BY DOROTHY UDO UMOATAN, PhD

Tupocracy as one word for leadership by example, coined from two Greek words, tupos and kraeia, in the family of Democracy, Aristocracy, Oligarchy, Autocracy, Gerontocracy etc. It is a system of government involving people who lead by positive example based on transparency, intergrity, altruism, patriotism and godly character which is worthy of emulation by their colleagues and followers.
The Judiciary is one, out of the three arms of government known. It is seen as the third organ of government vested with the responsibility of interpreting and applying the laws to all cases, as well as, settling disputes in the court of law. Nigeria’s continued survival as a corporate entity unmistakably hinges to a very reasonable degree on the towering shoulders of the Judiciary. The scintillating performance and excellence recorded in the score-card of the Nigerian Judiciary makes the relevance of the sacred institution in the course of Nigeria’s nascent constitutional democratic experiment to be compellingly obvious. It is the Judiciary through the instrumentality of the courts that kept Nigeria and Nigerians with bated breath during the incidents of awaiting decisions of courts whether at courts of first instance or any of the other courts with appellate jurisdiction. It is quite indisputably also, the relevance of the Judiciary in any free and democratic society can never be guilty of over emphasis.
Nigeria’s quest for self- actualization can only transcend a hoax of pipe dream of the Judiciary functions optimally and operates efficiently, which paradoxically it is not the case. The relevance of the paper, therefore is to address the menace of indiscipline and corruption trailing the Judiciary and robbing it of its pride of place which can be curbed through tupocracy.
Functions of the Nigerian Judiciary
The Judiciary is the third arm of government and the last hope of the common man. As the third arm of government, it is saddled with the unique albeit onerous responsibility of the organization, powers and workings of the courts. The Judiciary is concerned with its personnel, that is; the Judges, Magistrates and other supporting staff of the courts. It is the institutional framework for attaining justice. Since the advent of independence, Nigeria has played a commendable role in the promotion of the rule of law by interpreting and applying the law in order to resolve conflicts and/or disputes between individuals, groups, government and its agencies. The Judiciary is also duty bound to enforce the fundamental rights of Nigerians as provided for in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended).
Other functions include judicial review of government actions, development of a body of Nigerian laws, promotion of constitutional tenacity and political governance. Corruption, It is instructive to note is an integral part of criminal and deviant behavior. Nigerians look up to the Judiciary to provide the necessary leadership in the fight against corruption.
Indiscipline and Corruption in the Judiciary
Indiscipline has been understood to be the unwillingness to respect constituted authority. It has also been held to be an act of misconduct which is not only a physical act but could also be a thing of the mind. Indiscipline also connotes a disregard to laid down standards of behaviours, rules and regulations of a social system such as it is negligence of norms and cultures of a social system.
Different authors and scholars have conceptualized corruption variously. Corruption is a perversion or a change from good to bad and essentially involves the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit. It is a behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of public role because of private gain or expectation of private gain. In essence, corruption entails an abuse of official position for private gain. An application of the above definitions of corruption in Nigerian clearly reveals that corruption has become an acceptable way of life and has found itself into every sphere of the national existence. This is because the indicators of corruption like embezzlement, bribery, misappropriation, conversion of public funds to personal purse, manipulation of procurement processes, falsification of official financial records, award of contracts by public office holders to cronies and personally held companies and rigging of elections are all easily observable in virtually all public offices and public affairs in Nigeria.
Corruption diverts scare resources into private pockets, literally undermines effective governance, endangers democracy and erodes the social and moral fabric of a nation. It has now become clear that corruption is one of the main obstacles to peace, stability, sustainable development, democracy, and human rights around the globe.
Causes and Indicators of Indiscipline and Corruption in the Judicial System
Some of the possible causes include low remuneration and the administrative nature of the roles of judges, far reaching discretionary powers and weak monitoring of the execution of those powers. Factors which engender judicial abuse of power also create an environment where whistle blowing is unlikely, given the extensive power and authority of the individuals involved.
Lack of transparency and the absence of comprehensive and regularly updated databases further worsen the effects of corruption in the judiciary. Such situations easily lend themselves to inconsistencies in the application of the law and make it much more difficult to identify patterns, trends or individual cases in which incorrect or anomalous results suggest the possibility of corruption. Inconsistencies might arise not only with regard to the substance of court decisions, but also with respect to court delays, fostered by the absence of time standards and their close monitoring. The lack of computer systems is one of the main causes for inconsistencies, according to Latin American lawyers and judges.
Indicators of indiscipline and corruption, as perceived by the public, include: delay in the execution of court orders; unjustifiable issuance of summons and granting of bails; prisoners not being brought to court; lack of public access to records of court proceedings; disappearance of files; unusual variations in sentencing; delays in delivery of judgments; high acquittal rates; conflict of interest; prejudices for or against a party witness, or lawyer prolonged service in a particular judicial station; high rates of decisions in favour of the executive; appointments perceived as resulting from political patronage; preferential or hostile treatment by the executive or legislature; frequent socialising with particular members of the legal profession, executive or legislature (with litigants or potential litigants); and postretirement placements.
Judicial corruption has a lot of negative impacts on society and is one of the most severe threats to human rights implementation in the country. The effects of judicial corruption in society are numerous which includes but not limited to the following: segregating the communities, violation of human right; reduces trade, economic, human development, and most importantly, reject persons from fair dispute settlements. These deteriorating effects are harmful to the democratic society and action needs to be taken to curb the malady of judicial corruption in Nigeria.
Judges must also be impartial, honest, and competent. They must lead by example. It is hard to exaggerate the negative consequences of judicial corruption, both nationally and internationally. Combating transnational crime and terrorism becomes unfeasible; it diminishes economic and human development; and it denies citizens their long-recognized right to impartial dispute settlements.
One of the major factors that precipitated corruption in the judiciary is lack of independence of the judiciary. This is as a result of the appointment of the judicial officers by the executive arm of government and confirmation of the appointment by the legislative. These politicians who are in the position to appoint the judicial officers would surely appoint the people who are loyal to them and would overlook their faults whenever they commit any offense or embezzle public funds and this has increased corruption in the judicial arm of government.
Low or insufficient salaries for judicial personnel have made some of them use the office for their respective personal gains. The salary of some of these judicial officers is unheard and these court personnel could use their position to accumulate wealth. They should endeavour to lead by example by being contented with their salaries so that the other officers of the judiciary like the clerks and administrative personnel can emulate same.
Furthermore, the lack of transparency in the appointment of judicial officers has made it difficult to eradicate corruption. In Nigeria today, judges are not appointed based on merit but, the appointment is based on political affiliation and connection of the applicant for the post.
The absence of technological equipment to keep a record of judgment has made it easy for corrupt behavior to be carried out unnoticed. The insufficient computer system can make the court personnel manipulate the judgments of the court and ensure that the right person is punished and the guilty person will go unpunished through bribery.
Lack of transparency in the court administration and court procedures, complex procedural rules is also one of the ways the Judicial Personnel used to hide the Judicial decision, the courtrooms are closed for the press to avoid the spread of the news to the public and this has become the machinery for judicial officers to carry out their evil act.
Weak monitoring systems and low press freedom are some of the major factors that are causing judicial corruption in Nigeria. The press is not given enough freedom to investigate cases in the court and thereis no effective body or agent responsible to monitor the activities of the Judicial Personnel. This corruption has become so rampant to the extent that the court registrars are collecting bribe to manipulate the case list in court.

Courts, corruption and judicial independence
A well-functioning justice system is crucial to address corruption effectively, which in turn is important for development. But judicial institutions are themselves corruptible. Experiences with and perceptions of corruption in the courts are widespread.
Corruption and perceptions of corruption in the judiciary not only undermines the courts’ credibility as corruption fighters. More generally, it erodes trust in the courts’ impartiality, harming all the core judicial functions, such as dispute resolution, law enforcement, protection of property rights and contract enforcement. In addition, it harms the broader accountability function that the judiciary is entrusted with in democratic systems – upholding citizens’ rights, securing the integrity of the political rules of the game, and sanctioning representatives of other branches when they act in contravention of the law. While there is broad consensus that corruption in the court system is destructive and should be addressed, there are particular challenges involved in fighting judicial corruption. Anti-corruption efforts may jeopardize the independence of the judiciary and thus undermine judges’ ability to fulfill their accountability functions. In fact, limiting judicial independence may be the real motive behind such measures. So while we should care about corruption in the court system, we should also keep in mind that corruption charges and measures against judicial corruption may serve as a way to rein in bothersome judges.
Implications of indiscipline and corruption for judicial Independence
Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public office or entrusted power for private gain. When judicial system corruption, is discussed, the paradigmatic image is that of judges taking bribes. Judicial indiscipline and corruption is a lot more, however. It includes all forms of inappropriate influence that may damage the impartiality of justice, and may involve any actor within the justice system, including lawyers and administrative support staff. The question of corruption is not only a matter of relations between judicial personnel and ‘court users’ (public and private parties in civil cases, prosecutors and accused in criminal cases); it is also about internal relations in the judiciary. The ‘gain’ need not be material. It can also be sexual favours, or the offered ‘furtherance of political or professional ambitions’ and may also take the form of avoiding something undesired, in the form of threats. Biased decision-making is thus not only a matter of the personal integrity of judicial personnel, but concerns the structural protection of judicial independence and the insulation of judicial decision-makers from illegitimate political and hierarchical influence.
Bribery
Systemic petty corruption or bribery in the judicial system is a problem in many developing countries as well as in more developed economies. Bribes offered by users of the legal system may take many forms, including illegal ‘fees’ that court personnel levy to do what they should do anyway. Court users pay just to get their case through the system, to influence the outcome of a given case, or to delay it. Bribes may be paid to the judge, or to assistant staff or lawyers to remove files or get the case assigned to a particular judge. Where petty corruption is prevalent it creates an additional barrier for ordinary citizens to access the justice system. For poor people the sums involved may be prohibitive. Even where it does not directly affect case outcomes (and even more so when it does), bribery adds to the class bias of the justice system and strengthens exclusionary patterns based on gender, race, ethnicity, caste and so on. Widespread bribery also erodes trust in the courts and distorts their ability to perform their functions as impartial arbiters of disputes, guarantors of contracts and enforcers of the law. Bribery is not only a problem in formal judicial institutions, but commonly also in alternative administrative and judicial institutions (variably termed informal, traditional, customary, community, or nonstate) that most people in the developing world turn to for lack of access to or trust in the formal justice system. The share of respondents who report having experienced bribery when being in contact with the judiciary is alarming. Still, a much higher percentage perceives their judiciary to be corrupt. Media reports of high-profile corruption scandals and allegations of political bias among judges contribute to shaping citizens’ perceptions of indiscipline and corruption.
Undue Political Influence
Judges’ political bias and people’s perceptions of indiscipline and corruption undermine the role of the judiciary as protector of citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the state in its various manifestations. It leaves ordinary people without effective recourse to justice when the state is the offending party, and with scant protection when the state presses charges. The political bias is not necessarily consistent across all types of cases. It tends to tick in when the stakes are high, such as when the executive or other power-holders feel their position threatened. It is thus particularly damaging for the courts’ political accountability function, their ability to impartially enforce the rules of the political system, for example in relation to election fraud.
Illegitimate political influence on judges take different forms, some are clearly illegal, while other forms of undue influence stem from the ways in which relations between the judiciary and other arms of government are organized, or reflect a legal culture where judges are expected to defer to political authorities. Structural sources of political bias in the judiciary are related to procedures for appointment of judges and judicial leadership; terms and conditions of tenure for judges; and budgetary and financial regulations, including salaries and benefits.
Judicial appointments
Where the government is perceived to appoint deferential judges – or friends – to the bench, it damages trust in the judiciary, regardless of whether the judges are in fact biased in their rulings. In many countries the executive (is widely perceived to) decisively influence who are appointed as judges – even when there are rules and institutions in place to prevent this from happening. Judicial service commissions or other bodies designated a role in nominations, are often effectively circumvented – or themselves ‘packed’ and politically biased. Rules of ratification or confirmation by parliament have often limited effect, particularly in dominant party contexts.
Terms and conditions of tenure
Where judges are appointed for limited terms, and particularly where the terms of service are renewable and short, judges have an incentive to rule with an eye on the interests and preferences of those for whom they depend for reappointment or new employment after they finish their judicial tenure. The same is true where judges’ promotion/demotion depend on being favoured by their superiors, and where the security of tenure in practice is weak. Formal rules to protect tenure may not be sufficient to allay judges’ fears if experience show that they in practice risk losing their seat if they fall out of favour with the government, or when administrations change.
Regulation of finances, including of salaries and benefits
Control over the purse strings gives many governments a stronghold – if not a stranglehold – over the courts, by enabling them to strategically regulate not only judges’ salaries and benefits, but also the running costs of the judiciary. This may lead to perceptions of bias.
Undue Influence via the Internal Judicial Hierarchy
In many cases, undue influence on judicial rulings comes not from politicians directly, but via the judicial hierarchy. Such influence may be the result of direct pressure from superiors; more subtle incentives based on judges’ anticipation that a ‘wrong’ decision in an important case could have career consequences; or selective allocation or cases to judges who are likely to rule in a particular manner. Besides, internal procedures can be misused to limit individual judges’ ability to voice criticism, for example by refusing dissenting judgments. Hence, where the judicial leadership – and in particular the chief justice – is close to the sitting regime, this can taint the entire judiciary. Even where judicial appointments are otherwise effectively regulated in ways that place them beyond executive influence, the executive often has a much stronger say over the appointment of the Chief Justice.
Addressing Indiscipline and Corruption in the Judiciary
Given that indiscipline and corruption in the judicial system is a problem in most countries, there is a need for systems to uncover irregularities, and discipline and dismiss corrupt officers. If misused, however, anticorruption strategies become very effective tools for undermining judicial independence by ridding the judiciary of independent-minded judges that the authorities find bothersome, and scare others from following in their tracks.
As described, judicial system corruption is a diverse phenomenon and requires a range of responses. The individual bribe or petty corruption, which is only one part of the problem, needs systemic responses whereby judges are made more accountable to the rules. Corruption stemming from undue political influence may, on the other hand, require reforms that make judges less accountable to the rulers, for example by weakening the mechanisms that political power-holders (and the judicial hierarchy) can use to influence judges’ rulings. In either case, solutions must be developed based on deep knowledge of the particular society and informed by the broader normative, socio-political and economic context.
A large number of public institutions, donor agencies and independent organizations are engaged in developing strategies for advancing judicial integrity. Setting common standards and fostering professional communities where these are not only known, but also matter for peer recognition has been one aspect of this.
Petty corruption and bribery has generally been addressed along four lines, the first two seek to reduce the motivation to engage in corruption, the third seeks to reduce opportunities to do so, and the fourth seeks to put in place effective sanctions.
Improvement in material conditions for judicial personnel and support staff, particularly in the lower judiciary where the lack of a living or socially acceptable wage is seen to be a significant driving factor for corruption.
Normative change in the attitude towards bribery, primarily within the legal professions, but also in society more broadly. Measures include training, codes of conduct for judges, lawyers and judicial support staff, and efforts to build a culture where these norms matter for professional recognition and standing, through national and regional judicial forums.
Preventive procedural measures undertaken to reduce opportunities for corruption take many forms. Increased transparency around different types of transactions and improved case management systems and procedures that reduce the scope for individual discretion reduces the opportunities for both judges and support staff to ‘levy fees’ or conveniently lose files. Where judges are required to declare assets this may help uncover excessive income.
Disciplinary/accountability systems for judges normally include complaint mechanisms where members of the public can report knowledge or suspicion of corruption, investigative measures, as well as a hearing or ‘trial’ mechanism for disciplining and dismissal of judges. International standards require that the disciplining bodies should be independent from the government, and that disciplinary or removal proceedings against judges ‘must be determined in accordance with well-established procedures that guarantee the rights of judges to a fair and transparent hearing and to an independent review’.
It be noted that where governance generally is weak and corruption levels high, traditional, anti-corruption reform measures that rely on reducing incentives for corrupt behaviour have little effect unless accompanied by attitudinal change.

Addressing Undue Political Pressure on Judicial Personnel
Following the discussion on undue political influence above, measures aimed at reducing political influence on the selection and appointment of judges can be distinguished on judges’ tenure; and through budgets and finances. In addition, there are efforts to strengthen judges’ resistance to pressure by enhancing their competence and strengthening professional norms. It should be noted, however, that this is a controversial terrain and part of a much broader discussion about how politically unfettered unelected judges should be and how to check abuse of judicial power.
Reducing political and particularly executive influence on judicial selection has been the focus of much attention. Recommendations run along three lines: increase the number of actors (veto-players) involved in the selection process; establish clear criteria; and increase the transparency of the process. Following these principles, most countries now have a (more or less) independent body – a judicial council or judicial service commission – tasked with vetting and nominating candidates for judicial offices. Their composition varies, some consist mainly of representatives from within the legal profession, others have a majority of politicians or are appointed by the executive, yet others have representation from civil society. The understanding is that to reduce executive influence, political appointees should not be in majority. Equally important is how the process is conducted and the degree of transparency. With vetting and nominations behind closed doors (sometimes not even the final list is public), the scope for executive influence is significant. More transparent processes, with open calls for nominations/applications, open hearings, public interviews of candidates, and open ranking lists, reduce the scope for undue executive influence. Clear and relatively demanding selection criteria reduces the pool of qualified candidates and makes political appointments more difficult, particularly in developing countries with a limited legal profession. Once nominations are made, the appointing body should be limited to select among the nominated candidates, not (as happens) have a free choice also outside the vetted nominees. Most countries also have different bodies involved in the actual selection, for example appointment by the executive and ratification by the legislature. Where the ruling party has a legislative majority, confirmation may have little effect, however, and special procedures and majority requirements are needed for an effective check.
Minimizing political influence on judges’ tenure and conditions is arguably even more important. Once a judge is in place, who appointed him or her is less important than who holds the key to a future career and wellbeing. It is thus crucial to minimize the executive’s ability to influence judges’ tenure and conditions. Judges should thus be appointed for life, or for long non-renewable terms, and conditions of service should be constitutionally guaranteed, with strictly defined impeachment criteria and procedures.
Eliminating undue influence on judicial budgets and administration. Administrative autonomy and budget independence for the judiciary prevent the executive from ‘starving’ the judiciary – or rewarding judges when important decisions are pending. Such problems are avoided where the judiciary receives a guaranteed share of the national budget. A related issue concerns the jurisdiction of the courts.
Increasing resilience by strengthening judges’ competence and professional norms has been an important area of reform. Unlike most of the measures discussed earlier, this does not depend on new legislation or cooperation from the political authorities. Training and resources that make judges more professionally secure and skilled, reduces risks of submitting to pressure. By creating forums within each country, as well as regionally and globally – where judges meet, share experiences, give support and exchange recognition, professional norms develop and reputations matter more.
This raises the ‘reputational costs’ of succumbing to undue influence and may contribute towards a stronger sense of social purpose. It may also create material incentives, if judicial integrity and professional competence are seen as factors in appointments to attractive positions – including to international courts.
Curbing Indiscipline and corruption through Tupocracy
The effects of indiscipline and corruption on economic and socio political development of any nation are multifaceted. For instance, corruption hinders development as it results in misdirection of resources or investment to less socially desirable ventures. In this case, investment may be channeled into sectors not for economic benefits because the major consideration may be kick backs it would attract or for some other selfish considerations. By extension, corruption results to waste and misplaced priority in spending public fund. Corruption equally wastes skills and discourages hard work, honesty, sincerity and valuable economic activities.
Leadership in this article refers to the occupation of important position in the formal polity or government administration. Most discussions on leadership have focused essentially on identifying and discussing what a leader should be, who a leader should be, the role of a leader in positively shaping and influencing the course of events in the society, the role of a leader in bringing about economic and socio-political development of the state and in developing policies and programmes and taking actions to solve given societal problems as they may exist at given points in time. In essence, writers on leadership has laid much emphasis on identifying and discussing some ideal characteristics or attitudes that are needed in people in leadership positions that would ensure good governance and effective effort at nation building and development. Basic among the attributes that have been identified as necessary for good leadership include the facts that a leader must lead through personal example , a leader must encourage the rule of law and a leader must ensure institutional checks and balances.
Even though there are arguments that ordinary Nigerian citizens have a role to play in curbing corruption, our argument in this work is that the effectiveness of any fight against corruption can be meaningfully and substantially enhanced where there is good and exemplary leadership with its corollary good governance. In essence, good leadership is very imperative to successfully tackle the issue of corruption or even any other social, political or economic problem for that matter.
Fundamentally, every society needs good leadership to move forward and progress. In essence, for the growth and development of any nation to be realized, it must have the best in its leadership positions as such can only bring about good governance. Indeed, the quality and style of leadership plays key role in the extent to which government of any nation can solve societal problems. Curbing corruption in Nigeria has been very difficult because the dominant leadership style in Nigeria, either at national, state or local government levels, has been the instrumental or selfish type that is mainly concerned about their well being and that of their cronies to the neglect of the welfare of the ordinary citizens and national growth. In fact it has been such selfish type that dwells much on looting of the government treasury and misappropriation of public fund. Leaders in Nigeria enjoy very high estacodes and allowances and roam about in convoys of dozens of state-of-the-art cars and generally revel in ostentation and abundance.
Very unfortunately, corruption among Nigerian leaders creates or induces corrupt tendencies in the minds of the ordinary citizens. As well, the profligacy of Nigerian leaders may deter the ordinary citizens from developing the sympathy and patriotism to support or champion the efforts of the leadership towards curbing corruption. The common citizens in the circumstance of the pervasive corruption at the leadership levels rather seek every means, legal or illegal, to make his own wealth.
It is worthy to note that all the various leaderships in Nigeria, since independence, made efforts at curbing Indiscipline and corruption but very unfortunately corruption had continued to soar by the day. This is attributable to the fact that those in leadership positions and who initiate the efforts at curbing corruption are immersed in corruption themselves.
Virtually all the past leaders in Nigeria have vacated office much richer than they were before they went into leadership positions. And Nigerians, from this, have learnt over the years that their leaders lack modicum of integrity, honesty and transparency. This perception makes the fight against corruption complex and difficult. Indeed, corrupt leadership cannot genuinely and effectively, fight corruption. In essence, there are errors in the character of Nigerian leadership that has made the fight against corruption ineffective. Leaders in Nigeria are of the instrumental type and who lack the desired quality of leading by personal examples that is required for effective curbing of corruption.
Further to the above is that Nigerians as led by corrupt leadership have little chance of becoming virtuous citizens. This is because bad leaders hardly produce good, law abiding and patriotic citizens or followers as citizens are more often than not, motivated to do good and to be patriotic through the good exemplary lives of honesty and integrity of their leaders. The experience in Nigeria since its existence as a sovereign nation is top down direction of corruption. And the scale, manner and impunity of the ordinary citizens, corruption is directly linked to the scale, manner and impunity of the leadership corruption.
Normally, leaders should serve as role models and, in which case, their life styles, values and principles need to be such that they are worthy of emulation by the citizens . Indeed, exemplary leadership is required in getting the voluntary co-operation and loyalty of the citizens towards required action by the government. In essence, in solving any given societal problem, leaders are expected to mobilize support and create motivation among the citizens to support polices and action adopted to solve them. This motivation can easily and successfully be gotten through exemplary deeds of the leaders. Indeed, when leaders in Nigeria, serve as role models, they will have the chances of successfully evoking the highest level of commitment from the citizens towards the fight against corruption. The basic problem of Nigeria is the unwillingness or inability of its Leaders to rise to the responsibility and the challenge of personal examples which are the hall marks of true leadership. One outstanding exemplary selfless act by a leader at the top such as unambiguous refusal to be corrupt or tolerate corruption at the fountain of leadership will radiate powerful sensation among the citizens towards eschewing corruption. If such exemplary acts become a regular occurrence or culture within the leadership circles at the nation‘s various social political structures, then the common citizens may not need sermons on patriotism nor a special agency or commission to preach against corruption. Certainly, if the leadership is seem to allow the common wealth to be used for general public welfare and benefit; it will reduce the motivation for corruption.
One bad thing about the corruption among the leaders is that their immunity from censure makes the leaders the envy of the ordinary citizens who, unfortunately again, turn them into role models and imitate their acts of corruption. It is the explosion of such corrupt actions among our leaders and the tendency for the ordinary citizens to copy such that brings the whole nation under a climate of corruption and has, as well, made it difficult for corruption to be controlled or curbed.
Very unfortunately, there is a vicious relationship between bad leadership and corruption. This is because bad leadership breads corruption and corruption breeds bad leadership. In essence, bad leadership causes and is, as well, a consequence of corruption. For instance, in a situation of bad leadership, there are always cases of electoral corruption which enhances the possibility of bad leadership being re-elected or elected. This bad leadership, in subsequent elections, supports and perpetrates electoral fraud or corruption that enhances the possibility of electing bad leaders and the circle continues. It has been observed that in Nigeria, and following electoral corruption, victory in an election is no more linked to the ability to lead well. Neither is re-election of political leaders linked to their previous performance. Indeed, political leadership, particularly of the ruling political party in Nigeria, through corrupt manipulation of the state agencies like the electoral commission, the police and the judiciary, has ensured that candidates of their choice, even if unacceptable by the electorates, win in an election. One can imagine the type of leadership that such manipulated electoral process can produce. In fact, it may be mere illusion for somebody to believe that the 2015 general elections and subsequent ones will produce any credible political leadership in the context of the pervasive electoral corruption.
Summarily, corruption in Nigeria appears intractable in the context of bad or poor leadership lacking in exemplary life styles. What Nigeria needs to effectively fight corruption is leadership that would be prepared to lead by good personal examples, that is willing to identify and apply good societal values to leadership and governance, that is willing and able to abhor materialism and greed, that is willing to submit its desires and actions to restraints of orderly conduct and rule of law in recognition of the rights of the citizens to enjoy peace, equity and justice. Indeed, the fight against corruption cannot be effectively initiated or championed by leaders whose moral turpitude leaves much to be desired and cannot easily earn public confidence.
The Way Forward
There is the need for integrity and honesty among Nigerian leaders as such qualities would enhance or engender responsible and patriotic follower ship. Nigerian leaders need to live by the highest standards of honesty and integrity. If this becomes the case, the citizen will become inclined to developing patriotic spirits and, consequently, feel obliged to adhere to leadership calls to avoid corrupt practices.
Leaders in Nigeria should show exemplary life style and follow it up with radical programmes of social and political reorganization and consistent agenda of reform. It is pretty difficult for corrupt leaders to genuinely initiate policies and actually fight corruption. Indeed, to effectively fight corruption, the creed for leaders in Nigeria should be do as I do and not just as I say.
Succeeding leaderships should have the will to scrutinize and investigate the activities of their predecessors and to prosecute them conclusively if found to have been involved in corrupt activities. Effective and serious effort at fighting corruption in Nigeria should start by effective prosecution of corrupt past leaders. This is necessary because it appears that it is the unwillingness and inability of succeeding regimes to probe the corrupt activities of their predecessors that make it difficult for the citizens to see government leadership efforts to fight corruption in Nigeria as genuine.
Moreover, there is the need for the leadership of any government to enthrone and ensure the observance of the principle of checks and balances. Checks and balances is a corollary to the theory of separation of powers because it emphasis one arm of government being a watch dog over the other arm, each having been assigned its specific function according to the principles of separation of power . Indeed, the existence of institutional checks and balances moderates the use of power associated with leadership position. This is necessary because as Lord Acton notes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Again, there is the need for the leadership itself to adhere to the principles of the rule of law which describes the idea that the law of the state is supreme and should not offer any special protection to any citizen either at the followership or leadership level. Here, the issue of immunity clause as entrenched in section 308 of the 1999 constitution may need not to apply if the anti-graft war is to be effective in Nigeria.
In addition, government leadership need to establish special courts for trying corruption cases as a means of speeding up the trial of cases and reducing the effect of massive corruption in the judiciary. Such courts with special rules will fast track the trial of corruption cases in a manner that both low and high profile cases will not last more than a year before it is determined.
Finally, Nigeria needs national leadership rooted in constitutionalism and proper democratic practice and that is willing to develop strong institutions in preference to strong rulers.

Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion on the issue of curbing indiscipline and corruption in the Nigeria Judicial System through tupocracy, it is concluded that corruption is a critical problem for good governance in Nigeria as it reflects a crisis in the functioning of the public sector and as such should be a priority for government leadership to control. But as long as Nigeria does not have the best at its leadership positions, and as long as leaders are not willing to adhere to the ethical demands of their leadership positions, the Nation‘s effort at curbing indiscipline and corruption may, at best, remain an illusion. Indeed, effective fight against indiscipline and corruption in the Nigerian Judicial System requires a good and exemplary leadership with a strong will to fight corruption and with such high level of ethical and moral standards to be able to motivate and influence the citizens to voluntarily follow in the fight against corruption. In essence, the inability of the Nation to curb corruption underscores the poverty of good leadership in Nigeria. The effective way to curb corruption is, therefore, for the leadership to eschew corruption itself. In this way, it will have the stronger justification and moral right to effectively fight corruption down to the grassroots.
Indeed, effective fight against corruption in Nigeria requires leaderships with apparent display of commitment, personal sacrifice, exemplary lifestyle and a personal show of integrity and honesty. The efforts of such leaderships at fighting corruption should be beyond ordinary formulation and making of laws, policies or pronouncements, and extend to visible and concrete show of exemplary lives of , integrity and transparency. It is in fact, in the hope and possibility of such leaderships emerging that Nigeria should have reason to remain optimistic about the future of Nigeria with particular reference to effectively controlling or curbing corruption.
In a situation when there’s a problem, there would surely be a solution to solve these problems. Corruption in Judiciary can be eradicated totally by ensuring the independence of the Judiciary which involved the issue of the selection of judges, the security of tenure, promotion, financial and administrative autonomy, and safeguards against interference through manipulation of budgets meant for organs of the Judicial Arm of government. The appointment of the Judicial Personnel by the executive and approval by the senate as enshrined in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should be amended; if the Judicial Arm of government is not independent, there’s no way we can combat judicial corruption in the country.
Investigative Journalists have a vital role to play by going undercover to expose the corrupt judicial officers in the country. If the names of these corrupt judicial personnel are published on national dailies, it would serve as a deterrent to others who have the intention to engage in such corrupt practices which include: bribery, trading in influence, gift receiving, fraud, greasing, blackmailing, preferential treatment, nepotism, embezzlement e.t.c.
Judges, court personnel and lawyers leading by example should be subjected to disciplinary action under the code of conduct which will have binding force and strict implementation and should be punished like anyone else under the same law. Even though, immunity for the official act is absolutely necessary to prevent frivolous charges and suits against judicial officers who perform their function in good faith and without any form
of corrupt practices. Judicial officers should refrain from membership of political parties to avoid being pressurized to favor politicians for private or group gains. Judges should be apolitical and there should be an effective monitoring body to ensure the effectiveness of this body.
The judiciary also has its own function to play in combating corruption within themselves by finding the courage to remove itself from bad notion of the public that judicial personnel are corrupt by objectively prosecuting mischievous judicial officers who are charged or otherwise found to have engaged in one form of indiscretions or the other, particularly corrupt acts. The National Judicial Council should be more provident by adhering to the prerequisites of in-depth scrutiny of proposed candidates for nomination and appointment, in addition, to stand firmly to investigate and discipline the corrupt judicial officers. There is a need to review from time to time the tenure of the members of the National Judicial Council and should be headed by a retired judicial officer for the purpose of guaranteeing firmness in the performance of their duties.
The Code of Conduct Bureau should ensure total compliance by judicial officers with the requirement of compulsory declaration of assets to enable security agencies to take bearing and be properly guided if and when there is need to investigate these judicial officers. Anti-corruption strategies should be effectively implemented and at the same time should not be used as machinery to indict judicial officers in order to achieve any negative gain.
Judicial officers including their administrative staff should be adequately remunerated via an enhanced pay structure to reduce the craving for money and other forms of gratification which has become the bane of the judiciary.
The Executive and Legislative arms of government should comply with the requirements of checks and balances in the polity as an integral requirement of a democratic government that is practicing true federalism to reduce the prevalence of corruption within the Nigerian judicial system.

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