₦airaland Forum

Read David Mark's Monday, April 11, 1994 Interview of How He And Other Military Officers Brought Abacha To Power.

He Also Claimed That He and His Colleagues Refused To Validate Chief MKO Abiola's June 12, 1993 Victory Because Yoruba Obas Wanted Full-Scale Military Rule. This Claim Was Later Debunked By Multiple Yoruba Obas and Elders, Who Claimed It Was An Excuse David Mark And His Colleagues Used To Topple The Civilian Administration of Earnest Shonekan.

Newswatch: What happened?

Mark: When we saw that things were getting out of control in the country and it had become obvious that the interim government could not hold an election and the ship of state was drifting precariously, we reluctantly decided that the military should again intervene. When we met, we considered three possible options. The first option was to give Shonekan and his team the teeth to be able to bite and conduct the presidential election successfully as was in the transition programme. The second option was to go for a short but full military regime for six months and conduct only the presidential election thereafter. And the third option was a mixed grill, a diluted military regime for no more than one year, culminating again in a presidential election.

Most of us favoured option one for obvious reasons. We believed that Nigeria at that time, was not in the mood for a military regime. People were no longer prepared to tolerate the military. In addition, most of us were acutely aware that the entire world was moving toward democracy. The dramatic effects of the last few years-the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of democratic movements around the world clearly galvanised that point.

Newswatch: How were you to accomplish this?

Mark: We were to accomplish option one by openly telling the nation that the military was strongly behind Shonekan and his team in their effort to complete the transition programme successfully. General Abacha was to make the announcement and warn the State Governments that were not cooperating that they risked being removed and state of emergency being declared in their states. We were to be emphatic and unequivocal in our support for Shonekan and his team. But surprisingly the Governors did not want Shonekan to succeed. They made Abacha's home their pilgrimage point and urged Abacha to take over power.

The second option was a short full fledged military regime for six months - we discarded this for obvious reasons, some of which I have already told you.

This option presented more problems than we could handle at that time. The problems included possible economic sanctions from the western world, head on collision with the international monetary and financial institutions; if at that late stage in our march towards democracy we returned to military government again, it would completely undermine our leadership role in the African continent. And more importantly there was the possibility of being disgraced out of office by a civilian uprising. We were not even sure that the soldiers in the barracks who had also witnessed the move toward democracy around the world, would be supportive. Why should they anyway when their condition is worse off in a military regime? And we realised sadly too that the solution to our economic and political problems could not be solved by simple military decree.

The third option, which was a longer one, was a diluted military arrangement for no more than one year. Within this one year we were to conduct all the elections from local government chairmanship to the presidential. After all, Obasanjo and Yar'Adua did their elections in one year; therefore there was no reason why we could not have done the same.

In all the three options, there were a few constants. The two political parties were to remain, although they could be renamed if the politicians so desired, government was to stop funding the political parties. Parties were to fund themselves, the parties were not to be treated as government parastatals. The parties were to refund N100 million each back to the government. Independent candidacy was to be allowed in all the elections and as much as possible each of the two political parties was to nominate a southern presidential candidate for obvious reasons.

Newstwatch: By southern Presidential candidate do you mean a Yoruba?

Mark: No not necessarily, I mean a candidate from the Southern part of Nigeria. He could be Igbo or any Southern minority.

Newswatch: You did not appear to have settled on any of the three options. What we now have bears no resemblance to all the careful calculations. What happened?

Mark: Yes we did settle on an option. At the end of a stormy debate, we favoured option one which marked the beginning of a major disagreement within the group. Eventually, General Abacha and Diya reluctantly agreed but with the proviso that Diya "would sound out the CD, CLO, Yoruba leaders of thought, the elders, and the Obas to see if option three would be acceptable." Diya confirmed that he sent Onagoruwa to meet the Ala'afin and to tell him that the Ooni was opposed to a military regime in hope thereby to get his support, since Diya knew the two traditional rulers rarely agreed on any one issue. He also added that he had discussed with Jakande who was prepared to abandon Abiola if he was offered the position of Minister of External Affairs or Finance. Diya maintained that most Yoruba leaders would settle on any other Yoruba man, apart from an Egbaman, as a presidential candidate. He eventually assured us that after an extensive consultation with Gani, Beko, Falana, Onagoruwa, the CLO, CD, the elders, the Obas, and the leaders of thought, they agreed to support total military regime for no less than five years to put the economy right. He then arranged for Onagoruwa to go and thank all those involved as well as seek the support of other eminent Yorubas.

Newswatch: Was Diya's assurance of the support of the Yoruba all you needed to adopt option three?

Mark: Yes, option three, as originally conceived, that is for one year because our concern at that state was how best to defuse the tension in the western part of the country and assure the Yorubas that there was no plan to deliberately deny them or any section of the country, for that matter, the presidency.

Like I said earlier we were also worried about the popularity and support of the CD and CLO in the Yoruba speaking area. Happily we were assured that Onagoruwa had taken care of that sector.

Newswatch: If all of you were anxious for democracy, did you consider reversing the annulment of the June 12 election?

Mark: No.


Newswatch: Why?

Mark: Because after Diya, consulted with the Yoruba leaders of thought, they unanimously and unequivocally agreed to forego June 12 and instead opted for a military government. It was at this point that Diya again raised the issue of discarding option one because Chief Shonekan would deliberately ensure that Abiola was one of the presidential candidates. He said that would be against the wishes of the Obas and the Yoruba leaders of thought.

PETER OBI BOUGHT £1 MILLION HOUSE IN UK IN 6 MONTHS AS ABACHA WORKER
Hear Peter Obi Boast of Buying a House In London For £1 Million, Six Months After Abacha Appointed Him Into His Government On April 24, 1996. Video is at link given below:
https://www.facebook.com/reel/1267303472250041/?mibextid=rS40aB7S9Ucbxw6v

Read David Mark's Monday, April 11, 1994 Interview of How He And Other Military Officers Brought Abacha To Power.

He Also Claimed That He and His Colleagues Refused To Validate Chief MKO Abiola's June 12, 1993 Victory Because Yoruba Obas Wanted Full-Scale Military Rule. This Claim Was Later Debunked By Multiple Yoruba Obas and Elders, Who Claimed It Was An Excuse David Mark And His Colleagues Used To Topple The Civilian Administration of Earnest Shonekan.

Newswatch: What happened?

Mark: When we saw that things were getting out of control in the country and it had become obvious that the interim government could not hold an election and the ship of state was drifting precariously, we reluctantly decided that the military should again intervene. When we met, we considered three possible options. The first option was to give Shonekan and his team the teeth to be able to bite and conduct the presidential election successfully as was in the transition programme. The second option was to go for a short but full military regime for six months and conduct only the presidential election thereafter. And the third option was a mixed grill, a diluted military regime for no more than one year, culminating again in a presidential election.

Most of us favoured option one for obvious reasons. We believed that Nigeria at that time, was not in the mood for a military regime. People were no longer prepared to tolerate the military. In addition, most of us were acutely aware that the entire world was moving toward democracy. The dramatic effects of the last few years-the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of democratic movements around the world clearly galvanised that point.

Newswatch: How were you to accomplish this?

Mark: We were to accomplish option one by openly telling the nation that the military was strongly behind Shonekan and his team in their effort to complete the transition programme successfully. General Abacha was to make the announcement and warn the State Governments that were not cooperating that they risked being removed and state of emergency being declared in their states. We were to be emphatic and unequivocal in our support for Shonekan and his team. But surprisingly the Governors did not want Shonekan to succeed. They made Abacha's home their pilgrimage point and urged Abacha to take over power.

The second option was a short full fledged military regime for six months - we discarded this for obvious reasons, some of which I have already told you.

This option presented more problems than we could handle at that time. The problems included possible economic sanctions from the western world, head on collision with the international monetary and financial institutions; if at that late stage in our march towards democracy we returned to military government again, it would completely undermine our leadership role in the African continent. And more importantly there was the possibility of being disgraced out of office by a civilian uprising. We were not even sure that the soldiers in the barracks who had also witnessed the move toward democracy around the world, would be supportive. Why should they anyway when their condition is worse off in a military regime? And we realised sadly too that the solution to our economic and political problems could not be solved by simple military decree.

The third option, which was a longer one, was a diluted military arrangement for no more than one year. Within this one year we were to conduct all the elections from local government chairmanship to the presidential. After all, Obasanjo and Yar'Adua did their elections in one year; therefore there was no reason why we could not have done the same.

In all the three options, there were a few constants. The two political parties were to remain, although they could be renamed if the politicians so desired, government was to stop funding the political parties. Parties were to fund themselves, the parties were not to be treated as government parastatals. The parties were to refund N100 million each back to the government. Independent candidacy was to be allowed in all the elections and as much as possible each of the two political parties was to nominate a southern presidential candidate for obvious reasons.

Newstwatch: By southern Presidential candidate do you mean a Yoruba?

Mark: No not necessarily, I mean a candidate from the Southern part of Nigeria. He could be Igbo or any Southern minority.

Newswatch: You did not appear to have settled on any of the three options. What we now have bears no resemblance to all the careful calculations. What happened?

Mark: Yes we did settle on an option. At the end of a stormy debate, we favoured option one which marked the beginning of a major disagreement within the group. Eventually, General Abacha and Diya reluctantly agreed but with the proviso that Diya "would sound out the CD, CLO, Yoruba leaders of thought, the elders, and the Obas to see if option three would be acceptable." Diya confirmed that he sent Onagoruwa to meet the Ala'afin and to tell him that the Ooni was opposed to a military regime in hope thereby to get his support, since Diya knew the two traditional rulers rarely agreed on any one issue. He also added that he had discussed with Jakande who was prepared to abandon Abiola if he was offered the position of Minister of External Affairs or Finance. Diya maintained that most Yoruba leaders would settle on any other Yoruba man, apart from an Egbaman, as a presidential candidate. He eventually assured us that after an extensive consultation with Gani, Beko, Falana, Onagoruwa, the CLO, CD, the elders, the Obas, and the leaders of thought, they agreed to support total military regime for no less than five years to put the economy right. He then arranged for Onagoruwa to go and thank all those involved as well as seek the support of other eminent Yorubas.

Newswatch: Was Diya's assurance of the support of the Yoruba all you needed to adopt option three?

Mark: Yes, option three, as originally conceived, that is for one year because our concern at that state was how best to defuse the tension in the western part of the country and assure the Yorubas that there was no plan to deliberately deny them or any section of the country, for that matter, the presidency.

Like I said earlier we were also worried about the popularity and support of the CD and CLO in the Yoruba speaking area. Happily we were assured that Onagoruwa had taken care of that sector.

Newswatch: If all of you were anxious for democracy, did you consider reversing the annulment of the June 12 election?

Mark: No.

Newswatch: Why?

Mark: Because after Diya, consulted with the Yoruba leaders of thought, they unanimously and unequivocally agreed to forego June 12 and instead opted for a military government. It was at this point that Diya again raised the issue of discarding option one because Chief Shonekan would deliberately ensure that Abiola was one of the presidential candidates. He said that would be against the wishes of the Obas and the Yoruba leaders of thought.

Dress as you want to be addressed.
The current generation of students are very wayward.
Its now very common to see female teachers and students wearing skimpy bikini dresses to school.
At a recent school graduation ceremony all the graduating female students wore skimpy revealing see through dresses and came on stage to sing. Parents and male teachers were shocked to see many immature breasts on display in public.

God bless the Nigerian Army.
God will defeat and shane all the enemies of Nigeria. Death to all terrorist and rebel.

Fake Prophets Everywhere.
Too many con men defrauding people by parading themselves as Christ or Apostles of Christ.
Many claim to be more Christian than Christ.
Many claim to be more Angelic than Angels.
Many claim to be more Godly than God.
Some ask for money, some ask for sex, some ask for your Assets like cars or houses from believers.
Some Muslims do the same.
Some days ago I saw a muslim preacher on the streets of Abuja that claimed he is resurrected Muhammed here in Nigeria.
Very Funny.

The Nigeria police force is one of the most corrupt Police force in the world. It is full of so many crooks and criminals and clowns parading themselves as officers. The NPF claim to have 80,000 officers and up to 300,000 workers including spies yet there is insecurity everywhere in Nigeria. Bribery and extortion of money from motorists seems to be their major interest.
Many Nigeria police men shameless ally with corrupt politicians to steal public fund. Some aid criminals in oil theft. Others aid drug smugglers.
Some Nigerian police officers aid fraudsters that defraud people of their money. Fraudulent land sellers that sell one piece of land to many people often have accomplices in the nearby police stations that prevent the defrauded people from attesting the defrauders.
It is well known that police officers force people to pay for Bail that is supposed to be free. It is well known that police officers steal public fund by selling lies and fake information to the government.
There are many variations of these type of fraud. The latest is police officers allying with thieving employers to steal workers salary and workers pension funds running into billions of dollars.

[b]Ndi Sankiri-ti-for-eni-isan a language spoken by the Yoruba and Igbo people of Southern Nigeria is the ancestor of all semitic languages and all Indo-European languages.
These are names of nations in sankiri:
Scythia : sankiri-ti-a : sankiri it's we.
Samantha : sank-ma-eni-ti-a : sank known persons it's we.
India : ndi-a : we indigene.
Hindu : Hi-ndi-uo : He your indigene.
Europe : Euro-pe-a : we called people.
European ; Euro-pe-eni-a : We called we persons.
Rome : Euro-mi : My people.
Roma : Euro-mi-a : We 'my people'.
Roma Latina : Euro-mi-a lati-nna -a : my people from we nation.
Romulus Greeko : Euro-mi-uo-ilu-si ga-ire-e-ko : My people your city seen great good you build.
Britannia : bi-ari-ti-enia : it's we persons birth place area.
Bithynia : ibi-ti-eni-a : it's we persons place.
Aran : Ara-eni : persons brethren.
Arania : Ara-eni-a : we persons brethren.
Aryan : Ara-yi-eni-a : This persons we brethren.
Arabia : Ara-ibi-a : we brethrens place.
Syria : Si-yi-ari-a : see this as we area.
Assyria : A-si-yi-ari-a : we see this as we area.
Ashuria : A-shur-ari-a : we protect we area.
Canaan : kwa-nna-a-eni : we persons nation packs.
Levant : ile-wa-ni-ti : we land in it.
Lebanon : ile-oba-ouni : land king owns.
Nubia : inu-ibe-a : we in the place
Part of the linguistics archeological evidence is posted here the reminder containing thousands of Indo-European words from different languages will be available online soon. The genetic or DNA evidence is already online. It is available online on Wikipedia. Use Google to search for the article all modern humans descended from Koisan people.[/b]

Exam mulpractice now very common in Nigeria. Many students in our schools don't write exams by themselves anymore. It's also now common in even police and army schools. But exam mulpractice in Nigeria law school is something to worry about.

Sankiri Ancient African Language Spoken In Ancient Egypt.
The word Nile in River Nile comes from ni-ile which in sankiri-ti for-eni-isan means in home or in our land.


The word Nubia comes from inu-ibe-a which in sankiri-ti for-eni-isan means we in place or place we in.


The word Arabia comes from Ara-ibi-a which in sankiri-ti for-eni-isan  means we brethrens place.


The word Hebrew comes from He-bi-eru which means he's born slave in sankiri-ti for-eni-isan which is the major language in ancient Egypt.


The word Israel comes from yi-si-ra-eli which means this is God's ransomed in sankiri-ti for-eni-isan which is the major language in ancient Egypt.



The word Syria comes from si-yi-ari-a which in sankiri-ti for-eni-isan  means see this as we area.


The word Assyria comes from A-si-yi-ari-a which in sankiri-ti for-eni-isan  means we see this as we aria.


I have made many posts over the past years in the groups. The posts were all about sankiri and Phoenician and Kush the three major languages in ancient Egypt.


One of the greatest discoveries in modern times in language is that sankiri spoken in West Africa is the ancestor of all the Indian, Indo-European and semitic languages.


In fact the language lineages    of the semites and the Indo-Europeans seperated in ancient Egypt when the Indo-Europeans went to Babylon and Anatolia and the semites went to Arabia both taking with them their spoken dialects of the ancient Egyptian language.


I have studied sankiri of the Phoenician for over 25 years of my adult. I am now near 50 years  of age and I want to publish all my research findings on sankiri-ti for-eni-isan.


I am writing a book on sankiri language and also compiling a dictionary of sankiri words.

My aim is to teach sankiri language to European and American scholars and linguistics experts and other researchers in ancient languages.


I believe a knowledge of sankiri will help researchers in ancient languages like Phoenician, Kush, Greek, Latin, and Hebrew because these languages are all descended from sankiri.