₦airaland Forum

logica:
We have had this discussion before; the accounts of Frederick Forsyth being Ojukwu's close friend and biographer can only be taken with a pinch of salt.

logica:
We have had this discussion before; the accounts of Frederick Forsyth being Ojukwu's close friend and biographer can only be taken with a pinch of salt.

pazienza:
And the account given by Nigerians and friends of Nigeria must be taken with a pinch of sugar.

logica:
Your cup of tea; but far more neutral and credible sources have published reports on the Civil War than Frederick Forsyth. A single line from the book told the story "...like everything with Yoruba was complex".

Going further and reading, anybody with average logical ability will ask the questions: "So how did Banjo plan to assassinate Ojukwu without drawing a backlash? Where was the assassination to take place and by who? How was Ojukwu to be isolated and assassinated since he was always surrounded by a retinue of guards? How do you think a strategist like Banjo unlike Ojukwu would not see the endgame plan? Who would Banjo and Ifeajuna have presented to the Biafrans as an acceptable replacement?" These questions when asked reveal the entire story for what it is: a hoax.

pazienza:
How did Nzeogwu intend to assassinate a Northern premier without drawing a backlash?

Where was the assassination attempt going to take place?
In your kitchen. See redundant question.

How was Ironsi to be isolated and killed since he was always surrounded by guards?

logica:
Nzeogwu was misguided into thinking the Northerners would see him as their own and may not have expected the end result of the coup; an obvious lopsided elimination of leaders (political and military) of the North and Southwest which turned him into a villain in the North. Assassinations are planned to detail; if Ojukwu did uncover a plot, the so called loophole would have been mentioned. What was the loophole?

Comparing the circumstances of the assassinations of the Sardauna and Ironsi is a bit obtuse; nobody no matter how foolhardy would dare attempt the assassination of Ojukwu in Biafra.

pazienza:
Well, someone was foolhardy enough to dare murder Saraduna in the North, what stops the same from happening to Ojukwu in the East?

logica:
Of course, that is the obtuse comparison again. Nzeogwu grew up in the North, spoke fluent Hausa and was even one of the Sardauna's favorites; who never considered him Igbo. He was well accepted in the North until the murders in the coup drew suspicion.

On the other hand, Banjo had no footing in Igbo land. He only appeared in the Biafran theater by a stroke of ill luck being the location he was incarcerated. Apples and oranges.

By the way, which troops was he going to use to carry out the assassination? Or was he, Alele and Ifeajuna planning to go all Rambo and take out all comers? Which Igbo boys would they use?

logica:
Your cup of tea; but far more neutral and credible sources have published reports on the Civil War than Frederick Forsyth. A single line from the book told the story "...like everything with Yoruba was complex".

Going further and reading, anybody with average logical ability will ask the questions: "So how did Banjo plan to assassinate Ojukwu without drawing a backlash? Where was the assassination to take place and by who? How was Ojukwu to be isolated and assassinated since he was always surrounded by a retinue of guards? How do you think a strategist like Banjo unlike Ojukwu would not see the endgame plan? Who would Banjo and Ifeajuna have presented to the Biafrans as an acceptable replacement?" These questions when asked reveal the entire story for what it is: a hoax.

logica:
Nzeogwu was misguided into thinking the Northerners would see him as their own and may not have expected the end result of the coup; an obvious lopsided elimination of leaders (political and military) of the North and Southwest which turned him into a villain in the North. Assassinations are planned to detail; if Ojukwu did uncover a plot, the so called loophole would have been mentioned. What was the loophole?

Comparing the circumstances of the assassinations of the Sardauna and Ironsi is a bit obtuse; nobody no matter how foolhardy would dare attempt the assassination of Ojukwu in Biafra.

Again I state that Banjo was a strategist and it shows in his understanding of the use of dialog and alliance; far better than Ojukwu whom he gave plenty of advise but rather chose to try to out muscle a far stronger military force.

logica:
Of course, that is the obtuse comparison again. Nzeogwu grew up in the North, spoke fluent Hausa and was even one of the Sardauna's favorites; who never considered him Igbo. He was well accepted in the North until the murders in the coup drew suspicion.

On the other hand, Banjo had no footing in Igbo land. He only appeared in the Biafran theater by a stroke of ill luck being the location he was incarcerated. Apples and oranges.

By the way, which troops was he going to use to carry out the assassination? Or was he, Alele and Ifeajuna planning to go all Rambo and take out all comers? Which Igbo boys would they use?

Letter from Lt. Col. Ojukwu to Lt. Col. Victor Banjo |
From: The Military Governor,
Republic of Biafra Enugu,
22nd August, 1967.
My dear Victor,

1. For some time now, you and I have been discussing the circumstances that have led to the current and inevitable disintegration of what was the Federation of Nigeria.....

(iv)Biafran troops will, after the liberation of the Yorubaland, remain in that territory only for as long as we in Biafra consider it necessary for the Yorubas to consolidate their position and sovereignty against any external threat.

(v)On the liberation of the Yorubaland, you will be appointed as the Military Governor of that territory.

(vi)The liberation of Western Nigeria will be a prelude to the liberation of all Yorubas up to the River Niger and the severance of all connections between the West and the North at Jebba.

(vii)During the period of Biafrans troops’ presence in your territory, all political measures, statements or decrees shall be subject to the approval, in writing by myself or on my authority.

(viii) Should our troops arrive and liberate Lagos, the government of the Republic of Biafra reserves the right to appoint a Military administrator for the territory. Such an Administrator will remain in office until a merger of that territory with Yorubaland is effected by Biafran troops.
https://oldnaija.com/2017/03/27/letter-from-lt-col-ojukwu-to-lt-col-victor-banjo-commanding-him-to-liberate-western-nigeria/

pazienza:
Lol!

How exactly did Banjo support Biafra?

Banjo was saved by Biafra . The Arewa wanted his head, Ojukwu gave him a chance to redeem himself, the Afonja trait in him raised its ugly head and he messed up Biafra Lagos mission entrusted on him.

He also managed to rope in Ifeajuna and Alale, both non Yorubas, who both paid the ultimate price with him.
But ofcourse, Afonjas would rather focus on Banjo execution, his accomplices ie Ifeajuna and Alale death doesnt matter.

laudate: (viii) Should our troops arrive and liberate Lagos, the government of the Republic of Biafra reserves the right to appoint a Military administrator for the territory. Such an Administrator will remain in office until a merger of that territory with Yorubaland is effected by Biafran troops.

logica:
This was the most interesting part of your quote. No be today their thirst to control Lagos started.

ColonelDrake:
No, he wasn't saved but just a means to an end. Stop talking like they released him out of the goodness of their heart. He was released to be used and dumped. They released Banjo because they had their eyes on Lagos and thought banjo could be used as the afonja to fight his own people so that they could capture Lagos. Bunch of thieves and scammers

America’s Secret Files On Ojukwu (2) | February 26, 2013 | PM News

Confidential US dispatches on the Nigerian Civil War yield a wounding portrait of Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who was painted by those who knew him as a man that experienced rejection as a child, a megalomaniac, demagogue and one who once threatened to shoot his own father. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

In a broadcast to the German people on BayerischerRundfunkMuchen (Bavarian Broadcasting, Munich) on 11 September 1967, Klaus W. Stephan, the West African correspondent of the service for many years, said Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu had harboured an ambition to “alter the political constellation of power in Nigeria by means of the army one day”.

On 12 September 1967, Radio Biafra broadcast attacks on Awolowo and Anthony Enahoro for being in “the rebel government of Gowon”. The radio station referred to the recent arrest and detention of “Wole Soyinka, that patriotic Yoruba son” and the arrest and interrogation of Tai Solarin, the well-known Yoruba educator and writer. It thought it “significant” that these “Yoruba freedom fighters” should be threatened by a government of which “Chief Awolowo himself a Yoruba is a deputy head.”

Radio Biafra reminded its listeners that “Awolowo and Enahoro have not only succumbed to northern pressure, but have also teamed up with Gowon to suppress Solarin and Soyinka, whose ebullient enthusiasm for Yoruba freedom is threat to their security, but they have substituted private interest for commonwealth.” The radio station, confirming the findings of the US intelligence estimate, then recommended that “all Yorubas should waste no time in responding to call by one of their own sons, Brigadier Victor Banjo, commander of liberation forces. It is such young men as Brigadier Banjo, Wole Soyinka and Tai Solarin that will provide effective but selfless leadership that Yorubas badly need at this moment”.

On Biafrans sounding more Yoruba than the Yoruba themselves, the American ambassador noted in a confidential document of 15 September 1967: “In fact, the Eastern effort to tell Yorubas who their leader should be, as well as not to follow Awolowo, could cause opposite reaction among majority of people in Yorubaland.” It did.

With troops blazing with Biafran agenda already at West’s door at Ore, it became clearer to Awolowo that Ojukwu was not interested in secession, but actually in conquest. Awolowo proceeded to rally the Yoruba, who had hitherto been lukewarm to Gowon’s government with a powerful “I am absolutely and irrevocably committed to the side of Nigeria” press release on 12 August 1967.

It was Awolowo’s first statement defending the Federal Government since the Civil War began on 6 July. Unlike many of Awolowo’s speeches and public statements, this one derived its forceful elocution from the use of adverbs and intensifiers. There were no “could,” “might” and other hedge-betting modal verbs. It was all “must,” “will” and other commanding auxiliary verbs.

“It is imperative that the unity of Nigeria must be preserved and the best judge of what to do now is the Federal government, which Yorubas must continue to support. The Yorubas have never set out to dominate others, but have always resisted, with all the energy in them, any attempt, however slight or disguised, by others to dominate them.…"

"Indeed it is for these reasons that they must now be ready to resist any attempt by the rebel forces from the East and the Mid-West to violate their territory and subjugate them.… To these ends, therefore, all Yoruba people, particularly those in the Western and Lagos states, which now face the threats of invasion, must not only be as vigilant as ever, but must also lose no time and spare no efforts in giving every conceivable support to the Federal troops in defence of their homeland and of the fatherland,” Awolowo said.

He was not only rallying the Yoruba people, he was sending a powerful message to the Biafran High Command in Enugu. Victor Banjo, on 11 August, had sent a secret note to Governor Adebayo, the man who, according to the Biafran High Command, was slated for assassination by Banjo’s gun. In the letter, amongst other things, Banjo asked for “clarification of the Western position.” Adebayo promptly passed the letter to Awolowo in Lagos.....

On 7 August 1967, the American consul in Ibadan, Strong, wrote: “An old line of supporters, including more mature intellectuals like Professor Hezekiah Oluwasanmi (Ife University Vice Chancellor) and S.O. Ighodaro (lecturer at the University of Lagos) support the statement. They said Awolowo has always been a minorities man and the Eastern takeover of Midwest and continued occupation of Eastern minority areas is an indication of continued Ibo desire to dominate southern Nigeria.”

On the night of 11 August, Mr Smallwood, British Deputy High Commissioner, came to inform his American counterpart that “decision has been taken by a group of AG activists to support efforts to stage a Midwest type coup here in the West. Timing uncertain but could happen anytime from 12th. Planners supposedly do not include top members of AG hierarchy, but certain young activists who hope present AG leaders with fait accompli consistent with their own sympathies.”

Strong was skeptical of the success of the coup, not because of Awolowo’s rallying call, but as he wrote: “In the West, several ingredients for successful coup are lacking. There is, for example, no real counterpart of Ibo officers here.”

And that was the coup for which Victor Banjo, confident of its success, received Ojukwu’s bullets with his head raised high and his chest pumped out at the firing squad in Enugu.

https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2013/02/26/americas-secret-files-on-ojukwu-2/

Mrchippychappy:
Banjo was a traitor, I have read the full transcript, shame about it but Ojukwu did what had to be done by executing him. Traitors are dangerous