₦airaland Forum

mikeapollo:
@Mummy wa, it is okay.
NGX messed up.!
But all the issuers coming to NGX, whether Otedola, Wale, 1st Alhaji, 2ndAlhaji, Zichis, NCR, MTN etc. must play by the rules. They owe us that as a minimum. .

megawealth01:
In which country?

mikeapollo:
@Mummy wa, it is okay.
NGX messed up.!
But all the issuers coming to NGX, whether Otedola, Wale, 1st Alhaji, 2ndAlhaji, Zichis, NCR, MTN etc. must play by the rules. They owe us that as a minimum. .

mikeapollo:

TerraCota:
Thank you so much for sharing your analyses - please do not delete! I usually re-read few times "until it sticks" (or sometimes with your work and Bovali, and few others, I do screenshots and save them locally.

ositadima1:


This is based on the last Q3 unaudited financial reports. Since the information is quite lengthy and takes up a lot of space, please let me know if you would like me to delete it.

ositadima1:
This is FCMB’s take.

megawealth01:
Who of the names you mentioned doesn't manipulate this market?

mikeapollo:
If their shares are well established in the NGX, well circulated in the hands of investors, and maybe Otedola raises the price from e.g. N20 to N1000, all the investors would benefit. It happened in Geregu, FBN etc. Other investors are also selling/buying too so it is difficult to challenge the price moves.
Chop I chop man no go vex now. The meaning of market is ''you chop I chop''.
But who be Zichis to just appear only one month ago and take everybody for a ride just like that?
Pikin wey never even get leg for NGX sef!

nosa2:
Analysts should continue dancing tombolo tombolo. We are here for them. Thank God they have not started upgrading my next target

mikeapollo:
I remember this dance.
Which ''tombolo'' be your won? D'Banj or Obesere Abasido?

nosa2:
Na Obesere

mikeapollo:
If Oando likes, let it close on ''overflow bid''!
Seems you only see stocks that would close on full bid only after you buy them!

Is it monkey hunting?

SonofElElyonRet:
Which penny stocks have the greatest likelihood of huge capital appreciation right now.. ?
Loco's pitch I think I already know... ROLYALEX
Others are free to give their opinion

mikeapollo:
If Oando likes, let it close on ''overflow bid''!
Seems you only see stocks that would close on full bid only after you buy them!

Is it monkey hunting?

deathwing:
Ellahlakes, once they announce something

SonofElElyonRet:
Which penny stocks have the greatest likelihood of huge capital appreciation right now.. ?
Loco's pitch I think I already know... ROLYALEX
Others are free to give their opinion

Stockpromoter:
Peterichy u sure say you no go vomit wetin you swallow for Japaul inside oando train.

E be like Regulators don begin check something for that right issue.

You fit turn to medium term investor there if you no do strong advert

mikeapollo:
Insurance stocks (N1-N2) and Japaul.
May2026 seems far away, but once Japaul announces commencement of gold processing, there will be another rally.

2026 Q1 is around the corner....Access Bank will not stay at N20+ for long. It should be around N40

Stockpromoter:
I nagba lika lika nefu.
Cheretu ka nke emere juo oyi.

PETERiCHY:
Before ACCESSNK will finally MOVE above #30
WATCHOUT for a very SHARP DROP to circa #20 in order to SHAKE-OUT WEAK HANDS.

BARGAIN HUNTERS TAKE NOTE!

SonofElElyonRet:
Which penny stocks have the greatest likelihood of huge capital appreciation right now.. ?
Loco's pitch I think I already know... ROLYALEX
Others are free to give their opinion

deathwing:
Ellahlakes, once they announce something

ositadima1:
The Cost of Equity: Why This Number Dominates Everything
If there is one input that dominates this valuation above all others, it is the cost of equity. Let me be very explicit about the calculation.
The risk-free rate is the Nigerian Federal Government bond yield. As of late 2025, ten-year FGN bonds trade at approximately 18.5%, and I use that as the risk-free rate. The equity risk premium has two components: the base US equity risk premium, which Damodaran estimates at approximately 4.6% for a mature market, and the Nigeria-specific country risk premium. Damodaran's approach values the country risk premium using the sovereign credit default spread scaled by the relative equity market volatility. For Nigeria in 2025, this country risk premium works out to approximately 7.9%, giving a total equity risk premium of 4.6% + 7.9% = 12.5%.

For the beta, I use a bottom-up approach. Nigerian commercial banks historically have betas relative to the NGX in the range of 0.75 to 0.90. Access Holdings is the largest bank by assets, which gives it high systemic exposure to Nigerian macro, but its pan-African diversification across 17+ countries provides some offset. I use a beta of 0.80, which is reasonable for a large-cap systemically important bank.
Putting it together: cost of equity = 18.5% + (0.80 × 12.5%) = 18.5% + 10.0% = 28.5%. This is in naira nominal terms. In USD real terms, applying a naira depreciation assumption of 10–12% per year and adjusting for the inflation differential, the equivalent USD cost of equity is roughly 12–14%, which is consistent with how international investors value frontier and emerging market banks. Both approaches reach similar conclusions about intrinsic value when applied correctly.

The sensitivity of the valuation to this number cannot be overstated. At 26% cost of equity, intrinsic value rises to roughly ₦28–30/share. At 31%, it falls to ₦14–16/share. I will return to this in the scenarios.

Building the FCFE Model and Discounting It
For a bank, Free Cash Flow to Equity is simply the cash that can be paid out to shareholders after retaining enough earnings to support future growth while maintaining adequate capital ratios. The formula is: FCFE = Net Income − Equity Reinvestment Required.
In the near term, as established above, FCFE is negative or near zero because the bank is growing its balance sheet far faster than retained earnings can fund. Annualized net income is approximately ₦568,936 million, but equity reinvestment needed to support 25% asset growth is approximately ₦813,000 million, implying negative FCFE of roughly ₦244,000 million. This is not a distress signal — it is what fast-growing banks look like. The bank funds the gap through deposit growth and wholesale borrowings, which is visible in the ₦10.6 trillion surge in customer deposits. But it does mean shareholders receive minimal free cash in the near term, which depresses current intrinsic value.

Looking forward across a three-phase model, Phase 1 covers 2025 through 2027 with net income growing at 15–18% per year in naira nominal terms as the high interest rate environment and loan book seasoning continue to compound. Net income reaches approximately ₦660,000 million in 2026 and ₦760,000 million in 2027. Asset growth slows toward 15–18% as the deposit surge normalizes, reducing equity reinvestment needs. FCFE in this phase is approximately ₦170,000 to ₦240,000 million per year. Phase 2 from 2028 through 2031 sees growth tapering toward 10–12% as the rate cycle turns and the loan book matures. Net income reaches ₦850,000 to ₦1,030,000 million by 2030, with asset growth slowing to 12%. FCFE expands meaningfully to ₦310,000–₦450,000 million as reinvestment needs shrink relative to income. In the stable phase from 2032 onward, I assume perpetual growth of 8% in naira nominal terms, which is roughly Nigeria's long-run nominal GDP trajectory. Terminal FCFE is approximately ₦660,000 million.

Discounting the Phase 1 and Phase 2 FCFE streams back at 28.5% produces a present value of approximately ₦820,000 million. This is the meat of the valuation — actual cash deliverable to shareholders before the terminal value.
The terminal value is calculated as ₦660,000 million divided by (0.22 − 0.08), where 0.22 is the stable-phase cost of equity (which I allow to compress from 28.5% as Nigeria's macro presumably stabilizes over a decade) and 0.08 is the terminal growth rate. That gives a terminal value of ₦660,000 / 0.14 = ₦4,714,286 million. I discount this terminal value back eight years at a blended rate reflecting the transition from 28.5% to 22%, applying a discount factor of approximately 0.090, giving a present value of terminal value of ₦4,714,286 × 0.090 = ₦424,286 million. Note that the terminal value only contributes 34% of total equity value (424,286 / 1,244,286), which is actually encouraging — it means the valuation is not being carried by heroic assumptions about the distant future.

Total equity value = ₦820,000 + ₦424,286 = ₦1,244,286 million.
Dividing by 53,317,838,433 shares outstanding gives ₦1,244,286,000,000 / 53,317,838,433 = ₦23.34 per share before the AT1 adjustment. The Additional Tier 1 Capital of ₦206,355 million is a perpetual instrument with a discretionary coupon that ranks ahead of ordinary equity in distributions — economically it behaves like senior equity and its coupon (₦107,628 million paid in nine months, annualized to roughly ₦143,000 million) is a claim ahead of ordinary shareholders. Deducting the AT1 capital of ₦206,355 million from total equity value and dividing by shares gives an adjusted intrinsic value per share of (₦1,244,286 − ₦206,355) / 53,317.8 = ₦1,037,931 / 53,317.8 = ₦19.47 per share in the base case.

Sanity Check: What Do the Multiples Say?
It is worth pausing here to verify that these numbers make sense relative to market comparables.
At an intrinsic value of ₦1,244,286 million for total equity, the implied price-to-normalized earnings multiple is ₦1,244,286 / ₦490,000 = 2.5x. Nigerian bank P/E multiples have historically ranged from 2x to 6x, with the large banks typically at 3–5x in normal years, so 2.5x is conservative but not unreasonable given the current rate environment and capital cycle. The implied price-to-book on tangible equity of ₦3,308,010 million (total equity less intangibles of ₦417,468 million) is ₦1,244,286 / ₦3,308,010 = 0.38x. This compares to GTCO at roughly 0.8–1.1x tangible book, Zenith at 0.5–0.7x, and UBA at 0.3–0.5x. At 0.38x, Access Holdings is priced cheaper than GTCO and Zenith but roughly in line with UBA. That relative positioning feels approximately right: Access is a larger, faster-growing franchise than UBA but arguably less capital-efficient than GTCO in the near term.

The price-to-Pre-Provision Operating Income comes out at ₦1,244,286 / ₦960,000 = 1.3x, meaning you are paying 1.3 years of franchise-level earnings before credit costs. For a bank with a 15-year+ track record of surviving multiple Nigerian currency and macro crises, that seems like a modest price if you believe the impairment cycle is near its peak.

The Three Scenarios in Full
The base case as derived above gives ₦19–24 per share with central estimate ₦19.47 after the AT1 adjustment. This assumes normalized ROE of 14–15%, COE declining from 28.5% to 22% over ten years, terminal growth of 8%, and terminal FCFE of ₦660,000 million.
The downside case assumes that the CBN recapitalization exercise forces Access Holdings to raise significant new equity at or below book value, diluting the per-share economics materially. If the bank raises ₦500,000 million in new equity at current prices, it would add approximately 15–20 billion new shares to the float, diluting intrinsic value per share by roughly 25–30%. Simultaneously, if the new capital is deployed into lower-return assets than the existing book — which is common in forced recapitalizations — normalized ROE compresses to 12%. Running the model with 12% ROE, 28.5% COE throughout (no compression assumed if Nigeria deteriorates), and 6% terminal growth gives a terminal value of ₦360,000 / (0.28 − 0.06) = ₦360,000 / 0.22 = ₦1,636,364 million and a present value of approximately ₦147,000 million. Adding discounted Phase 1–2 FCFE of roughly ₦480,000 million gives total equity value of approximately ₦627,000 million, or about ₦11.76 per share on the diluted share count. This is the ₦12–15 range I cited at the top.

The upside case assumes the recapitalization is successfully executed at attractive terms, new capital is deployed into high-return opportunities across the African network at ROE of 17–18%, and Nigeria's macro stabilizes sufficiently to allow the COE to compress to 20% in the terminal phase. Terminal FCFE rises to ₦900,000 million on higher earnings. Terminal value becomes ₦900,000 / (0.20 − 0.10) = ₦900,000 / 0.10 = ₦9,000,000 million, with present value of approximately ₦810,000 million. Discounted Phase 1–2 FCFE of ₦1,200,000 million gives total equity value of roughly ₦2,010,000 million, or ₦37.69 per share. This is the ₦32–42 range.

What Could Break This and What Would Prove It Right
The three risks that could push the stock to the downside scenario or below are all related to things outside management's control. A renewed sharp naira devaluation — not the gradual depreciation modeled here but a step-down of 30–40% in a single CBN intervention — would cause massive mark-to-market losses on the naira-denominated loan book and trigger a new round of provisioning. The FX translation reserve already shows a cumulative loss of ₦707,555 million at September 2025 (down from ₦979,653 million at January 2025), meaning the bank has already absorbed ₦272,098 million in unrealized FX losses this year alone. Another sharp devaluation would hit both the P&L and regulatory capital simultaneously. The second risk is a credit cycle following the loan book's rapid growth. Loans grew from ₦5,100,807 million in December 2022 to ₦12,894,263 million in September 2025, a 152% increase in less than three years. Bank loan books typically season over 24–36 months, meaning the NPL cycle from loans originated in 2023 and 2024 would peak in 2025–2027. The 141% surge in impairment charges in 2025 may be the beginning of that cycle, not the end of it. Third, the recapitalization. The CBN's directive requiring international commercial banks to reach a minimum capital base of ₦500,000 million creates meaningful dilution risk if Access needs to raise external capital in a challenging market environment.

What would prove the bull case right is simpler: watch the impairment charge. If Q4 2025 and Q1 2026 impairments stabilize or decline from the Q3 run rate of ₦119,915 million per quarter, the credit cycle is passing and normalized earnings of ₦490,000 million or higher are achievable. Watch the capital raise: if Access successfully issues new equity at prices above ₦20/share, it validates the intrinsic value and signals management confidence. And watch the NII margin: with CBN rates likely to begin declining in 2026, the question is how much of the 49% NII growth is rate-driven versus volume-driven. If volume accounts for the majority, the franchise is building durable earnings power.

Final Thought
Access Holdings is one of those situations where the math looks cheap but the uncertainty is high enough that it should not be a large position for anyone without a clear view on Nigerian macro. At ₦19–24/share, you are paying about 0.38x tangible book for a bank that earns 14–16% on equity, has grown total assets at a compounded 25%+ over five years, and operates the most geographically diversified banking network in sub-Saharan Africa. The normalized earnings yield at the base case valuation is approximately 39% in naira terms, which is compelling on paper. The catch is that 28.5% of that is consumed by the cost of equity before you see a real return. The margin of safety is real but not enormous. At ₦15 or below, it would be difficult to make a bearish case on a five-year view. At ₦30 or above, the upside scenario would need to materialize in full to justify holding. Somewhere in between is where the honest answer lives.

Numbers first, narratives later.
-- ositadima1

emmanuelewumi:
At the end of the day, don't be surprised to see it at N3

EDUECO:
Professor,na because of ACCESSCORP make you write full Finance textbook?

First Bank is ₦50+ while ACCESSCORP is close to ₦28 .

ACCESSCORP is superior to First Bank.

The price of the stock of a company is never the measure of its real value.It is clear to everyone that the price of a stock of a company can be manipulated.

megawealth01:
AMEN

Redoil:
ellah lake have gotten serious investors hence they decide to return the money back to IPO People. now who is fooling who