@ Vedaxcool,

I see u seems only good at Religious post (675) compare to Politics (25) so u dont know shi.t on Politics abi. But am still wondering on your stu.pid.it.y. Mo.r.ron. You are not more a Religious fanatic.

Big Wikileaks Mirror Sites:

1.
http://freie-re.de/
2.
http://wikileaks.terrax.info/
3.
http://www.powned.tv/wikileaks/
4.
http://wikileaks.info/
5.
http://digitalevuilnisman.nl/wikileaks/
6.
http://wikileaks.2600nl.net/
7.
http://mirror.infoboj.eu/
8.
http://wikileaks.piratenpartei.de/
9.
http://wikileaks.piratskapartija.com/
10.
http://wikileaks.teoriza.org/
11.
http://wikileaks.whistleblowerschutz.de/
12.
http://informationsbefreier.de/
13.
http://213.251.145.96
14.
http://46.59.1.2
15.
http://wikileaks.dhumes.com/
16.
http://wikileaks.dd19.de/
17.
http://wl.04u.nl/
18.
http://www.cu2.nl/W1k1l34Ks
19.
http://wikileaks.indymedia.org/
20.
http://wikileaks.lalistadesinde.net/
21.
http://wikileaks.insertco.in/
22.
http://213.251.145.96/
23.
http://wikileaks.rickbradley.com/
24.
http://wikileaks.ultramegaman.com/
25.
http://wikileaks.realprogrammer.org/
26.
http://wikileaks.high-color.de/
27.
http://www.wikileaks.nl/
28.
https://www.wuala.com/wikileaks/
29.
http://wikileaks.sebbcn.net/
30.
http://wi.kileaks.com/
31.
http://wikileaks.fonolog.com/
32.
wwwouter.nl/">http://leaks.wwwouter.nl/
33.
http://leaks.be/
34.
http://www.afgetapt.nl/
35.
http://wikileaks.rorbuilder.info
36.
http://www.wikileaks.comiendolimones.com/
37.
http://wikileaks.hermanuscoenradistraat.nl/
38.
http://wikileaks.hermanuscoenradistraat16.nl/
39.
http://wikileaks.zipped.in/
40.
http://wikileaks.lalistadesinde.net/
41.
http://wikileaks.iz.rs/
42.
http://wikileaks.freedomofspee.ch/
43.
http://openstream.nl/
44.
http://79.159.1.172/wikileaks/
45.
http://www.atariprofibuch.de/
46.
http://wikileaks.sebastianbartsch.eu/
47.
http://mirror.sebastianbartsch.eu/
48.
http://leakmirror.users.anapnea.net/
49.
http://wikileaks.renout.nl/
50.
http://wikileaks.outofsin.com/
51.
http://wikileaks.outofsin.es/
52.
http://wikileaks.servehttp.com/
53.
http://wikileaks.pl/
54.
http://88.80.13.160.nyud.net/
55.
http://wikileaks.piraten-lsa.de/
56.
http://ljsf.org/
57.
http://120310wl.frezeb.webfactional.com/
58.
http://wikileaks.majcenic.info/
59.
http://mirror.sebastianbartsch.de/ (user/pass: guest)
60.
http://wikileaks.opperschaap.net/
61.
http://wikileaks.juridische.info/
62.
http://wikileaks.lu/
63.
http://wikileaks.bastianhaas.de/
64.
http://wikileaks.virtadpt.net/
65.
http://mirrorleaks.org/
66.
http://85.88.21.139/
67.
http://www.wikileaks.fi/
68.
http://wikileaks.littledrummerboy.info/
69.
http://wikileaks.countdown4me.com/
70.
http://wikileaks.no-ip.co.uk
71.
http://www.roborobo.info/
72.
http://likiweaks.com
73.
http://wikileaks.eu/
74.
http://wikileaks.cx


Source: http://www.twitlonger.com/show/79s9r1

blacksta:

US embassy cables: Washington requests biometric information for African leaders


Leadership dynamics and decision-making processes of key civilian and military officials; influence of corruption and patronage in decision-making. -- Status of relations among top leaders of African Great Lakes countries, especially Kigali and Kinshasa, and Kampala and Kinshasa. --

Plans and intentions regarding political succession, including post-election transitions; indications of coup plotting. -- Leader influence on popular opinion and popular sentiments. -- Influence on government leadership of religious organizations, interest groups, ethnic groups, and military. -- The role of military, intelligence, and security services in national policy decision-making and their control of government institutions and parastatals.

-- Leadership policies and actions that cause or respond to political instability or economic deterioration. -- Leadership financial resources and personal relationships. -- Government and public views about and evidence of impact of corruption and crime on internal stability and development

. -- Information on political stability, sources of instability, and nature of challenges to effective governance. -- Government plans and efforts to respond to threats to political stability; strategies for addressing underlying discontent. -- Changes inside key ministries and security forces, including personal dynamics, tribal politics and factions. -- Details on identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors.

-- Biographic and biometric data, including health, opinions toward the US, training history, ethnicity (tribal and/or clan), and language skills of key and emerging political, military, intelligence, opposition, ethnic, religious, and business leaders. Data should include email addresses, telephone and fax numbers, fingerprints, facial images, DNA, and iris scans.

For what?  . Before you know, they'll be asking for same info of all Africans. Not that they'l get it from Africans.

blacksta:

we already know what they can possible say about Nigerian leader


1. eXTREmly corrupt
2. ethnic bigots
3. sexually immoral
4. Election riggers
5 . treasury looters
6 .  GEJ is a mumu for obj
7 .  Yara adua wont last long
8  Country is advancing towards failed state
9  Get as much oil you can


Me i am not surprised

Haha. So true. It'll be interesting to see which nations or people have been working hand in hand with Nigerian oficials in stealing from the country.

I am in total support of wikileaks. Even more so as most leaders in the West want his head on a platter. See how they all want him arrested for the "despoil" meme after the case had been dropped by Sweden's chief prosecutor. It's also interesting to see how wikileaks sites are been shut down almost everywhere and some politicians- Mike Huckabee and Sarah Palin et al wanting him executed.
Fear in action.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 001339

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF, INL, AND S/CT
LONDON AND LISBON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
DOD FOR AF:HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR AF:GAVIN
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR GAST

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PREL PINR EAID EU UK MA NG MR NI AG FR
SUBJECT: U.S.-FRANCE-EU DISCUSS SAHEL SECURITY ISSUES

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: U.S. government representatives met
French, British, and European Union officials on
September 10 in Paris to review efforts to address the
security threat posed by terrorism in Africa's Sahel and
Maghreb regions. There was broad agreement that the USG,
France, and other third countries should identify areas of
cooperation and mechanisms to coordinate and de-conflict
efforts to improve multilateral and individual country
capacity in the region to address immediate and long-term
threats from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The
discussions focused on factors influencing the region's
ability to address the AQIM threat, including the Sahel
countries' lack of law enforcement and military capacity; the
complexity of state relations with its nomadic populations,
e.g. the Tuareg and Berbiche ethnic groups, the profitability
of illicit trade and kidnapping networks; the need for
Algeria to work more closely with its neighbors; the
importance of better donor coordination; and undermining
recruitment efforts that could expand the scope of radical
Islam in West and Central Africa. Participants agreed on the
need to meet in the future to exchange information regarding
each other's efforts in region. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Johnnie Carson led a high-level interagency delegation in
discussions with a French delegation led by Under Secretary
for Political Affairs (P)-equivalent Policy Director Jacques
Audibert and Africa A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz. The
U.S. and French delegations were joined by British and
European Union counterparts for the afternoon session. The
discussion began with an exchange of information on the
current security and political situation in the Sahel, which
Gompertz described as France's "main area of concern" in
sub-Saharan Africa and was followed by exchanges on a wide
range of critical factors related to the region's terrorist
threat. Martin Julliard, France's Head of Transnational
Threats Section, Strategic and Security Affairs Department at
the MFA, said that AQIM's political agenda was not well
understood and was evolving over time. He noted that AQIM is
targeting westerners, but it was not clear whether it wanted
to challenge the legitimacy of governments or even the
states. Participants noted that while AQIM's northern group
remains concentrated on Algeria, elements of the southern
group have shifted away from acting primarily as logistical
support for northern operations and have increased planning
and operations in the Sahel. It was emphasized that the
southern group remained linked with its northern leadership,
but has made inroads in recruiting in the Sahel, particularly
in Mauritania, and has increased the scope and sophistication
of its operations in parts of the Sahel during the past year.
USG and French participants considered whether there were
opportunities to exploit apparent divisions within AQIM.
Remi Marechaux, an Africa Advisor to President Sarkozy summed
up the situation succinctly, "we feel we are losing the
battle between improved development in these countries and
the increasing security threats in the region."

LACK OF CAPACITY
----------------
¶3. (SBU) There was broad agreement among the participants
that the focus countries of the conference (Mauritania, Mali,
and Niger) lack the resources to fully control their vast
territories. In addition, lack of governmental capacity
remains a serious hindrance in terms of military/security
effectiveness and developmental progress. The EU chair noted
that each country posed specific challenges for partners in
addressing security threats:

-- Mali, where in addition to capacity constraints, there are
questions about the government's willingness to confront and
engage AQIM militarily, despite clear indications that AQIM
maintains a degree of impunity within its Northern Mali
"sanctuaries." S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin noted that
Mali is perhaps becoming more helpful, but French speakers
consistently referred to the Malian position as "ambiguous"
and "enigmatic;"

-- Mauritania, which may possess greater political will for
taking-on AQIM, but political instability following the
recent coup hampered efforts to support its CT efforts; and

PARIS 00001339 002 OF 005



-- Niger, where recent un-democratic maneuvering by
President Tandja makes it difficult to offer new assistance.
NSC Senior Advisor Michelle Gavin underscored that our CT
efforts cannot undercut our governance and democracy
priorities in Africa. While remarking that President Tandja
had already "won his gamble" to secure a third term and the
French will focus their attention on pushing for credible
elections, Gompertz stated that France did not have a clear
strategy to balance its CT objectives with the urgency of
promoting good governance and constitutional rule in the
country.

PROFITS FROM ILLICIT TRADE AND KIDNAPPING
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) France's MOD Director of Strategic Affairs Pascal
Texeira noted that AQIM is commonly understood to have only
about 150 fighters in the Sahel, but it has significant
financial resources for obtaining weapons and logistic
support such as vehicles and radios from profitable illicit
trafficking networks, including arms, people, drugs, and
other contraband. Of even greater concern is AQIM's apparent
success in securing large ransom sums for kidnapped
westerners. When asked, U.K. FCO Director for Africa Adam
Wood confirmed that following the January murder of U.K.
hostage Edwin Dyer, his country would play a more active role
in the region, and would certainly support an AU initiative
at the UN to rally international opposition against ransom
payments in cases of piracy and hostage-taking, which he
believed was being spearheaded by Algeria. Participants had
not yet seen a draft of the resolution.

¶5. (SBU) Developing a better understanding of Tuareg
activities and motivations was seen as an important priority,
especially since they develop ad-hoc agreements with AQIM
elements in support of trafficking and perhaps kidnapping.
Texeira stated that Mali views the threat of a new Tuareg
rebellion as more dangerous than that from AQIM, and neither
Mali nor Niger could count on Tuareg leaders to fight against
AQIM. French and USG analysts also noted that breakdowns in
traditional ethnic political, social and economic networks
was potentially destabilizing.

NEED TO INVOLVE ALGERIA
-----------------------
¶6. (SBU) A/S Carson raised the importance of getting
Algeria involved in multi-national efforts to combat AQIM,
and also for Algeria to work in concert directly with Mali to
disrupt AQIM and criminal networks. "There can be no
solution without Algeria," according to Texeira, who thought
that Algeria would work with regional partners, but did not
want to be implicated with "outside players." They noted
that Algeria engages in limited intelligence-sharing and has
made inquiries about other forms of counterterrorism
assistance, but remains reticent about enhanced cooperation
with potential western partners.
Participants viewed positively Algeria's plans to organize a
regional security summit in the coming months, but they
agreed that there was relatively little information about
summit objectives or the agenda.

TREAT OF SPREADING RADICALISM
-----------------------------
¶7. (SBU) The potential spread of AQIM (or some other brand
of radicalized and violent Islam) in Africa was also a
recurring issue. In particular, participants expressed deep
concern that northern[size=15pt] Nigeria[/size] is at risk of such influence.
AQIM personnel or facilitators had also reportedly been
identified in Niger and Senegal recently. Guinea-Bissau and
Guinea are also at risk should AQIM make greater inroads into
the West African narcotics trade, according to Gilles de
Kerchove, the European Union Council's Coordinator for
Counter Terrorism. Part of the problem is that
disenfranchised young men from the southern parts of the
Sahel are moving north and joining the group.
Participants agreed on the need for a greater understanding
of how AQIM successfully recruited militants/fighters/suicide
bombers, especially from
Mauritania. (Note: during a lunchtime conversation,
France's Ambassador to Mauritania explained to INR Analyst

PARIS 00001339 003 OF 005


Bernadette Graves and Embassy Paris Africa Watcher that he
sees no clear trend, nor does he understand the reasons for,
AQIM's apparent success in recruiting young Mauritanians. He
notes that these recruits have come from a variety of
backgrounds and ethnic groups and the trend does not fit the
commonly held view of Mauritania as a moderate, tolerant
Muslim country with Sufi traditions. End note.)

DONOR COORDINATION
------------------
¶8. (SBU) One of the goals of the conference, and a recurring
theme, was to improve assistance co-ordination among donors.
The U.S., France, and the EU provide a range of military and
security training in the region. Assistant Secretary Carson
discussed the background and goals of the U.S. interagency
Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). He
noted that TSCTP was a broad-based holistic approach to
supporting regional CT efforts that includes military and law
enforcement capacity-building, public diplomacy/strategic
communications, and support for local and national good
governance. USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator Earl Gast
observed that development indicators in the Sahel are among
the worst in the world and USAID involvement in USG
counter-extremism programming reflects that the regional
vulnerability to terrorism is increased by the lack of
employment opportunities for youth and poor or nonexistent
governance and service delivery in large swaths of territory.

¶9. (SBU) France is focused on responding to Mali's request
to assist its efforts to establish four forward operating
bases in its northern frontier. It is also exploring how to
support efforts to improve Malian administration and local
governance in the north and improve customs and border
security. Gompertz stated that France has security dialogues
with Niger and Mali and would soon initiate discussions with
Mauritania. The French also highlighted the urgency of
assisting countries with judicial reform, training of
prosecutors and magistrates, and criminal procedures.

¶10. (SBU) The EU completed an assessment of Mali in July and
will visit Mauritania in October, but has postponed plans to
visit Niger due to the current political situation. Future
assistance may include border surveillance and customs
services, and Sweden's Ambassador for Counter Terrorism Carin
Wall highlighted the EU's desire to collaborate more closely
with other actors, "not least the U.S."

¶11. (SBU) All three donors have or are considering programs
in judicial processes and law-enforcement. A/S Johnson
explained that the U.S. will likely establish a Regional
Security Training Center in West Africa, and the EU noted
that it is considering something similar: a Sahel-based
"multi-functional" regional training center focusing on
military, law enforcement, and border control and customs
capacity building. The EU and French representatives
highlighted the importance of building academies and
"clearinghouses" to provide training to a range of security
organs.

¶12. (SBU) The participants agreed to collect and share
detailed information about the specific programs and projects
each is pursuing or considering in the region as the first
step for further consultations and coordination. Towards the
end of the event, A/S Carson encouraged the participants to
find the time and means to expand this type of dialog into
other areas in need of greater mutual understanding and
coordination in Africa, including the way forward in Somalia,
Sudan, and the Great Lakes, and also for transboundary issues
such as demographic pressures, democracy, and development
priorities. A/S Johnson added judicial reform, including
best practices in corrections as another timely need.

"LEAD FROM THE SIDE"
--------------------
¶13. (SBU) The three-plus groups agreed that supporting
regional CT efforts in the Sahel was an important immediate
and long-term priority, but there was a clear consensus that
external actors must ensure that they limit visibility of
their activities and avoid actions that would be seen as
undercutting regional leadership over the issue. Elysee

PARIS 00001339 004 OF 005


Advisor Marechaux noted that the French had not crafted a
"Sahel plan" in order to avoid a potential backlash from
Sahelian and Maghreb states suspicious of its intentions in
the region. He noted that increasing the "profile" of the
AQIM problem would likely enhance the group's Jihadist
"credentials" and attract potential recruits from inside and
outside the region. A/S Carson agreed: "We don,t want to
become part of the problem by appearing to take the lead; we
need to lead from the side, not from out front." He noted
that raising the profile of external actors in the region
risked alienating key Sahelian interlocutors and further
risked assisting AQIM recruiting and resourcing efforts.
Ambassador Benjamin agreed that it was vital to ensure that
the counterterrorism effort had a "local face."

COMMENT
-------
¶14. (SBU) This gathering will likely prove the kick-off to
further discussions and closer cooperation. The French and
the EU reps were willing to share their analysis of the
situation, but were clearly also ready to defer to the U.S.'s
assessment. More than one French participant who later
joined a POL-hosted reception noted how impressed they were
with the high level of participation by the U.S. and by A/S
Carson's positive role as co-Chair of the event.

wirless cables

Use an interactive guide to discover what has been revealed in the leak of 250,000 US diplomatic cables

http://eca.sh/YVho

i can only say this. Wikileaks has exposed what the govts of the world were hiding. whether here or abroad. corruption is a global thing. I do not look at the figures that the stupid westerners trum up and publish to the world under the guise Nigeria is the 2nd corrupt nation. At least with this exposure it is obvious Nigeria is just getting started and the baba corrupters are actually those that published those reports.

they are seeking ways to punish the editor of wikileaks from exposing them under the guise that it is national security. Some of these sites are no longer accessible because they are being blocked. anything you post on the internet is censored and monitored and your ip address traced. The editor should just be careful because he may have an unfortunate 'accident' as usual. one thing i know is that truth can only be suppressed for a while but cannot stay hidden. must be exposed eventually.

Inundating the Africans with the so-called wikileak’s info is a futile effort. Ivory Coast is burning and Africans are sheepishly led to believe the issue is election or lack thereof.

Доброго времени суток!
Подскажите кто нибудь пожалуйста
Решила купить фотик, только с моделью никак не определюсь. Очень нравица Kodak Z915 У кого нибудь был или есть такой? Буду признательна за любой комментарий или отзыв, особенно за указание его недостатков.

more from wikileaks

The fundamentalist group even targeted the daughter of General Buhari for indoctrination into their views. The cable writer noted: “They attempted Gen. Buharis daughter but we kept it secret and we organized and tackle then, but they are after her to date," the message said.

The text writer also referred to a web chat room called Nigerian Muslim Network in which Abdulmuttalab was revealed to have burning desire for General Buhari’s daughter.

With reference to Abdulmuttalab’s background, the writer said he was “groomed” by Yakubu Kano, Maigari and Sheik Gumi.

It was further noted in the cell phone message Abdulmuttalab’s extremist tendencies started early, observing that “he left a mark” in his British School in Lome (BSL), in Togo. For further information about that, he the writer gave the name of Mr. Ian Sayer, the school principal whom he said was in the United Kingdom. It is unclear if Mr. Sayer had retired at that point, or was merely on vacation in the UK.

The principal target of the fundamentalists was Dr Mahmood Tukur. According to the text, they managed to turn his daughter against him and she later married Ibrahim Maigari Ahmadu.

http://saharareporters.com/news-page/wikileaks-cable-shocker-underwear-bomber-umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-was-obsessed-gen-buhari

1. the f.oolish boy could probably have married buhari's daughter [or someone similar] had he really set his mind to it instead of becoming a terrorist.

after all, he came from a reputable family.


2.

According to the text, they managed to turn his daughter against him

may God deliver us from evil and lord have mercy.