[b]Baga: the carnage, inaccurate reportage and Government ‘indifference’ (2)

To the credit of Goodluck Jonathan though, he has embarked on one of the largest military overhauls in the history of the African continent. Never, since the times of the Murtala-Obasanjo administration (when with Gen TY Danjuma as Chief of Army Staff, the country reduced its army from 250,000 to 90,000, mechanised the entire force, ordered several warships including the MEKO Frigate NNS Aradu and other missile carriers, most of which arrived during the time of President Shehu Shagari) has any country begun the kind of procurement of modern equipment now being supplied to the Nigerian military. Though he dallied, Jonathan has since ‘woken up’ and obtained state-of-the art helicopter gunships (latest Mi-35) not found in any African inventory except perhaps in that of the Algerian Air Force; and modern T-72 tanks for the Nigerian Army Armoured Corps as well as Stealth Frigates for the Nigerian Navy. The Air Force is also reportedly expecting delivery of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets—the first country after Pakistan and China—who jointly built the aircraft, to induct the airframe.

These procurements have had a great impact in reversing the gains of Boko Haram. What is not helping is President Jonathan not having a clear policy on the political component to the military campaign. Many Nigerian, and indeed, domestic and western media, fail to acknowledge that there is nowhere in the world where an insurgency of this nature, fuelled by such extremist ideology, can be defeated on the battlefield and this explains why the gains of the Nigerian military are not rightfully understood and have not been complemented by an appropriate political plan. Indeed, anyone with even a basic knowledge of strategic studies will admit that the military strategy in this situation should simply be to frustrate Boko Haram, make it realise that it cannot win on the battlefield, and consequently force it to negotiate and concede its hardline demands. Last October, the Nigerian army seemed to have achieved just that with the rout of the insurgents at the Battle of Konduga, to which the insurgents had committed massive equipment and personnel and during which the group’s leader at the time, Abubakar Shekau II was killed (he has since been replaced by another version, a treble). Rather than ride that victory, political aides advised the Nigerian President to halt the military advance and start negotiations, ostensibly to free the Chibok girls. Not a few experts in Nigeria agree that that was the greatest mistake this administration might have made since full-scale military operations against Boko Haram began. The lull gave the insurgents a breathing space and recover they surely did!

The aftermath of those ‘negotiations’ supposedly midwifed by President Deby of Chad, as well as the reported arrest of a close ally of his by Sudanese authorities for illegally purchasing arms for Boko Haram on Sudanese territory, clearly suggested that Chad may not be an honest ally of Nigeria’s in the on-going campaign against the insurgency. Furthermore, Chad’s reputation has not been helped by the reported withdrawal of Chadian forces from Baga two days before the latest deadly attack described at the top of this analysis was launched by the extremists. This definitely strengthens the hand of those observers and civil society groups who demand tougher action by Nigeria and the international community against Chad.

The role of the United States of America and France in the Boko Haram crisis—as well as how relations with these powers have been managed by President Jonathan— have also been called into question by some domestic observers and a section of retired Nigerian military officers. To begin with, when the group abducted the Chibok girls and Western countries offered to help search for them, the Nigerian government ought to have been specific and focused on the type of help it would need, especially because what was finally offered—the use of surveillance aircraft—was the type already available and that had been deployed extensively to no avail by the Nigerian Air Force (conducting Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance- ISR- operations with its ATR surveillance aircraft). The Nigerian political authorities thus gave the impression that they were not even aware of the capability of their own forces! It was no surprise therefore when the western air forces could not do better than the NAF!

Read the conclusion at http://www.gaskiya.net/[/b]