Senior commanders of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) during Normandy (left to Right).

Lt Gen Omar Bradley (US Army), Commander US 1st Army for the landings and later 12th US Army
Group for the drive across Europe

Adm Sir Bertram Ramsay (Royal Navy), Allied Naval Commander in Chief Expeditionary Forces·

ACM Sir Arthur Tedder (Royal Air Force), Deputy Supreme Commander SHAEF

Gen Dwight Eisenhower (US Army), Supreme
Commander SHAEF

Gen Bernard Montgomery (British Army) Commander in Chief 21st Army Group in charge of all ground forces for the Normandy landing (including all US troops) and then only 21st Army Group (mainly British and Canadian troops) after the 12th US Army Group became active and Ike took on responsibility as Ground Forces Commander

ACM Trafford Leigh Mallory (Royal Air Force), Allied Air Commander Expeditionary Forces

Lt Gen Walter Beddell Smith (US Army), Chief of Staff to Gen Eisenhower

Armed Russian Fighters Fly Dangerously Close To U.S. Navy Patrol Plane Over The Mediterranean

The incident follows the American military's release of evidence that Russia has sent combat aircraft to join Libya's civil war.

BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK
MAY 26, 2020
THE WAR ZONE

The U.S. Navy has released a video and images showing two fully-armed Russian Su-35 Flanker-E fighter jets flying dangerously close to one of its P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol planes over international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea today. The incident comes after U.S. Africa Command issued a press release, along with images, some of which a P-8A appeared to have captured, showing Russian combat jets making their way to Libya to reinforce mercenaries and other forces fighting there on behalf of rogue general Khalifa Haftar, something The War Zone had already been investigating in depth.

The Navy says that two Su-35s intercepted and flew on either side of the P-8A over a period of 65 minutes. The U.S. Sixth Fleet, which oversees American naval operations around Europe, including in the Mediterranean, said that there had also been two other unsafe intercepts in the general area in April.

"For the third time in two months, Russian pilots flew in an unsafe and unprofessional manner while intercepting a U.S. Navy P-8A Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft in U.S. Sixth Fleet, May 26, 2020."

"On May 26, 2020, a U.S. Navy P-8A aircraft was flying in the Eastern Mediterranean over international waters and was intercepted by two Russian Su-35 aircraft over a period of 65 minutes. The intercept was determined to be unsafe and unprofessional due to the Russian pilots taking close station on each wing of the P-8A simultaneously, restricting the P-8A’s ability to safely maneuver."

"The unnecessary actions of the Russian Su-35 pilots were inconsistent with good airmanship and international flight rules, and jeopardized the safety of flight of both aircraft."

"While the Russian aircraft was operating in international airspace, this interaction was irresponsible. We expect them to operate within international standards set to ensure safety and to prevent incidents, including the 1972 Agreement for the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA). Actions‎ like these increase the potential for midair collisions."


"This incident follows two unsafe interactions in April, over the same waters. In all cases, the U.S. aircraft were operating in international airspace, consistent with international law, with due regard for safety of flight, and did not provoke this Russian activity."


Unsafe and unprofessional Russian intercepts of American aircraft are not necessarily uncommon, both around Europe and elsewhere around the world. They're so routine that the Navy had even developed dedicated camera pods for its EP-3E Aries II intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft to capture evidence of similar altercations.

However, the time of this incident, coming soon after the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) statement regarding Russian MiG-29s and other combat jets heading toward Libya, makes it particularly notable. As we mentioned at the start of this article, one or more P-8As were very likely responsible for capturing some of the evidence of those aircraft making their way to the North African country by way of Syria. The multi-role maritime patrol jets spend a lot of time flying racetrack patterns off the Syrian coast where Russia's air base is located in the war-torn country. From there perch they can monitor Russia's actions at the base and around the Eastern Mediterranean.

The already convoluted civil war in that country has become more complex in recent months as Turkey has expanded its involvement in the conflict, something you can read about more in these past War Zone pieces. The Turkish government has become the primary benefactor of the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), which has been fighting for years against strongman Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA enjoys support from Russia, as well as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, among others.

Haftar recently suffered a major defeat, which appears to have prompted the Kremlin to rush additional reinforcements in the form of advanced combat jets to help the LNA. There are also concerns that this deployment could have broader impacts on regional security, in addition to leading to a worrisome escalation in Libya's civil war.

"If Russia seizes basing on Libya's coast, the next logical step is they deploy permanent long-range anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities," U.S. Air Force General Jeff Harrigian, head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, had said as part of the AFRICOM statement on the Russian combat jets earlier on May 26. "If that day comes, it will create very real security concerns on Europe's southern flank."

This latest intercept in the Meditteranean certainly seems to be a response at least to the U.S. military's efforts to monitor Russia's activities in the region and especially in regards to the country's deepening involvement in the ongoing conflict in Libya.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS_uc5jXHA0


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-OBs12jx3M

Pic of aerodynamic testing of ISRO RLV ( reusable launch vehicle ) model . It is meant to be launched by a rocket into space , do what it is meant to do and then land back on earth like an aircraft. It is now in the technology demonstration stage.

In addition to the civilian role someday in the future hopefully a varient of it will serve the same purpose as Boeing X-37.

BabaOwen:
Is it true Egypt wants to buy SU-35

Bidexii is your guy for queries on Egypt

Somewhere in the northern sector

Naval exercise between USA India Japan with their respective aircraft carriers

Old pic of the ELF comm facility of IN

This is used to communicate at very long distances with the submerged submarines.

It is necessary especially for nuclear submarines.

IN Landing Craft Utility ship MK IV

nemesis8u:
Sukanya class OPV

Bro,are you sure its not a Saryu clas?

kikuyu2:


Bro,are you sure its not a Saryu clas?

Sorry my mistake , it is Saryu class

I wrote this long time back , should clear any doubts if any . It the most simplest explanation one can expect .

nemesis8u:


SAMs are basically classified according to slant range and engagement altitude.

we have
1.MANPADS
2.SHORT range sam
3.ER-SHORADS
4.medium range sam
5.LONG range sam
6.VERY LONG range sam

against maneuvering and agile targets using terrain masking flight profile ,

1.MANPADS will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

2.SHORT range sam will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

3.ER-SHORADS will have the highest kill probability under best case scenario

4.medium range sam

5.LONG range sam

6.VERY LONG range sam

MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM will be useless against the above targets.

MANPADS SRSAM ERSHORAD are best effective against maneuvering and agile targets flying at low altitudes in order to evade the radar , because of the low engagement range capability , very quick response time , very short kill chain , low escape zone , high maneuvering capability , seeker sensitivity, acquisition and lock on is optimal at low ranges.

my point being u have to select ur sam depending on ur requirements and conditions .
1.point defense / base defense / area defense
2.terrain to be protected , flat / mountainous / valleys
3.static defense / mobile defense
4.stand alone / networked
5.internal sensors / external sensors
6.integral protection / deterrence

etc etc

if MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM comes up against a maneuvering and agile targets flying at medium to high altitudes (a foolish decision in the first place) then the best case scenario for the MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM will be to force the fighter to dump its weapons and fuel and turn tail.
ie MRSAM LRSAM and VLRSAM achieved a MISSION KILL which is as good as a TARGET KILL.


the best scenario is when u have all of these networked , integrated and in overlapping mode

1.MANPADS protects against low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets

2.SHORT range sam protects against low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets , maneuvering targets on weapon delivery run , PGMs , cruise missiles

3.ER-SHORADS forces low flying , pop up targets , terrain masking targets to either abort mission or to fly up into the engagement envelope of MRSAM / LRSAM or get killed.

4.medium range sam kills target within their engagement envelop at medium or high altitudes , if the targets have been forced to the kill zone or if the target is unaware of the existence of the said SAMs. however kill probability is low especially against receding targets while high on head on mode.

5.LONG range sam good against bombers, awacs , tankers , and against a flight/group of fighter formations, also good if the fighter pilot falls asleep during flight.
also tries to force targets to descend into lower altitudes to be caught up by MRSAM SRSAM ETC.

6.VERY LONG range sam same above with additional anti ballistic capability.

nemesis8u:


I wrote about previously on how different Sams work together and how their role is complementary to each other.


INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

REQUIREMENTS :

1.an automated Air Defense command and control center for controlling and monitoring of Air Defense Operations.
In network centric warfare era, RASP(recognizable air situation picture) information is required to be made available at the appropriate level for taking tactical decision. These levels are

1.strategic level
2.Operational level
3.tactical level

The information sharing involves sharing of the information among navy, army and civil radar network. The system will receive data from different types of homogeneous/ heterogeneous radars, reports from mobile observation posts and data from various other Air Force Airbases or Civilian agencies viz Air Traffic Control, Air Force Movement Liaison Unit etc. to create real time comprehensive recognized air situation picture (RASP) at the Command & Control Center (C & C Center). The connectivity of sensors/agencies from/to the C&C Center will connected on a redundant high speed wide area network based on IP protocol.

the automated Air Defense command and control should have the following features
1.Adaptable to legacy systems
2.High availability rate
3.Open architecture and state of the art HMI
4.Upgrade ability and expand ability
5.Situational awareness and Analysis
6.Generation of Recognized, accurate, updated and complete real time Air Situation Picture (RASP) for local as well as centralized air space control and surveillance Threat Evaluation on the basis of Identification of track.
7.Integration of various types of radars and adaptable to user legacy systems.
8.System generated solution for Weapon assignment including Surface to Air Guided Weapons, AAA and aircraft (Fighter aircraft interception control)
9.Automation of tactical functionalities viz. Interception, Aircraft recovery, Threat evaluation, PAD (Passive Air Defense) warning etc.
10.Automatic track Identification based upon flight plan and IFF data with manual override
11.Interception solution & commands for defender aircraft against target.
12.Flight Plan ingestion & collision resolution.
13.Surveillance alert generation.
14.Simulation of exercise environment through multi identity tracks.
15.Dissemination of weapon control orders & other tactical commands to weapon units.
16.Record & Replay of operator actions as well as ASP situations.
17.Air Defense Resource Planning, management & deployment including radar coverage area analysis
18.Post mission analysis
19.Air tasking order processing
etc

at the minimum the idea is to provide an appropriate solution to identify the track information in the Air.
1.To produce a “Recognized Air Situation Picture” (RASP) by using the information received from different radars and other assets.
2.To provide a perfect WA solution for enemy aircraft/missiles using different interception tactics (for Combat Air Patrol), sam missiles and AAA.
3.To achieve automation in the Air-Defense hierarchy of the concerned air force.


WHAT IS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A MODERN GOOD sam

1.High Mobility
2.High Resistance to Jamming
3.Optimal Missile range and corresponding Radar Power
4.Lower Band Operating Frequencies
5.Advanced Digital Signal and Data Processing
6.Defensive Counter Measures and Emitting Decoys
7.Low Probability of Intercept Techniques
8.Digital Data links/Network Centric Setup
9.Dual Missile Seekers
10.Ability for Interception of PGMs
etc

sam missiles are not standalone much depends on the radars supporting it.

The limit of the interception range of a modern surface-to-air missile system can be easily estimated.
Given the radar performance parameter R0, which is the maximum range for initial detection of a target with a radar cross section of one square meter, the detection range for a target with a radar cross section σ, is:

R det (σ)=R0·σ1/4

After initial detection, there is a time delay or reaction time during which a firm track is established, the target is identified, and the missile is launched. The time dependence of the target range, as measured from the radar, is:

R target (t)=[[{R2 det (σ)-altitude2}½- V target .t]2 +altitude2]½

here
2 stands for square
½ stands for square root
altitude = target altitude
V target = target speed
R det(σ) = radar detection range for a target with a radar cross section σ

Again the time dependence of the range of the intercepting surface-to-air missile, as measured from the radar is

R sam (t)=V sam ·(t−τ delay )

here
V sam = surface-to-air missile average speed
t delay = time delay or reaction time

By setting these two equations equal, R sam (t) = R target (t), the maximum potential interception range, as limited by surface-to-air missile fly-out, can then be calculated as a function of several variables.

these kind of calculations and analysis are required to set up Weapon Engagement Zones WEZs which are a critical part of air defense planning because they represent the defense posture against the air and missile threats.

WEZ is an airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon system and can be sub divided into the following

(a) FEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft.
(b) HIMEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with high-altitude SAMs.
(c) LOMEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles.
(d) SHORADEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with SHORAD weapons. It may be established within a low- or high-altitude missile engagement zone.
(e) JEZ In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which multiple AD systems (SAMs and aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats.

Again air defense includes includes various types of defensive coverage depending on operational requirements

(a) Area Defense. Area defense uses a combination of weapon systems (e.g. aircraft and SAMs) or various combinations of airborne and ground-based sensors and shooters to defend broad areas.

(b) Point Defense. Point defense protects limited areas, normally in defense of vital elements of forces or installations. For example, a sam or AAA unit positioned to protect an airfield is considered point defense.

(c) Self-Defense. Self-defense operations allow friendly units to defend themselves against direct attacks or threats of attack through the use of organic weapons and systems. The right of self-defense is inherent to all ROE and weapons control procedures.

which again in turn requires

(a) Determination Of Surveillance Coverage Areas. Defended airspace must be under continuous surveillance to facilitate early warning. The planner should use a combination of air-, surface-, and space-based detection assets to achieve this requirement. Adequate early warning of air and missile attacks provides the reaction time necessary for friendly forces to seek shelter or take appropriate action. Early warning of hostile air and missile attacks is vital for a layered defense.

(b) Development of the Active AMD(air and missile defense) Fire Plan. The objective is to provide the required level of protection specified in the critical asset list. Defense resources involve applying a mix of the following six employment guidelines, because not all may be required or possible to defend dependent upon the threat and defensive counter-air assets available:

1. Mutual Support. Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the adjacent weapon systems. For gun systems, this dead zone is usually small. For missile systems, the dead zone may be large and mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover non-operational units or units at lower states of readiness.

2. Overlapping Fires. Weapons are positioned so that their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes from which the enemy can attack or conduct surveillance operations, defense planners must apply mutual supporting and overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.

3. Balanced Fires. Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions. This is necessary for AD in an area where the terrain does not canalize the enemy or when the avenue of approach is unpredictable.

4. Weighted Coverage. Weapons are positioned to concentrate fires toward the most likely threat direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage in a more likely direction.

5. Early Engagement. Sensors and weapons are positioned to maximize early warning and to engage and destroy aircraft and missiles before they acquire and fire on or damage the defended asset.

6. Defense in Depth. AMD sensors and weapons are positioned to enable multiple engagement opportunities and deliver an increasing volume of fire as an enemy air or missile threat approaches the protected asset. Defense in depth reduces the probability that “leakers” will reach the defended asset or force.

again,

steps must be taken for reduction of Enemy targeting effectiveness of ur assets via

1.Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability by complicating enemy surveillance and reconnaissance efforts to pinpoint locations of targets. Mobility may be coupled with concealment to “hide” assets.

2.Deception. Deception misleads adversaries by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. Deception may be used to cause an enemy to waste munitions on false targets, deceive their combat assessment process, and falsely influence their decision makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information.Deception may deny the enemy the ability to gain correct tactical, operational, and strategic information when using their reconnaissance and surveillance systems.

3.Emission Control/Communications Security. Communications security and an emission control program for infrared, electromagnetic, and acoustic
signature reduction can deny the enemy sensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisition and ID of friendly target systems (eg C2 nodes).

4.Camouflage and Concealment. Practice visual signature reduction measures that can “hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets/target systems. These measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings. Timely intelligence concerning the overflight by enemy satellite and aircraft collection systems is important to the effort. Those measures also may be coupled with deception measures to
further complicate chances of effective enemy attacks.

5.Redundancy. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical nodes, capabilities, and systems that are particularly vulnerable to air and missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. Redundancy includes dual, contingency, or backup capabilities that can assume primary mission functions (in whole or in part) upon failure or degradation of the primary system. Of
primary concern are “soft” targets such as C2 nodes and sensors (antennae) and fixed sites such as airfields and ground stations for airborne sensors.

6.Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration and making a target system less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed.
etc

HTT40

Initial 70 nos to be ordered soon

It had successfully completed the spin recovery tests

HTT36

It needs to start the spin recovery test soon to stay in the game.

2nd pic the version which will do the spin recovery tests

nemesis8u:
I saw the discussions on why Pantsir got tanked in Libya , some of the guys got some of the reasons correct like hostile HUMIT etc revealing position and state of deployment of Pantsir etc.

Well, you missed something, why did the Tor-M engage more targets than the Pantsir then?

Considering that the Pantsir was designed to replace the Tor system.

According to Wikipedia, the Pantsir has a detection range of 32km, how could it not spot the drones, we saw in some of the videos, the Pantsir was active.

Can the ANKA-S engage targets from 30,000 feet? I'm sure they need to come close to engage their targets.

The Pantsir has performed badly in both battlefields in Syria and Libya.

The Tor and Buk systems have outperformed the Pantsir in both Syria and Libya.

nemesis8u:
I wrote this long time back , should clear any doubts if any . It the most simplest explanation one can expect .

Nice thesis. Nice read.

Vikkie14:
Nice thesis. Nice read.

U read my reply I posted to u ?

Ur email was empty

U can ask me here if u want

nemesis8u:


U read my reply I posted to u ?

Ur email was empty

U can ask me here if u want

I did. Sent a reply to the other thread, seems you didn't read that before I wiped it off.
Technically, every mail on this site is designed to be empty, in order to forestall trolling and undue message.

nemesis8u:
I wrote this long time back , should clear any doubts if any . It the most simplest explanation one can expect .

I've read all you wrote with regards to how SAMs perform. It's quite detailed and informative.

However crucially it failed to answer this question with regards to the performance of the Pantsir against contemporaries.

The Tor M has out performed the Pantsir in the same class and same engagement envelope.

Why is this?

nemesis8u:
I wrote this long time back , should clear any doubts if any . It the most simplest explanation one can expect .

saw the discussions on why Pantsir got tanked in Libya , some of the guys got some of the reasons correct like hostile HUMIT etc revealing position and state of deployment of Pantsir etc.
Additionally one main factor was the Turkish UAVs were flying above the engagement zone of Pantsir.
Every SAM has a minimum and maximum engagement zone , anything flying below or above the said engagement zone cannot be targetted .
Air defence cannot operate in isolation , it needs to operate in a cooperative mode in a layered configuration.
Different types of SAM with different engagement ranges will be needed to enable an effective air defence , especially protect each other while simultaneously engaging aerial threats.
It was very foolish of the Saudis to send in Pantsir without sending a medium and long range SAM to protect it . Thus making it a easy target. ( Also no SAM can operate 24x7 . It needs to shut down for brief periods )
Eg the Russians operationally use Pantsir with S300 or S350 or S400. Why ?
Because S series SAM protects the Pantsir from medium and longer range threats while the Pantsir protects the S series SAM with short ranged threats. So basically they both concurrently engage all threats at all ranges.
No single SAM can ever protect an airspace on its own , it needs to be layered , with multiple types defending each other and in turn defending the entire airspace at different ranges and altitude.

kabe1:


I've read all you wrote with regards to how SAMs perform. It's quite detailed and informative.

However crucially it failed to answer this question with regards to the performance of the Pantsir against contemporaries.

The Tor M has out performed the Pantsir in the same class and same engagement envelope.

Why is this?

First let me clarify

the question u asked regarding pantsir ver tor m is not right in a sense

Because

Pantsir is being operated by a militia in Libya

Tor m is not available in Libya as far as I know , Syria operates tor m , Syria has a more or less professional army and since it operated tor m for a long time before the beginning of the conflict , it had considerable experience and expertise in the same . Plus Syria operates three different types of Sam's in a layered configuration wherever possible. Hence possible reasons why tor m is doing well in Syria than pantsir in libya.

Training, expertise tactics matters a lot in war . One can give f22 to Libya but still it will be destroyed , so who will you blame , the weapon ?

Espionage problem is definitely more likely in a militia ( Libya ) than in a professional army ( Syria ) leading to compromising of air defence assets.

So one cannot compare the performance of 2 types operated by 2 different forces in 2 different countries. Situation is completely different.

Also one cannot factor in the slant range and attitude without also factoring the engagement radar performance and the performance of the guidance mechanism of the missile itself.

Majority of people have very generic and incorrect idea on how Sam system and missiles works .

Eg.
Thanks to Hollywood people think missiles chase aircrafts and that too again and again till fuel runs . It is wrong , to any observer it looks like it is chasing ( sort of optical illusion ) but they don't chase, they use radar or the onboard seeker ( radar / IR ) or a combination of the above 2 and related algorithms to anticipate the probable position of the target and plot a collision course or technically correct term " cross over " point where the missile and the target will cross path ( hit to kill warhead ) or will be in proximity ( proximity warhead ) . And If the missile fails to meet the target , it's over , it won't turn around and start chasing again like in Hollywood movies

Both pantsir and tor m missiles use LOS command guidance to go after and home in on their target . This means the engagement radar of both the systems need to keep the target and the missile they fired in their LOS . If the radio link to the missile is jammed or the radar destroyed or the radar is jammed / spoofed it won't be able to guide the missile .

So basically there is no difference between pantsir and tor m interms of the type of guidance mechanism they use .

Also pantsir is a short range Sam by design while tor m is a medium range Sam by design .

Performance of any missile at its extreme range envelope is always low in terms of kill probability. So pantsir being a short range Sam by design will offer better kill probability at near to medium advertised range and altitude . And tor m since it is a medium range Sam by design it's medium advertised range and altitude envelope will be same as that of pantsir at its long advertised range and altitude envelope and hence tor m kill probability will be higher than pantsir.

Also propaganda is part of war , Turkish govt backed sources handled peddled doctored videos inorder to claim additional kills .

Also

Refer the post above by lionel4power

It will answer rest of ur queries

Note : I am not ruling out that there might be deficiencies with pantsir . The difference between your pov and mine is I am not making an conclusion as to whether pantsir is good or bad , I am keeping all options open . But u arrived at a conclusion - pantsir has failed based on videos and news reports etc.

There is too many unknowns to fathom a guess , forget about a definitive conclusion .

In the other thread u said u saw videos
Ironically videos never tell the whole story, like was the radar on standby or was it on manual mode or was it shut off or was there sabotage of radar or inaptitude of crew during operation. So how can u say based on a video a system is good or bad

As for news reports , all I will say , throw the money or use ur power and watch the fun

IA tunguska tracked Sam system

Missiles not loaded

Personally not a fan of this system

Tethered mini drone by a private company

nemesis8u:


First let me clarify

the question u asked regarding pantsir ver tor m is not right in a sense

Because

Pantsir is being operated by a militia in Libya

After so many periods of asking, despite the fact that you replied my comments on those previous occasions but you never answered my question.

Now I can say you have provided a satisfactory answer.

Although you still misrepresented my comments, I didn't just say Libya, I always mentioned Syria and Libya and the perceived poor performance of the Pantsir.

I still don't think the Pantsir has performed well in both battlefields. However your response did go a long way to provide some answers.

Tejas LCA

nemesis8u:
Tethered mini drone by a private company

Is there any English language documentary on the Tejas LCA?

If yes, can you share it?

kabe1:


I've read all you wrote with regards to how SAMs perform. It's quite detailed and informative.

However crucially it failed to answer this question with regards to the performance of the Pantsir against contemporaries.

The Tor M has out performed the Pantsir in the same class and same engagement envelope.

Why is this?

A lot could be wrong.
First, check out Pantsir system performance in Syria. That should be a launching pad for you to deduce its in/effectiveness.

And I think the system first combat kill was on a Turkish jet in 2012 or thereabout. Its efficiency and effectiveness is not in doubt(to me) and if I may add this, there's no system without its lapses, especially when there's human input.

Most of the kills(if not all) by the LNA, Israelis and Turkish attacks on the ShoRAD were either in hangar, or while it's out of missiles or radar turned off to avert Anti-Radiation attack or radar not powerful enough to track modern cruise missiles.

I'm yet to read a report of the system being damaged/destroyed while fully operational. (I don't mind if citation to correct the above could be provided to me to update my library).

Besides, ADS doesn't work in isolation. There should be layered protection if air defense would be achieved. That's why it's used to cover lapses that the S-series can't engage.

If the system is ineffective (like you have opined), the Americans wouldn't used that "then" to protect their patriot in Iraq.

These Libyan Batteries getting damaged/destroyed might be due to their working in isolation coupled with the issues of social publicity, resupply vehicles not on ground to replenish expended stocks, system inability to operate 24/7, Manning, reaction timeframe, radar coverage/power, e.t.c.

nemesis8u:
IA tunguska tracked Sam system
Missiles not loaded
Personally not a fan of this system

Why any issues, is it unreliable?

Indian and Chinese soldiers fighting.

China captured some Indian soldiers.

kabe1:
Indian and Chinese soldiers fighting.

China captured some Indian soldiers.

kabe1:
Ind.. and Chiese soldiers fighting.

Chin. captured some Ind... soldiers.

I cannot verify the pic

But reportedly there was clashes between Chin.ese soldiers and ITBP ( indo Tibetan border police ) , ind.ian police .

The PLA had reportedly ambushed a small ITBP patrol team and beat them and held them before releasing them after a few hours .

Later it seems the ITBP did the same to a PLA convoy of vehicles and soldiers .


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USuaGW6vyiQ

As with the pic , I cannot verify the video also.

Fights like these keep happening , as Chi.nese try to capture land and ind.. pushes back .

But this time it seems there r trying to deflect the Wuhan virus mess among their population via all these.

It will become real intersting if Pak..... joins the fun , they will most likely take advantage .

Let's see what happens

giles14:
Why any issues,
is it unreliable?

Radar and FCS problems

Including inability to operate optimally in extreme hot conditions , the electronics malfunction.