants, even where they had been settled in the region for as much as a century (Bala et al. 2002).

Perversely, there has been a simultaneous expansion of the numbers and titles of traditional rulers among minorities, based largely on the Hausa model they affect to despise. A study by Blench et al. (2005) showed that pressure to create ‘chiefs’ has resulted in the appointment de novo of ‘traditional rulers’ in many areas as well as the upgrading of existing chiefs. The colonial authorities initiated a system of four ‘classes’
of chief and this system has been both maintained and further consolidated within the Nigerian bureaucratic system (Oladimeji 1985). These chiefs have little real power, as their financial resources are limited, except where they have become wealthy prior to appointment; indeed traditional titles are now sometimes seen as a confirmation of wealth and prestige acquired in civil society. Intriguingly, typically Hausa icons of power, such as long trumpets, swords, sandals and ostrich feather fans are often faithfully reproduced, even among non-Muslims. For example, the Ninkyob people in Kaduna State were traditionally a segmentary society with no central political authority and a strongly antiIslamic ethos. However, after years of agitation, a chief was created by the state government in 2004. A ‘palace’ was promptly constructed and Hausa-style regalia commissioned.


Gomo of Kuje in Hausa/Fulani attire and palace guards dressed in attire similar to that of the northern emirates

[size=18pt]Reframing oral traditions [/size]

The manipulation of oral traditions by elite groups is hardly new, and Stevens (1975) presents a case-study of the restructuring of the Kisra legend to underpin current power relations in the Borgu Emirate. The slave trade has a tendency to be downplayed in elite narratives and minorities are supposed to have submitted peaceably to the rule of the Emirates. Despite this, the era is increasingly a source of anger in the
descendants of those affected and episodes from the trade are recalled in notional oral traditions. Two cairns at Panshanu on the Jos-Bauchi road represent a very public reminder of the impact of slave raiding on the Izere people and others in the Toro area. The individual stones represent the heads of every non-Fulani killed in the resistance.
In the face of this, part of the process of restructuring relations between the elite and the minorities is reframing oral traditions to match the new equations of power.

The case of Hamman Yaji, the Adamawa slaver, is mentioned above as part of the final days of raiding. Hamman Yaji was arrested in 1927 by the British, first taken via Yola to Sokoto and then finally exiled in Kaduna, where he died of septicaemia in 1929 (Vaughan & Kirk-Greene 1995). However, this is a far from theatrical or moral end for an individual who caused so much misery, and the populations he raided have
now developed their own distinctive narrative more in keeping with retributive justice. The lead up to his arrest has been embroidered with magical circumstances and unlikely events in keeping with older traditions. According to a version recounted by the montagnard peoples of the Gwoza hills, they assembled at Durghwe (a major landmark and regional rain shrine) in Dghweɗe and sent a delegation to the Shehu of
Bornu, in Maiduguri, to complain about Hamman Yaji’s slaving activities. Vaima, a member of the Ɗagha (peacemaker) lineage was chosen to lead a multi-ethnic expedition. The Ɗagha are ritual specialists who hold power through the magical properties of Cissus quadrangularis, a succulent liana. Vaima publicly swallowed a large number of cut pieces of the liana together with sorghum beer. The expedition followed a
certain predestined route which involved passing sites where further ceremonies with the remaining Cissus had to be carried out. The expedition led them to the Wandala of Mora, to Dikwa, the regional colonial headquarters and from there to Maiduguri where they informed the Shehu of Hamman Yaji’s atrocities.

Acting on this, the Shehu of Bornu informed the British governor who invited the delegation to go with a group of British soldiers to Madagali. By the time they reached Madagali, Hamman Yaji had escaped into the hills, but his hiding place was discovered. The British officer was so angry with Hamman Yaji that he wanted to shoot him on the spot, but Vaima stopped him because Hamman Yaji had licked Vaima’s back as
a sign of submission. However, Hamman Yaji was later killed, though with difficulty because of his magical powers. None of the Dghweɗe delegation survived long, including Vaima, perhaps due to the ingestion of significant amounts of Cissus quadrangularis. Vaima’s courageous actions are still recounted today as part of a broader anti-slavery narrative despite their tenuous relation with recorded historical material.

Another example of how the memories of the slave trade are still very much alive in current politics, can be found among the Mada people. The Mada live north of Akwanga in central Nigeria and were extensively slaved in the late nineteenth century. The grandfather of Barau Kato, a modern researcher on Mada, was captured by the slavers in c. 1895. He was carried in a caravan to Keffi and kept in a slave encampment
until a sufficient number could be aggregated to be sold on further north. He managed to escape and made his way back to his home community, but other Mada disappeared forever during this period. His ability to recount this experience to the community stimulated intense opposition to Hausa domination in a region where the British promoted the use of Hausa-speaking officials in the colonial era. This was also responsible for the rejection of Islam by a majority of the Mada and for their early adoption of Christianity.

omenka come and see how the Hausa Fulani dey sell una since 1805

^^^^^And who sell una within and beyond the shores of Africa to the Caribbeans and Americas packed in ships like sardines?

ItsMeAboki:
^^^^^And who sell una within and beyond the shores of Africa to the Caribbeans and Americas packed in ships like sardines?

From this article, there is a very strong chance that you are a descendant of one of those captured slaves.

Slavery is the foundation for the North.

bump!

You deserve a Medals for Copy and Paste , Wahla igo lonpa oni Icewater

Hamman Yaji