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Keep it up, Corruption must be totally destroyed. vedaxcool: |
enemies of Nigeria are already angry, sore losers |
He is simply a criminal not a herdsmen or was he arrested with his herd of cattle? He is a kidnapper of Fulani extraction simple. There is a network of criminals who kidnap people stretching from the North to the south. Our current IG is out of his depth in this |
The sad clowns who claim Trump is Putin puppet have change gear. Let's sit back and watch a puppet fights it's master. |
Empiree:Defender of murderer animal, Assad, accept my condolences on the departure of truth and Candie from your life. I wonder how you sleep at night knowing you side a evil beast! |
[s] lastmessenger:[/s] Good, hope you are done being dishonest and divisive. |
[s] dajoaneke:[/s] Smh some words made in past has come back and bite him and it represents witch hunt to you. |
Shehu Sani has been hailed by people gullible enough to fall for his antics, where he accuses unnamed governors of doing exactly what he advised Jonathan to do, page up violent non state actors to secure peace.
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[s] SalamRushdie:[/s] Just as GEJ was also complicit each time so called herdsmen attacked right? And besides was he also in support of the herdsmen agenda when he became their grand patron? Like I said take a comprehension class and stop humiliating yourself!
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[s] lastmessenger:[/s] Why did you leave out Zamfara aren't people being killed there as well? |
Simple reseach will prove that PMB spoke the truth about Libya buy shameless thief thief PDP won't have commonsense vedaxcool: |
[s] lastmessenger:[/s] Why did you leave out Zamfara? Liars everywhere |
[s] IsmP:[/s] Even an entire party suffers comprehension and basic sense, how can we expect it's supporters to fair well |
[s] SalamRushdie:[/s] Comprehension is still being thought in in Primary school I suggest you take a class. |
SternProphet:Gbam, this article is actually 5 years old, wailing zombies when countered come up with a new excuse. |
Fair Observer NAVIGATE Helios Global 5 years ago Libya: Weapons Proliferation and Regional Stability in the Sahel Libyan weapons have further militarized movements in Africa. The 2011 fall of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi and the subsequent breakdown in order in Libya, has been a major contributor to the instability plaguing large swaths of the Sahel region and Northwest Africa. In particular, the flow of weapons, such as a multitude of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and explosives, from liberated Libyan military stockpiles into the surrounding countries has galvanized existing political opposition currents, separatist movements, and transnational militant groups. Much of the concern regarding the impact of weapons proliferation out of Libya emphasizes the potential threat of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) falling into the hands of radical Islamist militant groups, such as al-Qaeda or one of its regional or international affiliates. In light of the persistent threat of international terrorism as it relates to commercial air travel, such concerns remain valid. Yet it has been the residual impact of the proliferation of SALW and explosives on regional stability and security, that has posed the most immediate threats to what is an already precarious political and security environment. Mali, which has experienced severe unrest since January 2012 – including ethnic Tuareg-led insurrections, radical Islamist insurgency, and a military-led coup d’état – has been the most dramatic example of the region’s post-Qaddafi volatility; Chad and Niger have also been forced to deal with fallout from the Libyan revolt. Algeria has experienced a noticeable uptick of violence, including the January 2013 attack against the Tigantourine natural gas facility in Amenas in eastern Algeria along the Algerian-Libyan border. The attack at Amenas was orchestrated by militants associated with an offshoot of al-Qaeda’s North African affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), known as al-Mulathameen (The Masked Ones). Nigeria believes that radical Islamist militants affiliated with Boko Haram have also been emboldened by their access to Libyan arms. While lying outside of the geographic space that is the subject of this analysis, the increase in violence in Egypt’s Sinai region is also being partially attributed to the influx of smuggled Libyan arms into Egyptian territory. To date, the proliferation of Libyan weapons has further militarized numerous existing political opposition and radical movements and afforded opportunities for other violent and irregular actors to pursue their own objectives. Qaddafi’s fall was followed by a troubled political transition that remains marred by violence between rival factions and militias, resulting in a power vacuum in one of the region’s most militarized states. As Libya struggles to consolidate its domestic political institutions and establish some semblance of law and order, SALW and explosives proliferation stemming from within its borders will continue unabated. Consequently, the countries lying within the Sahel and Northwest Africa will continue to have their security undermined by developments in Libya. Libyan Weapons: Galvanizing Violence Despite the concerns surrounding the disposition of Libya’s arsenal of MANPADS, there is no concrete evidence that any militants present in the region – radical Islamist or otherwise – have procured the weapons systems. Nevertheless, the potential threats associated with MANPADS continue to attract much of the attention in regards to proliferation. These worries were exacerbated by documents discovered in Libya in September 2011, indicating that Russia had provided Qaddafi with several hundred advanced – and unaccounted for – SA-24 “Grinch” surface-to-air missiles. In March 2011, Chad’s President Idriss Deby claimed that Libyan MANPADS had entered Chad and Niger. Malian officials echoed Deby’s claims. A number of unconfirmed reports circulated in regional media outlets claimed that various North African regional militant groups had acquired MANPADS in 2012 and 2013. Algerian officials reported in February 2013 that they confiscated numerous Russian surface-to-air missile systems in Algeria’s southern regions. But it is the proliferation of more prosaic weapons systems – essentially a diverse array of SALW and explosives – that have most actively contributed to the recent wave of unrest and instability in the Sahel and Northwest Africa. An assortment of Libyan weapons started entering neighboring countries soon after the outbreak of civil war in Libya. In early 2011, assault rifles, ammunition, mortars, mines, and plastic explosives began crossing Libya’s borders into Algeria, Egypt, Niger, and Mali. In April 2011, regional media reports claimed that pickup trucks carrying arms, ammunition, and explosives from eastern Libya had crossed into Mali via Chad and Niger. Since 2011, concerned officials have repeatedly claimed that Libyan weapons and stockpiles of plastic explosives are being distributed to militants in Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, and elsewhere. Established organized criminal and illicit trafficking networks traversing the Sahel’s ancient East-West trade routes, and associated networks that link the north to the south, are facilitating this trend. The porous borders throughout the territories in question also help ensure that the relative free flow of illicit trade continues unimpeded. The increasing availability of arms has also provided aspiring militants with the opportunity to establish their own fringe factions. Weapons traffickers are also benefiting from the additional sources of supply and increasingly diverse selections of arms. Mali, Chad, and Niger This is most evident in Mali. The political leadership in Bamako has long disenfranchised Mali’s Tuaregs, a nomadic population that is related to the indigenous Berber peoples of North Africa and the Sahel region. Qaddafi employed thousands of Tuareg mercenaries from Mail, Niger, and Chad to bolster the Libyan military while fortifying his own power base within the Libyan security apparatus. Following the collapse of his regime, the repatriation of these generally well trained, heavily armed, often battle hardened, and politicized Tuaregs remains a major challenge. In January 2012, a separatist Tuareg rebellion broke out in northern Mali. In March 2012, Malian military officers launched a coup against the government of President Amadou Toumani, in response to what they claimed was the mismanagement of the military with the rebellion. By April 2012, Tuareg rebels, allied with a variety of Islamist militants, had gained control of most of northern Mali, prompting a joint French-Malian military campaign to recapture the north in January 2013. Despite French and Malian efforts, northern Mali remains a militant stronghold. Tuareg separatist groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), and the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) exist alongside – and increasingly clash with – regional Islamist extremist groups such as AQIM, the AQIM-affiliated Movement of Jihad and Oneness in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar al-Dine (AAD), among others. For instance, MIA is a splinter group of AAD. The MIA broke from AAD in January 2013 and subsequently renounced its tactics and ties to AQIM. Similarly, MAA was formed as a secular alternative to the more Islamist-oriented MNLA. These groups – all of whom have benefitted from the influx of weapons from liberated Libyan caches – have created an atmosphere of ongoing violence in Mali, complicating the region’s prospects for stability. The specter of anti-government violence also haunts Chad. The Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) threatened in March to renew its militant campaign against the Deby regime despite having agreed to lay down its arms in 2010. There has been speculation that arms from Libya have encouraged the UFR’s saber rattling, and Deby – who has survived multiple coups, including an alleged attempt by two generals and two legislators to take over the country this past May – has accused Libya of harboring UFR rebels. Niger also faces an uncertain future in the wake of the Libyan collapse. In May, MUJAO militants launched a suicide bombing – the first attack of its kind in Niger – against a Nigerien army base and French uranium mine operated by Areva in northern Niger. The group claimed that the operation was designed to punish Niamey for deploying a contingent of peacekeepers to Mali. The attacks, which Niger claimed were launched from Libya, raised concerns in both Niger and Europe about the safety of Niger’s uranium deposits; France, which derives the majority of its electricity from nuclear power, receives about 40 percent of its uranium from Niger. Niger is also reported to possess significant oil deposits, and has a history of rebel-led violence directed at its uranium and oil sector. Since 2007, the Tuareg-based Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) has threatened to attack oil and uranium operations in the country, unless Niamey provides the MNJ with a greater share of national energy revenues. MNJ has kidnapped Chinese and French workers at oil and uranium facilities, and many fear that the instability in Libya will provide the MNJ with additional resources and an increased operational capacity. Organized Crime and Regional Smuggling Networks As the number of militant groups in the region grows, the demand for weapons increases, bolstering the illicit trade networks that have existed alongside legitimate trade relationships in the region for years. The Sahel and Northwest Africa are focal points of arms trafficking since the 1990s, and since the early 2000s, narcotics trafficking – especially of cocaine and cannabis resin – has been on the rise. The region in question is widely touted as a global hub of narcotics trafficking that encompasses links to Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Europe. Organized criminal networks, which often incorporate networks of underpaid and corrupt government officials and regional security personnel, have exploited the growing instability to expand their operations, assisted by the flood of Libyan weapons into the region. Risks The current Tuareg separatist and radical Islamist-led violence in the Sahel and Northwest Africa is unlikely to recede in the near-term. The desperate poverty of the region, where drought and expanding desertification have ravaged the agrarian economy and frequent kidnappings have decimated the foreign tourist trade, provides few legitimate and viable employment opportunities to Tuareg mercenaries returning from years of service – and employment – in Libya. These populations have been ignored and marginalized by their governments for decades, resulting in extreme resentment and a steady process of politicization. Qaddafi was in power for over 40 years, and his absence is being felt on many levels. Despite his government’s isolation from the larger Arab and Western worlds, the former Libyan army colonel actively cultivated close ties with his African neighbors to the south, using Libya’s considerable oil wealth to promote infrastructure development projects, broker peace deals, and provide employment to impoverished and disenfranchised minority groups. Libya’s new provisional government is unlikely – and largely unable – to continue Qaddafi’s policies towards Libya’s African neighbors, policies on which many of those neighbors had come to depend economically, politically, and socially. This, combined with the influx of Libyan SALW and explosives into the region and the subsequent strengthening of numerous anti-government and separatist militant groups, clouds the security, political, and economic outlook for the Sahel and Northwest Africa. *[This article, originally published with the title, "Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation from Libya Threatens Stability in the Sahel and Northwest Africa," has been reproduced with the permission of Helios Global, Inc. Copyright 2013 Helios Global, Inc.] The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. Image: Copyright © Shutterstock. All Rights Reserved https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/weapons-proliferation-libya-threatens-stability-sahel-northwest-africa/amp/?__twitter_impression=true |
Amoto94:haven't gotten the direct source still searching for it:https://istighfar./2007/07/08/the-stone-of-justice/ |
When the Copt arrived back in Egypt he went to Amr straight away and gave him the stone saying that it was from the Sweeper of the Prophet’s Mosque in Madinah. No sooner had Amr seen the lines on the stone except that his face went pale in fright. Amr began to apologise profusely to the Copt and immediately ordered that the part of the mosque built over the Copt’s house must be rebuilt exactly as and where it was. Puzzled by this sudden change of heart in the Governor, the Copt asked Amr what the significance was of a simple stone with two lines on it. Amr thus related to him the story behind The Stone of Justice. During their early adulthood in Makkah before the advent of the Prophet , Umar bin Al Khattab and Amr bin Al-Aas were the best of friends. They were also business partners, trading in fine Arabian horses. Once they received an order for a significant quantity of horses from King Numan, the Arab King of the Al-Mundhir Governate which, being under the rule of the Persian Empire was a buffer region between Arabia and Persia (represented today by parts of modern-day Iraq). King Numan made a down payment to Umar and Amr, who promptly set about finding and training horses to meet the King’s requirements. When the horses were ready, the two friends set off to Al-Mundhir to deliver them to their buyer, King Numan. Whilst they were travelling through the desert in Al-Mundhir, they came across a royal entourage. It turned out to belong to a Persian prince, a son of the Emperor Kisra, who had come on a hunting expedition to Al-Mundhir. The Prince, upon sighting the fine Arabian horses, asked to see their owners. He offered to buy the horses from the two friends but was told by them that they had already been sold to a buyer, but that he could place a fresh order with them if he wanted to. The Prince doubled and trebled his offer but Umar and Amr refused to go back on their contract with King Numan, so they politely declined the Prince’s offers. After much haggling the pompous Prince grew impatient and ordered his guards to seize (without payment) the horses from the two men and to send them away. Distraught, Umar and Amr were unsure of what to do. Local tribesmen advised them to travel to the capital of the Persian Empire itself and speak to the Emperor, Kisra, as he was a just man and no one was wronged in his empire. The two friends thus journeyed into Persia and, weary and dishevelled, eventually reached Kisra’s court. They complained to him that their horses had been stolen by a man who claimed to be a son of the Emperor. Kisra listened to them intently and then asked the two men to return to him the following day whilst he looked into the matter. He ordered his palace courtiers to arrange hospitality for the two men, as guests of the Emperor. The following day Umar and Amr went to Kisra and he came down to them from his throne, asking the two to accompany him. He led them to a courtyard where, lo and behold, they saw their stolen horses. Kisra asked them to confirm if these were their horses that the Prince had seized from them and if so, that they should check that they were okay. Umar and Amr carefully checked each horse and informed Kisra that everything was just fine. Kisra then profusely apologised to the two for what had happened and he asked them if he could be of any further assistance to them. They told him that they were satisfied now and would like to continue on their journey. Kisra ordered his staff to give the men some provisions and he guaranteed them safe passage until they left the precincts of his territory. Just before they left, Kisra asked the two to leave the palace grounds from their two different gates: the Eastern Gate and the Western Gate. Umar bin Al Khattab left via the Eastern Gate and, to his astonishment, he saw hanging there half of the body of the Persian Prince, son of Kisra, as if he had been sawn in two. When he rejoined Amr, Amr told him that he had seen the other half of the Prince’s corpse hanging from the Western Gate. Kisra was not prepared to let a spoilt son of his damage his widespread reputation as the beacon of justice in the East. He not only wanted justice to be done, but he wanted that justice must be seen to be done. Having related this story to the Copt, Amr bin Al Aas , by now Governor of Egypt, told the Copt that the man sweeping the Sacred Mosque of the Prophet was none other than the Caliph himself: Umar bin Al Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him. And what Amr understood from the two lines scratched on the stone was that if he did not return the house to the Copt then Umar would cut him not in two halves like the Persian prince was, but into four quarters. Since Amr knew that whenever Umar said something he meant it, he took no chances and ordered the Copt’s house to be rebuilt, albeit at the expense of destroying part of the newly built mosque. No sooner had the Copt seen with his own eyes the concept of justice amongst the Muslims that he accepted Islam immediately and gave his consent for the mosque grounds to remain on the same spot where his house used to be. O Umar! If only you would return, To spread justice so the world would learn, That even a stone of your justice, Would rescue it from this fathomless abyss. |
During the caliphate of Umar bin Al-Khattab (radiallahu ‘anh), Amr bin Al-Aas (radiallahu ‘anh) was appointed the Governor of Egypt. One of Amr’s first projects was to expand the main mosque of Cairo, which was at the time surrounded by the dwellings of ordinary Egyptians. Amr’s workers proceeded to buy the houses of the Egyptians so that they could be destroyed to pave the way for the expansion. All the people agreed to sell their houses except one Coptic Christian man. He refused to give up his home as it was of sentimental value to him. The matter reached all the way to Amr, so he asked to see the Copt. Amr offered the Copt double, triple and quadruple the value of his house but the Copt refused to sell it whatever the price. After much persuasion the Copt refused to budge so Amr became angry and ordered the Copt’s house to be destroyed by force and for him to be offered to take or leave its price. The Copt was distraught and felt that he had been wronged by this new Muslim Governor of Egypt. Unsure who to seek help from he was eventually advised: “Go to Madinah and speak to the Caliph, Umar bin Al Khattab, for no man is wronged in his lands.” So the Copt decided to travel to Madinah to complain to the Caliph about how he had been unjustly treated by one of his governors. When he arrived in Madinah and asked to see the Caliph he was told, “Go to the Sacred Mosque of the Prophet (salallahu ‘alayhe wasalam) and there you will find a man sweeping the floor. Speak to him.” The Copt thus went to the Sacred Mosque hoping that its sweeper would be able to direct him to the Caliph. When the Copt entered the Sacred Mosque, he found this man sweeping its floor so the Copt asked him if he could help him get to the Caliph. The Sweeper asked him, “And what business do you have to speak to the Caliph about?” The Copt replied, “I have been wronged by one of his governors so the people asked me to complain to the Caliph as he is a just man and no one is wronged in his lands,” and he related to the Sweeper the story of what had happened to his house in Cairo. Having listened attentively to the Copt’s story, the Sweeper picked up a stone and with another stone he scratched two lines on it, one crossing the other at right angles. He gave the stone containing the lines to the Copt and told him to give it to the Governor of Egypt with the words, “This stone is from the Sweeper of the Sacred Mosque of Allah’s Messenger .” The Copt thought that the Sweeper was mocking him but the Sweeper reassured him to do as he said and his problem would be resolved. The Sweeper made no mention of the Caliph. The Copt thus returned to Egypt with the stone given to him by the Sweeper of the Sacred Mosque of Allah’s Messenger . |
Lol so each time there was a change in governance the governors handed over the militia criminals to their successor? Only Jonathan smelly feet kissers will believe this. |
Demmzy15:See the 2 demented liars working hard to absolve their master, Assad from his obvious crimes. A man that can destroyed entire cities and killed 100s of 1000s would find it impossible to gas people resisting his rule. |
Mist100:It is the harsh truth |
Godbless yarimo |
Demmzy15:It is just funny how he employ lies, deciet and poorly reasoned articles as a basis to sustain Assad in power, when he accuses people without evidence it is deduction when you accuse people based on evidence available he will asked you did you verify it. There is no helping some people who decide to traffic lies. |
As usual, they only have insults not reason to share |
[s] gustav25:[/s] Every decent Nigerian community views rain as a blessing not a sadness. |
Philistine:They act as if Jonathan handed PMB a Nigeria in pristine state.
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Sai Baba Sai Osinbanjo, honest and decent patriots are with you. They gave you a horrible situation yet you did your best in the most difficult times to put us back in motion, they prefer the old ways of stealing and senseless looting but we prefer a new path of probity and accountability.
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casualobserver1:We are too busy fighting ourselves in this country to realize the sword of Damocles hagging above our heads. |
Sadly the Assad regime is using chemical weapons repeatedly even in Idlib
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