₦airaland Forum

Valthegreat:
You have bought OANDO yesterday and immediately started marketing it. Last week was JAPAULGOLD. This business no easy o!

Peter the babalaje of nsepa..

Importer n exporter..

[quote author=KarlTom post=138569755][/quote]No cast the thing na...

He doesn't know about that bank na

Mfunkynation:
Na wa for u ooo..
Jaiz bank no get evidence to support it movement?
Come on bro!

Valthegreat:
I think you are comparing 🍏 with 🍊. Compare apple with apple so that we will have a justifiable outcome. NCR is an old stock that has circulated properly into different hands both whales and retail investors so controlling the price can only work if all holders are in agreement just like FTGINSURE currently. But in the case of ZICHIS only the directors have the shares because of the listing by introduction. Just ask yourself this question, could the price have jumped this high if they listed by public offer? Very impossible because different holders will be happy to sell at different prices e.g #2.05 for quick ejaculators like Loco (LOL!), #2.30 for JIJOISTs like Ginalex, #3 for BILLIONAIRE preservers (deceivers) like Agba or even at #20 for Aradite holders like YMCY. With the picture painted above you can see that there will be liquidity at every junction and as such price manipulation will be impossible.

Kudos!
It is just obvious for anyone that has reasonable experience in the NGX and how it works to see clearly.

awesomeJ:
You're exactly right.
But let NGX have more robust regulations to avoid unnecessary issues.

From my days of programming backend engineering, we think of as many crazy scenarios as possible and make our logic accommodate them. That's how to build robust stable and sophisticated systems.

But even the most robust systems still have some weird, crazy, edge cases unhandled, what do you do then, simple, just push a new patch and have a new release/version.

If you had an app that's never been updated in the past 6 years, you can imagine how hectic your user experience would be.

So are these old NGX rules becoming, they need a little bit of refinement.

The market has changed significantly from what it was in 2019.


As a matter of fact, since the demutualization that gave birth to a stand alone Regco, the said company, whose core job is regulation has not even come up with a single new rule, not even an amendment to an old rule, yet the market keeps changing.

I put the larger blame on the NGX in this situation.

All these self-regulation when the holding structure goal is profiteering is just cosmetics, SEC should stand up to its mandate of protecting the investors as the sector regulator.

know posts to ignore and have your peace. peace and out

lionshare:
All these self-regulation when the holding structure goal is profiteering is just cosmetics, SEC should stand up to its mandate of protecting the investors as the sector regulator.

I agree.
But as the owner of the platform, they will still need their own rules which we partipants have to play by.

Mfunkynation:
Na wa for u ooo..
Jaiz bank no get evidence to support it movement?
Come on bro!

At least you can see what the insensitivity of NGX has caused.....reading different meanings to the suspension.
When I said NGX has a blame here, some are arguing......
Hopefully, market will put this behind and move ahead in coming days

Rates decision in less than 30 minutes.

My guess is either an outright cut of 50bps or an adjustment around the corridor that effectively delivers 100-150bps cut.

crownprince2017:
Who is buying Access, what is T.A saying? Osita, aj8 make una help check the entry level.

The Bottom Line First
Let me save you some reading. Based on a Free Cash Flow to Equity model discounted at a naira cost of equity of 28.5%, the intrinsic value of Access Holdings common shares sits in a range of ₦18 to ₦24 per share in the base case, with a downside scenario of ₦12–15 and an upside of ₦32–42 if management executes the recapitalization well and Nigeria's macro stabilizes.

What Access Holdings Actually Is
Before touching a single number, it helps to be precise about the business. Access Holdings Plc is a Nigerian financial holding company listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group. Its main engine is Access Bank Plc, one of the largest banks in Africa by total assets, which now sits at ₦52.2 trillion as of September 2025. The Group also runs Hydrogen Payment Services, AccessARM Pensions, Access Insurance Brokers, and Oxygen X Finance. In practice, virtually all the earnings come from the bank. The holding company itself generated profit before tax of ₦141.7 billion for the nine months, essentially all of it dividends and management fees from its subsidiaries.

The bank makes money the old-fashioned way: it takes deposits at one rate, lends and invests at a higher rate, and keeps the spread. Interest income calculated using the effective interest rate came in at ₦2,744,815 million for the nine months to September 2025, and interest income on financial assets at fair value through profit or loss added another ₦159,405 million, giving total interest income of ₦2,904,220 million. Against that, interest expense was ₦1,646,281 million, producing net interest income of ₦1,257,940 million. That net interest income line grew 49% year-on-year, which is the headline number that makes this bank look interesting right now. Fee and commission income added ₦600,404 million on the gross line, offset by fee expenses of ₦124,486 million, leaving net fee and commission income of ₦475,919 million — up 44% year-on-year. That combination of NII and fee growth is genuinely strong underlying performance.
The problem is what sits below those lines. Net impairment charges came in at ₦349,985 million for the nine months, up 141% from ₦144,949 million in the same period last year. That surge in provisioning ate heavily into the pre-provision profit. Fair value and foreign exchange gains collapsed to ₦255,400 million from ₦548,376 million the prior year, a drop of 53.5%, because the massive naira devaluation tailwinds of 2023–2024 have largely passed. Profit before tax came in at ₦616,248 million, up just 10.4% despite the strong revenue growth, because the combination of higher impairments and lower FX gains absorbed most of the income gains. After tax of ₦168,700 million, the effective rate of which works out to 27.4%, profit for the period was ₦447,548 million. Profit attributable to equity holders of the parent was ₦426,702 million.

Cleaning the Numbers
Raw reported profit is not the right starting point for a valuation. Two major distortions need to be addressed before we can talk about earnings power.

First, fair value and FX gains are volatile and partly non-recurring. The nine-month figure of ₦255,400 million in 2025 compares to ₦548,376 million in 2024. Neither number is a reliable guide to the future. The 2024 figure was inflated by the naira devaluation cycle; the 2025 figure is more normalized but still includes mark-to-market movements that can swing sharply. I normalize this line to ₦150,000 million annually, which represents roughly 5% of gross earnings and reflects a reasonable mid-cycle contribution from a bank with active treasury and derivatives operations.

Second, the impairment charge. The ₦349,985 million figure for nine months, annualized to roughly ₦467 billion, reflects an acceleration that is partly cyclical as the loan book reprices following the 2023 naira depreciation and partly structural as the loan book grew 30% year-on-year. Loans and advances to customers stood at ₦12,894,263 million at September 2025, up from ₦8,037,723 million at December 2023. Fast loan growth with a two-year seasoning lag means 2025–2026 impairments are elevated by design. I normalize impairments to ₦280,000 million for a nine-month period, representing a mid-cycle credit cost of roughly 2.5% of average loans, which is consistent with Nigerian bank history outside of crisis years.

With those two adjustments applied — reducing FX/fair value gains to ₦112,500 million for nine months and reducing impairment charges to ₦280,000 million — normalized pre-tax income comes to approximately ₦525,000 million for the nine months, or roughly ₦700,000 million annualized. At a 28% normalized effective tax rate, normalized net income runs at approximately ₦504,000 million per year. I will use ₦490,000 million as my working normalized net income figure, applying a small additional haircut for conservatism.
For a bank, the analog to EBIT is Pre-Provision Operating Income, which strips out impairments to show the underlying earnings power of the franchise before credit cycle noise. PPOI for nine months 2025 calculates as net interest income of ₦1,257,940 million plus net fee and commission income of ₦475,919 million plus normalized other income of ₦150,000 million minus personnel expenses of ₦358,563 million minus depreciation and amortization of ₦91,320 million minus other operating expenses of ₦714,197 million, giving ₦719,779 million for nine months or approximately ₦960,000 million annualized. That is a genuinely strong franchise-level earnings number.

Capital Productivity: Is This Bank Creating or Destroying Value?
The central question in any bank valuation is whether return on equity exceeds the cost of equity. If it does, growth creates value. If it does not, growth destroys value and shareholders would be better served by a high payout policy.
Access Holdings' total equity attributable to the parent at September 2025 was ₦3,725,478 million. The opening equity at January 2025 was ₦3,544,295 million. Using the opening equity as the denominator, annualized profit attributable to equity holders of approximately ₦568,936 million (scaling the nine-month figure of ₦426,702 million) produces a return on equity of 568,936 divided by 3,544,295, which equals 16.1%. On normalized earnings of ₦490,000 million, the normalized ROE sits at roughly 490,000 / 3,544,295 = 13.8%.
The five-year trajectory of ROE tells an important story. In 2020 profit attributable to equity holders was ₦104,683 million against an approximate average equity of ₦680,000 million, implying ROE of around 15.4%. In 2021 it was ₦158,208 million against roughly ₦900,000 million, for 17.6%. In 2022 it fell to ₦153,790 million against about ₦1,140,000 million for 13.5%, as the post-merger integration of Diamond Bank's legacy assets weighed on returns. In 2023 reported ROE spiked to roughly 35.9% on reported profit of ₦612,492 million, but that is entirely explained by the massive foreign exchange translation gains from naira devaluation — stripping those out, underlying ROE was closer to 14–15%. In 2024 reported ROE was approximately 21.5% on profit of ₦618,637 million, again boosted by FX. Normalizing for these distortions, the underlying ROE has been relatively stable at 13–16% throughout the five years. It is not a high-return franchise but it is a consistent one, and at this scale that consistency is worth something.

Reinvestment and the Capital Trap
Here is where the story gets complicated and where I think most retail analysts miss the key issue with Access Holdings.
The bank's total assets grew from ₦41,498,015 million at December 2024 to ₦52,195,257 million at September 2025, an increase of ₦10,697,242 million or 25.8% in just nine months. Loans and advances to customers grew from ₦11,487,710 million to ₦12,894,263 million, a ₦1,406,553 million increase, and deposits from customers exploded from ₦22,524,925 million to ₦33,101,559 million, an increase of ₦10,576,634 million. The bank is taking in deposits at an extraordinary rate and deploying them into investment securities (up from ₦11,343,195 million to ₦15,250,810 million) and loans.

The problem is that this asset growth requires equity capital to support it under CBN capital adequacy requirements. If the bank maintains an equity-to-assets ratio of approximately 7.6% (which is where it currently sits: 3,979,472 / 52,195,257 = 7.6%), then ₦10,697 billion of asset growth requires ₦10,697 billion × 7.6% = approximately ₦813,000 million of new equity per year. But the bank is only retaining approximately ₦217,000 million in equity after dividends and AT1 coupon payments (calculated as: profit for the period of ₦447,548 million minus dividends of ₦101,809 million minus AT1 coupon of ₦107,628 million = ₦238,111 million, less NCI share). The gap between equity needed and equity generated is large. This is why the company periodically needs to raise capital and why the CBN's new minimum capital requirements of ₦500 billion for international commercial banks are a live issue.

For the sustainable growth rate calculation, I use the retention ratio multiplied by ROE. After paying the ordinary dividend of ₦101,809 million and the AT1 coupon of ₦107,628 million against profit attributable to equity holders of ₦426,702 million, retained profit is ₦217,265 million, giving a retention ratio of 217,265 / 426,702 = 50.9%, which I round to 51%. Applying that to the normalized ROE of 15% gives a sustainable nominal growth rate of 51% × 15% = 7.65%. In naira nominal terms this is well below the 25% balance sheet growth actually being pursued, which confirms that the bank is growing beyond what internal capital generation can support and will need external equity periodically.

The Cost of Equity: Why This Number Dominates Everything
If there is one input that dominates this valuation above all others, it is the cost of equity. Let me be very explicit about the calculation.
The risk-free rate is the Nigerian Federal Government bond yield. As of late 2025, ten-year FGN bonds trade at approximately 18.5%, and I use that as the risk-free rate. The equity risk premium has two components: the base US equity risk premium, which Damodaran estimates at approximately 4.6% for a mature market, and the Nigeria-specific country risk premium. Damodaran's approach values the country risk premium using the sovereign credit default spread scaled by the relative equity market volatility. For Nigeria in 2025, this country risk premium works out to approximately 7.9%, giving a total equity risk premium of 4.6% + 7.9% = 12.5%.

For the beta, I use a bottom-up approach. Nigerian commercial banks historically have betas relative to the NGX in the range of 0.75 to 0.90. Access Holdings is the largest bank by assets, which gives it high systemic exposure to Nigerian macro, but its pan-African diversification across 17+ countries provides some offset. I use a beta of 0.80, which is reasonable for a large-cap systemically important bank.
Putting it together: cost of equity = 18.5% + (0.80 × 12.5%) = 18.5% + 10.0% = 28.5%. This is in naira nominal terms. In USD real terms, applying a naira depreciation assumption of 10–12% per year and adjusting for the inflation differential, the equivalent USD cost of equity is roughly 12–14%, which is consistent with how international investors value frontier and emerging market banks. Both approaches reach similar conclusions about intrinsic value when applied correctly.

The sensitivity of the valuation to this number cannot be overstated. At 26% cost of equity, intrinsic value rises to roughly ₦28–30/share. At 31%, it falls to ₦14–16/share. I will return to this in the scenarios.

Building the FCFE Model and Discounting It
For a bank, Free Cash Flow to Equity is simply the cash that can be paid out to shareholders after retaining enough earnings to support future growth while maintaining adequate capital ratios. The formula is: FCFE = Net Income − Equity Reinvestment Required.
In the near term, as established above, FCFE is negative or near zero because the bank is growing its balance sheet far faster than retained earnings can fund. Annualized net income is approximately ₦568,936 million, but equity reinvestment needed to support 25% asset growth is approximately ₦813,000 million, implying negative FCFE of roughly ₦244,000 million. This is not a distress signal — it is what fast-growing banks look like. The bank funds the gap through deposit growth and wholesale borrowings, which is visible in the ₦10.6 trillion surge in customer deposits. But it does mean shareholders receive minimal free cash in the near term, which depresses current intrinsic value.

Looking forward across a three-phase model, Phase 1 covers 2025 through 2027 with net income growing at 15–18% per year in naira nominal terms as the high interest rate environment and loan book seasoning continue to compound. Net income reaches approximately ₦660,000 million in 2026 and ₦760,000 million in 2027. Asset growth slows toward 15–18% as the deposit surge normalizes, reducing equity reinvestment needs. FCFE in this phase is approximately ₦170,000 to ₦240,000 million per year. Phase 2 from 2028 through 2031 sees growth tapering toward 10–12% as the rate cycle turns and the loan book matures. Net income reaches ₦850,000 to ₦1,030,000 million by 2030, with asset growth slowing to 12%. FCFE expands meaningfully to ₦310,000–₦450,000 million as reinvestment needs shrink relative to income. In the stable phase from 2032 onward, I assume perpetual growth of 8% in naira nominal terms, which is roughly Nigeria's long-run nominal GDP trajectory. Terminal FCFE is approximately ₦660,000 million.

Discounting the Phase 1 and Phase 2 FCFE streams back at 28.5% produces a present value of approximately ₦820,000 million. This is the meat of the valuation — actual cash deliverable to shareholders before the terminal value.
The terminal value is calculated as ₦660,000 million divided by (0.22 − 0.08), where 0.22 is the stable-phase cost of equity (which I allow to compress from 28.5% as Nigeria's macro presumably stabilizes over a decade) and 0.08 is the terminal growth rate. That gives a terminal value of ₦660,000 / 0.14 = ₦4,714,286 million. I discount this terminal value back eight years at a blended rate reflecting the transition from 28.5% to 22%, applying a discount factor of approximately 0.090, giving a present value of terminal value of ₦4,714,286 × 0.090 = ₦424,286 million. Note that the terminal value only contributes 34% of total equity value (424,286 / 1,244,286), which is actually encouraging — it means the valuation is not being carried by heroic assumptions about the distant future.

Total equity value = ₦820,000 + ₦424,286 = ₦1,244,286 million.
Dividing by 53,317,838,433 shares outstanding gives ₦1,244,286,000,000 / 53,317,838,433 = ₦23.34 per share before the AT1 adjustment. The Additional Tier 1 Capital of ₦206,355 million is a perpetual instrument with a discretionary coupon that ranks ahead of ordinary equity in distributions — economically it behaves like senior equity and its coupon (₦107,628 million paid in nine months, annualized to roughly ₦143,000 million) is a claim ahead of ordinary shareholders. Deducting the AT1 capital of ₦206,355 million from total equity value and dividing by shares gives an adjusted intrinsic value per share of (₦1,244,286 − ₦206,355) / 53,317.8 = ₦1,037,931 / 53,317.8 = ₦19.47 per share in the base case.

Sanity Check: What Do the Multiples Say?
It is worth pausing here to verify that these numbers make sense relative to market comparables.
At an intrinsic value of ₦1,244,286 million for total equity, the implied price-to-normalized earnings multiple is ₦1,244,286 / ₦490,000 = 2.5x. Nigerian bank P/E multiples have historically ranged from 2x to 6x, with the large banks typically at 3–5x in normal years, so 2.5x is conservative but not unreasonable given the current rate environment and capital cycle. The implied price-to-book on tangible equity of ₦3,308,010 million (total equity less intangibles of ₦417,468 million) is ₦1,244,286 / ₦3,308,010 = 0.38x. This compares to GTCO at roughly 0.8–1.1x tangible book, Zenith at 0.5–0.7x, and UBA at 0.3–0.5x. At 0.38x, Access Holdings is priced cheaper than GTCO and Zenith but roughly in line with UBA. That relative positioning feels approximately right: Access is a larger, faster-growing franchise than UBA but arguably less capital-efficient than GTCO in the near term.

The price-to-Pre-Provision Operating Income comes out at ₦1,244,286 / ₦960,000 = 1.3x, meaning you are paying 1.3 years of franchise-level earnings before credit costs. For a bank with a 15-year+ track record of surviving multiple Nigerian currency and macro crises, that seems like a modest price if you believe the impairment cycle is near its peak.

The Three Scenarios in Full
The base case as derived above gives ₦19–24 per share with central estimate ₦19.47 after the AT1 adjustment. This assumes normalized ROE of 14–15%, COE declining from 28.5% to 22% over ten years, terminal growth of 8%, and terminal FCFE of ₦660,000 million.
The downside case assumes that the CBN recapitalization exercise forces Access Holdings to raise significant new equity at or below book value, diluting the per-share economics materially. If the bank raises ₦500,000 million in new equity at current prices, it would add approximately 15–20 billion new shares to the float, diluting intrinsic value per share by roughly 25–30%. Simultaneously, if the new capital is deployed into lower-return assets than the existing book — which is common in forced recapitalizations — normalized ROE compresses to 12%. Running the model with 12% ROE, 28.5% COE throughout (no compression assumed if Nigeria deteriorates), and 6% terminal growth gives a terminal value of ₦360,000 / (0.28 − 0.06) = ₦360,000 / 0.22 = ₦1,636,364 million and a present value of approximately ₦147,000 million. Adding discounted Phase 1–2 FCFE of roughly ₦480,000 million gives total equity value of approximately ₦627,000 million, or about ₦11.76 per share on the diluted share count. This is the ₦12–15 range I cited at the top.

The upside case assumes the recapitalization is successfully executed at attractive terms, new capital is deployed into high-return opportunities across the African network at ROE of 17–18%, and Nigeria's macro stabilizes sufficiently to allow the COE to compress to 20% in the terminal phase. Terminal FCFE rises to ₦900,000 million on higher earnings. Terminal value becomes ₦900,000 / (0.20 − 0.10) = ₦900,000 / 0.10 = ₦9,000,000 million, with present value of approximately ₦810,000 million. Discounted Phase 1–2 FCFE of ₦1,200,000 million gives total equity value of roughly ₦2,010,000 million, or ₦37.69 per share. This is the ₦32–42 range.

What Could Break This and What Would Prove It Right
The three risks that could push the stock to the downside scenario or below are all related to things outside management's control. A renewed sharp naira devaluation — not the gradual depreciation modeled here but a step-down of 30–40% in a single CBN intervention — would cause massive mark-to-market losses on the naira-denominated loan book and trigger a new round of provisioning. The FX translation reserve already shows a cumulative loss of ₦707,555 million at September 2025 (down from ₦979,653 million at January 2025), meaning the bank has already absorbed ₦272,098 million in unrealized FX losses this year alone. Another sharp devaluation would hit both the P&L and regulatory capital simultaneously. The second risk is a credit cycle following the loan book's rapid growth. Loans grew from ₦5,100,807 million in December 2022 to ₦12,894,263 million in September 2025, a 152% increase in less than three years. Bank loan books typically season over 24–36 months, meaning the NPL cycle from loans originated in 2023 and 2024 would peak in 2025–2027. The 141% surge in impairment charges in 2025 may be the beginning of that cycle, not the end of it. Third, the recapitalization. The CBN's directive requiring international commercial banks to reach a minimum capital base of ₦500,000 million creates meaningful dilution risk if Access needs to raise external capital in a challenging market environment.

What would prove the bull case right is simpler: watch the impairment charge. If Q4 2025 and Q1 2026 impairments stabilize or decline from the Q3 run rate of ₦119,915 million per quarter, the credit cycle is passing and normalized earnings of ₦490,000 million or higher are achievable. Watch the capital raise: if Access successfully issues new equity at prices above ₦20/share, it validates the intrinsic value and signals management confidence. And watch the NII margin: with CBN rates likely to begin declining in 2026, the question is how much of the 49% NII growth is rate-driven versus volume-driven. If volume accounts for the majority, the franchise is building durable earnings power.

Final Thought
Access Holdings is one of those situations where the math looks cheap but the uncertainty is high enough that it should not be a large position for anyone without a clear view on Nigerian macro. At ₦19–24/share, you are paying about 0.38x tangible book for a bank that earns 14–16% on equity, has grown total assets at a compounded 25%+ over five years, and operates the most geographically diversified banking network in sub-Saharan Africa. The normalized earnings yield at the base case valuation is approximately 39% in naira terms, which is compelling on paper. The catch is that 28.5% of that is consumed by the cost of equity before you see a real return. The margin of safety is real but not enormous. At ₦15 or below, it would be difficult to make a bearish case on a five-year view. At ₦30 or above, the upside scenario would need to materialize in full to justify holding. Somewhere in between is where the honest answer lives.

Numbers first, narratives later.
-- ositadima1

This is based on the last Q3 unaudited financial reports. Since the information is quite lengthy and takes up a lot of space, please let me know if you would like me to delete it.

awesomeJ:
You're exactly right.
But let NGX have more robust regulations to avoid unnecessary issues.

From my days of programming backend engineering, we think of as many crazy scenarios as possible and make our logic accommodate them. That's how to build robust stable and sophisticated systems.

But even the most robust systems still have some weird, crazy, edge cases unhandled, what do you do then, simple, just push a new patch and have a new release/version.

If you had an app that's never been updated in the past 6 years, you can imagine how hectic your user experience would be.

So are these old NGX rules becoming, they need a little bit of refinement.

The market has changed significantly from what it was in 2019.


As a matter of fact, since the demutualization that gave birth to a stand alone Regco, the said company, whose core job is regulation has not even come up with a single new rule, not even an amendment to an old rule, yet the market keeps changing.

I put the larger blame on the NGX in this situation.

NGX know they have a fault.
They literally said it indirectly in the video that the float Issue has caused them bad names. So they will begin with Zichis this new year 2026 to enforce it from the get-go for any new company..



NGX still have lingering issues with Prestige, UPDC, etc...long after listing.

It may look like a double standard thing. But it's more like pushing forward to avoid such issues from any listed company from 2026.

MPC, for those interested:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CMPeMKMsbUs

yMcy56:
At least you can see what the insensitivity of NGX has caused.....reading different meanings to the suspension.
It's generally affecting the market.
When I said NGX has a blame here, some are arguing......
Hopefully, market will put this behind and move ahead in coming days

You may have a good point, but still mixing up the issues.
NGX has a blame, does not mean that Zichis has done nothing wrong or has no blame (as per the rules of NGX) and should not have been suspended or penalised.

Truly, NGX has a blame. But Zichis too should be penalized.
I would have preferred NGX fines the directors like N20billion, because I know some innocent investors may have been affected by the suspension.

I was on point!
50 bps cut!

The N0.07kobo dividend is why it is riding high. Okay o!

megawealth01:
He doesn't know about that bank na

awesomeJ:
Rates decision in less than 30 minutes.

My guess is either an outright cut of 50bps or an adjustment around the corridor that effectively delivers 100-150bps cut.

Hope they won't retain again

Reserves at 13 year high of $50.4bn as of 16th February

Another 3 months before the next meeting. Scheduled for May.

Thank you so much for sharing your analyses - please do not delete! I usually re-read few times "until it sticks" (or sometimes with your work and Bovali, and few others, I do screenshots and save them locally.

ositadima1:


This is based on the last Q3 unaudited financial reports. Since the information is quite lengthy and takes up a lot of space, please let me know if you would like me to delete it.

ositadima1:


This is based on the last Q3 unaudited financial reports. Since the information is quite lengthy and takes up a lot of space, please let me know if you would like me to delete it.

Better collaborate and publish articles on journals as well.

awesomeJ:
Another 3 months before the next meeting. Scheduled for May.

Abeg is rate going up, down or sideways?

Meanwhile where are all those people that were saying bank money is fake money?

Zenith bank up over 50% from date of that discussion (AND STILL RISING)

Anyway fundamentally sound stocks are rallying. Speculative stocks are getting slaughtered. All is well with the world. Shalom!

mikeapollo:
You may have a good point, but still mixing up the issues.
NGX has a blame, does not mean that Zichis has done nothing wrong or has no blame (as per the rules of NGX) and should not have been suspended or penalised.

Truly, NGX has a blame. But Zichis too should be penalized.
I would have preferred NGX fines the directors like N20billion, because I know some innocent investors may have been affected by the suspension.

Why did you keep repeating same thing or going in circles here?
Where did I say ZICHIS has no blame or has done nothing wrong?
What actually is your issues with ZICHIS?

If NGX had sit up and address the free float issues, ZICHIS wouldn't have flouted the rule in the first place.
When listed, the 20% should have been enforced while NGX monitor for compliance.

What is NGX looking at that a stock did straight +10% for a month in the first place?
Where's the penalty for the officer(s) that's supposed to oversee that ZICHIS complied?

NGX leaving the affair of a newly listed company totally in the hands of brokers is wrong.....
What do you expect from a broker who is a trader, an investor with lots of customers that can generate revenue?

Abeg, I'm not replying on this issue again.
Anything they wan do let them do it.....my own be say, there has been a lot of negligence of duty on the part of NGX, let her sit up.

nosa2:
Abeg is rate going up, down or sideways?

Meanwhile where are all those people that were saying bank money is fake money?

Zenith bank up over 50% from date of that discussion (AND STILL RISING)

Anyway fundamentally sound stocks are rallying. Speculative stocks are getting slaughtered. All is well with the world. Shalom!

slightly downwards.

This is exactly what our market needs. Only banking stocks should still be going up for now.

megawealth01:

The debt situation is unbelievable, even after removing subsidy which everybody said was the main problem draining the govt's purse.
Only God will help us in this country.

NB:
I don't have any preference for any party nor candidate.
I only assess the persons in power/govt who are ruling at any point in time because I pay my taxes to them.

Jagaban for a reason

mikeapollo:
The debt situation is unbelievable, even after removing subsidy which everybody said was the main problem draining the govt's purse.
Only God will help us in this country.

NB:
I don't have any preference for any party nor candidate.
I only assess the persons in power/govt who are ruling at any point in time because I pay my taxes to them.

yMcy56:
Why did you keep repeating same thing or going in circles here?
Where did I say ZICHIS has no blame or has done nothing wrong?
What actually is your issues with ZICHIS?

If NGX had sit up and address the free float issues, ZICHIS wouldn't have flouted the rule in the first place.
When listed, the 20% should have been enforced while NGX monitor for compliance.

What is NGX looking at that a stock did straight +10% for a month in the first place?
Where's the penalty for the officer(s) that's supposed to oversee that ZICHIS complied?

NGX leaving the affair of a newly listed company totally in the hands of brokers is wrong.....
What do you expect from a broker who is a trader, an investor with lots of customers that can generate revenue?

Abeg, I'm not replying on this issue again.
Anything they wan do let them do it.....my own be say, there has been a lot of negligence of duty on the part of NGX, let her sit up.

@Mummy wa, it is okay.
NGX messed up.!
But all the issuers coming to NGX, whether Otedola, Wale, 1st Alhaji, 2ndAlhaji, Zichis, NCR, MTN etc. must play by the rules. They owe us that as a minimum. .

mikeapollo:
You may have a good point, but still mixing up the issues.
NGX has a blame, does not mean that Zichis has done nothing wrong or has no blame (as per the rules of NGX) and should not have been suspended or penalised.

Truly, NGX has a blame. But Zichis too should be penalized.
I would have preferred NGX fines the directors like N20billion, because I know some innocent investors may have been affected by the suspension.

To buttress my point, there are lots of stocks on NGX that has free float less than 20%, some less than 10%....
There's one I know with 0%...

* These are companies that has been listed for donkey years...
* What has NGX been doing since all these years without addressing this?

* See Premier Paints for instance, since the day suspension was lifted, more than 2wks if I'm right, no trading going on there....
Let's even assume the holders might have write it off....
What about the directors holding the large chunks of the shares?
Who is liaison with NGX, submitting the Financial Reports until the suspension was lifted?
Why was free float not addressed till now? Etc..