The formerly secret files on the
Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s
show very clear British complicity
in the Nigerian government’s
aggression against the region of
Biafra, where an independence
movement was struggling to
secede from Nigeria. This brutal
civil war resulted in between one
and three million deaths; it also
significantly helped shape modern
Nigeria, and not least the division
of oil revenues between the
central government and the
regions and people.
Background to civil war
For those in Britain old enough to
remember the war in Nigeria in
the late 1960s, ‘Biafra’ probably
still conjures up images of
starving children – the result of
the blockade imposed by the
Nigerian government in Lagos to
defeat the secession of the
eastern region, Biafra. For
Biafrans themselves, the period
was one of immense suffering – it
is still not known how many died
at this time as a direct result of
the war and the blockade, but it
is believed to be at least one
million and as high as three
million.
For those seeking to understand
Britain’s role in the world, there is
now an important side of the
Biafran story to add – British
complicity in the slaughter. The
declassified files show that the
then Wilson government backed
the Nigerian government all the
way, arming its aggression and
apologising for its actions. It is
one of the sorrier stories in
British foreign policy, though by
no means unusual.
The immediate background to the
war was a complex one of
tensions and violence between
Nigeria’s regions and ethnic
groups, especially between those
from the east and the north. In
January 1966 army officers had
attempted to seize power and
the conspirators, most of whom
were Ibos (from the East)
assassinated several leading
political figures as well as officers
of northern origin. Army
commander Major General Ironsi,
also an Ibo, intervened to restore
discipline in the army, suspended
the constitution, banned political
parties, formed a Federal Military
Government (FMG) and appointed
military governors to each of
Nigeria’s regions.
Ironsi’s decree in March 1966,
which abolished the Nigerian
federation and unified the
federal and regional civil services,
was perceived by many not as an
effort to establish a unitary
government but as a plot by the
Ibo to dominate Nigeria. Troops
of northern origin, who dominated
the Nigerian infantry, became
increasingly restive and fighting
broke out between them and Ibo
soldiers in garrisons in the south.
In June, mobs in northern cities,
aided by local officials, carried out
a pogrom against resident Ibos,
massacring several hundred
people and destroying Ibo-owned
property.It was in this context that in July
1966 northern officers staged a
countercoup during which Ironsi
and other Ibo officers were killed.
Lieutenant Colonel (later General)
Yakubu ‘Jack’ Gowon emerged as
leader. The aim of the coup was
both to take revenge on the Ibos
for the coup in January but also
to promote the secession of the
north, although Gowon soon
pulled back from calling explicitly
for this. Gowon named himself as
the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces and head of the
military government, which was
rejected by the military governor
in the eastern region, Lieutenant
Colonel Ojukwu, who claimed, with
some justification, that the
Gowon regime was illegitimate.
Throughout late 1966 and 1967
the tempo of violence increased.
In September 1966 attacks on
Ibos in the north were renewed
with unprecedented ferocity,
stirred up, eastern region officials
believed, by northern political
leaders. Reports circulated that
troops from the northern region
had participated in the
massacres. The estimated
number of deaths ranged from
10,000 to as high as 30,000. More
than one million Ibos returned to
the eastern region in fear.
In January 1967 the military
leaders met in Aburi, Ghana. By
this time the eastern region
under Ojukwu was threatening
secession. Many of Ojukwu’s
eastern colleagues were now
arguing that the massacres the
previous September showed that
the country could not be reunited
amicably. In a last minute effort
at Aburi to hold Nigeria together,
an accord was agreed that
provided for a loose
confederation of regions. Gowon
issued a decree implementing the
Aburi agreement and even the
northern region now favoured
the formation of a multistate
federation. The federal civil
service, however, vigorously
opposed the Aburi agreement and
sought to scupper it.
Ojukwu and Gowon then disputed
what exactly had been agreed at
Aburi, especially after the Federal
Military Government (FMG) issued
a further decree in March which
was seen by Ojukwu as reneging
on the FMG’s commitment at Aburi
to give the eastern region
greater autonomy. The new
decree gave the federal
government the right to declare a
state of emergency in any region
and to ensure that any regional
government could not undermine
the executive authority of the
federal government. Ojukwu then
gave an ultimatum to Gowon that
the eastern region would begin
implementing its understanding
of the Aburi agreement, providing
for greater regional autonomy, by
31 March.While Biafra was threatening to
secede and declare an
independent state, the FMG
imposed sanctions against it to
bring it into line. On 26 May the
eastern region consultative
assembly voted to secede from
Nigeria and the following day
Gowon declared a state of
emergency throughout the
country, banned political activity
and announced a decree restoring
full powers to the FMG. Also
announced was a decree dividing
the country into twelve states,
including six in the north and
three in the east.
On 30 May 1967 Biafra declared
independence and on 7 July the
FMG began operations to defeat
it. It lasted until January 1970 as
an extremely well-equipped
Nigerian federal army of over
85,000 men supplied by Britain,
the Soviet Union and few others,
took on a volunteer Biafran army,
much of whose equipment initially
came from captured Nigerian
supplies and which only later was
able to procure relatively small
quantities of arms from outside.
The background is therefore very
complex and it remains far from
clear cut as to where the ‘blame’
lay for the failure of peaceful
negotiations and the resort to
war. It does appear, however,
that the FMG did go back on its
agreement at Aburi on the extent
of regional autonomy it was
prepared to offer the easterners.
Before they began to back the
FMG unequivocally once war
began, British officials had
previously recognised the
legitimacy of some of Ojukwu’s
claims. The High British
Commissioner in Lagos, Sir Francis
Cumming-Bruce, had told Gowon in
November 1966, for example, that
the September 1966 massacres
of the Ibos in the north ‘changed
the relationship between the
regions and made it impossible
for eastern Nigerians to associate
with northerners on the same
basis as in the past’. The issue
was one of basic ‘law and order
and physical safety throughout
the federation’. He told Gowon
that the FMG had to go ‘a
considerable distance to meet the
views of Colonel Ojukwu’.
British officials also recognised
that the Aburi agreements were
‘extremely woolly on many
important points and lend
themselves to infinite arguments
over interpretation’. By end
January 1967 Cumming-Bruce was
saying that both Gowon and
Ojuwku were ‘seriously at fault
and they share responsibility for
poisoning of atmosphere [sic]‘.
Then there was the wider
question of whether it was
legitimate for a region to secede
and whether Biafra should have
been allowed to establish its
independence. Again, a lot of
complex issues are involved.
British officials feared that if
Biafra were to secede many
other regions in Africa would too,
threatening ‘stability’ across the
whole of the continent. Most of
the great powers, including the
US and Soviet Union, shared this
view largely for the same reason.
Yet there appears to be no
reason why Biafra, with its 15
million people, could not have
established a viable, independent
state. Biafrans argued that they
were a people with a distinctive
language and culture, that they
were Christian as opposed to the
Muslim communities lumped into
the Nigeria federal state, which
had, after all, been a colonial
creation. In fact, Biafra was also
one of the most developed
regions in Africa with a high
density of roads, schools,
hospitals and factories. The
struggle for an independent
state certainly appeared to have
the support of the majority of
Biafrans, whose sense of
nationhood deepened throughout
the war as enormous sacrifices
were made to contribute to the
war effort.
What is crystal clear is that the
wishes of the Biafrans were
never a major concern of British
planners; what they wanted, or
what Nigerians elsewhere in the
federation wanted, was simply
not an issue for Whitehall. There
is simply no reference in the
government files, that I have
seen, to this being a
consideration. The priorities for
London were maintaining the
unity of Nigeria for geo-political
interests and protecting British oil
interests. This meant that
Gowon’s FMG was backed right
from the start. But the files also
reveal astonishing levels of
connivance with the FMG’s
aggression.

Nigerian aggression, British support British interests are very clearly revealed in the declassified files. ‘Our direct interests are trade and investment, including an important stake by Shell/BP in the eastern Region. There are nearly 20,000 British nationals in Nigeria, for whose welfare we are of course specially [sic] concerned’, the Foreign Office noted a few days before the outbreak of the war. Shell/BP’s investments amounted to around £200 million, with other British investment in Nigeria accounting for a further £90 million. It was then partly owned by the British government, and the largest producer of oil which provided most of Nigeria’s export earnings. Most of this oil was in the eastern region. Commonwealth Minister George Thomas wrote in August 1967 that: ‘The sole immediate British interest in Nigeria is that the Nigerian economy should be brought back to a condition in which our substantial trade and investment in the country can be further developed, and particularly so we can regain access to important oil installations’. Thomas further outlined the primary reason why Britain was so keen to preserve Nigerian unity, noting that ‘our only direct interest in the maintenance of the federation is that Nigeria has been developed as an economic unit and any disruption of this would have adverse effects on trade and development’. If Nigeria were to break up, he added: ‘We cannot expect that economic cooperation between the component parts of what was Nigeria, particularly between the East and the West, will necessarily enable development and trade to proceed at the same level as they would have done in a unified Nigeria; nor can we now count on the Shell/BP oil concession being regained on the same terms as in the past if the East and the mid-West assume full control of their own economies’. Ojukwu initially tried to get Shell/ BP to pay royalties to the Biafran government rather than the FMG. The oil companies, after giving the Biafrans a small token payment, eventually refused and Ojuwku responded by sequestering Shell’s property and installations, forbidding Shell to do any further business and ordering all its staff out. They ‘have much to lose if the FMG do not achieve the expected victory’, George Thomas noted in August 1967. A key British aim throughout the war was to secure the lifting of the blockade which Gowon imposed on the east and which stopped oil exports. In the run-up to Gowon’s declaration of war, Britain had made it clear to the FMG that it completely supported Nigerian unity. George Thomas had told the Nigerian High Commissioner in London at the end of April 1967, for example, that ‘the Federal government had our sympathy and our full support’ but said that he hoped the use of force against the east could be avoided. On 28 May Gowon, having just declared a state of emergency, explicitly told Britain’s Defence Attache that the FMG was likely to ‘mount an invasion from the north’. Gowon asked whether Britain would provide fighter cover for the attack and naval support to reinforce the blockade of Eastern ports; the Defence Attache replied that both were out of the question. By the time Gowon ordered military action in early July, therefore, Britain had refused Nigerian requests to be militarily involved and had urged Gowon to seek a ‘peaceful’ solution. However, the Wilson government had also assured Gowon of British support for Nigerian unity at a time when military preparations were taking place. And Britain had also made no signs that it might cut off, or reduce, arms supplies if a military campaign were launched. The new High Commissioner in Lagos, Sir David Hunt, wrote in a memo to London on 12 June that the ‘only way… of preserving unity [sic] of Nigeria is to remove Ojukwu by force’. He said that Ojukwu was committed to remaining the ruler of an independent state and that British interests lay in firmly supporting the FMG. Before going to war, Gowon began what was to become a two and half year long shopping list of arms that the FMG wanted from Britain. On 1 July he asked Britain for jet fighter/bomber aircraft, six fast boats and 24 anti-aircraft guns. ‘We want to help the Federal Government in any way we can’, British officials noted. However, Britain rejected supplying the aircraft, fearing that they would publicly demonstrate direct British intervention in the war and, at this stage, also rejected supplying the boats. London did, however, agree to supply the anti-aircraft guns and to provide training courses to use them. The Deputy High Commissioner in Enugu, Biafra’s main city, noted that the supply of these anti- aircraft guns and their ammunition would be seen as British backing for the FMG and also that they were not entirely defensive weapons anyway since ‘they could also take on an offensive role if mounted in an invasion fleet’. Nevertheless, the government’s news department was instructed to stress the ‘defensive nature of these weapons’ when pressed but generally to avoid publicity on their export from Britain. High Commissioner Hunt said that ‘it would be better to use civil aircraft’ to deliver these guns and secured agreement from the Nigerians that ‘there would be no publicity’ in supplying them. Faced with Gowon’s complaints about Britain not supplying more arms, Wilson also agreed in mid- July to supply the FMG with the fast patrol boats. This was done in the knowledge that they would help the FMG maintain the blockade against Biafra. Wilson wrote to Gowon saying that ‘we have demonstrated in many ways our support for your government as the legal government of Nigeria and our refusal to recognise the secessionists’. He also told him that Britain does ‘not intend to put any obstacle in the way’ of orders for ‘reasonable quantities of military material of types similar to those you have obtained here in the past’. Gowon replied saying that ‘I have taken note of your concurrence for the usual purchases of arms supplies to continue and will take advantage of what is available now and others when necessary’. By early August Biafran forces had made major gains against the FMG and had invaded the mid- West region. Commonwealth Minister George Thomas noted that ‘the chances of a clear-cut military decision being achieved by either side now look rather distant’. Rather, ‘we are now faced with the probability of an escalating and increasingly disorderly war, with both sides shopping around for arms’. In this situation, he raised the option of Britain launching a peace offensive and halting all arms supplies. But this was rejected by David Hunt in Lagos and others since it would cause ‘great resentment’ on the part of the FMG against the British government and be regarded as a ‘hostile act’. Instead, the government decided to continue the flow of arms and ammunition of types previously supplied by Britain but to continue to refuse supplies of ‘sophisticated equipment’ like aircraft and tanks. The decision to continue arms exports was taken when it had already become clear in the behaviour of the Nigerian forces that any weapons supplied would be likely to be used against civilians. It was also at a time when Commonwealth Secretary General Arnold Smith was making renewed attempts to push for peace negotiations after having been rebuffed by Gowon in a visit to Lagos in early July. By early November 1967 the FMG had pushed back the Biafrans and captured Enugu; British officials were now reporting that the FMG had ‘a clear military advantage’. Now that our side seemed like winning, talk of reducing arms to them disappeared; George Thomas now said that ‘it seems to me that British interests would now be served by a quick FMG victory’. He recommended that the arms export policy be ‘relaxed’ and to supply Lagos with items that ‘have importance in increasing their ability to achieve a quicker victory’. This meant ‘reasonable quantities’ of equipment such as mortars and ‘infantry weapons generally’, though not aircraft or other ‘sophisticated’ equipment. On 23 November 1967 the Cabinet agreed that ‘a quick Federal military victory’ provided the best hope for ‘an early end to the fighting’. By early December, Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson [sic, not Thomas. need also to check cos he may have been FO minister at this time' he certainly became CW sec by mid 68] noted that the ‘lack of supplies and ammunition is one of things that are holding operations up’. He said that Britain should agree to the FMG’s recent shopping list since ‘a favourable response to this request ought to give us every chance of establishing ourselves again as the main supplier of the Nigerian forces after the war’. If the war ended soon, the Nigerian economy will start expanding and ‘there should be valuable business to be done’. Also: ‘Anything that we now do to assist the FMG should help our oil companies to re-establish and expand their activities in Nigeria after the war, and, more generally should help our commercial and political relationship with postwar Nigeria’. He ended by saying he hoped Britain could supply armoured cars since they ‘have proved of especial value in the type of fighting that is going on in Nigeria and the FMG are most impressed with the Saladins and Ferrets’ previously supplied by Britain. As a result Britain supplied six Saladin armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 30 Saracen APCs along with 2,000 machine guns for them, anti-tank guns and 9 million rounds of ammunition. Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary, wrote that he hoped these supplies will encourage the Nigerians ‘to look to the United Kingdom for their future purchases of defence equipment’. By the end of the year Britain had also approved the export of 1,050 bayonets, 700 grenades, 1,950 rifles with grenade launchers, 15,000 lbs of explosives and two helicopters. In the first half of the following year, 1968, Britain approved the export of 15 million rounds of ammunition, 21,000 mortar bombs, 42,500 Howtizer rounds, 12 Oerlikon guns, 3 Bofors guns, 500 submachine guns, 12 Saladins with guns and spare parts, 30 Saracens and spare parts, 800 bayonets, 4,000 rifles and two other helicopters.ritish support for a united Nigeria, saying in April 1968 that ‘I think we can fairly claim that we have not wavered in this support throughout the civil war’. These massive arms exports were being secretly supplied – indeed, massively stepped up – at a time when one could read about the actions of the recipients in the newspapers. After the Biafran withdrawal from the mid- west in September 1967 a series of massacres started against Ibo residents. The New York Times reported that over 5,000 had been killed in various towns of the mid west. About 1,000 Ibos were killed in Benin city by local people with the acquiescence of the federal forces, the New York Review noted in December 1967. Around 700 Ibo males were lined up and shot in the town of Asaba, the Observer reported in January 1968. According to eyewitnesses the Nigerian commander ordered the execution of every Ibo male over the age of ten. Nigerian officials informed the British government that the arms were ‘important to them, but not vital’. More important than the actual arms ‘was the policy of the British government in supporting the FMG’. This support was now taking place amid public and parliamentary pressure for a halt to British arms to Lagos, with 70 Labour MPs, for example, filing a motion for such an embargo in May 1968. Yet the real extent of arms supplied by Britain was concealed from the public. Throughout 1967 and 1968, Ministers had been telling parliament that Britain was essentially neutral in the conflict in that it was not interfering in the internal affairs of Nigeria but simply continuing to supply arms to Nigeria on the same basis as before the war. As the declassified files, referred to above, show, this was simply a lie. For example, Wilson told the House on 16 May 1968 that: ’We have continued the supply… of arms by private manufacturers in this country exactly on the basis that it has been in the past, but there has been no special provision for the needs of the war’. One British file at this time – mid-1968 – refers to deaths of between 70,000-100,000 by now as ‘realistic’. The Red Cross was estimating around 600,000 refugees in Biafra alone and was trying to arrange desperately needed supplies to meet needs, estimated at around 30 tons a day. Humanitarian suffering, especially starvation, was severe as a result of the FMG’s blockade of Biafra. Pictures of starving and malnourished children went around the world. The FMG was widely seen as indulging in atrocities and attacks against civilians, including apparently indiscriminate air strikes, in an increasingly brutal war in which civilians were the chief victims. The files show that Wilson told Gowon on several occasions in private letters that he had successfully fended off public and parliamentary criticism in Britain, in order to continue to support the FMG – clearly showing where the government’s priorities and sympathies lay. As in Vietnam at the same time, Wilson was not going to be deflected by mere public opposition from backing ongoing aggression by key allies, whatever the level of atrocities and casualties. With federal forces in control by mid-year of Port Harcourt, the most important southern coastal city, British officials noted that ‘having gone this far in supporting the FMG, it would be a pity to throw away the credit we have built up with them just when they seem to have the upper hand’. Britain could not halt the supply of arms since ‘apart from other considerations, such an outcome would seriously put at risk about £200m of British investments in non-Biafra Nigeria’, George Thomson explained to Harold Wilson. It was also at this point that British officials sought to counter widespread opposition to the Nigerian government by conniving with it to improve the ‘presentation’ of its policies – another example of Britain’s past ‘information operations’ described in earlier chapters. Britain urged the FMG to convince the outside world that it was not engaged in genocide or a policy of massacre and to make public statements on the need for a ceasefire and humanitarian access to Biafra. High Commissioner Hunt suggested to Gowon that the federal air force be used for ‘psychological warfare’ and to drop leaflets over the Ibo towns which would help the FMG score a ‘propaganda point’. Officials noted that their support for the FMG was under attack and that ‘our ability to sustain it… depends very much on implementing enlightened and humane federal policies and securing public recognition for them’. What was needed was ‘good and well- presented Nigerian policies which permit that support to continue’. Wilson therefore urged a senior Nigerian government official, Chief Enahoro, ‘to make a greater effort to ensure that their case did not go by default’. The files indicate that these ‘presentational’ issues were much more important to British officials than any actual suffering of the Biafrans themselves. London never did anything significant to press the FMG. British officials ruled out threatening to cut off, or reduce, arms exports to force the FMG to change policies. The issue that most concerned the government at the time was that it would be forced to withdraw or reduce its support for Gowon in the face of public pressure. This, therefore, had to be countered, and the FMG needed to make greater efforts.

Ahhhh op please summarise.

CONTINUE READING BELOW
http://www.codewit.org/reports/biafra/18191-nigeria-s-war-over-biafra-1967-70

After the Biafran withdrawal from the mid- west in September 1967 a series of massacres started against Ibo residents. The New York Times reported that over 5,000 had been killed in various towns of the mid west. About 1,000 Ibos were killed in Benin city by local people with the acquiescence of the federal forces, the New York Review noted in December 1967. Around 700 Ibo males were lined up and shot in the town of Asaba,




Why did Benin locals killed the igbos again!!



Although I knew it was a war but the kiling of Young igbos boy above 10 years is evil and not okay.... This shud nt be... It is bad in all circumstances..


Why shud normal igbos boys be killed,