https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bO0rnLsTK4c

MRAPS, MRAPS, MRAPS. Just as the army of Chad is known as Toyota Army, at this point I think the Nigerian Army will be regarded as MRAP Army.

Exnavyboy62:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bO0rnLsTK4c

MRAPS, MRAPS, MRAPS. Just as the army of Chad is known as Toyota Army, at this point I think the Nigerian Army will be regarded as MRAP Army.

maybe compared to Chad it has a lot of MRAPS but there are several African countries with a lot more MRAPS.

Here comes the Oryx

SANDF "medic"

EACRF Ugandan contingent forces M23 from DR Congo’s Rutshuru

The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) contingent in the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) dislodged M23 rebel group elements from strategic positions in Kiwanja, part of Rutshuru territory in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Sequential deployment of Uganda contingent troops and M23 withdrawal is in compliance with an extraordinary summit decision of the East African Community (EAC) heads of state in February and the East African Chief of Defence Forces meeting the same month. The summit directed serial withdrawal and deployment of the EACRF and immediate positioning of troops in areas vacated by the M23.

UPDF contingent commander Colonel Michael Hyeroba is reported in a statement as saying the arrival and subsequent occupation by Ugandan troops “yielded confidence in civilians who initially fled after being told of an imminent war between the UPDF and the M23”. He told locals to return home and continue with “normal life” as the EACRF was “a neutral force intent on securing a peaceful and stable environment for future stability”.

The UPDF statement notes in closing: “All positions occupied by the UPDF in Bunagana- [a town in Rutshuru territory of North Kivu] are secured and the situation is calm with no violence as the civil populace is already enjoying the dividends of peace brought by the Uganda contingent”.

https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/eacrf-ugandan-contingent-forces-m23-from-dr-congos-rutshuru/

ISWAP’s use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence

Deploying drones and other technology might change the conflict dynamics, giving violent extremists the upper hand.

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) could be close to using delivery drones for attacks in the Lake Chad Basin. Weaponising and adapting unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is a new trend in the group’s operational strategy, and could worsen the conflict.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research shows that ISWAP is already trialling delivery drones to carry improvised explosive devices. This includes assessing the weight that can be carried, how far they can go and how long they stay in the air. The threat goes beyond military targets and may impact humanitarian service delivery.

Ongoing operations by Nigeria’s military and clashes with Boko Haram faction, Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), have inflicted heavy losses on ISWAP and significantly reduced its space to operate. And successful intelligence-driven strikes resulting in arrests of ISWAP members outside the north-east are preventing the group from expanding. These setbacks may be forcing ISWAP to adapt its strategy, as it has done before.

So far, ISWAP’s use of drones has been limited to propaganda, surveillance and communication. ISS research, including analysis of publicly available propaganda materials and interviews with former combatants and associates, reveals an elaborate use of communication technology (see Chart 1). This includes satellite and android phones, drones, social media (Telegram and WhatsApp), high-speed printers, laptops, high-definition digital cameras, Wi-Fi, clip-on microphones, walkie-talkies, and data compression and archiving software.



All these tools are used by the media team headed by Abba Yusuf (Abu Rumaisa), son of late Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf. The team’s primary function is to showcase ISWAP as a successful jihadist group. That propaganda will encourage recruitment and present a positive image that cements its position as the top Islamic State affiliate globally. The media department also handles relations with other violent extremist groups, including Islamic State.

Former ISWAP members, including from the media unit, told ISS how the department functions. Staff are recruited from within the group and taught the basics of operating the equipment, mostly cameras. They accompany fighters, and wait at a distance to be invited to take photos and videos, usually when things go ISWAP’s way.

The raw footage and pictures are sent to Islamic State, which produces the propaganda material. The group shares the content with ISWAP’s media team, which distributes it through a private and members-only Telegram account, Nashir News Agency (see Chart 2).

ISWAP relies heavily on high-speed satellite internet to communicate with Islamic State and other groups. Sources told ISS that ISWAP used Thuraya Wi-Fi and spent about US$6 000 monthly on data. They said Lagos was the main supply source but that ISWAP encountered a problem with the supply, forcing it to switch to Chad. Although Thuraya satellite phones and internet services are illegal in Chad, they are used in secret.

A particular Thuraya model stands out as a possible device used by ISWAP. It is available in Nigeria but mainly in Lagos. The Thuraya XT-Hotspot is marketed as the ‘world’s fastest Wi-Fi via satellite for communication needs beyond GSM coverage … for quick and secure Internet connectivity in the remotest of locations.’

The sources claim ISWAP has dedicated vehicles fitted with internet services to facilitate communication and data sharing on the go.

The media team uses one of these vehicles when it accompanies fighters, enabling them to immediately share material from the battlefield. This explains how ISWAP can release information quickly, including images and videos, sometimes within hours of attacks.



ISWAP’s public communication also suggests it can easily share data with Islamic State using data compression and archiving software. In addition to speed and encryption, the software reduces bandwidth costs. There is no single way to deal with the problem of ISWAP’s use of technology. The solution lies in various measures working together.

ISS research has detailed how ISWAP exploited Lake Chad Basin trade routes to get vital supplies. The group’s remote location should be an advantage for security forces who could disrupt its supply lines. Checkpoint searches have proved successful and can be used again. Those bringing in equipment and accessories should explain their destinations, which security agents should verify. Collaboration among security forces in the four affected Lake Chad Basin countries can help.

The ISS report also showed how civilian and military collaborators helped ISWAP get supplies. Security force leaders in the region must hold their personnel to the highest standards and use an independent ombudsman to deter corruption. To prevent civilians from collaborating with terror groups, authorities should work with communities and trade unions to identify and disrupt networks helping ISWAP. The criminal justice system can also play a deterrent role.



A future concern is that violent extremist groups like ISWAP become involved in cybercrime. Given Nigeria’s enormous financial powers and growing tech industry, authorities should prepare for this. Investing in technology and collaborating with tech companies to prevent their products, platforms or services from falling into ISWAP’s hands is a start.

Going after ISWAP’s money is vital. The group should be forced out of its current location using targeted and joint military operations. This would cut ISWAP’s access to its major revenue base. In using these tactics, care should be taken to avoid adversely affecting civilians, either by destroying their livelihoods or inflicting human rights violations.

Curtailing ISWAP’s access to technology will prevent it from using tech to plan and execute attacks, spread propaganda and recruit. That will reduce the damage the group inflicts on civilians and aid workers in the Lake Chad Basin.

Malik Samuel, Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/iswaps-use-of-tech-could-prolong-lake-chad-basin-violence

Cabo Delgado: two years since the Palma invasion

The attack prompted nations and security companies to help fight one of Africa’s most rapidly evolving terrorist hotspots.

For nearly two years, Mozambique resisted the call for foreign military intervention in Cabo Delgado to help fight the insurgency that started in 2017. But when militants stormed the town of Palma in March 2021, forcing construction on the US$20 billion liquefied natural gas project to stop, Maputo had to accept foreign boots on the ground.

President Filipe Nyusi said in December 2020 that offers of help had been received from many countries, highlighting the need to carefully manage this mix of interventions. But two years on, domestic and international security forces in Mozambique are still fragmented.

Rwanda has the largest military and police contingent in Cabo Delgado – about 2 800 personnel. The Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) has about 1 900. These forces technically ‘support’ Mozambique’s security forces. Local militia and several private military companies have helped restore stability, mainly around gas exploration and liquefaction projects.

The relative calm in Palma and neighbouring Mocímboa da Praia districts has enabled global investors to return to Cabo Delgado, particularly to the natural gas project. TotalEnergies, which suspended operations at its billion-dollar plant in April 2021, is preparing to restart. Some construction work is already underway.

Major international players, including the World Bank, are committed to supporting the province’s gas exploration. Its importance for future global energy supply options has increased since Russia invaded Ukraine. ‘We are seeing that already most of Mozambique’s gas is being exported to Europe, so Europe is benefitting from Mozambique’s gas and this keeps Europe also from reverting to less clean energy sources,’ said Victoria Kwakwa, World Bank Regional Vice-President for Eastern and Southern Africa.

Despite these developments, the insurgency has not been defeated. Stability in the province’s north-east contrasts with a volatile situation in the north, central and southern districts. Insurgents displaced from Palma, Mocímboa da Praia and their bases on the Messalo River have split into smaller cells. They have adapted to new conditions, carrying out coordinated attacks in several districts.

Troops deployed in Cabo Delgado haven’t shown effective operational coordination, at times even competing with each other. In Palma district, where most are concentrated, there have been several friendly fire incidents, anonymous sources told ISS Today. Rwandan forces recently shot down two drones belonging to True North, one of several companies collecting intelligence and providing security to TotalEnergies. True North flew the drones without informing Rwanda’s forces, who shot them down. The resulting crisis required Mozambique government intervention.



Rwandan forces prefer to act unilaterally rather than coordinate with Mozambique’s military and police. Mozambique complains that Rwanda doesn’t share intelligence and operational information, often taking unilateral decisions. SAMIM sources have shared similar concerns about Rwanda. These sources also say that Mozambique has failed to actively lead the coordination effort as the host country.

Like many multilateral deployments, there are tensions within SAMIM, which has nationality-based geographical operational areas of responsibility. The recent deployment of 300 more Tanzanian security personnel outside the SAMIM framework as part of a bilateral agreement may further complicate matters.

Rwandan forces use Mozambique Air Force helicopters flown by Mozambican pilots in their counter-terrorism operations. But according to a Mozambique defence force source, ‘only when [the] pilots are in the air, are they informed about the mission.’ This atypical approach reflects the lack of trust among forces on the ground. Mozambican troops are long suspected of leaking operational information. Mistrust, poor coordination and even competition undermine the joint effort and benefit the insurgents.

The European Union Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM) expects to finish training 1 500 Mozambican soldiers from the Naval Forces and Special Forces in September 2024. However, they won’t be able to replace the international forces currently deployed.



The Mozambican Defence Armed Forces will remain dependent on foreign troops until it has adequate security capacity. This raises the challenge of sustaining the presence of SAMIM and the Rwanda Defence Force, both of which received US$35 million in 2022 from the European Peace Facility fund. With EUTM support, Mozambique is the EU’s biggest Peace Facility fund spend outside Ukraine.

The humanitarian situation also remains critical. Although over 850 000 of Cabo Delgado’s population remain displaced, about 350 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) had returned home by the end of March. However IDPs returning to resume their lives face a lack of basic public services and state help to allow decent human resettlement. Almost 100 humanitarian organisations in the province are trying to assist, but the situation remains dire.

Food insecurity is highest in the three northern provinces – Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula – where over 900 000 people face crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity. These provinces are directly targeted by insurgents and are reportedly key recruitment hotbeds for terrorists. As long as the humanitarian situation remains unaddressed, efforts to tackle the insurgency will be undermined.



The fragmented response extends beyond the realm of hard security, with a stovepipe approach preventing links between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding priorities. For example, organisations helping victims of gender-based violence haven’t been able to aid women and girls rescued by the military from insurgent bases.

While funds for emergency help to IDPs remain scarce, some development partners are holding back their project finance until the war ends. Better coordination between humanitarian and development initiatives could help allocate some of these funds to emergency humanitarian relief.

The current hard security resources in Cabo Delgado do not match the type and size of terrain the insurgents are operating in. Lack of air assets, fire-force and hot-pursuit assets are major factors. SAMIM contributes to containment but does not maximise the military options. The unhealthy reliance on local forces (militia) to provide security for many communities is also a problem.

As the Institute for Security Studies has suggested, the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council could help develop a regional force and stabilisation strategy that goes beyond military approaches.

SADC should approach the AU to help coordinate Mozambique, SAMIM and Rwanda’s security forces. SAMIM’s nascent peacebuilding efforts piloted in 2022 could also be supported with EU funds channelled through the AU. This would tackle the fragmented nature of current interventions and help stabilise Cabo Delgado.

Borges Nhamirre, Consultant, ISS Pretoria

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/cabo-delgado-two-years-since-the-palma-invasion

Algeria could return to playing pivotal role in Sahel security

Stuck in a holding pattern since Mali’s 2022 withdrawal, the G5 Sahel gathered the foreign ministers of its four remaining member nations in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena on 18 January to discuss how to fortify and sustain the joint counterterrorism force.

The group, made up of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger, indicated after the summit that it has a “burning desire for the sister Republic of Mali to rejoin the natural family that is the G5 Sahel.”

Security experts say the G5 Sahel should also look to Algeria.

“Even with Mali, the G5 Sahel cannot validly deal with terrorism without Algeria,” independent Niger-based analyst Abdoul Mooumouni Abass told Deutsche Welle.

“[Algeria] is another fairly significant weight that must be integrated today into the dynamics of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel.”

Political scientist Kamissa Camara touted the potential benefits of Algerian involvement in the Sahel. She believes the country offers valuable insights and lessons learned from countering terrorist organizations.

During its 10-year civil war that ended in 2002, Algeria defeated militant Islamist groups, including one that later resurfaced in Mali as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

Camara, who was chief of staff to former Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, is an expert on sub-Saharan African policy who founded the Sahel Strategy Forum.

“Algeria’s regional diplomatic clout, military might, and experience in fighting terrorism could help Sahelian states ward off an imminent political and security collapse,” she wrote for the Middle East Institute in December 2022.

With its porous and sparsely populated border regions, the Sahel would benefit from involving all of its neighboring countries to effectively combat the aggressive expansion of terror groups.

Algeria shares borders spanning nearly 3,000 kilometers with Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

Camara believes a collaboration between Algeria and the Sahel nations would be mutually beneficial, as Algeria’s security is tied to that of the Sahel — politically, demographically and geographically.

“Algeria’s southern border is at risk,” she wrote. “The country should act soon.”

In any security interaction with Sahel nations, Algeria comes with a track record and reputation as a regional leader in conflict resolution.

It facilitated negotiations that led to the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord between Mali and secessionist rebel groups that had grown violent over the preceding three years.

It created an intelligence data exchange called the UFL in which Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria share information.

Algerian Ambassador to Burkina Faso Mohamed Ainseur said the UFL guarantees “independent analysis of security intelligence in the Sahel.”

The Sahel’s largest neighbor to the north also has succeeded in countering extremist ideology in its mosques, schools and media. More recently, Algeria exported its knowledge of the de-radicalization process to the Sahel.

It created the League of Ulemas, Preachers and Imams of the Sahel (LOPIS), which is described in the region as a sort of traveling university that supports the training of imams and preachers and seeks to calm ideological discourse.

“The rejection of the other is a cause of very great problems in the history of the Umma [religious community],” Algeria’s LOPIS representative Dr. Lakhmissi Bezzaz said during a workshop.

“The dialogue will yield tangible results, which will contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in our countries.”

Rather than entice Algeria to join the G5 Sahel, another possibility would see the G5 replaced with an existing coalition in the Algeria-led joint military operations center called CEMOC, which also includes Mauritania, Mali and Niger.

Envisioning the CEMOC as a way to consolidate the concerns of the Sahel and the Maghreb nations, Camara argued that it “could generate the type of broader global response that Sahelian states have been waiting for.”

“CEMOC’s unique advantage had always been institutionalized security cooperation between Algeria and the Sahel,” she wrote.

“This integrated security cooperation now has to become a reality.”

https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/algeria-could-return-to-playing-pivotal-role-in-sahel-security/

@The Rand Show

First pics of algerian Beriev Be-200ES , in russia

04 in order , will be delivred in summer for fire fighting

Significant progress in the construction of EN MEKO A200 frigate at Egypt's Alexandria shipyard.

Tunisian anti terrorist brigad . Police

KDF
EACRF

The Kenya Nuclear Regulatory Authority (KNRA) today hosted Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) advance course participants from the Kenya Defence Forces Disaster Responce Battalion (DRB)) to familiarize themselves with the Organization and its operations in Oloolua, Kajiado County.

The day long conversation provided the participants an opportunity to be sharpened with the requisite knowledge and competencies in safe, secure and peaceful utilization of Nuclear technology.

EACRF Commander Maj Gen Jeff Nyagah and MONUSCO Force Commander Lt Gen Otávio Rodrigues met on Tuesday, 4th April 2023 at MONUSCO HQs and explored areas of coordination and collaboration between the two forces.
The possible areas of coordination and collaboration include: Demarcation and Delineation of Operational Boundaries; Battlespace management including Airspace Control;
Logistics support in terms of MEDVAC, CASEVAC and limited airlift capability to remote bases; Engineering support in defence preparations; Opening up of Main Supply Routes; Information/Intelligence sharing and surveillance.

Flanker:
Significant progress in the construction of EN MEKO A200 frigate at Egypt's Alexandria shipyard.

To think that when the SAN bought the MEKO A200 in the 90s it did not even exist, it was nothing more than a low-resolution 90s computer render (attached)... now they can simply pull out pictures of the SAN and Algerian Navy Mekos at the sales pitch.

GreenandGold:


To think that when the SAN bought the MEKO A200 in the 90s it did not even exist, it was nothing more than a low-resolution 90s computer render (attached)... now they can simply pull out pictures of the SAN and Algerian Navy Mekos at the sales pitch.

So was submarine AIP. The SAN said, "yes please"; the bureaucrats and politicians said, "only exists on paper, we're not going to be Guinea pigs".

Lurker4Long:

So was submarine AIP. The SAN said, "yes please"; the bureaucrats and politicians said, "only exists on paper, we're not going to be Guinea pigs".

I remember back in high school (2002) debating the Arms Deal.. of course, being on the "pro" side, I managed to convince the whole school hall that we needed an even bigger Arms Deal with aircraft carries, I overplayed the threat

..jokes aside... If we had gotten all the things on the shopping list (as suggested by the Defence Review) at that time, we would be up there in terms of gear.

How prescient was this op-ed in Thursday's Maverick:

Revolving door of resources
The UAE and Wagner are both allied with the Darfur warlord Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemeti) whose fighters were deployed in Yemen and then Libya.
Hemeti is now the number two man in the interim military regime in Sudan and the fate of his private army, the Rapid Support Forces, could determine whether the country moves toward a democratic transition in the next few weeks or disintegrates into civil war.
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-04-13-where-everything-has-a-price-russia-and-the-uae-are-closest-partners-in-africa/

Happening now:
Heavy gunfire amid military clash causes panic in capital of Sudan
Heavy gunfire was heard in the capital of Sudan, Khartoum, on Saturday as clashes erupted between the Sudanese army and its paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/15/heavy-gunfire-amid-military-clash-causes-panic-in-capital-of-sudan

Watching events happening in Khartoum - Sudan on Al-jazeera right now

Stargate254:
Watching events happening in Khartoum - Sudan on Al-jazeera right now

Sudanese have no chill.... weekends are for braais and brandy, not overthrowing governments

Sudanese TV be like "no coup d'état to see here, here's some singing guy, you ladies will love him"

Lurker4Long:
How prescient was this op-ed in Thursday's Maverick:



Happening now:
Heavy gunfire amid military clash causes panic in capital of Sudan

Heavy gunfire was heard in the capital of Sudan, Khartoum, on Saturday as clashes erupted between the Sudanese army and its paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/15/heavy-gunfire-amid-military-clash-causes-panic-in-capital-of-sudan

Additional info. The guy in charge of RSF, Hamdan Dagalo brokered a deal with Russia to build a Naval Base in Sudan this year.

His boss however has been pressuring the US state Dept to suspend calls for elections, using the base plan as a pawn. Unfortunately, Hamedti was not on that page. He's too sold to Russia.

About last year, US intelligence warned that RSF was cooperating with Wagner to spread disinformation within Sudan. I don't know how seriously that was taken. But eventually the command and control of the RSF was overrun by Russian elements.

Now the results are taking shape. Someone please blame NATO for this as usual

An commercial aircraft worth millions is casually burning away.

War makes expensive things look like they were bought for free.

This is enough to render a small airline bankrupt
https://twitter.com/omwambaKE/status/1647208737843576833?t=paIy4waLFMvazuZ9srmWbA&s=19

Faithful007:


Additional info. The guy in charge of RSF, Hamdan Dagalo brokered a deal with Russia to build a Naval Base in Sudan this year.

His boss however has been pressuring the US state Dept to suspend calls for elections, using the base plan as a pawn. Unfortunately, Hamedti was not on that page. He's too sold to Russia.

About last year, US intelligence warned that RSF was cooperating with Wagner to spread disinformation within Sudan. I don't know how seriously that was taken. But eventually the command and control of the RSF was overrun by Russian elements.

Now the results are taking shape. Someone please blame NATO for this as usual

Of course, before the re-branding, Hemeti's RSF was known in Darfur as Janjawīd. So the tie-up with Wagner is no surprise:
"Arseholes of the world unite, for an authoritarian hell-scape!"

Faithful007:


Additional info. The guy in charge of RSF, Hamdan Dagalo brokered a deal with Russia to build a Naval Base in Sudan this year.

His boss however has been pressuring the US state Dept to suspend calls for elections, using the base plan as a pawn. Unfortunately, Hamedti was not on that page. He's too sold to Russia.

About last year, US intelligence warned that RSF was cooperating with Wagner to spread disinformation within Sudan. I don't know how seriously that was taken. But eventually the command and control of the RSF was overrun by Russian elements.

Now the results are taking shape. Someone please blame NATO for this as usual

But an aljazeera reporter referenced that at one point the EU supported the RSF as part of a program to stop migrants from crossing through Sudan on their way to Europe

BORDER CONTROL FROM HELL

Large-scale migration to Europe has precipitated a paradigm shift in relations between the European Union (EU) and the government of Sudan, and closer ties between both entities. This new partnership has resulted in the EU disbursing millions of euros to the Sudanese government for technical equipment and training efforts geared toward stopping the flow to Europe of migrants from Sudan and those from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa who come through Sudan.

the EU’s action plan will involve building the capacities of Sudan’s security and law enforcement agencies, including a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been branded as Sudan’s primary “border force.” The EU will assist the RSF and other relevant agencies with the construction of two camps with detention facilities for migrants. The EU will also equip these Sudanese border forces with cameras, scanners, and electronic servers for registering refugees. There are legitimate concerns with these plans. Much of the EU-funded training and equipment is dual-use. The equipment that enables identification and registration of migrants will also reinforce the surveillance capabilities of a Sudanese government that has violently suppressed Sudanese citizens for the past 28 years. Sudan’s strategy for stopping migrant flows on behalf of Europe involves a ruthless crackdown by the RSF on migrants within Sudan. Dogged by persistent armed uprisings led by opponents protesting chronic inequalities in the distribution of national wealth and political power in its periphery regions, the Sudanese government has always relied on a plethora of militia groups to counter insurgencies.
The RSF is one of these militia groups. It evolved from the disparate supporter of APC militias that carried out the genocidal counterinsurgency policy of the Sudanese regime in Darfur that began in 2003.

However, in its functions and evolution, the RSF differs significantly from other militia groups employed by the government The RSF first evolved from a strike force deployed against insurgents in Darfur into a national counterinsurgency force under the operational command of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) that was tasked with fighting the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ArmyNorth (SPLM/A-N) in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Then, in September 2013, the RSF was deployed against peaceful demonstrators who were protesting the Sudanese government’s removal of subsidies on basic commodities. More than 170 people were killed in September 2013, in incidents that unmasked the Sudanese regime’s dependence on the militia to quell political dissent and marked a new evolution in the role of the RSF.

Starting in 2015 and 2016, and convinced of the RSF’s effectiveness as a counterinsurgency force, the regime designated the RSF as Sudan’s primary force tasked with patrolling Sudanese borders to interdict migrants’ movement. The Sudanese government made this designation within the framework of its partnership with the EU for the control of migration. As such, the RSF is positioned to receive EU funds for reducing the flows of migrants from Sudan to Europe. The Sudanese government enacted a law in January 2017 that integrated the RSF into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF, national army). The 2017 law (conflictingly) made the RSF autonomous, integrated into the army, and under the command of President Omar al-Bashir (see below).

The EU and the EU member states that are most engaged with Sudan in the actual programmatic partnership on migration flows should scrutinize the record and conduct of the RSF as the partnership unfolds. By “building the capacity” of Sudan’s newly minted border force with funding and training, the EU would not only be strengthening the hand of the RSF but also could find itself underwriting a complex system of a “militia state” that Sudan has evolved into since the current regime came to power in 1989. In so doing, the EU contradicts and undermines the overriding objectives of its own founding treaty. EU members cannot advance peace,security, and human rights and they cannot stem irregular migration from Sudan and the Horn of Africa by directly funding a government that deploys a militia group that stokes violent conflict, commits atrocities, and creates massive displacement of populations within Sudan.

The remainder of this paper synthesizes public information about the RSF’s activities and argues how EU support for this group could ultimately worsen irregular migration to Europe, escalate violent conflict within Sudan and the Horn of Africa, and embolden a regime and militia force that acts with impunity and now faces even fewer checks on its criminal behavior. This paper aims to highlight the latest developments from Sudan and examine the record of earlier engagements of the RSF, lest one or all of Sudan’s EU partners claim, at a later date, that they were unaware of the perverse incentives at play.

The research paper was written by reliefweb https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/border-control-hell-how-eus-migration-partnership-legitimizes-sudans-militia-state

https://reliefweb.int/attachments/0e6a1270-481d-36d1-9e28-7b81460125a9/BorderControl_April2017_Enough_Finals.pdf




This part especially
By “building the capacity” of Sudan’s newly minted border force with funding and training, the EU would not only be strengthening the hand of the RSF but also could find itself underwriting a complex system of a “militia state” that Sudan has evolved into since the current regime came to power in 1989


------------------------
I'm not trying to defend Russia here, I guess I'm experiencing some king of Dejavu based on a journal I was reading a couple of weeks ago, of what happened in Afghanistan with Russia and US involvement and what eventually led to the rise on war on Terror on a scale never seen before in the world... I think in a place where both Russia and US/NATO is involved, nothing good will come of it, it doesn't matter who is on the right side... There is a Swahili saying that basically translates to, "Two bulls cannot stay/live in the same barn"

Meanwhile, in the DRC.

Stargate254:
But an aljazeera reporter referenced that at one point the EU supported the RSF as part of a program to stop migrants from crossing through Sudan on their way to Europe

BORDER CONTROL FROM HELL
The research paper was written by reliefweb https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/border-control-hell-how-eus-migration-partnership-legitimizes-sudans-militia-state

https://reliefweb.int/attachments/0e6a1270-481d-36d1-9e28-7b81460125a9/BorderControl_April2017_Enough_Finals.pdf




This part especially
By “building the capacity” of Sudan’s newly minted border force with funding and training, the EU would not only be strengthening the hand of the RSF but also could find itself underwriting a complex system of a “militia state” that Sudan has evolved into since the current regime came to power in 1989


------------------------
I'm not trying to defend Russia here, I guess I'm experiencing some king of Dejavu based on a journal I was reading a couple of weeks ago, of what happened in Afghanistan with Russia and US involvement and what eventually led to the rise on war on Terror on a scale never seen before in the world... I think in a place where both Russia and US/NATO is involved, nothing good will come of it, it doesn't matter who is on the right side... There is a Swahili saying that basically translates to, "Two bulls cannot stay/live in the same barn"

I guess that was under Bashir's time as president. The RSF was under him. A lot of things have changed. I don't think Russia was thinking of a military base then. It's just like accusing the US of supporting Iran since most of Iranian fighter jets are made in the US.

The US don't have much interest in Sudan. Both the two factions don't really support the US. However, the military ruler favors an independent country, while the RSF Commander cozied up to Russia.

Lurker4Long:


Of course, before the re-branding, Hemeti's RSF was known in Darfur as Janjawīd. So the tie-up with Wagner is no surprise:
"Arseholes of the world unite, for an authoritarian hell-scape!"

Stargate254

Also note that EU and NATO interests do not always align, despite having some countries belong to both.

RSF taking kharthoum airpory with 05 egyptian Mig29 M and arresting egyptian personnel

Meanwhile, in Mozambique.