The ICJ does not resolve the dispute over Abkhazia and South Ossetia but readily tells Nigeria to hand over Bakassi to Cameroun.

What is easier? Let Russia have South Ossetia (>70% of whose citizen already hold Russian nationality) or Nigeria to cede Bakassi ( all of whose citizens are Nigerian)?
What is more important? The land or the people on the land? In such cases as Bakassi, a plebiscite that takes into view the desire of the people should be effected. Would the Cameroonians treat the Bakassians as brothers? What if they are marginalized or systematically eradicated and the land repopulated with bona fide Cameroonians? The ICJ might have succeeded in curtailing the present human rights of African fishermen while upholding the legality of yesteryear's colonial activities.

Territories are ceded by weaker nations to stronger ones. Cameroon has just proved to be the stronger nation- if not militarily at least diplomatically. Shame on us!

A swimming record and a track record has been set. Forget the overall gold count- whose performance was more thrilling? I'll go with U. Bolt- I've never seen anyone win with such panache in athletics.

adjagrade,

If you want to communicate an idea in today's fast moving world, you must be able to crystallize it into a few points. I think you have some sensible things to say but I would rather spend my minutes advising you than read through.

From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia.

    Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important.

    […] By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security.

    [George Friedman, Stratfor, August 12, 2008: “The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power”.]

Russia is not exactly invading Georgia. South Ossetia has been an independent region since the year of the break up of the USSR. Blame it on the original partitioning that put North Ossetia in Russia and South Ossetia in Georgia.

Georgian president said "this is not about Georgia, it's about America". It seems that he being conscious of Russia's possible response, went to with his campaign in S. Ossetia because he relied on Uncle USA. If he gets disappointed on this one, perhaps Georgia and other states would handle internal crises differently.