American R&B music star Trey Songz has blasted President Muhammadu Buhari over silence on End SARS protests.
The 35-year-old rapper and actor expressed his anger towards Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari via Twitter on the 12th of October told him "the people saying you full of sh!t fam".
"Reading this article looks as though they just gon re-employ these same officers in different positions. BULLSHIT!!!," American singer-songwriter added.
At the time of this report, Trey Songz is trending number 1 on Twitter Nigeria.
More than 24,000 Nigerian citizens have signed a petition calling for International Criminal Court to arrest Nigerian Police under the leadership of the Inspector-General of Police, Mohammed Adamu.
After the Inspector-General of Police, Mohammed Adamu, has dissolved the Special Anti-robbery Squad (SARS) earlier today a gazillion of policemen & soldiers have besieged Ogbomoso in Oyo State & a teenager was shot dead while two others are critically wounded.
A citizen, Amadi Chima took to petition.org to petition Mohammed Adamu to International Criminal Court for unleasing war against defenseless and innocent Nigerian youths whose only crimes was demanding an end to extortions, harassments, illegal arrests, detentions, and wanton killings by the rogue police unit, SARS.
'Arrest Nigerian IG of Police for Crimes Against Humanity' is trending number 1 on Twitter with more than 24,500 signatures in less than 4 hours.
The "petition seeks the support of everyone to compel the International Criminal Court at The Hague to order the arrest and prosecution of the IG of Police, Mohammed Adamu, for crimes against humanity, as the Head of the Nigerian Police that has carried out these heinous crimes against Youths in Nigeria."
No matter what you do in life, don't forget you can never please everyone. I saw everything Davido did from the begining to the end I don't think some of us that are born poor can do that.
He was inside the rain
He was inside the sun
Davido knelt and begged, Davido walked towards armed mehn with his hands in the air, Davido took a huge risk, Davido did it!!!!!!!
Davido said "Amidst it all. We must not forget the reasons we are protesting, we must not forget the peaceful manner of the protests and we must most certainly not back down until our demands are met! Sars ending is a great start but the task is far from completed!"
Runtown has teamed up with Falz to pay tribute to the late Kolade Johnson who was shot by officers with Nigeria's anti-cultism police unit during a raid in Lagos State.
As #EndSARS campaign intensifies, SARS operatives and youths clash as protests and tension heighten in Ughelli, Delta state
At the time of this report, the young man who was shot by SARS and his car stolen by them yesterday in ughelli is not dead and currently receiving treatment in an undisclosed hospital.
An operative of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), reportedly shot a young boy suspected to be ‘Yahoo Boy’ (Internet Fraudster) in Ughelli, Delta state on Saturday, October 3.
According to an eye witness, Ichie Teejay said: “SARS just shot a young boy dead at Ughelli, Delta state as we speak. In front of Wetland hotels. They left him for dead on the roadside and drove away with the deceased Lexus jeep.”
Yesterday, Thursday, October 1, 2020, The UAE wishes Nigeria a happy 60th Independence Day! Burj Khalifa in Dubai, a 2722 feet skyscraper was light up in the Nigerian flag colours to celebrate the country.
Hundreds of Nigerian citizens have taken to Twitter and Facebook accusing the government of paying millions for the advert.
Trending questions in Nigeria;
Did Nigeria government pay for Burj Khalifa light up flag?
How much did Nigeria pay for Burj Khalifa lighting?
Nigeria did not pay for Dubai's Burj Khalifa lighting, it's a marketing strategy. It's cost nothing, and the world's tallest building, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, has lighted up flags to celebrate many countries around the world.
The Burj Khalifa post it on social media. And on social media, it would draw more attention from people because of an advert.
Burj khalifa advertisement cost?
According to the marketing agency which manages the lighting displays, the starting rate of getting an advert on the Burj Khalifa is $68,073 almost 27 million naira for only 3 minutes.
The Edo State Governor and candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Mr. Godwin Obaseki, on Saturday, said the sacked national chairman of the All Progressives Congress (APC), Comr. Adams Oshiomhole, has no regard for Benin people, adding that the former governor likens Benin people’s attitude to money the way chickens run after corn thrown at them.
Obaseki, who said this during his reelection campaign rally in Ogbe wards 1 and 2, in Oredo Local Government Area (LGA), noted that “This election is not a contest between my brother Osagie Ize-Iyamu and I, but between Oshiomhole and me. We have dealt with him at the national level and will bury him politically in this election.”
The governor’s reelection also got a major boost as 1, 000 tricycle riders from Ogbe Community in Oredo LGA endorsed the governor for a second term, promising to mobilise other voters across the state to ensure the governor’s victory at the poll.
Declaring their support through their Chairman, Mr. Aiworo Austin, the riders assured that all the tricycle riders in the state will vote massively for the PDP.
According to Obaseki, “The sacked APC national chairman has no regard for Benin people; he can't dictate to the majority; he has no regards for us in Oredo. Benin people are not like chickens that run after corn thrown at them and will render the former national chairman politically irrelevant for disrespecting Benin people.
“Our place in the scheme of things is not negotiable with somebody who does not have a pedigree, who does not have the qualification to determine the political direction in Edo. Oshiomhole cannot determine who governs the state for the majority of the Benin people.
“Oredo Local Government Area has been taken for granted for some years now. One of the things that caused our quarrel was that Oshiomhole wanted to choose who will represent me, the governor, in the state and national assemblies. Can you imagine that?
“Can you imagine the insult? That was when this fight started, because he believed in his mind that Benin people are like chickens that run after a thrown corn.
“Not all of us are cheap; not all of us are looking for money desperately. This election is about the future of young people in Edo; this election is to tell people that politics is not a dirty game. It is only dirty when dirty people play it.
"I know I will win the election. We have almost 50 thousand registered voters in Oredo. I want us to win with a very large margin that will shock the opposition. When Oshiomhole sees that we won with a large margin, he will not have the courage to talk again in Edo.”
Ex-media aide to former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, Pastor Reno Omokri, Tuesday exposed President Muhammadu Buhari and chief of staff, Professor Ibrahim Gambari plans to rig Edo State 2020 election for APC candidates in Edo state.
According to Reno Omokri during a live broadcast on Twitter said; "the current INEC chairman, Mahmood Yakubu tenure is said to be over in 2020. His 5-year tenure, according to the electoral act and he's tenure is going to be running out very soon," Reno said.
He added that "I found out by my source, he had been called out by Buhari new chief of staff, Ibrahim Gambari and told that he would extend his tenure for another five years on the condition that he has to deliver Edo State to APC."
25. Coconspirator 2 also sent Coconspirator 1 a photograph showing a secure login to the CIBC Account in Coconspirator 2’s name. The account number ended in 1716, consistent with the account number that ABBAS sent to Coconspirator 1 in an image on October 17, 2019. 26. I reviewed international travel records from a law enforcement database, which showed that Coconspirator 2 traveled from Toronto, Canada to Los Angeles, California on October 16, 2019. This was one day before the wire transfer from the Chase Account to the CIBC Account in Coconspirator 2’s name. Further, as referenced above, Coconspirator 2 messaged Coconspirator 1 on October 17, 2019 that “I’m in La.” Travel records also show that Coconspirator 2 departed Los Angeles around October 23, 2019 for Canada. Taken together, this indicates that Coconspirator 2 was in Los Angeles at the time of the wire transfer. 27. Later in the day on October 17, 2019, while still in Los Angeles, Coconspirator 2 appeared to confirm the wire transfer in an iMessage found on Coconspirator 1’s iPhone: Coconspirator 1: Did the big hit? Coconspirator 2: Yessir
4 Where there are grammatical and spelling errors in the text when this affidavit quotes ABBAS, Coconspirator 1, and Coconspirator 2, those errors are in the original messages.
28. After Coconspirator 2 appeared to confirm to Coconspirator 1 that the money was transferred to the CIBC Account, Coconspirator 1 appeared to provide confirmation back to ABBAS, within a minute: ABBAS: Sup bro Coconspirator 1: Confo u sent me today Coconspirator 1: Landed Coconspirator 1: Just nown
29. Coconspirator 1 then wrote that he was on an airplane and had just landed. A few seconds later, ABBAS asked, “Money came in?,” and Coconspirator 1 responded, “Yes [¶] For Canada.” 30. ABBAS then demanded, “Give me a screenshot.” Coconspirator 1 stated that he was not able to because his Wi-Fi signal was not strong enough, but promised to send a screenshot. a. I know, based on my training and experience, that persons involved in fraudulently obtaining and laundering funds from BEC schemes and other online fraud schemes often request confirmation of fraudulent transactions, including in the form of screenshots or photographs showing proof that the funds were transferred. 31. Based on my review of messages, Coconspirator 1 ultimately did not send that screenshot. I know from law enforcement agents that Coconspirator 1 was arrested on or about October 17, 2019, in a U.S. airport, on a federal arrest warrant, shortly after sending his last message to ABBAS. C. The Foreign Financial Institution
32. Based on information from FBI agents investigating the cyber-heist from the Foreign Financial Institution, I know that, on February 12, 2019, the Foreign Financial Institution suffered a computer intrusion and cyber-heist in
which approximately €13 million (approximately $14.7 million) was fraudulently wired from the Foreign Financial Institution to bank accounts in multiple countries. 33. Coconspirator 1 and ABBAS, who used Phone Number 1 in these communications, exchanged messages discussing the cyber-heist from the Foreign Financial Institution. Based on my review of data from Coconspirator 1’s iPhone and his Online Account, and discussions with FBI special agents and other law enforcement personnel familiar with this investigation, I know the following: a. In a message on January 16, 2019, Coconspirator 1 contacted ABBAS asking for two European bank accounts that could receive “5m euro” (€ 5 million), which he said would be from the country in which the Foreign Financial Institution is located (the “Foreign Financial Institution Country”). Coconspirator 1 stated several times that the “hit” would occur on February 12. b. After some discussion, ABBAS sent Coconspirator 1 the account information for a Romanian bank account, which he said could be used for “large amounts.” c. ABBAS further said he could provide another account, and Coconspirator 1 said that it would be a payment of “5m”—i.e., € 5 million—to each account. d. On February 1, 2019, Coconspirator 1 told ABBAS that a coconspirator said that “12th February they doing it[.] I have 4 spots Available[.] u gave me 1/4[.] try to get me a next one pls it will both done at once.” Coconspirator 1 also sent ABBAS a photograph of a computer screen containing a messaging conversation which discussed a February 12 “drop” and a “cashout.” e. On February 7, 2019, Coconspirator 1 told ABBAS, “12th feb they lunching [sic “launching”] the swift I need 1 more from you pls.” Coconspirator 1 later explained, “I have 6 slots in total [¶] All 5m Euro [¶] Big hit in 12th feb [¶] They will all credit same time.”
i. SWIFT, or the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, provides a network that enables financial institutions worldwide to send and receive information about financial transactions in a secure, standardized, and reliable environment. SWIFT also sells software and services to financial institutions, much of it for use on the SWIFTNet network. SWIFT does not facilitate funds transfers. Rather, it sends payment orders, which must be settled by correspondent accounts that the institutions have with each other. Each financial institution, to exchange banking transactions, must have a banking relationship by either being a bank or affiliating itself with one (or more) bank(s) so as to enjoy those particular business features. ii. I further know, based on my experience with this investigation, and from FBI agents investigating Coconspirator 1 and other targets, that hackers sometimes will attempt to conduct cyber-heists by gaining access to a bank’s computer network and then sending fraudulent and unauthorized SWIFT messages. f. On February 10, 2019, Coconspirator 1 told ABBAS, “Brother tonight is my dead line to submit anything more,” and then asked, “Do u want add one more or just stick to that one u gave me ?” The next day, ABBAS responded, and provided account information for another bank account in Bulgaria. g. A photograph, dated February 13, 2019, found in Coconspirator 1’s Online Account showed a computer screen with a messaging conversation in which Coconspirator 1 and another person discussed a number of “drops,” i.e., bank accounts that could receive fraudulent funds. One participant said that there could only be “1 euro” drop, and they then discussed how many of Coconspirator 1’s drops would be used. The username known to be used by Coconspirator 1 stated, “I have 3 euro 1 usa [¶] 2 romania 1 bulgaria 1 usa.”
D. Additional Fraudulent Schemes and Attempted Money Laundering
34. In addition to participation in those fraudulent schemes, ABBAS and Coconspirator 1 discussed additional BEC frauds and/or other fraudulent schemes in 2019. These included schemes where ABBAS and Coconspirator 1 sought to fraudulently obtain millions—and, at times, hundreds of millions—of U.S. dollars and U.K. pounds sterling, as described below. 35. On March 10, 2019, Coconspirator 1 requested a bank account in the U.A.E. from ABBAS into which approximately $5 million could be deposited from a victim in the United States. Coconspirator 1 told ABBAS that the “job” would be “Monday am USA time,” and, after some discussion, wrote, “Brother I need it now or we will lose our chance pls.” ABBAS responded by providing bank account information for an account at Commercial Bank International in Dubai, U.A.E. 36. On April 30, 2019, Coconspirator 1 told ABBAS, “Brother I have 4 company’s in uk ready to switch bank acc on file but acc has to be open beneficiary.” After some discussion, Coconspirator 1 further stated, “I have a room working for me , we have leads and company contracts . My guy r changing acc on file for 100m contracts and there payment are once or twice a week 1-5m [¶] I have 4 ready to switch up.” a. Based on my training and experience, it appears Coconspirator 1 was referring to a BEC scheme, because BEC schemes often involve a hacker or fraudster tricking a victim into sending a payment to a coconspirator’s account by switching bank account information on payment instructions provided to the victim. I also know that an “open bene” or “open beneficiary” account is a bank
account where a different business account name can be substituted to help in deceiving the victim into sending funds. b. It thus appears that Coconspirator 1 was telling ABBAS that coconspirators were fraudulently obtaining $1 million to $5 million through a BEC scheme once or twice a week, and was asking ABBAS for a bank account that could be used to receive such funds. 37. On May 3, 2019, Coconspirator 1 told ABBAS, “I need uk open beneficiary acc for Monday bro !!!!! [¶] Today I they paid me.” Coconspirator 1 also sent ABBAS an image of a message from another person saying, “Yo [¶] 3 invoices totaling 1.1 M going into that account today . . . 346k 256k and 507k.” Coconspirator 1 then said, “Bro I have a room ready.” In the resulting discussion, Coconspirator 1 told ABBAS that he was “doing invoice account swap” and needed “account open beneficiary.” When ABBAS asked, “Which country,” Coconspirator 1 responded, “U tell me what country is best i attack [¶] But [¶] I have uk [¶] Ready live.” 38. On May 7, 2019, Coconspirator 1 sent ABBAS a photograph of an apparent banking website showing a transaction “due to be paid” of approximately 1,110,447 of some currency, which is around the same amount as the discussion described in the prior paragraph. Coconspirator 1 then wrote, “I sent 1.1m pound to acc they said open ben in uk money landed and now they asking questions Q I have other companies ready to swap bro pls help me out I am losing millions.” ABBAS then stated, “I will paste u one today,” and Coconspirator 1 responded, “When we swap bro the only thing we change is iban or acc on file and we keep all other info as original but we can put acc name on the memo , u need acc that can handle millions and not block.” The next day, after Coconspirator 1 stated, “Brother my guy can do refund to any visa debit card [¶] Just need card number exp and name,” ABBAS and Coconspirator 1 had some additional discussion that
appeared to be about credit card numbers, culminating with ABBAS providing bank account information for an account in Mexico. 39. On May 12, 2019, Coconspirator 1 wrote to ABBAS, “Brother tonight we are gonna swap ur acc on a big contract payments will be 3-6m every week [¶] I give u confirmation in 12he [¶] From uk.” After ABBAS acknowledged the message, Coconspirator 1 wrote on May 13, 2019, “Your acc has been updated on file , give me 2hr I will send unall details my workers just went to sleep.” ABBAS responded, “Waiting.” 40. Coconspirator 1 then sent messages to ABBAS about the apparent victims. First, Coconspirator 1 sent the name of an English Premier League football club, listing the club’s address as the stadium where the club plays. Coconspirator 1 also wrote, “Amount 100M £,” indicating that the fraudulent transaction would be for £ 100 million. Second, Coconspirator 1 sent the name of a U.K. company with an address in Edinburgh, Scotland, and wrote, “Amount 200m £.” Coconspirator 1 then added, “We swapped ur acc under 2 contracts . Tomorow morning we will send u the previous payment and amount with future paymanet and amount [¶] Can I have 1 more for tomorow to swap pls.” 41. In response, ABBAS stated, “Bro [¶] I can’t keep collecting houses n not give them a feed back n keep asking for more [¶] This things cost a lot of money now to open.” ABBAS and Coconspirator 1 then discussed the use of the account, and Coconspirator 1 sent a photograph of a computer screen showing the Mexican bank account information with the name of a U.K. company, with a U.K. address, substituted as the beneficiary information. ABBAS responded, “When it’s done let me know.” a. I know based on my training and experience, and from other FBI agents who have experience with these matters, that Nigerian-origin subjects sometimes use the words “aza” (sometimes “azar,” “azza,” or “azah”) or “house”
to refer to a bank account used to receive proceeds of a fraudulent scheme. The word “house” is also sometimes used to refer to a bank itself. I observed that, in other messages with ABBAS, Coconspirator 1 used the term “azza,” in addition to using the term “house.” (While Coconspirator 1 is not Nigerian, he is known to have communicated with multiple Nigerian-origin coconspirators.) 42. On July 3, 2019, Coconspirator 1 reported to ABBAS, “Brother I can’t send from uk to Mexico they keep finding out , but uk 2 uk these guy keep paying and I can show u my last week cashout.” He also added that another coconspirator “has acces to a European bank and want to initiate a MT103/202 10- 50 million if u know about it.” a. I know based on my training and experience that MT103 and MT202 are types of SWIFT messages. It thus appears that Coconspirator 1 was referencing a cyber-heist scheme in which a coconspirator would be able to make fraudulent transfers of 10 million to 50 million in dollars or euros. // // //
IV. CONCLUSION 43. For all the reasons described above, there is probable cause to believe that ABBAS has committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Conspiracy to Engage in Money Laundering).
ANDREW JOHN INNOCENTI Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation Attested to by the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1 by telephone on June 25, 2020.
THE HONORABLE ROZELLA A. OLIVER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
12. This Instagram profile also claimed that the user was a real estate developer and listed the user’s Snapchat account as “Hushpuppi5,” which is the same Snapchat account name that was saved in Coconspirator 1’s iPhone (see paragraph 9.a). 13. Based on records from Instagram received in June 2020, the Instagram account was subscribed with the name “RAY,” the email address rayhushpuppi@gmail.com, and the verified phone number +971502818689 (“Phone Number 2”). The Instagram account was created on October 10, 2012, and recent account history from 2020 showed logins from Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses located in the U.A.E.2 (ABBAS lives in the U.A.E., based on
2 Based on my training and experience, I know that an Internet Protocol version 4 address, also known as an “IPv4 address,” or more commonly “IP address,” is a set of four numbers, each ranging from 0 to 255 and separated by a period (“.”) that is used to route traffic on the internet. A single IP address can
information from his email and social media accounts, financial records, and internet research, some of which is further discussed below.) 14. Based on subscriber records from Snap Inc., the Snapchat account “Hushpuppi5” used the phone number +971565505984 (“Phone Number 3”) and the email address rayhushpuppi@gmail.com (i.e., the same email as the Instagram account). The Snapchat account used the display name “The Billionaire Gucci Master!!!,” which was the same Snapchat contact name saved in Coconspirator 1’s phone for the Snapchat account “Hushpuppi5.” 15. Records from Apple Inc. showed the following: a. The email account rayhushpuppi@gmail.com was used to create an Apple account on March 29, 2014, which was active as of May 2020, and used the subscriber name “Ray Hushpuppi.” b. The same email account was used in subscriber records of another Apple account, which account records also listed the email address rayhushpuppi@icloud.com and another Google account. c. Phone Number 1 was listed in the subscriber records of a third Apple account, which was created on November 7, 2019. The account listed the subscriber name “Godisgood Godson” and the verified email address godisgoodallthetime0007@gmail.com. Despite using that subscriber name, the name “Ramon Abbas” (i.e., ABBAS) was listed in account records in December 2019 and January 2020. Apple records further listed a user’s address as 1706 Palazzo Versace, in Dubai, U.A.E. (the “Palazzo Versace” address).
manage internet traffic for more than one computer or device, such as when a router in one’s home routes traffic to one’s desktop computer, as well as to one’s tablet or smartphone, while all using the same IP address to access the internet. IP addresses can be used to establish a person’s approximate—or, at times exact— geographic location.
i. Records from Google for ABBAS’ email address rayhushpuppi@gmail.com, which are described more below, included a lease renewal/tenancy contract for the Palazzo Versace address for April 4, 2020 through May 3, 2021, which also listed Phone Number 3. Posts on ABBAS’s Instagram page also suggested that he lived at the Palazzo Versace apartments in Dubai, U.A.E., including one that listed the location “Palazzo Versace Dubai.” ii. Google records, in turn, indicated that the email account godisgoodallthetime0007@gmail.com, which used the subscriber name “Godisgoodallthetime GraciousGod,” was both created and last logged into on November 7, 2019. This email account was accessed on November 7, 2019 from an IP address that geo-locates to the U.A.E. Google records for this account also included several Apple invoices billed to ABBAS, which used the Palazzo Versace address as the billing address. 16. Based on my review and an FBI computer scientist’s review of Google account records for rayhushpuppi@gmail.com, obtained through legal process and a federal search warrant in this District, I know the following: a. The account used the subscriber name “Ray HushPuppi” and was created on September 19, 2013. Additionally, the recovery email listed was rayhushpuppi@icloud.com, and the recovery phone number was Phone Number 2. b. Multiple emails in the email account rayhushpuppi@gmail.com confirmed that ABBAS used Phone Number 1, Phone Number 2, and Phone Number 3. i. As noted above, on April 6, 2020, an email sent to rayhushpuppi@gmail.com contained a tenancy contract for the Palazzo Versace address, with ABBAS listed as the tenant and Phone Number 3 as his phone number.
ii. On February 6, 2020 and March 3, 2020, rayhushpuppi@gmail.com was used to send Phone Number 1 to other persons, which the account user described as “my mobile number” and “my phone number,” respectively. iii. On December 13, 2019, a booking confirmation sent to rayhushpuppi@gmail.com contained ABBAS’ full name, the Palazzo Versace address, and Phone Number 3. iv. On August 14, 2019, an email sent to rayhushpuppi@gmail.com containing a flight itinerary for ABBAS also listed Phone Number 2. v. On July 11, 2019, an order receipt sent to rayhushpuppi@gmail.com contained ABBAS’ name, the Palazzo Versace address, and Phone Number 2. vi. On May 26, 2019, rayhushpuppi@gmail.com was used to send an email containing ABBAS’ name as well as Phone Number 1 and Phone Number 2 as contact numbers. vii. On May 25, 2019, rayhushpuppi@gmail.com was used to send an email (regarding a U.A.E. bank transaction that was blocked) and the sender listed Phone Number 2. viii. On February 5, 2019, an online order confirmation email sent to rayhushpuppi@gmail.com included both ABBAS’ name and Phone Number 1. ix. On November 4, 2018, an email containing a flight itinerary for ABBAS also listed Phone Number 3. c. Multiple emails in the email account also contained photographs or scans of several foreign identification documents for ABBAS.
i. On September 12, 2017, rayhushpuppi@gmail.com sent a photograph of the Federal Republic of Nigeria passport of ABBAS, with a passport number ending in 2132. The passport was issued in Malaysia in 2015, stated that ABBAS is a Nigerian citizen, and listed ABBAS’ birthday as October 11, 1982. (I) The photograph of this Nigerian passport was included with a photograph of a U.A.E. Resident Identity card in ABBAS’ name, containing his picture and an ID number ending in 9431. The email transmitting both photographs stated that they were the sender’s “identity and passport page followed by my real Instagram page.” Consistent with that statement, the email also included a screenshot of the Instagram account @hushpuppi, which also showed the Snapchat username “Hushpuppi5.” ii. On February 23, 2020, rayhushpuppi@gmail.com sent an email containing a photograph of a different Federal Republic of Nigeria passport of ABBAS, with a passport number ending in 5915, as well as a U.A.E. visa with the same resident ID number ending in 9431. Both the passport and U.A.E. visa are pictured below.[img][/img]
iii. On the next day, February 24, 2020, in response to that email, rayhushpuppi@gmail.com received a scan of a Saint Christopher (St. Kitts) and Nevis passport of ABBAS, with the passport number ending in 4154. The passport was issued in St. Kitts in February 2020, and also listed ABBAS’ birthday as October 11, 1982.
iv. The photographs on these four identifications were consistent with each other and were also consistent with photographs I have seen of ABBAS, including photographs on his publicly viewable social media accounts described in this affidavit. d. The email account rayhushpuppi@gmail.com also contained photographs or scans of foreign identification documents of approximately 13 persons other than ABBAS, of different nationalities (including Nigeria, U.K., Kenya, U.A.E., U.S.A., and Pakistan). e. Based on bank statements and transaction confirmations found in the email account rayhushpuppi@gmail.com from June 2016 to April 2020, ABBAS had financial accounts in Nigeria and the U.A.E. in his name. Moreover, emails from rayhushpuppi@gmail.com also showed that ABBAS conducted financial transactions and/or transfers with individuals believed by the FBI to be coconspirators, including a target of an investigation by the FBI in Chicago. Transaction confirmation emails included transfer amounts and the name of the sending or receiving accounts for those transfers. f. The email account rayhushpuppi@gmail.com also contained emails with attachments relating to wire transfers in large dollar values, including wire transfers in February 2018 in the amounts of $250,000 and $2,397,000. Based on the context of the emails, as well as other information gathered during the FBI investigation about one of the sender email accounts, it appears that these emails were related to fraudulent transactions. 17. Other financial records corroborate ABBAS’ identity. a. Records from Western Union indicate that two money transfers—one listing Phone Number 1 and one listing Phone Number 3— occurred in UAE in 2018, in which the sender was listed as ABBAS, with a birthdate of October 11, 1982, and using an identification bearing the same
number (ending in 9431) as the U.A.E. Resident Identity card, referenced in paragraph 16.c.i(I). b. That same U.A.E. Resident Identity card was also used in connection with two MoneyGram transactions in 2018, in which ABBAS, who again listed a birthdate of October 11, 1982 and address in U.A.E., received funds. In those two transactions, as well as several other transactions through MoneyGram, ABBAS listed Phone Number 3. 18. Other evidence corroborates that ABBAS’ birthdate is October 11, 1982, and that he is “Ray Hushpuppi.” a. A United States non-immigrant visa application submitted in December 2012 listed ABBAS’ full name and his birthdate as October 11, 1982. b. Moreover, on April 14, 2020, I reviewed information publicly viewable on the profile of the above-referenced “hushpuppi” Instagram account that is consistent with ABBAS’ birthdate being on or about October 11. Specifically, on October 12, 2018, the account posted an image of a birthday cake with the inscription “Happy Birthday” and included the caption “Thank you all so much for the love you showed me yesterday till now. I love you all and thanks @fendi @mohammedabdelnabi for the cake. God bless you all.” I also saw a post, on October 11, 2017, by that Instagram account of a birthday cake with the inscription “Happy Birthday Ramon” and the caption “Thanks so much @gucci for this special. God bless you guys at the Dubai Mall Gucci Store!!!”
B. The Victim Law Firm
19. In reviewing data from Coconspirator 1’s iPhone, I and another FBI employee saw messages reflecting that, in or around October 2019, ABBAS had conspired with Coconspirator 1 and Coconspirator 2 to commit a fraudulent wire transfer and money-laundering scheme, in which a U.S. victim (the “Victim Law
Firm”) lost approximately $922,857.76. The messages reflected that part of the scheme, including acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, occurred while Coconspirator 2 was physically present in the Central District of California. 20. Records obtained from JPMorgan Chase Bank (“Chase”) for a bank account held in the U.S. (the “Chase Account”) reflect that the Chase Account received a wire transfer on October 15, 2019 for approximately $922,857.76 from the Victim Law Firm. On October 17, 2019, there was a wire transfer from the Chase Account to an account at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“CIBC”), in Toronto, Ontario, for approximately $396,050. Bank records reflect that the specific account at CIBC ended in 1716 (the “CIBC Account”), consistent with what is discussed below in paragraphs 21, 24, and 25. The remaining funds in the Chase Account were transferred to other accounts. 21. Based on review of data from Coconspirator 1’s iPhone, on or around October 17, 2019, ABBAS, using what appeared to be the Snapchat account “hushpuppi5,” sent an image of a Chase wire confirmation to Coconspirator 1. The image appeared to show a wire transfer form related to a transfer of approximately $396,050 from the Chase Account to the CIBC Account, which, based on other messages on Coconspirator 1’s iPhone, appears to have been held by Coconspirator 2.3 22. On April 14, 2020, I interviewed S.R., owner of the Victim Law Firm, about the above-referenced wire sent on October 17, 2019. On April 16, 2020, I interviewed N.C., who was an attorney and co-worker of S.R., and on May 21, 2020, I interviewed K.C., a paralegal of the Victim Law Firm. Based on these interviews, I learned the following:
3 The “Sender” information in the image was blocked by a Chase bank business card, but other bank records show that this transaction involved the Chase Account.
a. The Victim Law Firm, which is located in New York State, was representing a client, A.D., in the refinance of real estate. b. A.D. was refinancing his/her property with Citizens Bank. As part of the closing for this refinance, on October 15, 2019, K.C. sent a verification email to what appeared to be a Citizens Bank email address (later identified as a “spoofed” email address) requesting wire instructions. Per internal policy of the Victim Law Firm, all wire verifications were to be sent to their firm via fax and followed-up by a phone call. K.C. received a fax message in response to her verification email with what was later determined to be fraudulent wire instructions to transfer the loan payoff amount of their client A.D. to the Chase Account. K.C. then called the phone number listed on the fax to verify the wire instructions. c. On October 15, 2019, K.C. initiated the wire transfer to the Chase Account for approximately $922,857.76. d. Neither the Victim Law Firm, nor their client A.D., realized the funds had been fraudulently transferred to the Chase Account until later in October 2019, when A.D. checked his/her account and realized that the funds for the refinance had not been credited. By this time, all of the funds had been depleted from the Chase Account. (I further understand from K.C. that, as of June 25, 2020, no funds had been recovered.) 23. Messages on Coconspirator 1’s iPhone reflect that, at approximately the same time on October 17, 2019 that ABBAS sent Coconspirator 1 an image of the wire transfer confirmation for the transaction from the Chase Account to the CIBC Account, Coconspirator 1 was communicating with another phone number to confirm the wire had been deposited into the CIBC Account. Based on other messages on the iPhone and records obtained by the FBI, that phone number was used by Coconspirator 2.
24. The communications between Coconspirator 1 and Coconspirator 2 on October 17, 2019 included the following messages: Coconspirator 1: Keep lookout for the 396 and so ur thing till u hear from me Coconspirator 2: Ok will do Coconspirator 2: I’m in La so how can I make sure??4
Hushpuppi and his cybercrime team attempted scamming a British Premier League club of $124 million according to the US Government’s Department of Justice’s website.
A complaint filed against Hushpuppi, by Andrew John Innocenti, Special Agent, FBI stated that he conspired to launder hundreds of millions of dollars from business email compromise (BEC) frauds and other scams, including schemes targeting a U.S. law firm, a foreign bank and an English Premier League soccer club.
Read the full message from the complainant, Andrew John Innocenti, Special Agent, FBI
AFFIDAVIT I, ANDREW JOHN INNOCENTI, being duly sworn, declare and state as follows: I. INTRODUCTION 1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and have been so employed since approximately March 2015. I am currently assigned to the Los Angeles Field Office, High-Tech Organized Crime Squad, where I primarily investigate cyber-enabled fraud and business email compromise (“BEC”) schemes. Between approximately August 2015 and December 2018, I was assigned to a cyber-crime squad in the Chicago Field Office, where I investigated cyber-related crimes, including BEC cases. During my career as an FBI Special Agent, I have participated in numerous computer- crime investigations. In addition, I have received both formal and informal training from the FBI and other institutions regarding computer-related investigations, computer technology, and white-collar fraud. 2. This affidavit is made in support of a criminal complaint against, and arrest warrant for, RAMON OLORUNWA ABBAS, also known as (“aka”) “Ray Hushpuppi,” aka “Hush” (“ABBAS”), for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Conspiracy to Engage in Money Laundering). 3. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon my personal involvement in this investigation, my review of reports and other documents related to this investigation, my training and experience, and information obtained from other agents, law enforcement officers, and witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and arrest warrant, and does not purport to set forth all of my knowledge of the government’s investigation into this matter. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all conversations and statements described in this affidavit are related in substance and in part only. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all dates set
forth below are “on or about” the dates indicated, and all amounts or sums are approximate. II. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE 4. RAMON OLORUNWA ABBAS is a Nigerian national living in the United Arab Emirates (the “U.A.E.”), whose social media accounts frequently show him in designer clothes, wearing expensive watches, and posing in or with luxury cars and charter jets. The FBI’s investigation has revealed that ABBAS finances this opulent lifestyle through crime, and that he is one of the leaders of a transnational network that facilitates computer intrusions, fraudulent schemes (including BEC schemes),1 and money laundering, targeting victims around the world in schemes designed to steal hundreds of millions of dollars. ABBAS participated in these fraudulent schemes and money laundering in coordination with multiple coconspirators, including the persons referred to herein as Coconspirator 1 and Coconspirator 2. 5. This affidavit discusses several fraudulent schemes involving ABBAS. First, messages found on the iPhone of Coconspirator 1 (reviewed pursuant to a federal search warrant issued in this District) reflect that ABBAS, Coconspirator 1, and Coconspirator 2, with others, committed a BEC scheme that defrauded a victim in the United States of approximately $922,857.76, including
1 BEC fraud schemes often involve a computer hacker gaining unauthorized access to a business-email account, blocking or redirecting communications to and/or from that email account, and then using the compromised email account or a separate fraudulent email account (sometimes called a “spoofed” email account) to communicate with personnel from a victim company and to attempt to trick them into making an unauthorized wire transfer. The fraudster will direct the unsuspecting personnel of the victim company to wire funds to the bank account of a third party (sometimes referred to as a “money mule”), which is often a bank account owned, controlled, and/or used by individuals involved in the scheme based in the United States. The money may then be laundered by wiring or transferring it through numerous bank accounts to launder the money, or by quickly withdrawing it as cash, by check, or by cashier’s check.
approximately $396,050 that ABBAS, Coconspirator 1, and Coconspirator 2 laundered while Coconspirator 2 was in Los Angeles, California. 6. Second, ABBAS and Coconspirator 1 conspired to launder funds intended to be stolen through fraudulent wire transfers from a foreign financial institution (the “Foreign Financial Institution”), in which fraudulent wire transfers, totaling approximately €13 million (approximately USD $14.7 million), were sent to bank accounts around the world in February 2019. Coconspirator 1 conspired with the persons who initiated the fraudulent wire transfers, and also conspired with a number of others, including ABBAS, to launder the funds that were intended to be stolen. ABBAS, specifically, provided Coconspirator 1 with two bank accounts in Europe that ABBAS anticipated would each receive €5 million of the fraudulently obtained funds. 7. Other communications between ABBAS and Coconspirator 1 indicate that, in addition to these schemes, ABBAS and Coconspirator 1 conspired to launder tens, and at times hundreds, of millions of dollars that were proceeds of other fraudulent schemes and computer intrusions, including a fraudulent scheme to steal £100 million from an English Premier League football club. III. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE A. Identification of ABBAS
8. Analysis of Coconspirator 1’s iPhone and other online accounts showed that Coconspirator 1 operated and tasked money mule crews for a number of fraudulent schemes, including BEC schemes and cyber-heists. Analysis also showed that Coconspirator 1 communicated with the U.A.E. phone number +971543777711 (“Phone Number 1”) about multiple fraudulent schemes and money laundering. As described below, Phone Number 1 was one of the phone numbers ABBAS used during 2019 and 2020.
9. Based on my review (pursuant to federal search warrants obtained in this District) of data from Coconspirator 1’s iPhone and from an online account connected to that phone (the “Online Account”), other law enforcement personnel’s review of that digital data, and from discussions with United States Secret Service (“USSS”) and FBI personnel, I know the following: a. Coconspirator 1’s iPhone listed Phone Number 1 (+971543777711) with the contact name “Hush.” The phone also contained a contact for Snapchat username “hushpuppi5,” which listed the Snapchat contact name “The Billionaire Gucci Master!!!” b. Searches of Phone Number 1 and the contact name “Hush” in Coconspirator 1’s iPhone revealed messaging conversations between “Hush,” using Phone Number 1, and Coconspirator 1. (For ease of reference, communications with this moniker and Phone Number 1 are referred to as communications with ABBAS in the remainder of this affidavit.) 10. In or around December 2019, April 2020, and June 2020, I reviewed the publicly viewable Instagram account of “hushpuppi” at www.instagram.com/hushpuppi. Based on information available on the profile page, the user of that account made more than 500 posts and had 2.3 million followers as of June 2020. 11. This Instagram account included numerous publicly viewable images of a man who appeared to be ABBAS, based on comparisons to photographs of ABBAS in passports and other identification documents referenced below in paragraphs 16.c to 16.c.iv. Hundreds of these images on the Instagram account showed ABBAS in designer clothing and shoes, posing on or in luxury vehicles, wearing high-end watches, or possessing other luxury items, indicating substantial wealth.
a. For example, on June 6, 2020, ABBAS posted a photograph of a white Rolls Royce Cullinan that included the hashtag “#AllMine.” On February 27, 2019, ABBAS posted a photograph of himself in front of two vehicles, one of which he described as his new Rolls Royce Wraith. Based on review of publicly available pricing information, the starting price for each of these vehicles is approximately $330,000. b. More than two dozen images showed ABBAS in front of, on top of, or inside other luxury vehicles, including multiple models of Bentley, Ferrari, Mercedes, and Rolls Royce. c. On numerous occasions, ABBAS posted photos of himself wearing items and/or holding shopping bags from luxury stores such as Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Channel, Versace, Fendi, and more. d. On multiple dates, including April 17, 2020, June 19, 2019, and July 1, 2019, ABBAS posted images of himself inside or in front of private jets. Multiple photographs also appeared to show ABBAS posing in locations around the world (such as Dubai and Paris).
e. The following photographs are from review of ABBAS’ Instagram account.
The girl was gang-raped in Narayi a neighbourhood in Kaduna South Local Government Area of Kaduna State.
A Twitter user, Uncle Shemzz has revealed how a young girl of 18 years identified as Jeniffer was gang-raped by a group of five boys leaving her severely traumatised in Kaduna State.
Five Kaduna boys took turns raping the 18-year-old victim and it was reported she hasn’t been the same since the incident occurred.
Two of the boys have been apprehended while three are still at large, Real jaeflex said.
For what MandyNews gathered, the victim's family are planning to accept payment of damages from the two arrested gang members.
At the time of this report, the two suspected rapists haven’t been charged to court as the victim family have agreed to accept payments.
Some citizens of Nigeria took to demand justice for Jeniffer with a trending hashtag #JusticeForJennifer.
The Republic of Senegal is making Africa proud, Leading the fight against the coronavirus COVID-19 with the highest recovery rates in Africa.
As world coronavirus recoveries top 841,996. Senegal, A 16 million population country has top the highest recovery rate from the deadly virus with 283 recoveries cases, 671 positive cases and 8 deaths record.
The country became the second country in sub-Saharan Africa to record a coronavirus case on March 2, 2020
So far the disease has killed more than 200,000 people around the world and infected 2,940,697.
Which country has the highest recovery rate?
As of Sunday, April 26 the United States of America has the highest recovery rate of coronavirus with 118,162 followed by Germany 109,800 and Spain 95,708, according to WHO data.
The founder of Omega Fire Ministry, Apostle Johnson Suleman has urges the Federal Government of Nigeria to permit Men of God to visit COVID 19 isolation centre to pray for infected patients.
In a video obtained by Mandy News, during the man of God online broadcast, he said that the federal government should permit at least three faith healers in the country to pray for sick coronavirus patients.
What did Apostle Suleman say about healing COVID-19 patients?
“If you say you have a gift of healing, this is the time to come and out display that gift. It is time to pray for the sick. What is holding the world is sickness," Suleman said.
“There is a gift called the gift of healing. We have seen people healed all over the world. Permit us to prove their prophets in Nigeria"
"We are not telling you we can heal all of them but by the time we are through with prayer, you will see a significant difference. If there are 20 people with the ailment we can be sure that 18 will be healed.”
God has gifted people to pray for the sick. The government should please permit them. God is a miracle worker. Anyone who has the COVID-19 let us pray for them” he added.
At the time of this report, some Nigerians have taken to Twitter to mock the prophet.
As of Sunday, April 26, 2020, the deadly coronavirus, COVID-19 has spread to almost 210 countries and territories around the world. More 2.9 million cases have been confirmed and killed over 200,000 persons
Nigeria, Africa most populous country has confirmed 1,182 confirmed cases of the deadly virus with 222 discharged and 35 deaths recorded.
Apostle Suleman said in Prophecy 29 on his world prophecies for 2020 that the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, should pray against the kidney infection.
Speculation has spread that the North Korean leader was in ill health after undergoing heart surgery on April 12, multiple sources have claimed that the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un died on Saturday night.
Can we say Apostle Suleman's 2020 Prophecy comes to pass?
Check out Apostle Prof. Johnson Suleman 2020 prophecy below.
WORLD PROPHECIES FOR 2020 By Apostle Prof. Johnson Suleman
1. The agricultural boom in Nigeria, the greatest in history.
2. I saw more activists arrested.
3. There will be a series of earthquake, tremor, even in Nigeria.
4. the U.K experiences Brex it finally.
5. A new pattern of letter explosion.
6. I see ethnic clashes in Nigeria. Please let's pray hard.
7. The improved security situation in Nigeria.
8. I see internal deportations in Nigeria.
9. 1 saw NFF ( Nigeria) receive world recognition.
Nigerian man who lives in Europe lay curses on Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari after he received stimulus from the European's Union government.
The young boy who we believe is from Edo state said Ogún (the powerful spirit of metalwork) will kill President Buhari and all the bad leader in the country.
Recently the European Union finance ministers approved €500 billion in stimulus measures designed to cushion the blow to the economies from the coronavirus pandemic.
The payment is made to people with social security numbers and individuals may get up to over 800 euro (N420,000).
Nigeria, a country population of citizens around 200 million. A total of 5,000 samples had so far been tested for coronavirus in Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) laboratories and there had been 288 positive results.
So far 5,000 samples have been tested in Africa's most populated country.
According to the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, seven people have died from having been infected with the coronavirus COVID-19.
The first case of coronavirus infection in Nigeria was reported on 27 February 2020, the case is an Italian citizen who works in Nigeria and returned from Milan, Italy to Lagos, Nigeria on the 25th of February 2020
On 1 April, the Nigerian government ordered the lockdown of Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria's commercial and political capitals.
46 Countries across Africa has been affected by the deadly Wuhan virus COVID-19, more than 5,000 people cases recorded and 157 deaths cases.
MandyNews, compiled the list of country, total cases and total deaths as released by the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa (WHOAFRO) and WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (WHOEMRO).
I know you came here because you noticed a strange flag behind President Buhari while addressing the nation amid the outbreak of coronavirus COVID-19 in Nigeria.
There were two flags during President Buhari's broadcast on Sunday, you came here because you don't know, the two flags belong to Nigeria. The national flag has three vertical bands of green, white, green. The two green stripes represent Nigeria's natural wealth, while the white band represents peace. The second flag is a 1:2 horizontal tetra colour of red, black, white, and green.
The 2 flags behind the president signify his office as President of Nigeria, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
Who is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in Nigeria?
President Muhammadu Buhari is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in Nigeria
What is the meaning of the two flags behind President Buhari?
Flag of the Nigerian Armed Forces together with the Nigerian flag, it means President Muhammadu Buhari is both the President of Nigeria and also the commander in chief of the armed forces.
What are the colour of the two flags?
The Nigeria flag has three vertical bands of green, white, green. The two green stripes represent Nigeria's natural wealth, while the white band represents peace.
The Commander in Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces flag has a 1:2 horizontal tetra colour of red, black, white, and green.
Read President Muhammadu Buhari speech while addressing the nation amid the outbreak of coronavirus COVID-19 in Nigeria.
What did Buhari say about Coronavirus?
We pray for a quick recovery for those who have been infected – President Buhari.
Since the outbreak was reported in China, our government has been monitoring the situation - President Buhari.
We ask Nigerians to support the work the NCDC and the Ministry of Health are doing – President Buhari.
As a government, we would continue to rely on advice from our experts in these difficult times – President Buhari.
We are working to prevent interstate movement to prevent the spread – President Buhari
Our goal is to ensure all states have the right support to respond immediately – President Buhari.
In Nigeria’s fight against CIVID-19, there is no such thing as overreaction and under-reaction. – President Muhammadu Buhari
I am directing the restriction of all movements in Lagos, FCT and Ogun State – President Buhari.
We would ensure the treatment of confirmed cases – President Buhari.
We should see this as our individual contributions to the war against COVID-19 – President Buhari.
Many other countries have taken far stricter measures in a bid to control the spread of the virus with positive results – President Buhari
Based on the advice of the Federal Ministry of Health and the NCDC, I am directing the cessation of all movements in Lagos and the FCT for an initial period of 14 days with effect from 11pm on Monday, 30th March 2020 – President Buhari This restriction will also apply to Ogun State due to its close proximity to Lagos and the high traffic between the two States – President Buhari.
Mohammad Tawhidi is back again blasting away at Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari.
The Iranian born Muslim influencer took to Twitter on Saturday addressing a report that he's a member of the Shiite group and a loyalist of El zakzaky.
In a live Twitter video, Imam of Peace said: "Buhari is the dumbest person on earth"
Celebrities › Re: Trey Songz Blasts President Buhari: “the People Saying You Full Of Shit” by Mandynews(op): 11:11am On Oct 12, 2020
