The General Courts Martial which have recently concluded in various
locations give us an interesting insight into the way Operation Zaman Lafiya
is conducted and the conditions of the soldiers at the front.
In the trial of troops from 111 Battalion (111 Bn), the CO Lt Col Timothy
Opurum described the operation that led to the alleged mutiny it involved 3
Battalions launching sequential attacks on 3 enemy held towns. 111 Bn was
tasked with capturing Delwa in order to allow 251 Bn and 252 Bn to pass
through and capture Bulabulin and Dabwa.
Despite a ration strength of 750 men, the CO only had 4 officers and 98 other
ranks under his command (i.e. a Company).
A standard infantry battalion consists of at least 3 Companies (about
120-150 men in 3-4 Platoons each) along with support, logistics,
administration and other echelon.
In other words 111 Bn was effectively down to 14% of its stated strength. By
virtually every matrix it was combat ineffective. For transport and support the
unit had 6 x Toyota Hiluxs and 1 x APC (type unknown). It is not clear
whether the Hiluxs were armed or what support weapons the Battalion had or
whether there was air or artillery support available.
The soldiers (fairly understandably) balked at such an operation however the
4 officers and 29 other ranks (i.e. a platoon) conducted the attack and
secured Delwa without incurring any casualties.
On 18 August they were attacked and overrun by a larger enemy force with
friendly forces not sustaining any casualties but losing 3 vehicles, 1 x GPMG
and 4 x rifles. The Battalion counter attacked on 20 August (with the 47
non conforming soldiers taking part bringing them back up to 98 men)
retaking the town.
Prior to this operation on July 9 the Battalion had been caught in a
successful enemy ambush whilst trying to capture Bulabulin, losing 3 officers,
23 other ranks and sustaining 83 wounded, in essence losing an entire
company.
At the General Courts Martial held at Maxwell Khobe Military Cantonment,
Rukuba, Jos 3 officers and 13 other ranks were arraigned in relation to the
abductions of students from GSS Chibok. Again testimony in this case gives
insight into the conditions of frontline soldier. The platoon commander 2Lt
Godknows (who was charged with Cowardice in the face of the enemy) was
stationed in the vicinity of Chibok with 13 other ranks armed only with their
personal weapons (AK 47s) and an unspecified ‘limited’ amount of
ammunition, no mention is made of transport, machine guns or any other
support weapons. A platoon normally consists of 30 men (further broken
down to 3 x 8 or 10 man sections) so 2Lt Godknows essentially only had half
a unit or at best 2 weak sections of 7 men each at his disposal.
On the night of 14/ 15 April 2014, Chibok was attacked by approximately 200
Boko Haram fighters mounted in pick up trucks armed with rifles, crew served
weapons, RPGs and IEDs. In essence the platoon was outnumbered 15: 1 and
completely outgunned.
Despite these odds 2Lt Godknows allegedly attacked the enemy with 9 men
leaving 4 men to guard their base. They fought until they ran out of
ammunition and then withdrew.
Lt Col Ojo was charged with failing to reinforce Chibok during the attack, in
his defence he states he was unable to communicate with units based in
Damboa.
203 soldiers from 19 Bn were allegedly dismissed after a summary General
Courts Martial for disobeying an order (the soldiers claim they were tasked
for an operation in Bama and Gwoza and were being transported into combat
in tipper trucks and without support weapons). Media reports state that one
of the soldiers claims they were given 2 weeks leave after returning from an
operation in Damboa in which their CO and several others were killed.
Returning from leave they claimed they were issued with new uniforms and
30 rounds of ammunition each as opposed to the ‘customary’ 60 rounds
prior to the above mentioned operation. When they questioned this, they were
told to stand down and then arrested the next day.
60 rounds is just 2 magazines, even at a deliberate rate of fire these fellows
would have gone through their ammunition in 6 minutes, with just 30 rounds
they would have fired it all of 3 minutes or less at best and this is literally at
best. It is no way near enough ammunition for any Army much less a
professional army with an arms factory in Kaduna and access to the world’s
arms market.
These trials have highlighted several things, the first and for me the most
important is that despite negative press and adverse conditions, by all
accounts the quality of the Nigerian soldier is extremely high.
Any Army that produces young officers who will reportedly lead 9 men with
rifles against 200 armed with rifles, machine guns, crew served weapons and
RPGs has young officers it can be proud of.
When 30 men out of a battalion of 750 can successfully capture an enemy
held town and despite being outnumbered hold it for 2 weeks and still
withdraw in good order with no casualties then we have battalions we can be
proud of.
When you have soldiers who initially refuse to soldier on, volunteering to go
back into the fight despite being outgunned and outnumbered to help their
besieged friends and commander then we have soldiers (however initially
misguided) we can be proud of.
These all indicate that the most important moral qualities that a soldier can
ask for exist in the Nigerian Army, comradeship, sacrifice, loyalty, discipline
and most of all courage.
We definitely have soldiers we can be proud of, now we need the Army to
lead, provide and look after them in a way they deserve. https://peccaviconsulting./2015/01/08/mutiny-in-the-sahel/

it is unfair

I personally know for a fact that troops carry at least 6 to 7 mags(210 rounds) ..guess mistakes had 2 be made b4 corrections are made

if all these are to be the true situation of things up there in the Northeast... then i salute the great courage and gallantry of every member of the armed forces there. Even corruption found its way into our armed forces. tooooo bad