₦airaland Forum

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015

YOUNG EAGLES EXERCISE 2015

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015

The Nigerian Army has recalled over 2,500 soldiers who were asked to withdraw from service for alleged offences committed under the counter- insurgency operations code named Operation Zaman Lafiya.

The review panel set up by the Army, which began sitting in Kaduna on August 17, has also screened and reinstated 102 officers, who were sentenced or facing prosecution in relation to the operations in the North-East.

The reinstated soldiers and officers, it was learnt, had commenced retraining at the Nigerian Army Training Centre, Kontangora, Niger State.

The 2,500 soldiers were among the over 4,000 who responded to a memo from the Army authorities inviting soldiers for a review of recent disciplinary cases, which emanated from the counter terrorism operations.

The NA had said on August 1, 2015 that the service would constitute a panel to review all recent disciplinary cases in the service.

But the Acting Director, Army Public Relations, Col. Sani Usman, cautioned that the directive to review disciplinary cases should not be mistaken for a “total reinstatement of dismissed and deserter soldiers.”

Our correspondent learnt that more dismissed personnel of the Army might be brought back to the service as the screening panel would continue with the review of cases on Monday (today).

A source in the Nigerian Army, who confided in our correspondent, said, “The panel has cleared 2,500 soldiers who were dismissed from their units for minor offences alleged to have been committed under Operation Zaman Lafiya.

“The review panel also cleared 102 officers who were either asked to withdraw, dismissed or facing prosecution for various offences under the operation.”

The soldiers, who were said to have been conveyed out of the NDA, Kaduna, venue of the review panel, in luxury buses on Saturday are expected to undergo a short retraining exercise as part of the reintegration requirements into the service at the NATRAC, Kotangora.

After the retraining, the Army authorities would screen the affected personnel and re-activate their suspended bank accounts.

It was further learnt that the panel would also review the cases of 66 soldiers who were sentenced to death by firing squad.

The source, who spoke to one of our correspondents on Sunday, said that not all the dismissed soldiers who turned up in Kaduna were lucky to have regained their jobs.

Some of the soldiers, said to have been dismissed about 15 years ago for various offences, were asked to leave the venue of the review panel.

The soldiers were said to have been dismissed from the Army for various offences since the regime of former President Olusegun Obasanjo.

It was learnt that majority of the affected soldiers were dismissed from the service for violating a law said to have forbidden the personnel of the Army from marrying foreigners.

When our correspondent contacted the Acting Director, Army Public Relations, Col. Sani Usman, he said that those asked to leave the venue of the review panel were not eligible for the review exercise.

Usman said that they were dismissed from the service for various offences about 15 years ago and were not part of those whose cases were meant for review.

Usman described them as “a group of mischief-makers who should have been arrested and prosecuted for disrupting the peace of the public.”

He said, “The alleged protesting soldiers were no longer soldiers for almost 15 years now.

“They were dismissed for various offences and therefore are not part of those whose disciplinary cases are being reviewed by the committee. Consequently, they are not eligible for the ongoing review.

“They are bunch of mischief makers that need to be arrested and prosecuted for constituting a nuisance to the public. Already the relevant security agencies have been alerted on their activities.”

On the issue of the recall of the officers and men of the Army, he said that he could not give the figure of those screened and cleared.

Usman said that the exercise was ongoing and that the panel was expected to submit its report to relevant authorities.

“This is an ongoing exercise; they want to ensure that justice is done. I cannot give you any figure, the authorities are waiting for the committee’s report; they will conclude sitting very soon,” he added.




http://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-army-reinstates-2500-soldiers-102-officers/

YOUNG EAGLE 2015

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015

YOUNG EAGLE 2015

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015....MOBILE KITCHEN FACILITY

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015....COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015

South Africa's Shoprite Holdings, Africa's biggest retailer by sales, will open nearly twice as many stores on the rest of the continent this year as in 2014, its chief executive, Whitey Basson, said on Tuesday.

Nigeria will get 14 new stores in the next 20 months and Shoprite is building a distribution centre in the country, aiming to move goods faster as imports into Nigeria can be delayed in ports for up to three months or so, Basson said.

Angola is the only other market large enough to justify a distribution centre in the next five years, he said.

The supermarket operator is banking on rapid growth in markets such as Nigeria and Angola where it aims to change the shopping habits of Africa's rising middle class.

The retailer, which also operates the Checkers grocery chain and OK Furniture, reported a 10.8 per cent rise in full-year earnings yesterday, buoyed by sales growth of 13.5 per cent in stores outside its home market.

It plans to add another 35 stores this year to the 189 it has in the rest of Africa, hoping to improve on the 16 percent contribution that Africa ex-South Africa makes to its profits. Last year it opened 20 stores outside South Africa.

“It usually takes three to five years for countries to change from pavement shopping to using supermarkets,” Reuters quoted Basson, to have said in a presentation of the company's results.

Hampered in South Africa by power outages, rising electricity costs and highly indebted consumers, Shoprite increased sales in its home market by stealing market share in its food business from rivals.

The retailer, which began as a chain of eight stores in South Africa in 1979 and has had Basson at the helm throughout, now spans 15 countries across the continent, 13 of which posted stronger economic growth than South Africa last year.

Shoprite said diluted headline earnings per share (EPS) totaled 772.9 cents in the year ended June, in line with the 773 cents estimate by Thomson Reuters StarMine SmartEstimates. Headline EPS is the most widely watched profit gauge in South Africa and strips out certain one-off items.

Shoprite shares were up 1.2 per cent by 1245 GMT. The shares nearly doubled in price over the last five years as the company expanded but are down almost 5 percent since the start of this year on sluggish consumer demand in South Africa. The retailer said total sales rose 11.2 per cent to R113.7 billion ($8.80 billion) for the year.

http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/shoprite-to-open-14-new-stores-in-nigeria/217827/

YOUNG EAGLES EXERCISE 2015

YOUNG EAGLE EXERCISE 2015

SANDF

No fewer than 39 soldiers have attacked a community in Makurdi, the Benue state capital in fight over a lady married out to a community member.

The Nation reports that the soldiers from the Nigeria Army School of Military Engineering (NASME) laid siege on the community in the north bank area of Makurdi, where they vandalised not less than 200 vehicles and stole mobile phones, TV set, radio and other personal effects belonging to the residents.

The soldiers were also alleged to have raped some women, although this claim could not be ascertained by the Nation’s correspondent who was on ground, but it was confirmed that the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) Samuel Attah, was beaten up in the process and his new Toyota Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) was also smashed.

https://www.naij.com/520399-39-soldiers-went-haywire-attacked-stole-phones-benue-state-community.html

SANDF

SANDF 9 PILOTS

HORRIBLE PICTURES OF THE NIGERIAN HOSPITAL

https://www.nairaland.com/2535227/photo-deplorable-state-uniport-teaching

SANDF 9 PILOTS

SANDF

SANDF 9 PILOTS

SANDF

PROUDLY SOUTH AFRICA

@LIONEL4POWER........YOU LIKE HUMILIATING NIGERIA...THIS IS WHAT SOUTH AFRICA PRODUCE ....NOT JOKES

SANDF 9 PILOTS

SANDF

SANDF 9 PILOTS

SANDF

Snapshot analysis: Boko Haram’s latest video

On 23 June, the Islamist militant group Boko Haram released a new video showing some of their recent activities. They did so under their newly adopted name: Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya (Islamic State of West Africa province). In the video, the group showed what appeared to be an attack conducted by a group of fighters on foot and in vehicles, resulting in the death of several Nigerian military personnel, and the capture of weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. The location and specifics of its target are unclear.

Boko Haram
Boko Haram, (official name Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad) is a militant group based in north eastern Nigeria, and fighting against the control of the Nigerian state in the region. The organisation has previously been responsible for a number of attacks on regional capital Maidiguri and surrounding towns, as well as being behind the kidnapping of schoolgirls from Chibok in 2014.
The video itself showed notably improved production value compared to video releases prior to 2015. This improvement in quality is associated with the group’s growing relationship with the Islamic State (ISIS). There is substantial debate around the extent of that alliance, and the possible consequences it might bring. What follows is some brief commentary on some stills captured from the video.

Establishing shot: Boko Haram fighters are seen advancing toward a number of structures, apparently already partially overrun.



Still 1: Shows a Boko Haram ‘technical’ (a light, unarmoured vehicle with a heavy machine gun bolted to the back) in action. The vehicle itself appears to have been captured from the Nigerian military. A unit number can be seen on the back: 81 Bn.



Still 2: Shows three Boko Haram technicals firing up the road at an unknown target. Although lightly armoured, these vehicles provide a significant potential firepower advantage for the insurgents against small, isolated Nigerian military units, especially when used aggressively in the fashion shown in the video.



Still 3: A fairly typical example of the infantry tactics and weapon handling displayed through much of the video. Here, a fighter wielding an FN MAG sprays what might be generously called ‘suppressing fire’ while a man serving as a loader points out targets. Although quite a lot of shooting takes place, it is unclear who or what they are shooting at, nor do they seem to have any particular concerns about finding cover from return fire.



Still 4: A Boko Haram fighter fires his FN MAG light machine gun around a corner, without using the sights. Interestingly, you can make out three ‘K’ symbols crudely marked on the weapon’s receiver – their meaning is unclear. Nigerian military markings showing “23 Bn” are also visible on the stock of the weapon, suggesting that, as with many or most of Boko Haram weapons, it was captured from the Nigerian military.



Still 5: Another example of poor weapon handling – a Boko Haram fighter aims his weapon one handed down a wall. In the same sequence another fighter moves into the open space visible on the right to fire an RPG at an unseen target. Despite it being easy to criticise the lack of training displayed by the Boko Haram fighters, later sequences show a number of dead Nigerian military personnel – indicating these tactics were effective to at least some degree. The insurgents have also employed relatively high levels of firepower in other videos as well, with the apparent intention of breaking the resolve of the Nigerian military and security forces they are attacking.



Still 6: After a number of short sequences showing the bodies of dead Nigerian military forces, the video transitions to a sweeping shot of collected spoils of battle. Piles of captured weapons, ammunition, and miscellaneous items are shown in this sequence. Visible in this image are numerous AK variant rifles and magazines at centre, as well as some RPG launchers at bottom right.



Still 7: As the camera pans left, a mortar tube is partially visible in the foreground, along with crates of ammunition, what appear to be stacked landmines, and some spare FN MAG barrels in the bottom left corner. While fuel and ammunition are likely considered a prime prize for Boko Haram, the logistics of conducting a protracted insurgency mean that supplies of items such as spare barrels are also vital.



Still 8: A closer look at those Kalashnikov rifles, belts of machine gun ammunition, RPG warheads, and mortar shells in protective cannisters.



Still 9: As the camera pans right, we get a closer look at several RPG launchers, and an eclectic mix of light machineguns, including at least one FN MAG, a number of RPKs, and what appears to be a somewhat rare M60.



Notes on the spoils of war sequence: This collection of captured arms and ammunition is not in any way a war-winning haul by itself. In fact, the entire video appears to show little more than what might be described as an ‘ordinary’ engagement. What is important to consider is the context. Boko Haram is ostensibly pressed by a renewed offensive by the Nigerian military, and by the combined efforts of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The implied consequence of that two-front fight was that the insurgents were cut off from cross-border resupply, and increasingly confined to shelter, notably in the Sambisa forest.

With that in mind, this video appears to be intended to show that the group is still active (which is already readily apparent from numerous attacks it conducted in June alone), and that it is still finding ways of sustaining itself.

http://www.africandefence.net/snapshot-analysis-boko-harams-latest-propaganda-video/

WHAT MILITARY EXPERTS SAYS NO PSEUDO ANALYST

A recent article in Netwerk24 asserted that Angola’s recent purchase of Su-30Ks poses a serious threat to South Africa’s security and air power capabilities. Although this may bear some thought and consideration, a counter-argument in response is detailed below.

SAAF
The South African Air Force is one of the world's oldest independent air arms, having been founded on 1 February 1920. With a long history that includes participation in both World Wars, the Korean conflict and the Angolan Civil War, it boasts a significant level of air power doctrine and broad-spectrum capabilities. Its front-line fighter aircraft is the Gripen C.
In short, modern air combat is no longer merely about raw performance, it’s about the interaction of complex systems of systems, all of which have a part to play. Fighter pilots are now concerned not only with dogfighting, basic radars and short-range missiles, but with juggling a complex array of jammers & other EW systems, tactical data links, covert and active radar modes and missiles which are massively more advanced than just a few years ago.

This is also subject I covered when the procurement was first announcedOne interesting look at how those systems can interact to allow even flawed aircraft like the F-35 to prevail is highlighted in this fascinating simulation of the F-35’s theoretical capabilities in BVR air combat from the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Tim Robinson.

If we look at the SAAF’s situation, there are some clear gaps that need to be filled:
1) A lack of a proper AEW aircraft
2) A lack of aerial refuelling platforms
3) A lack of an operational beyond-visual range (BVR) missile

The first can be mitigated somewhat by the use of a single Gripen in the AEW role feeding radar data to the attacking Gripens which operate in EMCON nose-cold mode, with all active transmitting sensors turned off. The Gripen has an impressively small RCS, making it difficult to detect unless the Su-30Ks are burning the sky with their radars on full power, which would make them vulnerable to being detected from far out by the Gripen EW systems.

The second is a problem, mitigated slightly by the way the Gripen is designed to be easy to sustain and operate away from main bases, but it’s a gap that ideally needs to be filled. Without it the Gripen has an 800 km – 900 km combat radius with 30+ minutes on station, adequate for most defensive scenarios but there’d be a lot more flexibility in mission scenarios if that could be extended by aerial refuelling.

Finally, the lack of a BVR missile is temporary and can be rectified quickly if the need were there by acquiring MBDA Meteors and giving the SAAF pilots needed refresher training. As it is, I would expect a BVR missile buy within the next five years, as it is on the Gripen roadmap as a necessary capability.

Finally, there’s doctrine. For various reasons, the Angolans allowed their air force to lose much of the expertise it gained in the 1980s and with it their ability to keep up with the latest developments in air power doctrine and technique. The SAAF, on the other hand, has the Air Power Development Centre and still places as much emphasis on up-to-date techniques and training as funding allows. This was highlighted by the excellent performance of 2 Squadron’s pilots in within visual range combat in Ex Lion Effort, where they also learnt valuable lessons in effective BVR combat.

Finally, beginning from next year the Gripens will be armed with the A-Darter, an extremely capable short-range air-to-air missile which is better than the R-73s the Angolan Su-30s are going to be equipped with. It’s nearly smokeless, very difficult to jam or decoy and has a range of at least 20km with good terminal manoeuvrability. In the interim they carry the equally-impressive IRIS-T, procured as a stop-gap until the A-Darter entered production.

So, let’s walk through a possible scenario in which four SAAF Gripens have to come up against four Angolan Su-30Ks for some reason. Let’s assume equal starting altitudes, a hostile situation allowing a first-shoot ROE and equivalent closing distance. We’ll also assume no ground radars, though those would play a factor in a real situation.

The first thing the SAAF would do is send a single Gripen D up near its service ceiling behind the lines, with its radar on full power and the picture being data-linked to the four Gripen Cs in the advance flight. The SAAF Gripens might fly in a wide formation of two each, providing good separation for their EW sensors and the ability to initiate a pincer movement if necessary. The SAAF pilots will constantly adjust positioning to ensure that they’re not outpacing the Gripen D in the AEW role and moving outside its protective radar umbrella.

Angola’s Su-30Ks carry the relatively old NIIP N001 Myech radar, which features an older conventional mechanically-steered cassegrain antenna and few of the electronic niceties that came in later variants. As a result of its age and widespread use, the radar has been quite well-studied and its capabilities are known. For one, it can detect a 1 m² – 3 m² target at between 80 km – 100 km depending on flight profile and when at full power. The Gripen C has a frontal ideal RCS of 0.1 m², going higher depending on angle, so let’s call it 0.5 m² to be fair and to account for marketing exaggerations. Simplifying things a lot, that would drop the Su-30K detection range down to 40 km – 50 km at best and the tracking range down to somewhere around 15 km – 20 km.

Note too that the Swedes have been developing and customising the Gripen’s systems to handle new-generation Sukhois and MiGs from the start, as a result of which there is serious capability in the onboard EW systems and radar.

The Gripen’s PS-05/A, on the other hand, which in this scenario is up at 50 000ft, is said to be able to acquire a Su-30K-sized aircraft at 120km and track it for a firing solution not much later. And the moment the Su-30Ks appear on that radar, the information is immediately sent to the four Gripen Cs flying ahead allowing them to use it to launch Meteor or Marlin missiles. As they’d be about 60 km away from the Flankers and out of detection range and don’t turn on their radars the entire time they won’t be seen until missile release.

In other words, given current capabilities plus the acquisition of a BVR missile, the Su-30K pilots would get missile launch warnings before they could see a single one of the launch aircraft. They’d be able to detect the Gripen D in the AEW role, but it would be too far away to do anything about and the Meteor has a good probability of kill for a long-range missile. Splash four Flankers.

This is without the PS-05/A Mk4 and Mk5 upgrades, which double detection and acquisition range. It also ignores the use of the Gripen EW system to jam the N001, which it’s quite effective at as the N001 does not have spectacular peak transmitting power.

Of course, this is a contrived scenario and it elides a lot of the complexities and variables, but it’s nonetheless as accurate a look at the relative capabilities of the SAAF’s new-generation Gripens vs Angola’s old-generation Su-30Ks as we can make with open source data. Were we speaking about latest-generation Su-30s with AESA radars and better defensive subsystems the picture would change drastically, but we’re not.

The Su-30K also has performance advantages over the Gripen in a close-in dogfight, but those too are mitigated by the Gripen’s carriage of the IRIS-T or A-Darter high off-boresight missiles and Cobra HMDS which allow pilots to fire missiles at targets in any direction, including directly behind their aircraft.

In sum, this acquisition is not the threat it initially appears to be. Nor do the Angolans intend it to be that, as they seem to want to use their Su-30Ks the same way they’ve used their Su-27s, for their ability to cover vast distances and mount long-range airstrikes in Angola. No doubt they find this discussion bemusing.

http://www.africandefence.net/angolas-su-30ks-are-not-a-serious-threat-to-the-south-african-air-force/