During a video released on March 7, 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau for­mally swore an oath of allegiance to the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). In his pledge, also known as "bay'a," Shek­au publicly accepted the authority of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and vowed to support him in times of "dif­ficulty and prosperity." Shekau further called upon "Muslims everywhere to pledge allegiance to the Caliph and sup­port him." On March 12, ISIS spokes­man Mohammed al-Adani graciously accepted Shekau's oath of fealty in an audiotape recording.

This is significant in that it has the potential to formalize a relationship be­tween two of the deadliest Islamist ex­tremist organizations currently in op­eration. According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, Boko Haram and ISIS together ac­counted for more than 60 percent of all deaths attributed to Islamist extremism in 2014. Moreover, while it may not be the first group to ally with ISIS with allegiances already pledged from jihad­ist groups in Pakistan, Libya, Egypt, and Algeria, Boko Haram is certainly the largest. According to United States in­telligence officials, it has 4,000 to 6,000 core fighters, making it several times larger than ISIS's largest-known affili­ates in Egypt (Wilayat Sinai) and Libya (Wilayat al-Barqah, Wilayat al-Tarabu­lus, and Wilayat al-Fizan).For many an­alysts, Boko Haram's announcement comes as no surprise.

In a December 2014 briefing, Jamestown Foundation analyst Jacob Zenn presented compel­ling evidence of Boko Haram shifting almost completely into ISIS's orbit. In particular, Zenn noted Boko Haram was increasingly using ISIS imagery in its video communiques, such as incor­porating the rayat al-uqab (the black standard or banner) flag as part of its own logo. Boko Haram's use of Islamic chants or "nasheeds," and the inclusion of an al-Baghdadi sermon in its videos, was seen as further evidence of an ide­ological, and potentially operational, contiguity with ISIS. Suggestions of growing symbiosis gained further trac­tion in January 2015 when Boko Ha­ram launched its al-'Urwah al-Wuthqa media wing, whose videos bore the sleek production quality and graphics associated with ISIS a significant im­provement on previous Boko Haram videos. Moreover, as highlighted by Ji­hadology founder Aaron Y. Zelin, re­leases from Boko Haram's media wing were being disseminated by official and semi-official ISIS social media ac­counts. This, Zelin correctly predicted, was a precursor to a more formal rela­tionship.

But, if Boko Haram had al­ready established ties with ISIS in 2014, why has the group only offered its alle­giance now? A possible explanation is that ISIS may not have previously been ready to accept Boko Haram as an offi­cial franchise. Although it espouses a similar brand of religious ideology, the Nigerian sect has lacked the credentials of the quintessential Salafi-jihadist movement. For one, unlike many of its counterparts, it has failed to attract the endorsement of any notable religious scholars within or outside of Nigeria's borders. Equally conspicuous is the fact that the global jihadist community has never attempted to justify or even con­done the group's armed campaign. Boko Haram's massacring of civilian popula­tions in north-eastern Nigeria may have also prevented formalized ties with ISIS. Although it is equally brutal, ISIS has been methodical in its use of vio­lence, generally framing it as retribu­tive and/or justifiable under Sharia Law. Moreover, ISIS has been able to offset its violent characterization by establish­ing legitimate administration struc­tures in areas assimilated into its sup­posed caliphate. By comparison, Boko Haram appears to be both gratuitous and explicit in its use of violence. As noted by David Cook of the James Bak­er III Institute for Public Policy, Boko Haram's mass killings, pillaging, and enslavement of children more closely match the operations of an African guerrilla movement than those of a Salafi-jihadist organization. Since pur­portedly establishing links with ISIS in 2014, Boko Haram has, however, made considerable efforts to transform its im­age. Recent communiques have offered justification for its attacks on civilian communities and refuted claims its members were indiscriminately killing Muslims. Self-proclaimed Boko Haram spokesman Sheikh Abu Mus'ab al-Bar­nawi showed an uncharacteristic pious­ness when he noted that anyone "who comes repenting will be forgiven and we will give him safety and security be­cause we are a nation whose morals re­fuse us initiating harm on those who don't harm us."Also worth noting is the concerted effort to alter the depiction of Shekau. The normally erratic Boko Haram leader has appeared more com­posed in recent video messages and has increasingly assumed the role of the sect's spiritual leader or imam a ploy possibly aimed at increasing his legiti­macy within the jihadist fraternity. Ever cognizant of its public image, ISIS may have delayed an open alliance with Boko Haram until the group asserted itself as a more traditional Salafi-jihad­ist movement. The transformative pro­cess may even have been spearheaded by ISIS and its savvy public relations wing.

Another plausible explanation for the timing of Boko Haram's declaration may relate to its composition. Although Boko Haram is often described as a ho­mogenous entity, many analysts have argued it functions more as an umbrel­la organization composed of various factions. The International Crisis Group has noted that Boko Haram may have as many as six of these factions, the largest and most powerful of which falls under the direct command of Shekau. That hypothesis was echoed by Jacob Zenn in a briefing to West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. For its part, ISIS seemed to have doubts about the homogeneity of Boko Haram and the Nigerian jihadist movement as a whole as recently as last year. In the No­vember 2014 edition of its official on­line magazine Dabiq, it noted it had ac­cepted ba yat from a number of foreign groups, including those based in Nige­ria, but the declaration of an ISIS wilay­at, or province, in these areas was de­layed due to the presence of stronger and larger groups which had yet to sub­mit to the authority of the caliph. The subsequent formalizing of the alliance may therefore represent enhanced syn­ergy and coordination within Boko Ha­ram. The pertinent question now is how the declaration could benefit either group, if at all. To begin with, it is clear that a formal alliance could be of sig­nificant symbolic and even strategic value to both.

For ISIS, declaring a "province" in Africa's most populous country will...
http://authorityngr.com/2015/11/Boko-Haram-s-pledge-to-ISIS--Public-relations-or-reality-/

Boko Boys, your days are numbered- Army Chief 2015