Bidexiii's Posts
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Random pictures;
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Nigerian Army confirms death of top terrorists' commander during encounter at Alagarno ! Nigerian Army on Wednesday confirmed that a notorious top terrorist commander, Abu Mojahid was among the terrorists that died in their encounter with troops in the outskirt of Alagarno, Tuesday morning. According to the Army, the terrorists had staged a daring attack on troops who were on patrol of the area, but a number of them died as the troops repelled the attack. Some Rocket Propelled Grenades as well as vehicle mounted Anti-Aircraft guns were said to be either captured or destroyed in the encounter. Meanwhile, the Army said military operations were continuing in the form of offensive action on identified terrorists in some forest locations. “Aggressive patrols, mopping up as well as cordon and search are also continuing in the other locations in search for weapons and terrorists,” the Army said. “Improvised explosive devices planted by the terrorists to deter the comprehensive offensive by the advancing troops are also being carefully cleared as troops continue to pursue fleeing ones. “The operations especially in forest locations are progressing in defiance of obstacles and land mines emplaced by the terrorists.” |
NAF pic's; 1st and 2nd pictures are vickers Mk3 MBT The 3rd pic his a mobile composite bridge decks
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Boko Haram lunch rocket attack on soldiers @ Baga killing 2:road side landmine attack on escort convoy hits soft skinned vehicle 6 soldiers and 1 vigilante injured ! https://beegeagle./2015/04/22/boko-haram-launch-rocket-attack-on-soldiers-at-baga-killing-2-roadside-landmine-attack-on-escort-convoy-hits-soft-skinned-vehicle-6-soldiers-one-vigilante-injured/ Picture is a :Nigerian troops in a DShK 12.7mm HMG-armed Landcruiser gun truck patrol the streets of Mubi
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South African Army.
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idu1:Yeap;they are NA soldiers drawn from defferent arms of NA, to be special/elite forces. The training is in pakistan ! |
IN CONTINUATION; CUBA/FAPLA SADF Tanks destroyed 94. 3 Troop carriers Destroyed 100. 5 logistic vehicles Destroyed 389. 1 soldiers killed 4785. 31 The idea of a SADF withdrawal might explain both Fidel Castro and Ronnie Kasrils’ observations that ‘ the SADF were far too cautious, missed a remarkable opportunity and failed to seize initiative (at Cuito) ’. Although this observation in part contradicts the SADF’s aims it emphasise the limitations to their orders to simply halt the enemy. CONCLUSION Whether it was a tactical retreat by the SADF or an Angolan forces victory one cannot contest that the battle at Cuito Cuanavale was a turning point that brought the border war to an end and led to the peace negotiations that saw the withdrawal of the SADF, MK and Cuban forces from Angola and Namibia and led to the independence of Namibia. The 20th anniversary of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale was commemorated this year. Nelson Mandela spoke of the battle as, ‘ a turning point for the liberation of our continent and my people’. It is fitting that at Freedom Park, outside Pretoria, the 2,070 names of Cuban soldiers who fell in Angola between 1975 and 1988, are inscribed along with the names of South Africans who died during our liberation struggle. Jacob Zuma, president of the ANC, led the party delegates to Angola. It was agreed during his visit that the graves of MK cadres who died during this battle should be identified and a monument be erected in their honour. It was further proposed that their remains be brought to south africa for reburial . 1st picture shows scene from the battle 2nd picture shows row of SAAF mirage F.7AZs seen at the oshakati AB in 1985.
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THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE "1988". The battle of Cuito Cuanavale and the Cuban intervention in Angola is one of the turning points in Southern African History. It led to the movement of powerful Cuban armed force, into the west, towards the Namibian border. The fighting in the south western part of Angola led to the withdrawal of the South African, ANC and Cuban presence in Angola, and to the Independence of Namibia. The battle of Cuito Cuanavale is, however, a contentious issue, widely discussed and debated by ordinary people, participants and historians. Depending on where you stand, Cuito Cuanavale is described as a defeat of the South African Defence Forces (SADF), a tactical withdrawal by the SADF, or, a stalemate. The battle, or more correctly termed the siege, of Cuito Cuanavale was fought on the banks of the Lomba River in the vicinity of Cuito Cuanavale, in south-eastern Angola, between UNITA (aided by the SADF) and the Angolan army (FAPLA) aided by Cuba, the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent East Germany. The stakes were high for both sides and the battle involved the biggest conventional operations of South African forces since World War II. ROOTS OF CONFLICT'S The battle lines were drawn along ideological conviction. Following Angolan independence in 1975, the Marxist orientated party Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), under the leadership of José Eduardo dos Santos ascended to power and set up a government. However, the triumph of the MPLA was not celebrated by all Angolans. Civil war broke out between MPLA and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Angolan government received support from the Soviet Union, Cuba and other liberation movements from the African continent. It was also backed by the African National Congress and SWAPO forces based in Angola. The Angolan rebel movement UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, received military and other means of support from anti-communist countries like the USA and the South African Regime. Because of international interference Angola became a battleground of the cold war. The prelude to the battle started in July 1987 when Angolan government forces (FAPLA) attempted to advance on Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA stronghold at Mavinga, the strategic key to his base at Jamba near the Caprivi Strip. At first the offensive progressed well, with FAPLA gaining the upper hand, inflicting heavy casualties on UNITA, driving them south towards Mavinga. Fourteen Angolan and Cuban brigades under a Russian commander began a large-scale attack on UNITA on 14 August 1987. SADF troops were rushed in to support UNITA. It was in the interest of the South African government that UNITA not succumb to the Cubans and FAPLA – they were of the opinion that it would disrupt peace in Namibia and enable Umkhonto We Siswe (MK), the military wing of the ANC, to establish bases in Angola, creating entrance routes to South Africa from Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe. THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE In October FAPLA’s advancing 47th Brigade at the Lomba River, 40 kilometers south-east of Cuito, was all but destroyed in an attack by SADF forces hastening to UNITA’s rescue. Several other FAPLA brigades wilted under heavy bombardment but managed to retreat to Cuito, a minor town near the confluence of two rivers that constitute its name, set in the remote expanse of south- east Angola, a region the Portuguese referred to as the Land at the End of the Earth. Cuito could have been overrun then and there by the SADF, changing the strategic situation overnight. The interior of the country would have been opened up to domination by UNITA with Angola being split in half. But, for whatever reason, the SADF failed to seize the initiative. This allowed an initial contingent of 120 Cuban troops to rush to the town from Menongue, 150 kilometers to the north-west and help organize the defences. It is from this point in the battle that opinions and interpretations of events differ. How the battle is seen, depends on how the intention of the South African regime is perceived. However, the events that follow FAPLA’s retreat to Cuito are fairly clear. Following the battles at the Lomba River in November 1987, battles on 13 January and 14 and 15 February followed. On 23 March 1988 the SADF launched its last major attack on Cuito Cuanavale. The cuban forces: school of thought on the intentions and the outcomes of the battle One school of thought (supported by the ANC, Cuba, other liberation movements and several historians) is that South Africa’s decision to launch the attack was influenced by their intention to rescue UNITA and their want to seize the town of Cuito Cuanavale through the capture of the air force base. It is argued that the actions of the SADF prior to the 23 March 1988 are clear evidence of their determination to break-through to the town. The SADF forces attacked Cuito with the massive 155mm G-5 guns and staged attack after attack led by the crack 61st mechanized battalion, 32 Buffalo battalion, and later 4th SA Infantry group. On the 23rd March the battle reached a halt. In the words of 32 Batttalion commander, Colonel Jan Breytenbach. He writes: ‘ the Unita soldiers did a lot of dying that day’ and ‘the full weight of FAPLA’s defensive fire was brought down on the heads of [SADF] Regiment President Steyn and the already bleeding Unita .’ According to this view, the SADF failed in its intention and was successfully thwarted by the combined Angolan forces. This view is supported by Horace Campbell, Hasu Patel, P Gleijeses, Ronnie Kasrils and others. Read Ronnie Kasrils’s article on Cuito Cuanavale. The SADF forces: school of thought on the intentions and the outcomes of the battle The second school of thought maintains that the SADF had only limited objectives, namely, to halt the enemy at Cuito, to prevent its airstrip from being used, and then to retreat. Further action would have undermined negotiations between Cuba, Angola and South Africa, which began in London early in 1988 and continued in May in Brazzaville, Congo, and Cairo, Egypt. By this time, the South African government had already recognised the political change in Russia and the ending of the cold war. Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, stated that the most important battle in the campaign was when the Cubans were defeated at the Lomba River and Cuito Cuanavale was simply part of a mopping up operation after this battle. This view is also supported by Gen. Magnus Malan, South African minister of defence at the time. Following this the SADF’s intention was to prevent the capture of Mavinga and through that prevent assaults on Jamba. This was successfully accomplished. This view is supported by the SADF and several historians such as Fred Bridgeland, W.M. James and others. In addition both SADF and military analyst’s statistics are mentioned contradicting claims of a victory. Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, quoted the following in support to this argument. |
Battle ready soldiers;
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CION pictures; 1st pic is NA soldier with an AK-74M with GP-34 grenade lunchers. 2nd pic is NA soldier with RPK (light machine gun).
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NA special force training in pakistan .... !
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NA Outpost on the front-line;
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NN. Pictures;
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PapiWata:Tnk's man |
Captured BH technicals and ZSU AA-guns.
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Continuation ;
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DISCOVERIES DURING TROOPS' ADVANCE TO BITA - Boko Haram food & fuel dumps, store for fertilizer used in making improvised explosive devices, police armoured personnel carrier, burnt police station, land loaders and the infamous human abbatoir where Boko Haram terrorists slaughter their captives.
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Battle Scenes picture !
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From the front lines;
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NAF PICTURES; The 1st picture,his an f7 armed with a 500kg unguided bomb,BH his in deep shit ! While 3rd pic is one of the six purchased pre-owned alpha jets with day and night capabilities(also armed with unguided bombs).
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CION PICTURES !
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KDF
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CONTINUATION The Kenyan invasion of southern Somalia, Operation Linda Nchi, came as no surprise. More than a year before the Kenyans rolled across the border, the country's foreign minister tried to gain US support for the invasion plan, but was curtly rebuffed. The Americans doubted that such a mission could be successful, and anyway preferred other, more indirect approaches to the Al-Shabaab problem.14 All the same, the US government knew of the plan to invade, as did Kenya's other Western partners – though they may not have known the precise timing.15 The question then must be what prompted the Kenyans to act at this time, and without the backing of their allies? According to Bruton and Williams, three factors conspired to determine Kenya's invasion: the chronic refugee crisis on its borders, worsened by famine, which was becoming a growing security concern; the evolving anxieties of regional insecurity, fuelled by Ugandan and Ethiopian concerns, and encouraged by AMISOM's success against Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu in August 2011; and the threat posed to Kenya's economy by the destabilization of the coastal regions through Al-Shabaab activities. The goal of Kenya's policy was to create a ‘friendly’ buffer-zone state in Jubaland that would work in Kenya's interests.16 Since at least 2009, the Kenyans had advanced a plan to infiltrate southern Somali with trained militia to undermine Al-Shabaab's influence and build an internal force against them. The United States trained elite Kenyan troops for this task, helping the country to establish a Ranger-style fighting force.17 In accord with this plan, the Kenyan military helped Azania, a rebel group led by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (also known as Mohamed Abdi Ghandi), a French-educated anthropologist, to enter southern Somalia and establish some kind of autonomous state. Azania is also an alternative name that some Kenyan politicians use for Jubaland. In April 2011, having completed training with the Kenyan army near Isiolo, the militia led by Ghandi and made up of Somali soldiers from Ogadeni clans began operations in southern Somalia.18 By then Kenya had trained a force of 3,000 Somali ‘counter- insurgents’, supplied with Chinese-manufactured weapons – though Ghandi had command of (at best) only 500 men.19 To open another front against Al-Shabaab, Kenya also supported the Ras Kamboni Brigade of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe.20 This group briefly took the town of Dhobley in April 2011.21 Madobe then had 600 men under arms. The actions of these surrogate forces and their supposed ‘successes’ are a matter of dispute. From the beginning, the Ethiopians objected to the Kenyan scheme as they feared it would give too much influence to Ogadeni activists sympathetic toward the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). But in adopting surrogate forces, the Kenyans saw themselves as following the Ethiopian example: since the 1960s, the Ethiopians have meddled in Somalia's internal politics by supporting dissident groups and cultivating militias,22 and since 2007 have focused this policy on securing their Ogaden border – combined with a forceful campaign against Somali insurgents throughout the Ogaden region.23 Ethiopia is home to 4 million ethnic Somalis,24 many of whom support the secessionist aims of local rebel movements. For Ethiopia, as for Kenya, foreign policy in Somalia has a strong domestic dimension – even though the two countries often disagree about how this should be managed. Kenya's invasion went ahead without the support of its most prominent Western allies, and without a common agreement with Ethiopia, which shares a border with Jubaland. As invasion turned into occupation, this would become a critical issue, but within a month of crossing the border the Kenyans appeared to have engineered broad-based diplomatic support. In November 2011, President Mwai Kibaki met his Ugandan counterpart, Yoweri Museveni, and Somalia's leader, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, in Nairobi. Declaring their unity in tackling the regional security threat presented by Al- Shabaab, their joint statement described this as an ‘historic opportunity’ to defeat Islamic terrorism.25 This announcement came one day before the meeting of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa, where the agreement was reached to incorporate Kenya's invading forces within the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) led by Uganda.26 At the same time, bilateral discussions between Kenya and Ethiopia resulted in an agreement on the support that Ethiopia might give against Al-Shabaab.27 The next week saw heavy Ethiopian military deployments moving toward Baidoa, protecting the northern flank of Kenya's advance, and the arming of local militias opposed to Al-Shabaab was stepped up.28 In December 2011, the Ethiopian intervention was strengthened, with soldiers of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) taking up strategic positions within southern and central Somalia until May 2012.29 In June 2012, the KDF signed the memorandum of agreement that formally incorporated them as part of AMISOM.30 By April 2013, Kenya had a total of 4,402 troops on the ground in southern Somalia, each being paid for by the EU at a rate of US$1,028 per month.31 The invaders had become peacekeepers – in name if not in deed. It was always the intention of the KDF's senior commanders that they would join the peacekeeping force.32 This brought considerable financial advantages, as well as greater professional experience through collaboration with other militaries. It also gave the invasion far stronger international legitimacy. Unwilling to be trammelled by the external influence of European paymasters, the Ethiopians continued to act only ‘in aid’ of AMISOM. Both armies, the KDF and the ENDF, understood that the campaign against Al- Shabaab might be protracted, and costly. The KDF's commander-in-chief, Karangi, was circumspect: ‘This campaign is not time bound’, he warned after two weeks of fighting. ‘When the Kenya government and the people of this country feel that they are safe enough from the Al-Shabaab menace, we shall pull back. Key success factors or indicators will be in the form of a highly degraded Al-Shabaab capacity.’33 This, of course, was an easier position to adopt knowing that the EU would pay, and not the Kenyan exchequer.34 Wider economic issues also loomed large. On 8 November 2011, The Guardian reported that the Kenyan invasion was intended to secure the coastal region and to establish Lamu as a development port. This was linked to plans for a second ‘transport corridor’ across Kenya, exploiting a potential outlet for oil from South Sudan. According to the report, the port scheme, and connecting transport network, had already secured an investment of US$10 billion from the Chinese.35 These early reports have since been corroborated, and Kenya is now openly canvassing investors for its visionary schemes for the development of the northern districts, including the border region with southern Somalia.36 Add to this the discovery of substantial oil deposits near Lake Turkana, and oil exploration in several off- shore blocks within Kenya's disputed maritime waters with Somalia, and it is easy to see how economic arguments have gained traction in analysis of the invasion and its motivations.37 After many decades of neglect and disregard, Kenya is now pursuing the economic integration of its northern region, and the security of southern Somalia is a critical element in this. Having established the political and economic contexts of the intervention, let us consider the military aspect. Two Kenyan battalions, with armoured vehicles and air support, were deployed to Somalia at the start of Operation Linda Nchi. Additional troops have entered the country since then; by July 2014 there were 4,400 Kenya soldiers in southern Somalia and the Kenya navy was patrolling Jubaland's coastline.38 Avoiding full engagement, Al-Shabaab fighters retreated to defensive positions, ambushing the KDF whenever the opportunity arose. Kenyan air strikes sought to dislodge Al-Shabaab fighters from key towns, including Afmadow, and targeted training camps and supply bases, but with only limited success. The Kenyans progressed to within five kilometres of Afmadow five days into the invasion, where they later linked up with Madobe's Ras Kamboni forces and the Somali National Army (SNA) in early November, but it would be several months before they finally wrenched the town from Al-Shabaab control. There is little information on casualties and costs of the operations, with the Kenyan press preferring upbeat coverage of the war in the early months. However, estimates suggest that the first five months of the campaign cost the Kenyans $180 million,39 and that more than 50 Kenyan soldiers may have been killed.40 The Ethiopians, also circumspect in declaring losses in their struggles against Al-Shabaab, have acknowledged heavy casualties.41 It was not until August 2012 that the KDF finally came within striking distance of Kismayo. Though Al-Shabaab is known to receive funding from wealthy backers in the Muslim world,42 control of the lucrative trade through Kismayo's busy port was critical to their strong financial position. Al- Shabaab reputedly raised revenues of $25 million per annum from taxing Kismayo's trade.43 Sugar, cement, and some manufactured goods are imported into Kismayo, for onward illegal transportation to Kenya; the principal export has been charcoal, produced locally for shipment to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Al-Shabaab takes rents from the producers of charcoal in the areas it controls, taxing the vehicles bringing bagged charcoal to Kismayo, and also taxing exports leaving the port. Since 2007 this trade had grown markedly, despite international efforts to close the port. Many vessels discharging legal cargoes at Mogadishu afterwards docked in Kismayo to load illegal charcoal, to avoid returning from the Somali coast unladen.44 Accordingly, seizing the port of Kismayo was the KDF's primary objective, because in this way it hoped to destroy Al-Shabaab's economic strength and thus make it harder for it to sustain control in the rural areas of southern Somalia. The final assault, Operation Sledge Hammer, commenced at dawn on 28 September 2012 with an amphibious landing on Kismayo's northern beach – nearly a year after the Kenyans first crossed the border. There was little resistance, and the port was easily secured.45 This was heralded as the beginning of Al-Shabaab's demise,46 but in the months that followed nothing of the kind happened. Having made an orderly retreat from the port, Al-Shabaab regrouped at strategic points throughout Jubaland and the Shebelle Valley. Although they were spread thinly, they were effective in keeping the Kenyans locked into Kismayo, while harassing them every time they moved to extend the “liberation” through the rural areas. Al-Shabaab attacks in southern Somalia increased over the six months following the capture of Kismayo. From October to December 2012, there were 178 attacks, including 70 combat engagements, 39 grenade attacks and 43 assassinations of Somalis believed to be assisting the invaders or obstructing Al-Shabaab. In the next three months, to the end of March 2013, this increased to 192 attacks, of which 78 were combat engagements, 26 grenade attacks, and 52 assassinations.47 Over this period, Al-Shabaab recaptured several towns that had been “liberated” by the ENDF the previous year. Intelligence gathered in early 2013 suggested that Al-Shabaab's 5,000-strong militia was still largely intact and fully operational, that they had stockpiled weapons in anticipation of mounting a retaliatory assault once international forces had reduced in intensity, and that the loss of Kismayo made no difference to their capacity to function in southern Somalia.48 |
OPERATION LINDA NCHI "(KENYA @ WAR)" Kenya's invasion of southern Somalia, which began in October 2011, has turned into an occupation of attrition – while “blowback” from the invasion has consolidated in a series of deadly Al- Shabaab attacks within Kenya. This article reviews the background to the invasion, Operation Linda Nchi, and the prosecution of the war by Kenya's Defence Forces up to the capture of the city of Kismayo and the contest to control its lucrative port. The second section discusses Al-Shabaab's response, showing how the movement has reinvented itself to take the struggle into Kenya. We conclude that while the military defeat of Al- Shabaab in southern Somalia seems inevitable, such a victory may become irrelevant to Kenya's ability to make a political settlement with its Somali and wider Muslim communities at home. ON 16 OCTOBER 2011, KENYA'S armed forces invaded southern Somalia in the midst of a severe local famine and a regional drought. Their purpose was to capture the port city of Kismayo and to crush the Al-Shabaab Islamist militia.1 The first aim was accomplished after more than a year of slow progress and sometimes hard fighting, but with the second aim seemingly as remote as ever after a third year of war, the capture of Kismayo looks increasingly like a hollow victory. Al-Shabaab has reacted with gun, bomb, and grenade attacks against targets in Nairobi, Garissa, and other Kenya towns, most notorious among them the assault upon Nairobi's prestigious Westgate shopping mall.2 The “blowback” from the invasion is now having an impact on Kenya's troubled internal politics, with recent evidence from attacks on the coastal settlement of Mpeketoni to suggest that the Islamists are skilfully exploiting local political quarrels to further their own cause.3 While Kenya's citizens come to terms with the fact they are at war, their soldiers in southern Somalia are locked into a longer-term struggle for ascendancy in Jubaland. How long can Kenya sustain this war, and can victory be ensured? Al- Shabaab has lost its economic stronghold of Kismayo, has recently suffered the death in an American attack of its leading emir, Ahmed ‘Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr’ Godane, and has also been forced to retreat from its training base and operational headquarters at Barawe.4 The Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) force, capably led by Uganda, has undoubtedly gained significant ground against Al-Shabaab's mujahideen. Yet, despite its defeats, this Islamist organization remains a potent and dangerous force: it still controls much of the countryside of southern Somalia, hampering the movement of the Kenyan military and other components of AMISOM through regular ambushes5 – and, meanwhile, its affiliate Al-Hijra has proved capable of bringing the war back into Kenya.6 This article analyses the impact of the Kenyan invasion. It is argued that, far from sweeping Al- Shabaab into the sea, the intervention in southern Somalia has fuelled wider political dissent within Kenya. Building on the extensive literature on eastern Africa's recent jihadist struggles,7 we emphasize the capacity of the Islamist group to adapt and transform. The flexibility and responsiveness of Al-Shabaab in the past has transcended its internal factionalisms between nationalist and internationalist jihadi elements, enabling it to react speedily to opportunities, both economic and political, without allowing ideology to impede its progress.8 In common with other analysts – including Ken Menkhaus,9 Matt Bryden,10 and Paul D. Williams,11 in their recent publications – we therefore warn against a complacent view that posits AMISOM successes as ‘victory’ without considering what the future of Al- Shabaab is likely to be. Drawing upon studies of the politics of Kenya's Muslim communities,12 we suggest that Al-Shabaab is likely to exploit the deeply rooted disaffection amongst the peoples of the Kenya coast and north-east in gaining recruits to its banner. These affiliates may only see Al- Shabaab's black standard as a temporary flag of convenience, but that may be enough to incubate and evolve an Al-Shabaab-led insurgency within Kenya. The article begins with a review of Operation Linda Nchi, which saw the Kenyans capture the port of Kismayo. It then considers the ‘blowback’ of retaliatory attacks, including the massacre at Mpeketoni in June 2014, and the response of the security forces, which culminated in Operation Usalama Watch (launched in April 2014 in an effort to disrupt Al-Shabaab support within Kenya). The implication of our analysis, discussed in the concluding section, is that Al-Shabaab is reinventing itself to exploit the wider sense of economic and social grievance amongst Kenya's disadvantaged Muslim populations in its north- eastern and coastal provinces. The resilience of Al- Shabaab presents the key challenge: unless the Kenyan state radically changes its approach, this could prove to be a war that Kenya did not want, mostly to be fought on Kenyan soil.13 |
aariwa:I think I have posted pictures of Nigeria female soldiers on page "0" or "1". Anyway more will be coming on female combatants . |
CION PICTURES !
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andrewza:I like these part of your statement ;"if there is one thing I like from Russia it is there new heavy IFV and APCs". I agree with u on these ! |
mzilakazi:I don't know where you got your fake/amateur link from but forbes is number one all over in the world. Mzilakizi and SA's. Has there own website....! These is a man that as started its own rifenary in lekki-ajah axis. And to commence production 2020. And you are here saying his being overrated ! |
CION pictures
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