₦airaland Forum

Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan recently said that external actors played a role in fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency during his presidency. That’s a serious allegation — and while there isn’t a single smoking-gun proving state-level sponsorship, a range of independently documented facts makes the idea of foreign contribution to Boko Haram’s capacity plausible. Below I lay out the strongest, evidence-based points that support Jonathan’s claim, with sources you can check.

1) Jonathan’s statement — the claim itself
Jonathan publicly voiced the view that foreign interests helped grow Boko Haram’s capabilities during his tenure. (See the video of his comments.)

2) Documented cross-border funding and money transfers
Courts and authorities outside Nigeria have prosecuted and convicted individuals accused of moving money from Gulf and other locations to Boko Haram networks. For example, UAE courts and U.S. sanctions actions have shown concrete transfers and fundraising tied to the group, demonstrating that foreign financial channels were used to sustain Boko Haram operations. That pattern proves outside actors — at least non-state individuals and networks abroad — contributed materially.

3) Proliferation of small arms and porous regional arms flows
Independent research and UN-linked studies document that the Lake Chad basin and northeast Nigeria were awash with small arms and light weapons (SALW), which fuelled violence and armed-group resilience. Studies show that weapons proliferation in the region — from illicit markets, porous borders, and cross-border trafficking — boosted non-state actors’ firepower and helped insurgents sustain campaigns against state forces. That environment makes it plausible that external suppliers (state or non-state) and regional traffickers increased Boko Haram’s lethal capacity.

4) External sanctuaries, networks, and transnational jihadi linkages
Analyses of Boko Haram’s rise point to transnational linkages (fighters, ideological contacts, and sometimes tactical cooperation) with other extremist networks. Think-tank reporting and longform analyses have documented how the group drew on cross-border flows of fighters, ideas and, at times, practical support — factors that amplify local insurgencies beyond purely internal causes. This regional/transnational pattern supports the idea that outside forces helped scale the conflict.
Crisis Group
+1

5) Weaknesses and gaps in state response that could be exploited by outsiders
Numerous expert reports highlight how failures of governance, corruption, training gaps, and fractured civil-military relations undermined Nigeria’s ability to contain Boko Haram. Where a state’s security apparatus is weak or compromised, external actors (criminal networks, smugglers, foreign facilitators) can more easily move money, weapons or personnel — thereby magnifying an insurgency’s pace and potency. That contextual fact supports the plausibility of external actors making a decisive difference.

How these facts map to Jonathan’s claim

Direct financial support? — Established in part: prosecutions and sanctions show individuals abroad sent funds to Boko Haram. That is concrete evidence of external material support (even if it was not the act of a foreign government).

Arms and logistics? — Well documented that SALW proliferation and trafficking across porous regional borders supplied insurgents with weapons; this shows external flows of materiel were a real factor. It doesn’t necessarily prove state sponsorship, but it does show outside supply channels existed and mattered.
UNIDIR → Building a more secure world.

Foreign fighters & networks? — Research documents regional and transnational jihadi networks and contacts that increased operational reach and tactical know-how. That strengthens the idea of external contribution short of official foreign-state orchestration.

State-level complicity? — That is the hardest claim to prove. Most high-quality public reporting and expert analysis point to a mix of diaspora fundraising, criminal trafficking, porous borders and local governance failures, rather than clear-cut proven evidence of direct state sponsorship by another country. In other words: evidence supports foreign contribution but not definitive proof of foreign governments intentionally arming Boko Haram.

Caveats & what the evidence does not show

There is no widely accepted, declassified dossier proving that any foreign government deliberately directed a policy of arming Boko Haram. Reliable sources tend to point to individuals, criminal networks, and illicit regional markets, rather than an orchestrated state sponsorship program.

Media interviews and political statements (including Jonathan’s) are important and newsworthy but must be weighed alongside independent investigations, judicial findings, and NGO/think-tank reporting for a full picture.

Bottom line (short version you can share)

Goodluck Jonathan’s assertion that “foreign interests fuelled Boko Haram” aligns with multiple documented facts: convicted overseas money transfers, clear regional arms flows, transnational jihadi linkages, and a Nigerian security environment that was vulnerable to external exploitation. Those facts make his claim plausible and partly supported by evidence — but they fall short of proving that any foreign government intentionally orchestrated or sponsored Boko Haram. The most defensible conclusion is that a mix of foreign individuals/networks, illicit arms and money channels, and regional dynamics materially amplified the insurgency.

Sources (key ones)

Goodluck Jonathan interview / video.
U.S. Treasury / OFAC & UAE court actions on individuals accused of transferring funds to Boko Haram.

UNIDIR / UN-linked research on proliferation of small arms and weapons flows in northeast Nigeria.

International Crisis Group reporting and analysis on Boko Haram’s resources, regional dynamics and decline/shift in tactics.

Council on Foreign Relations / expert analyses on Nigerian military response, governance failures and external factors.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMVGXTFrHp0

sreamsense:
Can you count how many Islamic terrorists that isreal has sent to Mohammed to collect their 72 virgins for their acts of terrorism? The small peace that remain in the world is made possible by USA and Israel. God will continue to bless them. If Israel blames Muslims wrongly, whom should UK, Germany, France and almost other nations on earth where Islamic terrorists carry out bombing,beheading for allah blame? It is hard to see a country in the world today that doesn't fight one Islamic terrorist or the other. Very few that don't is because they never allow Islam or Islam is just minority

Where they don't is When jews are killed in Spanish Inquisition, Ottoman rescued jews and Christians and preserved their culture and religion

amah4game:
Make me understand something! Can Muslims be killing Muslims or Christians killing Christians" still be called genocide? 🤔

Why call Murderers Muslim? They're Simply killers and are killing us.

Righteousness2:
The Gaza "Freedom Flotilla" was carrying… NOTHING.

❌ No food
❌ No medicine
❌ No aid at all

This wasn’t about Gaza. It was a fake “aid mission” for viral content
OUTRAGEOUS LIE AS USUAL EXPOSED.

God will heal you.

Righteousness2:
The Unparalleled ability of A little tiny nation of less than 10million people is what makes TERRORISTS, TERRORISTS Sympathizers and Supporters weep and cry from Generation to Generation.

How does tiny ISRAEL be able to do what it does?

This is what Causes the ENVY AND HATE OF GOD'S CHOSEN NATION

This is why they Manufacture all sorts of rubbish all in a bid to take out the only Jewish nation on Earth.
Unfortunately they keep Falling, Failing and Wailing From Generation to Generation.

ISRAEL IS THE APPLE OF GOD'S EYES.
ISRAEL IS THE CHOICE OF GOD.
If you are angry and boiling, go and Fight GOD ALMIGHTY your CREATOR.

ISRAEL ISN'T JUST A LAND. ITS A LIVING PROOF OF GOD'S PROMISES

PLEASE DISPROVE ME, IF YOU CANNOT IT SHOWS WHO YOU ARE AS SOMEONE WHO CAN SUPPORT TERRORISM.

STOP KILLING USLIMS IN NIGERIA, STOP MUSLIM DEATH NOOWW.....

huptin:
If moslems are killed by Islam, they subscribed to it, so it is very understandable.

All human lives matters but innocent people shouldn't be involved simple.

How does bandit killing become Islam but IPOb and Murderers who bear christian names anywhere in Nigeria isn't CHRISTIANITY OR JESUS?

ISRAEL HAS BEEN TERRORISING THE WORLS FOR A LONG TIME. MOST TERRORIST ATTACK IN EUROPE IS BY ISRAEL.

The history of Israeli false flag operations represents one of the most controversial and debated aspects of modern intelligence and statecraft. False flag operations are clandestine activities designed to mislead, creating the impression that a party or government is responsible when, in fact, another actor is behind the event. For Israel, intelligence agencies such as Mossad, Aman (military intelligence), and Shin Bet have historically employed covert strategies, including false flag tactics, to secure national interests. While many of these claims remain disputed, they have nonetheless shaped discourse on Israeli foreign policy, ethics in intelligence, and Middle Eastern geopolitics.

The Concept of False Flag Operations

False flag operations have long been a staple of military and intelligence history, predating the establishment of Israel in 1948. The term originates from naval warfare, where ships flew enemy flags to deceive opponents before attacking. In intelligence and counterterrorism, the strategy involves framing others—be it rival states, organizations, or ethnic groups—through sabotage, assassinations, or propaganda. Israel’s alleged reliance on such methods reflects both its precarious regional position and the aggressive strategies adopted to protect its sovereignty.



The Lavon Affair (1954)

Perhaps the most notorious confirmed Israeli false flag operation was the Lavon Affair, also known as "Operation Susannah." In the early 1950s, Israel’s military intelligence recruited a network of Egyptian Jews to carry out bombings on Western-owned targets in Egypt, including U.S. and British libraries, cinemas, and businesses. The plan aimed to destabilize Egypt and damage its relations with the West, thereby preventing British withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone. However, the operation failed when Egyptian authorities caught the operatives. The incident became a scandal within Israel, leading to Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon’s resignation. The fallout also damaged Israel’s reputation abroad (Segev, 2000).

The Lavon Affair remains a landmark in intelligence history, as it directly implicated a democratic state in orchestrating covert terrorist-style acts against civilian infrastructure, with the intent of blaming another party. It is often cited as a textbook example of a false flag operation.

The USS *Liberty* Incident (1967)

During the Six-Day War, Israeli forces attacked the USS *Liberty*, an American intelligence-gathering ship in the Mediterranean Sea, killing 34 U.S. sailors and wounding 171. Israel claimed it was a tragic case of mistaken identity, asserting that the ship had been misidentified as an Egyptian vessel. However, survivors and some U.S. officials alleged that the attack may have been deliberate, potentially to frame Egypt or prevent the U.S. from intercepting sensitive intelligence about Israel’s military operations (Ennes, 1980).

Although never definitively proven to be a false flag, the USS *Liberty* incident continues to fuel speculation about Israel’s willingness to engage in deception against even its closest ally when strategic interests are at stake.

Operation Wrath of God

Following the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, Mossad launched "Operation Wrath of God," targeting individuals linked to Black September, the Palestinian militant group responsible. While these assassinations were not explicitly false flag operations, Mossad frequently disguised its agents and employed deceptive tactics to deflect suspicion. For example, Mossad agents often used foreign passports, posing as nationals of other countries to carry out killings in Europe and the Middle East. These methods blurred the line between legitimate covert retaliation and deceptive operations that risked dragging uninvolved nations into conflict (Katz, 2005).

Operation Diamond and Espionage Disguises

In 1966, Mossad orchestrated the defection of an Iraqi pilot flying a Soviet-made MiG-21 fighter jet to Israel in what became known as Operation Diamond. While not technically a false flag, Mossad employed disinformation and deceptive tactics, convincing the pilot he was defecting to a neutral third party before revealing Israel’s involvement. This operation demonstrated Israel’s use of deception in intelligence to shift regional power balances.

Alleged False Flag Operations Against Western Nations

Several allegations exist regarding Israeli false flag actions against Western allies to manipulate political support. For example, investigative journalists and former intelligence officers have suggested that Mossad at times staged or encouraged certain attacks to implicate Arab or Palestinian groups, thereby swaying U.S. and European public opinion in Israel’s favor. While conclusive evidence is often lacking, claims persist that such tactics were used to justify stronger Western support for Israeli policies, particularly during the turbulent decades of the 1970s and 1980s.

Cyber False Flags in the 21st Century

In the modern era, false flag operations have evolved into the digital sphere. Israel, renowned for its cyber capabilities, has been implicated in joint U.S.-Israeli cyber warfare campaigns such as the Stuxnet virus, which targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. While Stuxnet was not framed as a false flag, analysts argue that the sophistication of Israeli cyber operations makes false flag attribution easier in cyberspace, where attacks can be routed through compromised servers and appear to originate from other nations or groups (Zetter, 2014). Such capabilities expand the concept of false flag operations into digital statecraft.

Disinformation Campaigns and Psychological Operations

Beyond physical attacks, Israel has been accused of engaging in psychological operations and disinformation campaigns aimed at framing opponents. For instance, during conflicts with Palestinian groups, false narratives and planted stories have circulated, sometimes attributed to Israeli intelligence efforts. These campaigns attempt to erode the credibility of adversaries and justify Israeli military responses, again aligning with the false flag framework of attributing responsibility elsewhere.

Ethical and Legal Implications

The use of false flag operations raises profound ethical and legal questions. Critics argue that such tactics undermine international law, erode trust among allies, and delegitimize the moral standing of states that employ them. In Israel’s case, while some argue these actions were necessary for survival in a hostile environment, others claim they crossed ethical red lines by endangering civilians and manipulating allies. The balance between national security and adherence to international norms remains a central tension in assessing Israel’s intelligence legacy.

Conclusion

The history of Israeli false flag operations is complex, blending confirmed cases like the Lavon Affair with contested events such as the USS *Liberty* attack, and extending into modern debates on cyber warfare and disinformation. These episodes highlight both the effectiveness and risks of deception as a tool of statecraft. For Israel, a nation navigating existential threats, such strategies were seen as necessary survival tactics. Yet, they continue to provoke debate about morality, legality, and the costs of covert deception in international relations.

References

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavon_Affair
Ennes, J. E. (1980). *Assault on the Liberty*. Random House.
Katz, A. (2005). *Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response*. Random House.
Segev, T. (2000). *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East*. Metropolitan Books.
Zetter, K. (2014). *Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon*. Crown Publishing.

IT IS CALLED FALSE FLAG OPERATION BY ISRAEL AND HERE IS WHY

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavon_Affair

franchasng:
How Moslems derive so much joy in spilling the blood of others in the name of religion beats my imagination.


Do they think if Christians and others decides to be this violent that there will be any of them left in the world?


This is sad, say no to Islamic terrorism.

RIP to the innocent victims at the Synagogue

what Makes this AN ISLAMIC TERRORISM?

FarahAideed:
Always them always them ..Since I have been born I have never heard of a Jew , Christian, Buddist, Hinduist , Toaist, traditionalist that walked into a mosque to attack anyone unprovoked , it always has to be the other way

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/new-zealand-mosque-shootings, i leave you to this.

this is a FALSE FLAG OPERATION BY ISRAEL, know this and Know PEACE.

huptin:
This your write up is not necessary...if moslems are killing moslems, how is that a big deal, if you subscribe to a religion whose foundation and values are built on violence and you get consumed by violence...very understandable, at least you can get your virgins.


But Christians are known to be peaceful, why bring your violence to them?

So, the lives of Muslims killed dont matter only the few christian killed makes the ENTIRE situation a security concern? Isnt that an Hypocrisy?

SpaceX:
I'm from borno state and I have experience it first hand, they chant allahu akbar and target Christians. I know what I'm saying. Do you have an idea of how Victor Moses parent were deleted?

what is the percentage of christians in borno and do all christians live in a singke village in borno state? there are several markets that has been attacked INCLUDING YESTERDAY IN KWARA STATE, do they do census of their reliigion before killing them?

BE A REASONABLE HUMAN BEING THINK PLEASE.

SpaceX:
Why do they chant allahu akbar while deleting people?

That they chant Allahu Akbar and over 90% of their victims are Muslims doesn't mean they kill for islam.

Righteousness2:
Galloway is a known Antisemite. But he is not the one.
That is your Flotilla Hamas Terror guy

He did

https://www.thenational.scot/news/25507476.george-galloway-responds-israel-posts-image-target-circle/

Elusive001:
Do we look like those ignorant and ill-informed Europeans and American who do are to lazy to even use the Internet that is readily available to them? We are Nigerians who either experience the genocide or have people who experience it.

The want to wipe out the small Christian communities so that they can establish Islamic rule in the North and extend to the whole Nigeria.

HERE IS A DETAILED KILLINGS OF MUSLIMS IN NIGERIA(2025 ALONE)

Comprehensive Report: Attacks, Killings and Abductions in Northwest and Northeast Nigeria (Jan 1, 2025 - Oct 1, 2025)

Date: October 2, 2025
Scope: This report focuses on recorded attacks, killings, abductions and related violent incidents in Nigeria's Northwest and Northeast geopolitical zones (as defined in Nigerian federal zoning), covering the period January 1, 2025 through October 1, 2025. The emphasis is on open-source incident reporting (major international and national press, and Nigerian authorities including NHRC), verified media accounts, and official dashboards where available. All references are included at the end of this document.
Executive Summary

Between January 1, 2025 and October 1, 2025, Nigeria's Northwest and Northeast regions continued to experience sustained and, at times, intensifying armed violence that included mass abductions, mosque and village massacres, ambushes of community security volunteers, and attacks on military installations. According to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the first half of 2025 alone saw more reported killings attributed to insurgents and bandits than the entirety of the previous year, with reported figures of over 2,200 killed and 857 abductions in H1 2025. [1]
The violence in the Northwest is dominated by criminally-motivated 'bandit' groups who conduct mass kidnappings, raids on villages and attacks on marketplaces and places of worship; Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto states have been hotspots during 2025. The Northeast remains affected by the long-running Islamist insurgency (Boko Haram and ISWAP factions), with particularly deadly village-level massacres documented in Borno state during 2025. [2][3][4]
This report compiles incident-level reporting, aggregates counts where reliable, describes patterns by state and attack type, assesses drivers and impacts (humanitarian and security), evaluates response measures and outlines recommendations for policymakers, humanitarians and civil society to reduce harm and improve documentation and accountability.
Key findings (high level)
- The NHRC reported a spike in violence for the first half of 2025, with reported killings and abductions that exceeded the prior year's comparable totals. [1]
- Major mass-casualty incidents in mid-2025 include attacks on mosques and villages in Katsina (August 2025), multiple mass abduction events across Zamfara (July–August 2025), and brutal village massacres in Borno (May 2025). [2][3][4]
- The Northwest violence is characterized by high-volume abduction-for-ransom operations and opportunistic massacres; the Northeast is shaped primarily by organized insurgent operations and communal purges that bear an ideological component. [5][6]
- Reporting inconsistencies are significant: initial counts frequently change, and local reporting, national agencies and international media sometimes diverge in attribution and casualty totals. This complicates any comprehensive casualty accounting but does not negate the clear qualitative trend of intensifying violence in both regions during 2025. [1][7]
Methodology

Data sources and selection
This report was compiled from open-source reporting (major wire services—Reuters, AP), international outlets (Al Jazeera, BBC), Nigerian press (Vanguard, Daily Trust, Premium Times where referenced), and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) public dashboards and releases. Where multiple sources reported on the same event, cross-references were used to reconcile details (dates, location names, casualty counts). The main load-bearing documents used for aggregate figures and high-profile incidents are cited in the References section. [1][2][3][4][6]
Inclusion criteria
Only incidents meeting the following criteria were included in the incident-level analysis:
- Clear reporting by at least one reputable news source or an official agency (NHRC, state government or security briefings).
- A dated event (between Jan 1, 2025 and Oct 1, 2025) and attributed to a place within the Northwest or Northeast geopolitical zones.
- Reported casualties (killed/abducted/injured) or a clearly described mass-displacement outcome.
Limitations (brief)
Open-source incident tracking is constrained by: variable reporting coverage across states (remote areas are under-reported), initial casualty count volatility (figures often revised), local political incentives that may under- or over-report, and the impossibility of independently verifying every single claim made in rapidly evolving security environments. Because of these constraints, this report emphasizes synthesized patterns rather than attempting definitive single-source counts for every event. The NHRC statewide dashboards were used to provide macro-level context where available. [1][6]
Regional & Historical Context

Northwest (operational profile)
The Northwest states (notably Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi) have seen a protracted surge in criminal banditry. These actors operate in remote forested and mining regions, frequently use motorcycles for mobility, and conduct raids primarily during early morning or nocturnal hours. Tactics include mass abduction (often of women and children), burning of homes, attacks on markets and places of worship, and ambushes of community security volunteers and travellers. The summer of 2025 saw several high-profile abductions and raids across Zamfara and neighboring states, including mass kidnappings of entire villages and an attack on a mosque in Katsina that resulted in unusually high casualties. [2][3][8][9]
Northeast (operational profile)
The Northeast remains the theater of an insurgency led by IS-linked groups (ISWAP) and the local Boko Haram faction (JAS). Over the last decade the conflict spawned from a primarily asymmetric insurgency into a complex mosaic of inter-factional fighting, community-level reprisals, and periodic large-scale assaults on villages and military targets. The insurgent groups operate in Sambisa forest corridors, Lake Chad islands and rural LGAs in Borno and Yobe, targeting communities perceived as collaborating with rival factions or with security forces. In 2025, multiple incidents of targeted village massacres were recorded, with reports of mass death and disappearances. [4][10]
Incident-level Findings (selected examples & aggregated patterns)

This section summarizes the highest-impact incidents and aggregates to highlight patterns across the Northwest and Northeast during the reporting window.
1) Northwest — mass mosque and village attacks (Katsina Aug 2025)
A particularly high-profile attack occurred on August 19–20, 2025 in Unguwan Mantau, Malumfashi LGA, Katsina State, where gunmen attacked worshippers inside a mosque and also raided nearby villages during morning prayers. Initial reports placed the death toll in the dozens, with subsequent reporting indicating figures as high as 50 killed and dozens abducted in the same sequence of attacks. The attack drew national attention given the targeting of a place of worship and the high casualty toll. [2][5][6]
2) Northwest — multiple large-scale abductions in Zamfara (July–August 2025)
Zamfara state continued to experience mass abductions in 2025. Multiple incidents — including the late July and August attacks — were reported in which armed gangs abducted scores to hundreds of civilians, often women and children. These operations frequently take place across several villages in a single operation and have involved the looting and burning of property as the attackers retreat to nearby forested hideouts. These mass abductions are a key driver of the heightened humanitarian needs and the security response in the Northwest. [3][8][11]
3) Northeast — mass killings in Borno (May 2025)
In May 2025, Reuters and AP reported brutal attacks in parts of Borno state in which militants from JAS or splinter groups killed dozens of civilians in two villages (Mallam Karamti and Kwatandashi were among the locations referenced). Witnesses described victims being marched into the bush and executed; reports also described dozens missing and presumed killed. The incidents were part of a wider surge of violence in the northeast that included attacks on military positions and roadside bombings in the Maiduguri corridor. [4][10]
4) Attacks on security volunteers and bases
Community security volunteers and local vigilante groups — often a first line of defense for remote communities — were repeatedly targeted. In several instances volunteers ambushed or were ambushed while on patrol; some incidents resulted in large numbers of volunteer casualties. Insurgent attacks on military bases were also registered, sometimes leading to mixed casualty reports that include both soldiers and civilians. [9][12]
Aggregate observations
- The NHRC and other monitors recorded substantially elevated casualty and kidnapping figures during the first half of 2025, indicating a national trend that includes heavy impacts in the Northwest and Northeast. [1][6]
- Abduction events in the Northwest often involved hundreds of victims when multiple villages were hit consecutively, while mass killings in the Northeast were at times carried out with a particular intensity and ideological targeting that marks the work of insurgent groups rather than opportunistic criminal gangs. [3][4][8]
Causal Analysis & Drivers

Violence in both regions is driven by a combination of structural and proximate factors. These include:
1) Governance and capacity gaps
Large geographic areas with weak state presence create spaces where armed groups can form safe havens, recruit and carry out attacks. Poorly resourced security forces and difficulties in projecting sustained presence in remote LGAs have enabled repeated raids and insurgent operations. Military responses have occasionally produced short-term tactical gains (e.g., freeing hostages) but have not yet eliminated the structural safe havens used by armed groups. [7][13]
2) Economics and livelihood pressures
Competition for land, especially between pastoralist communities and sedentary farmers, remains a flashpoint particularly in settings where grazing routes have been disrupted by desertification and local resource scarcity. The commercial value of kidnappings (ransom economy) also incentivizes mass abduction. In mining and informal rural economies, armed groups can extort revenue and tax local economies in exchange for “protection.” [8][11]
3) Organized criminal networks and fragmentation of armed groups
In the Northwest, loosely integrated criminal networks—often referred to as bandits—operate primarily for economic gain, including abduction-for-ransom. In the Northeast, more ideologically driven insurgent factions (ISWAP, JAS) act with different objectives—territory, ideology, and strategic control of corridors. These differences translate to different attack signatures (mass abduction vs village purge/targeted massacre). [3][4]
4) Local dynamics and cycles of revenge
Several large incidents appear to be triggered or intensified by local cycles of reprisal—e.g., a town's resistance to attackers in one incident followed by retaliatory attacks on that community. The August 2025 Katsina attack was, according to some local reports, linked to previous confrontations between townspeople and armed men. While this does not justify reprisals, it helps explain some of the rapid escalation observed in certain incidents. [2][5][6]


Humanitarian & Socioeconomic Impacts

The human cost of the violence extends beyond immediate killed/abducted counts. Recurrent attacks have led to:
- Population displacement and strain on IDP (internally displaced persons) sites in the Northeast and displacement to urban centers and other states from the Northwest.
- Loss of livelihoods, particularly affecting agriculture and artisanal mining, leading to food insecurity and market disruption.
- Psychological trauma and disruption of education as families keep children home or schools are repurposed as shelters.
- Reduced access for humanitarian actors in areas with active threats, worsening health and nutrition outcomes for vulnerable communities.
Response & Accountability

State and security responses
The Nigerian government and security forces have undertaken a mix of kinetic responses (airstrikes, targeted raids, freeing hostages), community engagement strategies and occasional negotiations. Notable security operations in 2025 include military airstrikes and reported hostage rescues; however, military actions are sometimes criticized for collateral damage or for failing to secure long-term safety for affected communities. [7][8]
Community responses
Communities continue to organize locally (vigilante and community self-defense groups), but these groups often lack formal training and clear accountability mechanisms; they are also vulnerable targets for retaliatory attacks. The involvement of civilian groups is a double-edged sword: they can defend communities effectively at times, but their use also increases risk and complicates human-rights compliance and state monopoly on force.
Accountability gaps
Investigation capacity (forensic, judicial follow-up) is limited in many affected areas. Human rights groups and the NHRC report violations, but systematic prosecutions and transparent accountability remain limited—this undermines longer-term deterrence and fuels cycles of impunity. [1][6][13]
Recommendations

Immediate (0–3 months)
- Prioritize accurate incident documentation: support trusted local NGOs and the NHRC to consolidate incident reports, maintain unique incident IDs, and publish regular dashboards that identify location, date, actor (if known), and casualties.
- Protective measures for high-risk communities: establish temporary local security outposts (community-police-military coordination) focused on rapid response and safe evacuation routes for civilians in hotspot LGAs.
- Humanitarian access: prioritize negotiated safe corridors for humanitarian actors to deliver food, health and psychological support to affected communities.
Short to Medium (3–12 months)
- Strengthen community-based early warning systems (SMS and radio networks) combined with rapid response teams and pre-positioned humanitarian supplies.
- Target economic resilience programs: conditional cash transfers, support for seed distribution and livestock recovery programs to reduce the economic incentives for joining or supporting armed groups.
- Transparent investigations: fund and support independent probes into high-casualty incidents to improve accountability and public trust (in coordination with NHRC and credible civil society organisations).
Long-term (12+ months)
- Security sector reform and localized capacity building: increase sustained presence in remote LGAs, paired with community policing reforms and training to reduce human-rights abuses.
- Address root causes of pastoralist-farmer conflict by funding land-use planning, secure grazing corridors and climate-resilient agriculture programs.
- Regional coordination: because insurgent and bandit networks exploit cross-border corridors (e.g., Lake Chad, border belts), strengthen regional cooperation and intelligence sharing with neighbors and multilateral partners.
- Reduce the ransom economy through combined legislation, financial countermeasures, and victim support programs that reduce the incentive structure behind kidnappings.
Limitations of this report

This analysis relies on open-source reporting and national dashboards. Reporting biases (under-reporting in remote areas; over-representation of high-profile incidents) and the volatility of early casualty figures make precise casualty accounting infeasible. This report therefore focuses on patterns, credible incident examples and pragmatic recommendations rather than attempting to certify an exhaustive casualty list.
Conclusion

The period Jan 1, 2025 to Oct 1, 2025 highlights a Nigeria confronting simultaneous security crises across the Northwest and Northeast. While the Northwest's violence is dominated by banditry and mass abductions, the Northeast remains wounded by an ideologically driven insurgency producing mass killings and displacement. A combined approach—improving community protection, strengthening documentation and accountability, addressing root economic and governance drivers, and enhancing humanitarian access—is required to reduce the toll on civilians and to create conditions for longer-term stabilization.


References

[1] Reuters, "Nigeria insurgents, bandits kill more in first half of 2025 than all last year", July 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-insurgents-bandits-kill-more-first-half-2025-than-all-last-year-2025-07-08/
[2] Reuters, "Bandits kill at least 27 in northern Nigeria mosque attack", Aug 19, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/bandits-kill-least-27-northern-nigeria-mosque-attack-officials-say-2025-08-19/
[3] Reuters, "Gunmen in Nigeria's Zamfara abduct over 100 in deadly attack", Aug 27, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gunmen-nigerias-zamfara-abduct-over-100-deadly-attack-2025-08-27/
[4] Associated Press (AP), "Militant attack on 2 villages in northeast Nigeria kills at least 57, witnesses say", May 19, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/8fb38a82c5ad79edb3333f0c45803d0a
[5] Al Jazeera, "Gunmen kill at least 27 in mosque attack in northern Nigeria", Aug 19, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/19/gunmen-kill-at-least-27-in-mosque-attack-in-northern-nigeria-officials-say
[6] NHRC (Nigeria Human Rights Commission), "NHRC reports 570 killings and 278 kidnappings in April, 2025" (dashboard & media releases). https://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/nhrc-media/news-and-events/578-nhrc-reports-570-killings-and-278-kidnappings-in-april-2025.html
[7] Reuters reporting on multiple mass abductions and overnight raids in northwest Nigeria (Aug 6, 2025; Aug 4, 2025; Jul 18, 2025). https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gunmen-abduct-60-northern-nigeria-kill-villagers-overnight-raids-2025-08-06/ https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/armed-men-motorbikes-kill-11-kidnap-70-northwest-nigeria-2025-08-04/ https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/bandits-kill-six-abduct-more-than-100-nigerias-zamfara-state-2025-07-18/
[8] Reuters, "Residents say gunmen kill at least 20 people in mining village, Nigeria's Zamfara state", Apr 25, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/residents-say-gunmen-kill-least-20-people-mining-village-nigerias-zamfara-state-2025-04-25/
[9] AP, "Nigerian military airstrikes free 76 hostages, including children", Aug 2025. https://apnews.com/article/b57a4cb562c2d57f378d3828e6643f2e
[10] Contextual reporting on insurgent operations in the northeast and international analyses (see Reuters/AP/Al Jazeera links in this references list).
[11] Local reporting & aggregated dashboards (Vanguard; NHRC updates). https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/08/we-recorded-331035-cases-of-rights-violations-375-killings-in-july-nhrc/
[12] Additional Reuters incident reporting (various 2025 pieces included above as grouped references).
[13] Reuters investigations and contextual reporting on wider security responses and gaps (see multiple Reuters items cited above).
---
End of report.

Comprehensive Report: Attacks, Killings and Abductions in Northwest and Northeast Nigeria (Jan 1, 2025 - Oct 1, 2025)

Date: October 2, 2025
Scope: This report focuses on recorded attacks, killings, abductions and related violent incidents in Nigeria's Northwest and Northeast geopolitical zones (as defined in Nigerian federal zoning), covering the period January 1, 2025 through October 1, 2025. The emphasis is on open-source incident reporting (major international and national press, and Nigerian authorities including NHRC), verified media accounts, and official dashboards where available. All references are included at the end of this document.
Executive Summary

Between January 1, 2025 and October 1, 2025, Nigeria's Northwest and Northeast regions continued to experience sustained and, at times, intensifying armed violence that included mass abductions, mosque and village massacres, ambushes of community security volunteers, and attacks on military installations. According to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the first half of 2025 alone saw more reported killings attributed to insurgents and bandits than the entirety of the previous year, with reported figures of over 2,200 killed and 857 abductions in H1 2025. [1]
The violence in the Northwest is dominated by criminally-motivated 'bandit' groups who conduct mass kidnappings, raids on villages and attacks on marketplaces and places of worship; Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto states have been hotspots during 2025. The Northeast remains affected by the long-running Islamist insurgency (Boko Haram and ISWAP factions), with particularly deadly village-level massacres documented in Borno state during 2025. [2][3][4]
This report compiles incident-level reporting, aggregates counts where reliable, describes patterns by state and attack type, assesses drivers and impacts (humanitarian and security), evaluates response measures and outlines recommendations for policymakers, humanitarians and civil society to reduce harm and improve documentation and accountability.
Key findings (high level)
- The NHRC reported a spike in violence for the first half of 2025, with reported killings and abductions that exceeded the prior year's comparable totals. [1]
- Major mass-casualty incidents in mid-2025 include attacks on mosques and villages in Katsina (August 2025), multiple mass abduction events across Zamfara (July–August 2025), and brutal village massacres in Borno (May 2025). [2][3][4]
- The Northwest violence is characterized by high-volume abduction-for-ransom operations and opportunistic massacres; the Northeast is shaped primarily by organized insurgent operations and communal purges that bear an ideological component. [5][6]
- Reporting inconsistencies are significant: initial counts frequently change, and local reporting, national agencies and international media sometimes diverge in attribution and casualty totals. This complicates any comprehensive casualty accounting but does not negate the clear qualitative trend of intensifying violence in both regions during 2025. [1][7]
Methodology

Data sources and selection
This report was compiled from open-source reporting (major wire services—Reuters, AP), international outlets (Al Jazeera, BBC), Nigerian press (Vanguard, Daily Trust, Premium Times where referenced), and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) public dashboards and releases. Where multiple sources reported on the same event, cross-references were used to reconcile details (dates, location names, casualty counts). The main load-bearing documents used for aggregate figures and high-profile incidents are cited in the References section. [1][2][3][4][6]
Inclusion criteria
Only incidents meeting the following criteria were included in the incident-level analysis:
- Clear reporting by at least one reputable news source or an official agency (NHRC, state government or security briefings).
- A dated event (between Jan 1, 2025 and Oct 1, 2025) and attributed to a place within the Northwest or Northeast geopolitical zones.
- Reported casualties (killed/abducted/injured) or a clearly described mass-displacement outcome.
Limitations (brief)
Open-source incident tracking is constrained by: variable reporting coverage across states (remote areas are under-reported), initial casualty count volatility (figures often revised), local political incentives that may under- or over-report, and the impossibility of independently verifying every single claim made in rapidly evolving security environments. Because of these constraints, this report emphasizes synthesized patterns rather than attempting definitive single-source counts for every event. The NHRC statewide dashboards were used to provide macro-level context where available. [1][6]
Regional & Historical Context

Northwest (operational profile)
The Northwest states (notably Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi) have seen a protracted surge in criminal banditry. These actors operate in remote forested and mining regions, frequently use motorcycles for mobility, and conduct raids primarily during early morning or nocturnal hours. Tactics include mass abduction (often of women and children), burning of homes, attacks on markets and places of worship, and ambushes of community security volunteers and travellers. The summer of 2025 saw several high-profile abductions and raids across Zamfara and neighboring states, including mass kidnappings of entire villages and an attack on a mosque in Katsina that resulted in unusually high casualties. [2][3][8][9]
Northeast (operational profile)
The Northeast remains the theater of an insurgency led by IS-linked groups (ISWAP) and the local Boko Haram faction (JAS). Over the last decade the conflict spawned from a primarily asymmetric insurgency into a complex mosaic of inter-factional fighting, community-level reprisals, and periodic large-scale assaults on villages and military targets. The insurgent groups operate in Sambisa forest corridors, Lake Chad islands and rural LGAs in Borno and Yobe, targeting communities perceived as collaborating with rival factions or with security forces. In 2025, multiple incidents of targeted village massacres were recorded, with reports of mass death and disappearances. [4][10]
Incident-level Findings (selected examples & aggregated patterns)

This section summarizes the highest-impact incidents and aggregates to highlight patterns across the Northwest and Northeast during the reporting window.
1) Northwest — mass mosque and village attacks (Katsina Aug 2025)
A particularly high-profile attack occurred on August 19–20, 2025 in Unguwan Mantau, Malumfashi LGA, Katsina State, where gunmen attacked worshippers inside a mosque and also raided nearby villages during morning prayers. Initial reports placed the death toll in the dozens, with subsequent reporting indicating figures as high as 50 killed and dozens abducted in the same sequence of attacks. The attack drew national attention given the targeting of a place of worship and the high casualty toll. [2][5][6]
2) Northwest — multiple large-scale abductions in Zamfara (July–August 2025)
Zamfara state continued to experience mass abductions in 2025. Multiple incidents — including the late July and August attacks — were reported in which armed gangs abducted scores to hundreds of civilians, often women and children. These operations frequently take place across several villages in a single operation and have involved the looting and burning of property as the attackers retreat to nearby forested hideouts. These mass abductions are a key driver of the heightened humanitarian needs and the security response in the Northwest. [3][8][11]
3) Northeast — mass killings in Borno (May 2025)
In May 2025, Reuters and AP reported brutal attacks in parts of Borno state in which militants from JAS or splinter groups killed dozens of civilians in two villages (Mallam Karamti and Kwatandashi were among the locations referenced). Witnesses described victims being marched into the bush and executed; reports also described dozens missing and presumed killed. The incidents were part of a wider surge of violence in the northeast that included attacks on military positions and roadside bombings in the Maiduguri corridor. [4][10]
4) Attacks on security volunteers and bases
Community security volunteers and local vigilante groups — often a first line of defense for remote communities — were repeatedly targeted. In several instances volunteers ambushed or were ambushed while on patrol; some incidents resulted in large numbers of volunteer casualties. Insurgent attacks on military bases were also registered, sometimes leading to mixed casualty reports that include both soldiers and civilians. [9][12]
Aggregate observations
- The NHRC and other monitors recorded substantially elevated casualty and kidnapping figures during the first half of 2025, indicating a national trend that includes heavy impacts in the Northwest and Northeast. [1][6]
- Abduction events in the Northwest often involved hundreds of victims when multiple villages were hit consecutively, while mass killings in the Northeast were at times carried out with a particular intensity and ideological targeting that marks the work of insurgent groups rather than opportunistic criminal gangs. [3][4][8]
Causal Analysis & Drivers

Violence in both regions is driven by a combination of structural and proximate factors. These include:
1) Governance and capacity gaps
Large geographic areas with weak state presence create spaces where armed groups can form safe havens, recruit and carry out attacks. Poorly resourced security forces and difficulties in projecting sustained presence in remote LGAs have enabled repeated raids and insurgent operations. Military responses have occasionally produced short-term tactical gains (e.g., freeing hostages) but have not yet eliminated the structural safe havens used by armed groups. [7][13]
2) Economics and livelihood pressures
Competition for land, especially between pastoralist communities and sedentary farmers, remains a flashpoint particularly in settings where grazing routes have been disrupted by desertification and local resource scarcity. The commercial value of kidnappings (ransom economy) also incentivizes mass abduction. In mining and informal rural economies, armed groups can extort revenue and tax local economies in exchange for “protection.” [8][11]
3) Organized criminal networks and fragmentation of armed groups
In the Northwest, loosely integrated criminal networks—often referred to as bandits—operate primarily for economic gain, including abduction-for-ransom. In the Northeast, more ideologically driven insurgent factions (ISWAP, JAS) act with different objectives—territory, ideology, and strategic control of corridors. These differences translate to different attack signatures (mass abduction vs village purge/targeted massacre). [3][4]
4) Local dynamics and cycles of revenge
Several large incidents appear to be triggered or intensified by local cycles of reprisal—e.g., a town's resistance to attackers in one incident followed by retaliatory attacks on that community. The August 2025 Katsina attack was, according to some local reports, linked to previous confrontations between townspeople and armed men. While this does not justify reprisals, it helps explain some of the rapid escalation observed in certain incidents. [2][5][6]


Humanitarian & Socioeconomic Impacts

The human cost of the violence extends beyond immediate killed/abducted counts. Recurrent attacks have led to:
- Population displacement and strain on IDP (internally displaced persons) sites in the Northeast and displacement to urban centers and other states from the Northwest.
- Loss of livelihoods, particularly affecting agriculture and artisanal mining, leading to food insecurity and market disruption.
- Psychological trauma and disruption of education as families keep children home or schools are repurposed as shelters.
- Reduced access for humanitarian actors in areas with active threats, worsening health and nutrition outcomes for vulnerable communities.
Response & Accountability

State and security responses
The Nigerian government and security forces have undertaken a mix of kinetic responses (airstrikes, targeted raids, freeing hostages), community engagement strategies and occasional negotiations. Notable security operations in 2025 include military airstrikes and reported hostage rescues; however, military actions are sometimes criticized for collateral damage or for failing to secure long-term safety for affected communities. [7][8]
Community responses
Communities continue to organize locally (vigilante and community self-defense groups), but these groups often lack formal training and clear accountability mechanisms; they are also vulnerable targets for retaliatory attacks. The involvement of civilian groups is a double-edged sword: they can defend communities effectively at times, but their use also increases risk and complicates human-rights compliance and state monopoly on force.
Accountability gaps
Investigation capacity (forensic, judicial follow-up) is limited in many affected areas. Human rights groups and the NHRC report violations, but systematic prosecutions and transparent accountability remain limited—this undermines longer-term deterrence and fuels cycles of impunity. [1][6][13]
Recommendations

Immediate (0–3 months)
- Prioritize accurate incident documentation: support trusted local NGOs and the NHRC to consolidate incident reports, maintain unique incident IDs, and publish regular dashboards that identify location, date, actor (if known), and casualties.
- Protective measures for high-risk communities: establish temporary local security outposts (community-police-military coordination) focused on rapid response and safe evacuation routes for civilians in hotspot LGAs.
- Humanitarian access: prioritize negotiated safe corridors for humanitarian actors to deliver food, health and psychological support to affected communities.
Short to Medium (3–12 months)
- Strengthen community-based early warning systems (SMS and radio networks) combined with rapid response teams and pre-positioned humanitarian supplies.
- Target economic resilience programs: conditional cash transfers, support for seed distribution and livestock recovery programs to reduce the economic incentives for joining or supporting armed groups.
- Transparent investigations: fund and support independent probes into high-casualty incidents to improve accountability and public trust (in coordination with NHRC and credible civil society organisations).
Long-term (12+ months)
- Security sector reform and localized capacity building: increase sustained presence in remote LGAs, paired with community policing reforms and training to reduce human-rights abuses.
- Address root causes of pastoralist-farmer conflict by funding land-use planning, secure grazing corridors and climate-resilient agriculture programs.
- Regional coordination: because insurgent and bandit networks exploit cross-border corridors (e.g., Lake Chad, border belts), strengthen regional cooperation and intelligence sharing with neighbors and multilateral partners.
- Reduce the ransom economy through combined legislation, financial countermeasures, and victim support programs that reduce the incentive structure behind kidnappings.
Limitations of this report

This analysis relies on open-source reporting and national dashboards. Reporting biases (under-reporting in remote areas; over-representation of high-profile incidents) and the volatility of early casualty figures make precise casualty accounting infeasible. This report therefore focuses on patterns, credible incident examples and pragmatic recommendations rather than attempting to certify an exhaustive casualty list.
Conclusion

The period Jan 1, 2025 to Oct 1, 2025 highlights a Nigeria confronting simultaneous security crises across the Northwest and Northeast. While the Northwest's violence is dominated by banditry and mass abductions, the Northeast remains wounded by an ideologically driven insurgency producing mass killings and displacement. A combined approach—improving community protection, strengthening documentation and accountability, addressing root economic and governance drivers, and enhancing humanitarian access—is required to reduce the toll on civilians and to create conditions for longer-term stabilization.


References

[1] Reuters, "Nigeria insurgents, bandits kill more in first half of 2025 than all last year", July 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-insurgents-bandits-kill-more-first-half-2025-than-all-last-year-2025-07-08/
[2] Reuters, "Bandits kill at least 27 in northern Nigeria mosque attack", Aug 19, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/bandits-kill-least-27-northern-nigeria-mosque-attack-officials-say-2025-08-19/
[3] Reuters, "Gunmen in Nigeria's Zamfara abduct over 100 in deadly attack", Aug 27, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gunmen-nigerias-zamfara-abduct-over-100-deadly-attack-2025-08-27/
[4] Associated Press (AP), "Militant attack on 2 villages in northeast Nigeria kills at least 57, witnesses say", May 19, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/8fb38a82c5ad79edb3333f0c45803d0a
[5] Al Jazeera, "Gunmen kill at least 27 in mosque attack in northern Nigeria", Aug 19, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/19/gunmen-kill-at-least-27-in-mosque-attack-in-northern-nigeria-officials-say
[6] NHRC (Nigeria Human Rights Commission), "NHRC reports 570 killings and 278 kidnappings in April, 2025" (dashboard & media releases). https://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/nhrc-media/news-and-events/578-nhrc-reports-570-killings-and-278-kidnappings-in-april-2025.html
[7] Reuters reporting on multiple mass abductions and overnight raids in northwest Nigeria (Aug 6, 2025; Aug 4, 2025; Jul 18, 2025). https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gunmen-abduct-60-northern-nigeria-kill-villagers-overnight-raids-2025-08-06/ https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/armed-men-motorbikes-kill-11-kidnap-70-northwest-nigeria-2025-08-04/ https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/bandits-kill-six-abduct-more-than-100-nigerias-zamfara-state-2025-07-18/
[8] Reuters, "Residents say gunmen kill at least 20 people in mining village, Nigeria's Zamfara state", Apr 25, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/residents-say-gunmen-kill-least-20-people-mining-village-nigerias-zamfara-state-2025-04-25/
[9] AP, "Nigerian military airstrikes free 76 hostages, including children", Aug 2025. https://apnews.com/article/b57a4cb562c2d57f378d3828e6643f2e
[10] Contextual reporting on insurgent operations in the northeast and international analyses (see Reuters/AP/Al Jazeera links in this references list).
[11] Local reporting & aggregated dashboards (Vanguard; NHRC updates). https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/08/we-recorded-331035-cases-of-rights-violations-375-killings-in-july-nhrc/
[12] Additional Reuters incident reporting (various 2025 pieces included above as grouped references).
[13] Reuters investigations and contextual reporting on wider security responses and gaps (see multiple Reuters items cited above).

Orlandoo:
Go and tell that to the displaced christians in Plateau, Benue and Kwara states. The attackers are Muslims after all.

ALL opf those killed in Kwara are muslims and then, how does the Religion the murderer practise becomes a thing? Do we call those who killin east or kidnap christaian terrorists too? how does the terrorist religion matter here?

OR YOU WANT TO PROVE TO ME THAT IT IS HIS RELIGION THAT COMMAND ITS Adherents to Kill themselves?

Orlandoo:
The Islamic brotherhood APC has been in overdrive dishing out lies upon lies ever since the world called them out over the jihad against christians going on in Nigeria.

when boko haram was attacking in borno, zamfara, sokoto, their bomb asks what is your religion before going off?

Orlandoo:
The Islamic brotherhood APC has been in overdrive dishing out lies upon lies ever since the world called them out over the jihad against christians going on in Nigeria.

Are yiu aware most of the bandit, boko haram, iswap and all attacks are in north, the question is who are the majority in the NORTH? muslims or christians? except you will say they ask of the religion of a farmer or do a census of the religion of a village before attacking them.

In recent days, coordinated attacks on Nigeria’s nationhood have swept across social media, blogs and television outlets, alleging a so-called “Christian genocide”. These attacks, driven by foreign actors, mischaracterise Nigeria’s domestic conflicts, ignore its complexities and manipulate longstanding ethnic and resource-based tensions to advance sectarian agendas.

One of the figures driving this propaganda is American comedian and television host Bill Maher, who used his show to deliver a sensationalised account alleging the systematic slaughter of Christians in Nigeria. “I’m not a Christian, but they are systematically killing the Christians in Nigeria. They’ve killed over 100,000 since 2009. They’ve burned 18,000 churches. These are the Islamists, Boko Haram,” he said. “This is so much more of a genocide attempt than what is going on in Gaza. They are literally attempting to wipe out the Christian population of an entire country.” His sources are largely fabricated claims and manipulated images from unverified outlets. These distorted narratives drew applause from his audience, while Fox News, true to form, amplified them.

This misinformation – aimed at maligning Nigeria as much as undermining the gravity of the situation in Gaza – is linked to Nigeria’s position at the 2025 United Nations General Assembly. By reaffirming support for a two-state solution to the Palestinian conflict, Nigeria challenged powerful interests invested in one-sided narratives. Delivering the statement on behalf of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu on September 24, Vice President Kashim Shettima stressed Nigeria spoke for peace, not partisanship. He framed Nigeria’s stance through its history as a nation that survived civil war and deep tensions, observing that “such bitter experience has taught us that such violence never ends where it begins”. He also drew on Nigeria’s struggle with violent extremism to argue that “military tactics may win battles measured in months or years, but in wars that span generations, it is values and ideas that deliver the ultimate victory”.

The mischief-makers who claim Nigeria ignored its own pressing challenges simply because Palestine was mentioned in only one of the 25 paragraphs could not have built their case on a shakier foundation. Nigeria’s statement was structured around four clear priorities: a demand for a permanent Nigerian seat on the UN Security Council as part of broader institutional reform; a call for urgent action on sovereign debt relief and expanded access to trade and finance; an insistence that host countries of critical minerals should benefit fairly; and an appeal to close the digital divide, echoing the secretary-general’s reminder that “AI” must stand for “Africa Included”.

These points, along with the cautionary lessons shared, were twisted by those urging Nigeria to ignore the violence in Gaza and elsewhere. This is blackmail and trivialises the genocide in Gaza. Citizens of afflicted nations may choose to ignore conflicts abroad, but state actors cannot. Nigeria, as a UN member state, bears the cost of violence in other regions, having participated in 51 out of 60 UN peacekeeping operations since its independence in 1960. Every country at the UN faces domestic challenges, yet many stood firmly with the people of Palestine. In acknowledging this, Nigeria offered one of the assembly’s deepest truths, declaring that “None of us is safe until all of us are safe,” and reminding the world that “None of us can achieve a peaceful world in isolation”.

Claims of a religious war between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria are simplistic and betray ignorance of the country’s internal dynamics. Over the decades, both Muslim and Christian communities have at times alleged “genocide” during crises. For instance, Muslim leaders claimed genocide in clashes around Jos in Plateau State, while some Christian leaders accused Muslims of campaigns against Christians in the North Central region, often called the Middle Belt, to resist being categorised as part of the Muslim-majority North. These mutual accusations show how the term “genocide” has often been invoked without credible evidence, inflaming tensions.

In reality, Nigeria’s conflicts are multi-faceted, driven by ethnic rivalries, land disputes and criminality, with religion often secondary. Boko Haram, which emerged in Maiduguri, Borno State, in 2009, positioned itself against the Nigerian state as an apostate entity, not against any single religious group. Most of its victims have been Muslims. Similarly, banditry in northern Nigeria often pits Fulani herders against Hausa communities, both predominantly Muslim, a stark example of Muslim-on-Muslim violence.

This broader context is crucial to dismantling the oversimplified narrative of one-sided persecution. Every region of Nigeria has both Christians and Muslims living side by side, and conflicts typically unfold along community or regional lines rather than strictly religious ones. Even during severe unrest, such as the Nigerian Civil War of 1967–1970, the violence did not amount to an organised genocide of one faith by the other but was rooted in political and socioeconomic grievances. Nigeria was then led by General Yakubu Gowon, a Christian, with Vice Admiral Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey, also a Christian, as deputy, making it impossible to frame the war as a campaign of the Muslim north against the Christian southeast. The same holds true in later communal unrest, such as the Plateau riots, driven by competing identities and resources rather than religious extermination. To present these conflicts, as Bill Maher does, as evidence of a Christian genocide erases these realities and distorts Nigeria’s history.

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu inherited a country that has faced brutal Islamist insurgencies led by Boko Haram and its offshoot, Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP), for more than a decade. While Western media often highlight attacks on churches and Christian communities, the reality is that these terrorists are indiscriminate in their violence. Most of Boko Haram’s victims have been Muslims, despite the group’s hostility to Christians. Operating mainly in the predominantly Muslim northeast, Boko Haram has slaughtered thousands of Muslims, including clerics, village heads and civilians it deems apostates or opponents.

The real danger lies in media outlets portraying Boko Haram, a group despised by both Muslims and Christians, as representative of Islam. Boko Haram, along with ISWAP and bandit groups, treat anyone who opposes them as an enemy, regardless of faith. They have bombed mosques, assassinated Muslim leaders and killed Christians, demonstrating their indiscriminate violence. To characterise this as a strictly anti-Christian campaign is propaganda.

While Christians have undeniably suffered horrific attacks, incidents of explicitly religious violence constitute only a fraction of Nigeria’s homicides, and direct interfaith confrontations are relatively rare. Framing Nigeria’s violence as Muslims killing Christians grossly misrepresents the situation. Worse still, some outside groups have published inflated statistics of Christian deaths without credible methodology, often counting every victim in certain regions as Christian by default or conflating deaths regardless of motive. Such dubious claims, pushed by the likes of Bill Maher, obscure the truth and trivialise the complexity of Nigeria’s conflicts.

A significant portion of the violence mischaracterised as religious persecution stems from longstanding herder–farmer clashes in the Middle Belt, driven by competition over land and water, population pressures and climate change. The Fulani herders are mostly Muslim, while the farmers come from diverse groups, many Christian. This demographic divide can create the illusion of a religious war, but at its root are disputes over resources. Both sides have been perpetrators and victims.

Since 2023, President Tinubu’s administration has prioritised tackling overlapping crises, from Boko Haram in the northeast to banditry in the northwest, farmer–herder clashes nationwide and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) violence in the southeast. Through operations such as Hadin Kai, Forest Sanity and Delta Safe, Nigeria has recorded major gains: over 13,500 terrorists neutralised, 124,000 fighters and family members surrendered, and 11,000 weapons with 252,000 rounds of ammunition destroyed in the northeast; networks including Ali Kachalla, Halilu Sububu and Isuhu Yellow dismantled in the northwest; and a return to normal life in the southeast as “sit-at-home” orders fade, attacks on security forces decline and more than 50 police stations rebuilt. National Security Adviser Malam Nuhu Ribadu confirmed these advances, noting terrorism-related deaths have fallen from 2,600 a month before May 2023 to fewer than 200 today.

Another factor that undermines the claim of Christian genocide is the religious diversity of Nigeria’s security leadership. The Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Gwabin Musa, is a Christian from Southern Kaduna. The Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Olufemi Olatubosun Oluyede, is also a Christian. The Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Emmanuel Ikechukwu Ogalla, is Christian. The Chief of Defence Intelligence, Major-General Emmanuel Undiandeye, is Christian. The Director-General of the State Security Service, Adeola Ajayi, is Christian. The Inspector General of Police, Kayode Egbetokun, is Christian. The Controller General of the Nigerian Correctional Service, Sylvester Nwakuche, is Christian. The Comptroller General of Immigration, Kemi Nandap, is Christian. This roll call makes clear the absurdity of portraying Nigeria’s security establishment as complicit in a so-called Christian genocide.

The facts dismantle the false narrative of a Christian genocide in Nigeria. Christians have suffered tragic losses, but so have Muslims, and often on an even greater scale. This is the story President Tinubu is rewriting. Nowhere is there an official policy or plan to eradicate Christians. Nigeria’s conflicts are grim and complex, but they centre on terrorism, crime and communal disputes, not religion. Terror groups kill opportunistically, striking churches, mosques, markets and villages alike. As the Tinubu-led government has stressed, no Nigerian is targeted by the state because of their faith. In fact, the very notion of a state-sanctioned “Christian genocide” collapses when one recalls that Nigeria’s First Lady Senator Oluremi Tinubu is herself a Christian, an ordained pastor and a lifelong advocate of interfaith causes. These are the nuances of Nigeria’s realities that foreign media mercenaries, eager to stoke ethno-religious divisions, fail to grasp or deliberately ignore.

Propaganda to the contrary is not only false but dangerous. It risks deepening divisions when unity is most needed. The truth, affirmed by data, is that religiously motivated killings account for only a small fraction of Nigeria’s violence, and many so-called religious attacks are entangled with ethnic and resource-based conflicts. Understanding this nuance is essential. It enables Nigerians and the international community to support holistic solutions that strengthen security, promote dialogue and drive development, rather than being misled by simplistic framings of Muslims versus Christians. Nigeria’s armed forces, led by both Christians and Muslims, stand united in defence of all Nigerians against terror.

Attached is a bombed mosque in Sokoto

Righteousness2:
EXPOSED:
Official Hamas documents found in the Gaza Strip - now revealed for the first time - prove Hamas’s direct involvement in the funding and execution of the “Sumud” flotilla to Gaza

Hamas documents that were discovered in the Gaza Strip, and are being revealed for the first time, show a direct link between the flotilla leaders and the Hamas terrorist organization.

While Hamas in the Gaza Strip is responsible for what happens inside the Strip, Hamas Abroad is responsible for activity outside the Gaza Strip, with emphasis on the PCPA organization, which is subordinate to Hamas and serves as a wing of the movement.

The PCPA (Palestinian Conference for Palestinians Abroad) was established in 2018 and functions as Hamas’ representative body abroad, operating de facto as Hamas’ embassies. The organization operates under the pretense of civilian cover and is responsible, on behalf of Hamas, for mobilizing actions against Israel, including violent demonstrations, marches against Israel, and demonstration and provocation flotillas.

The first official Hamas document was found in the Gaza Strip - a letter from 2021 signed by Head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, directly and explicitly calling on the PCPA chairman for unity. In the letter, Haniyeh publicly endorses the PCPA organization. It should be noted that Israel designated the PCPA as a terrorist organization in 2021 due to it being a wing of Hamas.

The second official Hamas document is a list of PCPA operatives, some of whom are high-ranking well-known Hamas operatives. Among the names on the list are Zaher Birawi, who serves as Head of the PCPA’s Hamas sector in the UK, and who is known as a leader of the demonstration flotillas to the Gaza Strip over the past 15 years (number 19 in the document), and Saif Abu Kashk (number 25 in the document), an operative from the organization in Spain. This document was found in a Hamas outpost in the Gaza Strip and proves again their direct connection between the flotilla leaders and Hamas.

In addition to being a Hamas-aligned PCPA operative, Abu Kashk is the CEO of Cyber Neptune, a front company in Spain that owns dozens of the ships participating in the “Sumud” flotilla. Thus, these ships are secretly owned by Hamas.

AGAIN you are VERY WRONG, that is George Galloway, A Former british MP and he is not on the flotilla ship, get educated.

For nearly a quarter of a century, the story of September 11th, 2001, has been etched into the global consciousness as a tragic tale of "failure to connect the dots." We've been told a consistent narrative: that a group of determined terrorists exploited the seams in America's vast intelligence apparatus, and that while warning signs existed, no single agency had the complete picture. A new documentary, however, presents a chilling and meticulously argued counter-narrative, asserting that this official story isn't just incomplete—it's a deliberate and monumental lie. It claims the truth is far more sinister: 9/11 was not the result of incompetence, but the catastrophic fallout from a secret, high-stakes CIA operation to recruit Al-Qaeda terrorists on U.S. soil, an operation that spun violently out of control and was subsequently buried under a mountain of official obfuscation.

Deconstructing the Myth: From "Missed Clues" to Deliberate Deception
The official narrative hinges on the idea of an intelligence failure. The documentary argues this is the foundational lie. The story begins not in 2001, but years earlier. U.S. intelligence, specifically the CIA and NSA, had a critical listening post: the "Hada Home Switchboard" in Sanaa, Yemen. This was a primary communications hub for Osama bin Laden and his inner circle. According to the film, while the CIA and NSA had been monitoring this hub since 1996, the FBI—the nation's primary domestic law enforcement agency—was kept in the dark about its existence until after the 1998 embassy bombings.

This information gap was not an accident; it was policy. And it was through this exclusive access that the CIA, in late 1999, learned that two known Al-Qaeda operatives, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, were traveling to a terror summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The CIA tracked their every move. In a layover in Dubai, agency operatives covertly entered al-Mihdhar’s hotel room and photocopied his passport. What they found should have triggered alarms across the entire U.S. government: inside was a valid, multi-entry U.S. visa. In a detail that the documentary frames as deeply significant, that visa was issued from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where the CIA station chief at the time was none other than a future Director of the CIA, John Brennan.

The Smoking Gun: "You Are Not to Say Anything"
Here, the narrative shifts from passive intelligence gathering to active, intentional concealment. The documentary features the explosive firsthand testimony of Mark Rossini, a former FBI agent who was detailed to the CIA’s bin Laden unit, known as "Alec Station." Rossini recounts the moment he and another FBI agent, Doug Miller, saw the cable detailing al-Mihdhar's travel and his U.S. visa. Their training and instincts screamed that the FBI had to be notified immediately.

Miller drafted a Central Intelligence Report (CIR) to send to FBI headquarters. But it never went. Rossini describes standing over the desk of a CIA analyst, Michael Ann Casey, and demanding to know why the report was stalled. Her alleged response is the crux of the documentary's accusation. She looked at him and said, "No, it's not. It's not an FBI matter. It's a CIA matter. And when and if we want the FBI to know, we will tell them, and you are not to say anything."

This was not a missed email or a lost file. According to Rossini, this was a direct, explicit order to conceal the presence of a known terrorist with a U.S. visa from the very agency responsible for stopping him on American soil. The question, then, is why?

The "Grand Delusion": A Secret Recruitment Scheme
Why would the CIA actively hide two Al-Qaeda operatives from the FBI? The documentary presents a theory it calls the "grand delusion": the CIA was running a highly classified, off-the-books "false flag operation" to recruit al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi as double agents. The goal was to finally get a source inside bin Laden’s notoriously impenetrable inner circle. This claim is reportedly backed by a court filing from former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke, who told investigators this was his belief.

This theory reframes the entire event. The hijackers weren't ghosts who slipped through the cracks; they were allegedly assets in a high-risk gamble. The CIA, in this telling, rolled the dice, believing they could control these men, turn them, and use them. They kept the FBI at arm's length because informing them would have led to the hijackers' arrest, blowing the entire covert operation. It was a fantastical plan that ended in the murder of 3,000 people.

The Saudi Connection and the 9/11 Commission Cover-Up
When al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi landed in Los Angeles in January 2000, the trail didn't go cold—it was actively managed. They were met by a man named Omar al-Bayoumi, whom the FBI has identified as a Saudi intelligence operative. Al-Bayoumi took the two unskilled men under his wing, finding them an apartment in San Diego, co-signing their lease, paying their first month's rent, and introducing them into a network of radical Muslims.

The documentary argues that al-Bayoumi was not a rogue actor but was working as a proxy for the CIA. Since the CIA is forbidden from operating domestically, they allegedly used Saudi intelligence as a "workaround," giving them operational capability and, crucially, plausible deniability. If the operation went sideways, the blame could be shifted to the Saudis.

This is the secret the documentary claims the 9/11 Commission was designed to protect. The film labels the commission's final report a "cover-up" and a "lie." It accuses the commission's executive director, Philip Zelikow, of colluding with the Bush White House to suppress the truth. It alleges that Zelikow made a secret agreement to allow the White House to screen documents before investigators could see them, limited access to key witnesses, and even tried to remove the most damning details of the Saudi collaboration from the final report, burying what remained in footnotes.

The truth is out there, the documentary concludes, but it has been systematically hidden. It argues that the story of 9/11 is not one of failure, but of a profound and criminal betrayal of public trust. The call to action is clear: nearly 25 years later, it is time for a new, truly independent investigation, one that is not afraid to follow the evidence, no matter how high up it leads.

picture 1: 9/11
Picture2: Indian plane crash

Video1:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa6M7n_swNw?si=be40wXwGq25-hppF
video2:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8egrUkjGJ0?si=iokRkwoMeaEJ2BWg

Righteousness2:
Very useless group.
With just 30 usd you can carry a tag of the so called international rubbish genocide.

Loads of Antisemites with their 30 usd tag.

The same TERRORISTS flotilla people who where Hamas affiliated are the same so called members

All haters of GOD'S chosen people and Nation

your statement that "The same TERRORISTS flotilla people who where Hamas affiliated are the same so called members" is very wrong, the genocide scholars are not the same as those on the Freedom flotilla mission, kindly make your findings in case you find yourself in a doubtful situation like this.

IAGS
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GENOCIDE SCHOLARS
IAGS Resolution on the Situation in Gaza

Recognising that, since the horrific Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023, which itself constitutes international crimes, the government of Israel has engaged in systematic and widespread crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, including indiscriminate and deliberate attacks against the civilians and civilian infrastructure (hospitals, homes, commercial buildings, etc.) of Gaza, which, according to official UN estimates, at the date of this resolution, has killed more than 59,000 adults and children in Gaza;

Recognising that these crimes are estimated to have left many thousands of people buried under the rubble or otherwise inaccessible, and most probably dead;

Recognising that this bombing and other violence is estimated to have injured more than 143,000 people, with many maimed;

Recognising that the actions of the Israeli government against Palestinians have included torture, arbitrary detention, and sexual and reproductive violence; deliberate attacks on medical professionals, humanitarian aid workers and journalists; and the deliberate deprivation of food, water, medicine, and electricity essential to the survival of the population;



Recognising that Israel has forcibly displaced nearly all of the 2.3 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip multiple times, and demolished more than 90 percent of the housing infrastructure in the territory;

Recognising that the consequences of these crimes have included destroying entire families and multiple generations of Palestinians;

Recognising that Israel has destroyed schools, universities, libraries, museums, and archives, all of them essential to the continued existence of Palestinian collective well-being and identity;

Recognising that Israel has killed or injured more than 50,000 children and that this destruction of a substantial part of a group constitutes genocide, as emphasized in a joint declaration of intervention in the International Court of Justice case of The Gambia v Myanmar by six countries—Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—which states "that children form a substantial part of the groups protected by the Genocide Convention, and that the targeting of children provides an indication of the intention to destroy a group as such, at least in part. Children are essential to the survival of any group as such, since the physical destruction of the group is assured where it is unable to regenerate itself.";


Page 2
Recognising that Israeli governmental leaders, war cabinet ministers, and senior army officers have made explicit statements of "intent to destroy", characterizing Palestinians in Gaza as a whole as enemies and "human animals" and stating the intention of inflicting "maximum damage" on Gaza, "flattening Gaza," and turning Gaza into "hell";

Recognising that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has endorsed the current US President's plan to forcibly expel all Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, with no right of return, in what Navi Pillay, head of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, has said amounts to ethnic cleansing;

Recognising that the deliberate destruction of agricultural fields, food warehouses, and bakeries and other violence that prevents food production, in conjunction with denial and restriction of humanitarian aid, indicate the intentional infliction of unlivable conditions resulting in starvation of Palestinians in Gaza:

Acknowledging that, on 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant of Israel, in the court's ongoing investigation opened on 3 March 2021, of crimes committed on Palestinian territory since 13 June 2014, charging them with crimes identified in the Rome Statute, in the Gaza Strip from at least 8 October 2023, including the starvation of civilians, intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population, murder, and persecution;

Whereas Israel's actions in response to the October 7 attack and subsequent holding of hostages have not only been directed against the Hamas group responsible for these, but have also targeted the entire Gazan population;

Acknowledging that the International Court of Justice found in three provisional measures order in the case of South Africa v. Israel January, March, and May 2024 that it is plausible that Israel is committing genocide in its attack in Gaza and ordered Israel to take all measures within its power to prevent and punish the direct and public incitement of genocide and to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in Gaza;

Acknowledging that leading global international law organizations and UN bodies, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Forensic Architecture, DAWN, B'Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights, and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, have conducted extensive investigations and issued reports concluding that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza;

Acknowledging that a number of Israeli, Palestinian, Jewish, and other scholarly experts working in Holocaust and Genocide Studies and in International Law have concluded that Israeli governmental and military actions constitute genocide;

Acknowledging that international civil society has a responsibility to prevent genocide by encouraging and assisting states to fulfil their obligations under the Genocide Convention to prevent, suppress, and punish genocide;

Page 3
Acknowledging that putative security measures against members of a group are often pretext for mass killing and genocide as it has become in this case;

Therefore, the International Association of Genocide Scholars:

Declares that Israel's policies and actions in Gaza meet the legal definition of genocide in Article II of the United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948);

Declares that Israel's policies and actions in Gaza constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

Calls upon the government of Israel to immediately cease all acts that constitute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity against Palestinians in Gaza, including deliberate attacks against and killing of civilians including children; starvation; deprivation of humanitarian aid, water, fuel, and other items essential to the survival of the population; sexual and reproductive violence; and forced displacement of the population;



Calls upon the government of Israel to comply with the Provisional Measures orders of the International Court of Justice;

Calls upon the state parties of the International Criminal Court to comply with their obligations, cooperate with the Court, and surrender any individual subject to an arrest warrant;

Calls upon all states to actively pursue policies to ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including under the Genocide Convention, the Arms Trade Treaty and international humanitarian law, with regards to Israel and Palestine; and


Calls upon the government of Israel and all other United Nations members to support a process of repair and transitional justice that will afford democracy, freedom, dignity, and security for all people of Gaza.

Current as of 28 July 2025

Resolution passed 31 August 2025


Source: https://genocidescholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/IAGS-Resolution-on-Gaza-FINAL.pdf

RAMALLAH, West Bank, July 19 (Reuters) - U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee called on Saturday for the perpetrators of an attack on a Palestinian church in the occupied West Bank blamed on Israeli settlers to be prosecuted, calling it an "act of terror".
Huckabee said he had visited the Christian town of Taybeh, where clerics said Israeli settlers had started a fire near a cemetery and a 5th-century church on July 8.

"It is an act of terror, and it is a crime," Huckabee said in a statement, "Those who carry out acts of terror and violence in Taybeh – or anywhere – (should) be found and be prosecuted. Not just reprimanded, that’s not enough."

Israel's government has not commented on the incident, but has previously denounced such acts.
On Tuesday, Huckabee said he had asked Israel to "aggressively investigate" the killing of a Palestinian American beaten by settlers in the West Bank, similarly describing it as a "criminal and terrorist act".
Huckabee is a staunch supporter of Israeli settlements and his comments are a rare and pointed public intervention by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.
Trump in January rescinded sanctions imposed by the former Biden administration on Israeli settler groups and individuals accused of being involved in violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.

Settler attacks on Palestinians and Palestinian attacks on Israelis in the West Bank have risen since the start of Israel's war on the Hamas militant group in Gaza in October 2023, though violence has long simmered there.
The United Nations' highest court said last year that Israel's settlements in territories it captured in the 1967 Middle East war, including the West Bank, were illegal.
Israel disputes this, citing biblical and historical ties to the land as well as security needs.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has demanded the complete demilitarisation of much of southern Syria.

It is an announcement that could make conflict between Israel and the new leadership in Syria, after the toppling of President Bashar al-Assad, more likely.

In a speech to Israeli military cadets on Sunday, Netanyahu said that Israel would not allow the forces of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) - the Islamist group that led the overthrow of Assad - nor the new Syrian army that is being formed to "enter the area south of Damascus".

"We demand the complete demilitarisation of southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Deraa and Suweida from the forces of the new regime," he added. "Likewise, we will not tolerate any threat to the Druze community in southern Syria."

He also said that Israeli forces would remain indefinitely inside the Syrian territory that they have seized since Assad's fall last December - which would be a shift in Israeli strategy.

Until now, Israel had described its move into a UN-monitored demilitarised buffer zone in the Golan Heights as a temporary measure to ensure the security of Israelis on the other side.

The rationale appeared to be to prevent extremist groups from moving down to the Golan in the power vacuum.

But with his latest comments, Netanyahu has made it clear that he believes that the new authorities in Syria - with their background in jihadism - could represent a similar danger.

Israel seized most of the Golan from Syria during the 1967 Middle East war and later annexed. The move was not recognised internationally, although the US did so in 2019.


Getty Images Syrians at Khan Arnabeh junction, in the southern Syrian province of Quneitra, protest against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's demand for the demilitarization of much of southern Syria (24 February 2025)Getty Images
Syrian protested against Netanyahu's demand on Monday in Quneitra province
Syria's new interim President, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, has tried to reassure Israel that he does not want conflict and that he is ready to uphold the long-standing disengagement agreement between the two countries concluded after another war in 1973.

He has also stressed that he will not allow Syria to be used as a base for attacks against Israel.

But Sharaa has also called on Israel to withdraw from the buffer zone it has taken, as he tries to assert sovereignty across the whole of Syria's fractured landscape.

Clearly, Netanyahu does not trust these assurances.

Like much of the international community, the Israeli prime minister is waiting to see if Sharaa makes good on his moderate, emollient stance in action as well as words.

From the perspective of the new Syrian leadership, freeing the country from the influence of all the foreign powers that jockeyed for position during the long years of civil war is seen as vital to ensuring a more positive future for the country and a definitive break with the past.

Some foreign players, such as Iran and Russia, have seen for now at least the curtailment of the overweening influence they once had.

Under President Donald Trump, the US might also further disengage from Syria - a role which has helped underpin Kurdish-led forces in the north-east of the country.

There has, though, been growing influence from Turkey - which provided essential support for HTS in its lightning campaign against Assad.

How big a part it chooses to play could be a determining factor in how Syria develops in the post-Assad era.

But Israel may present a more immediate challenge to the independence of Syria's new leadership.

To have Israeli troops increasingly infringing on the country's territory - as well as carrying out numerous strikes on targets associated with what's left of Assad's military arsenal - does not fit with the vision of a re-unified, sovereign state that Sharaa is trying to convince Syrians both inside and outside the country that his leadership can provide.

Netanyahu's move to forbid Syrian forces from operating freely within the country's borders may be a step too far for the new order in Damascus to stomach, however non-confrontational an image it is trying to maintain.

Israel’s defence minister has reaffirmed the country’s intention to occupy a swath of Syrian territory beyond Israel’s contested northern borders for an “unlimited amount of time” during a visit to the strategic Mount Hermon.

“The IDF is prepared to stay in Syria for an unlimited amount of time. We will hold the security area in Hermon and make sure that all the security zone in southern Syria is demilitarised and clear of weapons and threats,” Israel Katz said on a visit to the peak on Wednesday.

After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December, Israeli forces moved to control a 400 sq km demilitarised buffer zone in Syrian territory. The zone, which lies between Syria and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, was created by the UN after the 1973 Yom Kippur war, or Ramadan war as it is known in Arabic. A UN force of about 1,100 troops has patrolled the area since then.

Assad was ousted by a coalition of rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has its origins in extremist Islamist organisations including both al-Qaida and the Islamic State.

The new president of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, says he severed ties with extremist groups years ago and has promised a representative government and religious tolerance.

However Israel officials believe the new Syrian regime and other armed groups active in the country remain a potential threat.

Katz said the deployment on Mount Hermon was necessary to defend Israeli communities in northern Israel and on its contested borders.

“Every morning when [al-Sharaa] opens his eyes at the presidential palace in Damascus, he will see the IDF watching him from the peak of the Hermon, and remember that we are here and in the entire security area of southern Syria, to protect the Golan and Galilee residents against any of his threats and those of his jihadist friends,” Katz told reporters who accompanied him, according to the Times of Israel.

Israel also wants to disrupt Iran’s ability to smuggle weapons through Syria to the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.

People watch Israeli troops and an armoured vehicle near a fence
Fear and uncertainty in Golan Heights as Israeli troops drive deeper into Syria
Read more
The Israeli incursion into Syria in December sparked widespread international condemnation, with critics accusing Israel of exploiting the fall of the Assad regime for a land grab. Israel still controls the Golan Heights that it captured from Syria during the six-day war (1967) and later annexed – a move not recognised by most of the international community.

The Times of Israel reported that the Israel Defence Force (IDF) has established nine military posts inside Syrian territory, including two on the 2,800m summit of Mount Hermon. Some are in newly fortified former Syrian army positions.


In a speech last month, Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said he wanted “the complete demilitarisation of southern Syria”.

Israeli warplanes have launched hundreds of strikes since the fall of Assad to destroy military equipment left by the former regime, and officials have described an extensive new zone stretching across much of southwestern Syria as territory that Israel will ensure is “demilitarised”. A new wave of attacks struck targets in southern Syria earlier this week.

Israel had also offered protection to Syria’s Druze minority, many of whom live close to Israel’s borders. There is also a substantial Druze population within Israel.

Some analysts have warned that Israel risks becoming mired in a complex conflict in Syria, possibly one recalling the country’s costly, long-term occupation of southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000.

Col (ret) Dr Jacques Neriah, an Israeli analyst, said: “I hope that we don’t have in mind an idea like we had in Lebanon. We were drowning in the Lebanese swamp for more than 20 years. Let’s hope we won’t be drowning in the Syrian swamp ... We said our intentions were only temporary and now we hear [something] different.”

Al-Sharaa has repeatedly said he will not allow Syria to be used as a base for attacks on Israel.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a monitoring group, said on Wednesday that a least 1,383 civilians had been killed in “executions by security forces and allied groups” after violence broke out last week in the coastal heartland of the Alawite minority, to which toppled president Bashar al-Assad belongs.