I wrote this little piece called the mottled history of Reason because I have noticed that many people are not aware that the word has been applied to different things over the centuries, and held in various regards.  I once started a thread called "Only a christian can be Logic" which couldn't even hardly take off before running into the ground.  I thought that through the thread I would be able to talk about Logic and Reason in an ancient sense of the words. 

Then there was another thread started by Huxley called Critical Thinking that much to my frustration got moved out of the Religion section.
https://www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic-238976.0.html#msg3510196


Why it was moved, I don't know.  Huxley and I hardly ever post outside of the Religion Section and it should've been obvious that we were contributing to the thread because of it's implications for religion.  Anyway sha, off the back of that Critical Thinking thread I decided to write a short history of the lives and times of Reason.  Coming up next, I hope you enjoy.

ps. It'll be long sha

A Cursory Look At The Mottled History of Reason

I can't help noticing in discussions with various people that whenever Reason comes up the word is used in so many conflicting senses that often get conflated.  For this reason (oops, unintended pun) I have decided to write
this cursory overview of the life and times of Reason and of the various
changes, adventures and misadventures that it has undergone. 

The english word Reason is derived from the french Raison which in turn is
derived from the Latin Rationem.   Ratio (rationem) is used to translate the
Greek term Logos into Latin.  Another Greek term similar in usage to Logos
is Nous.  Nous has always been associated with the Mind and mental
activities in Ancient Greece, but it is in the work of Anaxagoras that we are
first aware of another sense in which it is used.  Nous is what created the
cosmos, everything that exists has it's characteristics confered on it by the Nous.  It
was an ordering principle that brought the world with it's laws into being. 

In Plato's philosophy the world is brought into existence by the ordering
principle of the Nous too (he calls it the Demiurge), but there is more to
the Nous (often translated as intellect) in Plato's system.  Nous is a part
of Man's Soul.  In other words there is a part of Man that is Rational and,
he goes further in The Republic to claim, immortal, while the rest of it is
irrational, or 'sensible' (derived from the senses). These different parts of Man's soul are
orientated to apprehending different aspects of existence.  Plato makes a
distinction between a Temporal world were things are constantly changing or
'becoming'  and an eternal world where things remain constant in state of 'being'.  Reason is for apprehending the eternal world of being, while irrational sensations are for apprehending the temporal world of becoming.  So
in Timaeus we read,

We must in my opinion begin by distinguishing between that which always is and never becomes (ie. the eternal) from that which is always becoming but never is (the temporal).  The one is apprehensible by INTELLIGENCE with the aid of REASONING, being eternally the same, the other is the object of opinion and irrational sensation, coming to be and ceasing to be, but never fully real.  . . . . Thus a description of what is changeless, fixed and clearly intelligible will be changeless and fixed - will be, that is, as irrefutable and incontrovertible as a description in words can be; but analogously a description of a likeness of the changeless, being a description of a mere likeness will be merely likely; for being has to becoming the same relation as truth to belief.  Don't therefore be surprised, Socrates, if on many matters concerning the gods and the world of change we are unable in every respect and on every occasion to render consistent and accurate account.  You must be satisfied if your account is as likely as any, remembering that both I and you who are sitting in judgement on it are merely human, and should not look for anything more than a likely story in such matters.



Plato obviously esteemed the Nous, (Intelligence, Rational, and reasoning)
above what he called Irrational sensation.  Nous is a sort of mystical form
of perception that does not rely on the senses but can give us access to a
surer reality than that which the senses give us.  It is this mystical
perception that he extolls as Reason and Intelligence. 

Following Plato, Aristotle's work included an assessment of thought processes that he called
syllogism.  This is a study of how we draw inferences from facts that we
already have.  So for example if we know the following:

All animals are mortal.

and,

All humans are animals.

Then it is possible to infer that:

All humans are mortal.

This syllogistic process was considered a function of what Plato would call
the irrational senses and Aristotle still made a distinction between that and
Nous.  In many modern translations of Aristotle's work Nous is translated as Intuition rather than reason and reason is itself identified as the syllogistic process.  The philosophy of Aristotle prevailed over Europe for the next 2 thousand years during which time the shift in the meanings of various terms occurred.  Reason was no longer used to refer to Nous but rather to the syllogistic process.  Syllogisms were studied as the proper way to think and extolled as Reason.  This study was called Logic which is derived from the word Logos.  Logos had over this time lost all it's mystical connotations.

The notion of a Nous as a faculty for arriving at the truth was pretty much discarded and forgotten about.  Truth was to be arrived at through the proper processes of Logic.  Meanwhile the only other means of arriving at Truth, according to the theologians, was through Faith, a very hazy notion that developed with christian theology and involved the unquestioning acceptance of certain authorities.  So now there was a polarity of Faith on the one hand and Reason on the other.  At first Tertullian in the 2nd century address the conflict so: "What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem? What have heretics to do with Christians?" Then St. Augustine suggested that they work together. "Believe and you will understand", he said. 
Then St. Thomas Aquinas claimed that they dealt with two very different orders of knowledge.  He said,
" . . . faith and science are not about the same things.
Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credible.  The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them see that they ought to believe them."
But before Aquinas' time there were doubts already being cast on the validity of Faith.  Abelard, a monk and a philosopher from the start of the last millennium had this to say about faith.
"How, then, is the faith of any people, however false, to be refuted, though it may have arrived at such a pitch of blindness as to confess some idol to be the creator both of heaven and of earth?  As, according to your own admission, you cannot reason upon matters of faith, you have no right to attack others upon a matter with regard to which you think you ought yourself to be unassailed." 

And slowly over the centuries Reason began to prevail over Faith until the 18th century when it was considered to be triumphant.  This perception was celebrated in the book by Thomas Paine called The Age of Reason.  But long before Thomas Paine's call for Reason to subjugate Faith, Reason itself was being doubted in the work of the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume and others before him.  Hume was influenced by the work of John Locke.  Locke had noticed what Plato said over 2000 years before him that reason (Plato's irrational sensation) could only give you probabilities based on your experiences (ie the likely story).  Therefore he sympathized with the King of Siam who branded all europeans liars when they told him about ice.  The man had never experienced frozen water before why shouldn't he call anyone who tells him about it a liar. 

But Hume took it further and gave an in-depth analysis of the Syllogistic process, now called reason, in what is known as the problem of Induction.  He questioned whether the fact that we know and have experienced something to behave a certain way means that it will always behave and has always behaved that way.  In the King of Siam's experience water always flowed.  He believed water to always be fluid.  So therefore his syllogistic reasons would go as follows:

Water always flows as liquid.

Europeans say water becomes solid.

therefore,

Europeans are liars. 

These the first two propositions are what we are informed with through our senses.  We see flowing water, and hear europeans telling us that water can be solid.  These perceptions are, according to Plato, not rational, but 'irrational sensation'.  So therefore according to Plato the inference that we arrive at, that europeans are liars, is only what is likely to be the case based on our experience. 
In other words the propositions on which we base what we call logic today is a product of our experiences and since we haven't experienced everything we are in no position to make absolute pronouncements about anything based on logic.
Hume went on further to say that: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."   In other words Reason is not equipped to seek out pure, absolute, unbiased Truth.  I would go further to say that the syllogistic process, known today as reason, is nothing more than a refinement of the brains ability to learn via the means of conditioned reflexes. 

In the 19th century there was a russian scientist called Ivan Pavlov who did some experiments to investigate conditioned reflexes in animal behaviour.  He would basically ring a bell prior to giving a dog some dinner.  After a few repeats of this he found that the dog would start to salivate whenever he rang the bell whether or not there was actually any dinner forthcoming.  The dog had 'learnt' to expect dinner when it heard the ringing of the bell.  Is there any difference between what went on in the dog's brain and what goes on when human's reason inductively.  What's the difference between a conditioned reflex and the pseudo-reasoning processes?  They are both based on the experience of the subject.
The main differences that I see are one, deliberation, and two, immediacy of response.  All thinking processes are, in my opinion, a combination of 2 abilities.  The ability to generalize and the ability to make distinctions.  Pavlov's dog takes an instance of a ringing bell and generalizes it leading him to always expect, at another instance of a ringing bell, the same things to happen.  The ability to make distinctions, actually the opposite trend from generalization,  allows for the consideration of subtleties that might affect the outcome of an event.  When we think about a situation, rather than just react reflexively, we delay the reaction and analyse the situation more deliberately and critically, looking out for such subtleties that might come to play. 

Moreover it seems that the brains anatomy demonstrates these two types of information processing.  It seems that the basic emotional urges are sourced at the Limbic system of the brain, while the pseudo-rational processes occur in the cortex and the neo-cortex.  While the limbic system causes an immediate reaction to stimuli the Cortical system seems to be able to process information without causing an immediate physiological reaction.  This ability to ruminate over information helps the brain to make more subtle distinctions between various instances thereby helping to make more accurate inferences.  The information is processed in a more detached way this ability in turn confers us the ability to communicate.  That information can be considered and processed in detachment from the biases of the organism allows the considerations to be shared with other organisms that can similarly detach their biases from the subject matter.  However such detachment is not absolute, and the limbic emotional urges still always have some influence on our thoughts. 

This is the current situation in the 21st century.  Pseudo-reason is still lauded but stands uneasily on her pedestal, while we have in universities across the world a new study called Critical Thinking that hopes to free her from the biases of her twin sister, the emotions.  And lying abandoned and forgotten is the faculty of Nous which was once called Reason.

Pastor, a happy new year to you and yours.

May your shadow never grow shorter.

This looks interesting, Your field of interest appears vast and engaging.

Just out of curiousity - what do you do (occupation)?

Na wa o! You don read am finish just now now now. I've hardly finished putting it up.

Deep Sight:


May your shadow never grow shorter.

Tenk u! Though if my shadow is growing shorter doesn't that mean that the sun is rising above me. Me I like sunshine o.

But anyway, I take it as a blessing. You too, may your phallic immensity never fail you.

I am a pastor. (Don't laugh) lol.

@ pastor. Haven't read yet but will in a minute. Looks interesting though. I'm busy invading ur inbox

But Hume took it further and gave an in-depth analysis of the Syllogistic process, now called reason, in what is known as the problem of Induction.  He questioned whether the fact that we know and have experienced something to behave a certain way means that it will always behave and has always behaved that way.  In the King of Siam's experience water always flowed.  He believed water to always be fluid.  So therefore his syllogistic reasons would go as follows:

Water always flows as liquid.

Europeans say water becomes solid.

therefore,

Europeans are liars.  

These the first two propositions are what we are informed with through our senses.  We see flowing water, and hear europeans telling us that water can be solid.  These perceptions are, according to Plato, not rational, but 'irrational sensation'.  So therefore according to Plato the inference that we arrive at, that europeans are liars, is only what is likely to be the case based on our experience.  
In other words the propositions on which we base what we call logic today is a product of our experiences and since we haven't experienced everything we are in no position to make absolute pronouncements about anything based on logic.
Hume went on further to say that: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."   In other words Reason is not equipped to seek out pure, absolute, unbiased Truth.  I would go further to say that the syllogistic process, known today as reason, is nothing more than a refinement of the brains ability to learn via the means of conditioned reflexes.

This is absolutely brilliant.

It really caused me to stop and think a bit about my deistic belief that certain truths can be inferred through basic logic.

I concluded (after a few seconds of reflection) that certain basic or elementary truths may be inferred: but compound truths requiring a compound knowledge may perhaps not be inferred for certain unless one is omniscient, as you have suggested above.

I give an example –

Question: IS Barack Obama a living thing?

Answer: Yes, because he has the characteristics of a living thing: Movement, Respiration, Nutrition, Growth, Reproduction and Death.

This is a logical answer. But it is based on our limited knowledge. It pertains to knowledge of the behaviour of physical living things only!

What if spiritual beings exist also on other planes outside the physical?

Based on our logic and the characteristics laid out above, such being may be said NOT to be living things as they may not for example share our features, such as Movement, Respiration, Nutrition, Growth, Reproduction or Death.

However a person who may have knowledge of such beings (if they do exist) may well declare our logic to be limited and leading in the direction of a falsity.

It is equally possible for another person to assert that neither Barack Obama nor any one of us are living things, but only relections of things living in other realms

Thus your point is secure and well founded.

What I would like to detract from it is this – Even though we may not deduce the compound truth, we may certainly deduce some basic elements which can certainly stand as true.

For example in the analogy I gave above, we can deduce, whether it be true that Barack Obama is alive or not, that –

1. There was an experience
2. It was called Barack Obama by some entities, shadowy or real
3. Some body (or something) calling himself Deep Sight is currently writing an example on a computer based on the “experience” called Barack Obama

Besides this I believe that observation by parties not present at the point of creation of something is evidence that –

1. The thing created exists
2. The person (or entity) that created it existed
3. The person viewing it exists

Let me give an example. The Pyramids in Egypt.

The fact that you can see them today shows clearly that –

1. The Pyramids are not the imagination of the people who built them. If they were, they would dissolve once those brains died.
2. The Pyramids are therefore real.
3. The Pyramids were there at a time when Deep Sight was not there.
4. Deep Sight looking at the pyramids today is accordingly not an imagination - Deep Sight is real.
5. The Pyramids would not be seen by Deep Sight if they were imagination of the makers only: accordingly the builders were not imaginary themselves: they existed.

Now even if it can be asserted that all of this is reflective existence only: it remains existence of a sort or the other.

I may be speaking mumbo jumbo, but the point I am trying to make is that some things can be deduced by logic for certain, even if not all things.

The notion of a Nous as a faculty for arriving at the truth was pretty much discarded and forgotten about. Truth was to be arrived at through the proper processes of Logic.

I still believe very strongly in intuition as an inner lamp that leads to truth, and that can proffer guidance.

The problem really is as indicated in your excellent write-up: faith has taken the place of the Nous for many people and faith itself is not to be equated with intuition necessarily; for faith very often indicates a slavish adherence to dogmas or ideas set forth by others: in which circumstances the faculty of intuition may be said to be dead.

Pastor AIO:


I am a pastor. (Don't laugh)

I did not laugh, for i believe you to be eminently well suited to teach and impart deep things.

I would also have liked you to be a lecturer in a university on theology, history, culture, philosophy or some related subject.

What denomination, (or angle/type) if you dont mind my asking.

The wise ones subscribe to a thread when Pastor AIO and Deep Sight are the discussants.

Deep Sight:

The problem really is as indicated in your excellent write-up: faith has taken the place of the Nous for many people and faith itself is not to be equated with intuition necessarily; for faith very often indicates a slavish adherence to dogmas or ideas set forth by others: in which circumstances the faculty of intuition may be said to be dead.

Very informative write-up, pastor.

Regarding the issue of 'faith' and it's relationship with the 'Nous', i would suggest that some peoples 'faith' would actually equate more to the 'Nous', and not to the 'slavish adherence to dogmas or ideas set forth by others' that you mention, Deepsight.

Is 'faith', in Christian doctrines, for instance, not more about 'intuitively' apprehending the spiritual and the eternal? The definition given in Hebrews 11:1(NLT) of it being 'the confident assurance that what we hope for is going to happen. The evidence of things we cannot yet see', sounds 'reasonably' 'Nous'-ish to me. But then that's my interpretation of the meaning of 'faith'.

*has read half of the main post and run out of brain fuel. Will continue after breakfast. Brain sef need chop chop*  I'm loving it though.

beneli:

Very informative write-up, pastor.

Regarding the issue of 'faith' and it's relationship with the 'Nous', i would suggest that some peoples 'faith' would actually equate more to the 'Nous', and not to the 'slavish adherence to dogmas or ideas set forth by others' that you mention, Deepsight.

Is 'faith', in Christian doctrines, for instance, not more about 'intuitively' apprehending the spiritual and the eternal? The definition given in Hebrews 11:1(NLT) of it being 'the confident assurance that what we hope for is going to happen. The evidence of things we cannot yet see', sounds 'reasonably' 'Nous'-ish to me. But then that's my interpretation of the meaning of 'faith'.

It is not fair to say this.

You know very well that Christian faith extends to far more than the apocalypse or after-life: for these basic concepts are shared by most religions – Islam is even recorded to state that it is Isa (Jesus) who shall come again to judge the world.

Cardinally, Christian faith requires a BELIEF that Jesus of Nazareth’s DEATH ON THE CROSS serves as spiritual remission of sins.

It is very difficult to accept this in view of the fact that there is not a single Christian who has bought into that belief that can be said to be “free” from sin – they continue, predictably, in sin, and are judged accordingly on the “last day” which makes one wonder what the point of the sacrifice was, since all remain to be judged by their “sins” – just as was the case before the sacrifice.

Anyhow, the real reason I doubt that Christian faith springs from intuition is this – how come it is that 99% of Christians are people brought up in Christian homes? (Ditto for all religions).

If it was by intuition, Christians would be evenly scattered across the globe: unless you want to suggest to me that the intuition of people in southern Nigeria is better than that of Malaysians, for example.

This alone shows that what people are BROUGHT UP TO BELIEVE more often than not determines their “faith” and not intuition.

Deep Sight:

I did not laugh, for i believe you to be eminently well suited to teach and impart deep things.

I would also have liked you to be a lecturer in a university on theology, history, culture, philosophy or some related subject.

What denomination, (or angle/type) if you dont mind my asking.

What I said might be a bit misleading so I hasten to add that I do not preach or teach, but my ministry is in music. Although, who knows, I might do so some time in the future.

Deep Sight:

It is not fair to say this.

You know very well that Christian faith extends to far more than the apocalypse or after-life: for these basic concepts are shared by most religions – Islam is even recorded to state that it is Isa (Jesus) who shall come again to judge the world.

Cardinally, Christian faith requires a BELIEF that Jesus of Nazareth’s DEATH ON THE CROSS serves as spiritual remission of sins.

It is very difficult to accept this in view of the fact that there is not a single Christian who has bought into that belief that can be said to be “free” from sin – they continue, predictably, in sin, and are judged accordingly on the “last day” which makes one wonder what the point of the sacrifice was, since all remain to be judged by their “sins” – just as was the case before the sacrifice.

Anyhow, the real reason I doubt that Christian faith springs from intuition is this – how come it is that 99% of Christians are people brought up in Christian homes? (Ditto for all religions).

If it was by intuition, Christians would be evenly scattered across the globe: unless you want to suggest to me that the intuition of people in southern Nigeria is better than that of Malaysians, for example.

This alone shows that what people are BROUGHT UP TO BELIEVE more often than not determines their “faith” and not intuition.

Very valid points you've raised. Apologies Pastor Aio, if it comes across that we are distracting from the gist of this post.

I think that there is a difference however between 'Christian faith' and faith as a Christian. While your point is relevant when discussing the doctrines of Christianity, it misses the point in the latter. There are over 2 billion adherents of the ‘Christian faith’, but of these very few actually exercise ‘faith’ as described in Hebrews 11.1, which is not about ‘doctrines’. I think that that ‘faith’ is about a way of living in spite of the doctrines.

In my understanding of that verse, ‘faith’, should transcend doctrine. It is an ongoing thing, a journey of revelations-if you prefer-towards a better connection with God. In that context you can then understand why it is written that it was by 'faith' that Abel offered a better sacrifice to God than his brother Cain, through which he obtained the testimony that he is 'righteous' (Hebrews 11.4)

Doctrines, however, are legalistic religious interpretations of the letters. The interpretations change with the politics of the times because most are based on superficial readings and cultural values. So, a Church in middle England, for instance, will have different interpretation of the gospels to a Church in rural South America. That’s not what the Christ was about. And that’s why he didn’t get along with the legalistic Pharisees; even though they were scholars of the letters, their interpretations of these letters were embellished by interpretations based on their own traditional values.

So when I say that ‘faith’ is ‘nous’-ish, the faith I am talking about has little to do with ‘doctrines’ but more to do with transcendental ‘knowledge’.

beneli:

Very informative write-up, pastor.

Regarding the issue of 'faith' and it's relationship with the 'Nous', i would suggest that some peoples 'faith' would actually equate more to the 'Nous', and not to the 'slavish adherence to dogmas or ideas set forth by others' that you mention, Deepsight.

Is 'faith', in Christian doctrines, for instance, not more about 'intuitively' apprehending the spiritual and the eternal? The definition given in Hebrews 11:1(NLT) of it being 'the confident assurance that what we hope for is going to happen. The evidence of things we cannot yet see', sounds 'reasonably' 'Nous'-ish to me. But then that's my interpretation of the meaning of 'faith'.

I totally see your point and I used to make a similar point until I gave up cos I kept running into people who contradicted me and I couldn't find adequate proof for my position, so I decided to leave it.  

The most influential understanding, or interpretation, of Faith is that of St. Augustine.

Faith illuminates reason

For Augustine, reason began with faith. "Believe and you will understand" was the operating principle for everything. He understood that much of what is called "reasoning" actually is based on authority. Augustine believed all knowledge is based on authority and that there was no greater authority than God and revelation; that is, especially the authority of sacred Scripture, but also tradition and the practice of the Universal Church.

Following these were authoritative bodies that the Church recognized as having decision-making powers: plenary councils of the Universal Church, regional councils of bishops and synods of bishops. These can be summed up as witnesses.

This brings us back to the Catholic talk-show host who said he didn't need the Pope to tell him what God wanted of him.

Augustine would have disagreed vehemently. According to the Rev. Thomas F. Martin, O.S.A., assistant professor of theology and religious studies, Augustine and the Church of his time had a clear sense of the authority of the Bishop of Rome, although certainly this was a far simpler authority than that which developed by the Middle Ages and that which is contained in the modern Vatican.

http://heritage.villanova.edu/vu/heritage/allthings/2000W.htm

For Augustine Faith means total acceptance of an authority, in his case the authority was the first the Vicar of Rome, and secondly the bible.   Or maybe it was the other way round.  

The basis of his argument is actually pretty strong.  He has noticed that at the basis of all human thought and opinion is the presence of an Authority of some sort.  Even the Materialists who only believes in 'rationalism' or syllogistic reasoning relies on the Authority of his senses.  In other words he is not prepared to question the possibility that the perceptions of his senses may be illusory.  He is not prepared to question the possibility that the sense objects that he perceives  might not be real but derivatives of real things, like shadows are derived from real bodies but are not the bodies in themselves.   He accepts sense impressions as authoritative.  

This realisation that in fact all thought and beliefs, heck human sanity, depends on the acceptance of one authority or the other leads him to then say that the highest possible authority would be God and God's authority is invested in the bible and in the Church.  Just why a person's authority couldn't be whatever that person chooses is not an issue he addresses.  

The understanding of the word Faith that I once used to propose went as follows:

imhotep:

Heb 11:1 => est autem fides sperandorum substantia rerum argumentum non parentum

Now my latin is not so hot but I would interprete that line as: Faith is however Hoping in the essence/substance of things PROVEN yet not seen.  

That faith is the substance of things Not seen does not make sense to me.  Faith is not a substance.  The word sperandorum means hope. Am I correct?  I don't  claim to be a scholar and I am open to correction.  The word hope does not occur in your translation.  Argumentum is the Latin word for Proof , is it not?  The word proof does not occur in your translation.  

Also I would rather use the word essence rather than substance because today the word substance means something different from what it once did.  Something has substance today when it has mass and bulk and is weighty.  Originally substance meant that which 'stands underneath'.  Sub - Stance.  Ultimately the idea is that beyond the world that appears to our eyes there is another world that exists behind it and that supports it.  In fact that other world is the essence of the apparent world, from which the apparent world is derived.  This world of substance is not accessible to the physical sense but is accessible through faith.  

Is not Faith a Faculty of Perception?  People talk about blind faith but is that not oxymoronic?  What people call faith today is nothing like what faith actually is.

https://www.nairaland.com/nigeria?topic=134741.msg2267674#msg2267674

Imhotep was one of the people that blasted me for saying so.  Perhaps I should start using the word Nous again (the adjective for Nous, by the way, is Noetic, lol)  since I can't use Faith and I can't use Reason or Logic.

beneli:


So when I say that[b] ‘faith’ is ‘nous’-ish[/b], the faith I am talking about has little to do with ‘doctrines’ but more to do with transcendental ‘knowledge’.

You're not distracting from the topic at all. 'Nous-ish' should be Noetic but we don't want to confuse people on this forum because they might think that we are talking about a certain person.

I am not a person of faith, but I have noticed that people of faith tend to assume the ‘faith position’ is a sort of ‘default position’ which is validated by the inability of any other position to prove itself beyond all doubts. They then claim legitimacy by default, refuse to subject their position to the same scrutiny that other positions are made to go through. And because this particular type of ‘knowledge’ is usually ‘revealed’, they are impervious to modification since they claim the knowledge is from ‘divine’ sources. To make matters even more complicated, there are hundreds of faiths out there, and each one claims divine authority. So when we discuss the issue of faith, we should not just assume we must be referring to the Christian version. We are talking simply of ‘belief without evidence’ or worse – belief in spite of contrary evidence!

Pastor AIO:


Water always flows as liquid.

Europeans say water becomes solid.

therefore,

Europeans are liars. 

I no sabi philosophy so may be totally off point . . . .

I think the rules say that the premises MUST be true for us to be sure of our inferences. If the premises can be shown to be false then it's back to the drawing board.  I think the syllogistic process realizes the limitations of our experiences, and is more on point than the whole mystical conception of "nous", which I think could be nonsense. When knowledge is claimed to come from some higher source, na wahala e go cause last last, IMHO.

so for the quote above, an appropriate conclusion may be. . . based solely on person x's experience of water only being liquid, Europeans (in his opinion) are bloody liars.

And why do we have to be able to make absolute pronouncements about everything in an ever changing universe. For all we know there are no absolutes. Plato's idea of immaterial universals is kinda ridiculous to me. There is little reason, IMO, to take it as fact.

Krayola:

I no sabi philosophy so may be totally off point . . . .

I think the rules say that the premises MUST be true for us to be sure of our inferences. If the premises can be shown to be false then it's back to the drawing board.  I think the syllogistic process realizes the limitations of our experiences, and is more on point than the whole mystical conception of "nous", which I think could be nonsense. When knowledge is claimed to come from some higher source, na wahala e go cause last last, IMHO.

so for the quote above, an appropriate conclusion may be. . . based solely on person x's experience of water only being liquid, Europeans (in his opinion) are bloody liars.

And why do we have to be able to make absolute pronouncements about everything in an ever changing universe. For all we know there are no absolutes. Plato's idea of immaterial universals is kinda ridiculous to me. There is little reason, IMO, to take it as fact.

Actually, the syllogistic process (,being unconscious) doesn't realize anything. People may or may not realize the limitations of our experiences.

One the one hand, people like Plato realize that the senses are limited and says so. He states that the best that they can give us is the 'likely story'. Therefore the result is probabalistic (spelling?) rather than certain.

On the other hand, people like T Paine (the writer of Age of Reason) seems ignorant of the limitation of the senses.

So you are right that the King of Siam's conclusion is only his opinion. Which is exactly what Plato said. He said irrational sensation is the object of OPINION and he also said:

but analogously a description of a likeness of the changeless, being a description of a mere likeness will be merely likely; for being has to becoming the same relation as truth to belief. Don't therefore be surprised, Socrates, if on many matters concerning the gods and the world of change we are unable in every respect and on every occasion to render consistent and accurate account. You must be satisfied if your account is as likely as any, remembering that both I and you who are sitting in judgement on it are merely human, and should not look for anything more than a likely story in such matters.

It would be wrong of you to accept that there is such a faculty as Nous if you didn't have direct experience of it. Also I think that it will help if you made a distinction between Truth and Facts.

Consider what I wrote in this post, actually read the whole thread it is only one page long.

huxley:

Admittedly, these are facts about what, which incidentally if answered "correct" may reveal the truth about the nature of water.

BTW, what is your definition of TRUTH and how does it relate to human life? How does one go about uncovering such truths?

Facts are True, but not all Truth is fact! What is a fact? A fact is a done thing.

[color=#000099]The word fact derives from the Latin Factum, and was first used in English with the same meaning: "a thing done or performed", a use that is now obsolete.[
From here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

Facts can only exist in history. That Croatia will win Euro 2008 is not a fact until it has happened. Facts are dependent on Time's process. They occur at some point in time. That water boils at 100 degrees celsius is not a fact until it has happened and when you have witnessed it happening then it becomes a fact. There are other facts that may not be witnessed but deduced from prior facts through various methods of conjecture.
Truth on the other hand is not limited to occurring temporally. Truths exist also in eternity. Eternity doesn't mean a long time but rather No Time. The existence of God is not a fact. It is a Truth. Another thing about facts is that they occur in time and have a span. All temporal things have a span. Everything that is a fact has a beginning also has an end. God has neither beginning or end.

The truth about water is the essence of water, the spiritual origin of water. No amount of facts about water is going to reveal this to you.

How does one go about discovering Truth? Was it you who said you were looking for a religion and I offered to help but you did not get back to me? you must be committed to the quest from the start. The quest for truth that is. I guess you were expecting me to present you with a doctrine which you could then pick apart and criticise. Well that was not what I was proposing for a religion. I was proposing a Practice which is a totally different proposition from a Doctrine. I can still suggest some practices for you if you are truly on a quest for Truth.

[/color]

Facts belong to the temporal world. They are happenings. They happen. What is the real meaning of the word Happen? In french they say Passer. To pass. In old English they say it comes to Pass. A happening is a passing thing. It has it's beginning when it comes to pass, and then it's end when it finally passes away.

Truth on the other hand belongs to the Aionios. That is the Eternal world. To know Truth you must first have the faculties for discerning Eternal things.

From here:

https://www.nairaland.com/nigeria?topic=142723.msg2384353#msg2384353

I ought to post Plato's allegory of the Cave once again too. Everytime I read it I get blown away by the simplicity with which such a heavy idea was presented:

Plato
Book VII of The Republic

The Allegory of the Cave

Here's a little story from Plato's most famous book, The Republic. Socrates is talking to a young follower of his named Glaucon, and is telling him this fable to illustrate what it's like to be a philosopher -- a lover of wisdom: Most people, including ourselves, live in a world of relative ignorance. We are even comfortable with that ignorance, because it is all we know. When we first start facing truth, the process may be frightening, and many people run back to their old lives. But if you continue to seek truth, you will eventually be able to handle it better. In fact, you want more! It's true that many people around you now may think you are weird or even a danger to society, but you don't care. Once you've tasted the truth, you won't ever want to go back to being ignorant!

[Socrates is speaking with Glaucon]

[Socrates:] And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: --Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

[Glaucon:] I see.



And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Very true.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision, -what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them, -- will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take and take in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he 's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

Last of he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

Better to be the poor servant of a poor master, and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?
Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

From http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html

Pastor AIO:

Actually, the syllogistic process (,being unconscious) doesn't realize anything.  People may or may not realize the limitations of our experiences.

I meant that as long as we frame our arguments to account for the tentative nature of our knowledge (which we should try to), we do not lose ourselves. Most modern scholars/intellectuals frame their arguments and conclusions accordingly. I'm weary of pretty much anyone that asserts anything as absolute.  . . We must all, imo, be aware of our limitations and ignorance.

People may or may not be inclined to accept Plato's ideas. Aristotle didn't.

Pastor AIO:

One the one hand, people like Plato realize that the senses are limited and says so.  He states that the best that they can give us is the 'likely story'.  Therefore the result is probabalistic (spelling?) rather than certain. 

Plato then goes on to assert the existence of higher realms that he can not show to exist. That cave allegory is, IMO, only a "possible" scenario.

That cave allegory shows that it is possible that IF there was a source from which all other things that we perceive came, our experience, and knowledge based on these experiences will only be limited. That is a big IF. That our senses are limited, or could even deceive us does not mean we need to accept higher realms as real.

We have "reason", and through this we can make tentative statements based on what we do experience. As long as we are aware of the tentative nature of what we claim to know, and continue searching, using our collective verifiable experiences and critical reasoning, we have a better chance, IMO, of not losing ourselves, than just deferring to higher realms, like plato seems to be doing.


I have ADHD and when I finished school I vowed never to use my medication again until I go to grad school. These long philosophical posts are hard for me to follow because I can't sit still for more than five minutes without walking off to do something else, or just wandering around the internet. . .  and it's kinda frustrating 

Krayola:

I meant that as long as we frame our arguments to account for the tentative nature of our knowledge (which we should try to), we do not lose ourselves. Most modern scholars/intellectuals frame their arguments and conclusions accordingly. I'm weary of pretty much anyone that asserts anything as absolute.  . . We must all, imo, be aware of our limitations and ignorance.

I know what you meant, I just thought I'd use that opportunity to hammer home the point.

Krayola:


People may or may not be inclined to accept Plato's ideas. Aristotle didn't.

Aristotle differed from Plato on many things but not on the issue of whether there was another faculty that can perceive another reality. Namely, Nous.

Krayola:


Plato then goes on to assert the existence of higher realms that he can not show to exist. That cave allegory is, IMO, only a "possible" scenario.

That cave allegory shows that it is possible that IF there was a source from which all other things that we perceive came, our experience, and knowledge based on these experiences will only be limited. That is a big IF. That our senses are limited, or could even deceive us does not mean we need to accept higher realms as real.

The Cave Allegory is only a allegory constructed to show HOW difficult it will be to explain higher realms to someone stuck in sense consciousness. I think it does so very elegantly.
So no, he cannot show in a 'sensible' way that it exists. In fact the only way to demonstrate higher realms is to awaken the faculties that can experience them in the person you want to demonstrate to. Everything else is just hot air. Or to continue using the cave allegory, the only way you can convince someone that there is a world outside the cave is to actually take them outside the cave.

I agree that the fact that our senses are limited doesn't mean that we have to accept higher realms. I don't think that was what Plato was saying.

Krayola:

I have ADHD and when I finished school I vowed never to use my medication again until I go to grad school. These long philosophical posts are hard for me to follow because I can't sit still for more than five minutes without walking off to do something else, or just wandering around the internet. . .  and it's kinda frustrating 

I get ADHD too. I hate classrooms. I fidget a lot. I don't use medication though. If someone's talking to me and I get the feeling that they are about to get all long-winded I, as politely as is possible, tell them that they have about 40 seconds to make their point or they'll have lost me. It can be brutal sometimes but I think it's a lot kinder than suddenly glazing my eyes and staring through them half way through their eloquent monologue.

Luckily, I also have an obsessive personality so when I get into a subject I'm like a terrier that has got it's teeth into something. I don't let go until I've investigated it to the last thread. But it also makes me have no patience or time for stuff that doesn't interest me no matter how important it is. To put it bluntly I'm one selfish, self-obsess, rude human being.

Pastor AIO:


Aristotle differed from Plato on many things but not on the issue of whether there was another faculty that can perceive another reality. Namely, Nous.

Please elaboratization on dis matter ^^ But in layman's language abeg. Too much philosophical grammar dey confusion me

Pastor AIO:

So no, he cannot show in a 'sensible' way that it exists. In fact the only way to demonstrate higher realms is to awaken the faculties that can experience them in the person you want to demonstrate to. Everything else is just hot air. Or to continue using the cave allegory, the only way you can convince someone that there is a world outside the cave is to actually take them outside the cave.

Oya, I want to awaken those faculties. . . I'm serious. Where do I start

Pastor AIO:
I get ADHD too. I hate classrooms. I fidget a lot. I don't use medication though. If someone's talking to me and I get the feeling that they are about to get all long-winded I, as politely as is possible, tell them that they have about 40 seconds to make their point or they'll have lost me. It can be brutal sometimes but I think it's a lot kinder than suddenly glazing my eyes and staring through them half way through their eloquent monologue.

haha. I know exactly what u mean. Mine was really bad when I was younger but I have it under control now. As u can imagine life in school in Naija for me meant daily flogging and punishment. From drumming on the table during class to straight up standing on the desks and walking from desk to desk, out of the classroom during class. I had to bring my mother to school at least once every other week for having done some totally ridiculous stuff. haha It's funny now, but back then it was hell. I don't like the medication though. I only used it when i had tests or exams to study for. I don't trust all these pharmaceutical companies. They'll just get u hooked on drugs so they can make a buck. Using the prescribed dosage I would have gone through about 5 refills last term, but I only used one and was only half way through it at the end of the term.

Pastor AIO:
Luckily, I also have an obsessive personality so when I get into a subject I'm like a terrier that has got it's teeth into something. I don't let go until I've investigated it to the last thread. But it also makes me have no patience or time for stuff that doesn't interest me no matter how important it is. To put it bluntly I'm one selfish, self-obsess, rude human being.

haha. DITTO!! I get bored easily. The only reason I was able to graduate was because I'm actually really interested in religion. When I was in a business programme I had good grades but just couldn't ever complete a term. I'd just stop going to class and find something exciting to do with my time. . . which was usually juvenile delinquency

Thirty-eight dishonest tricks which are commonly used in argument, with the methods of overcoming them

This is taken from "Straight and crooked thinking" by Robert H. Thouless, Pan Books, ISBN 0 330 24127 3, copyright 1930, 1953 and 1974. Heartily recommended.

In most textbooks of logic there is to be found a list of "fallacies", classified in accordance with the logical principles they violate. Such collections are interesting and important, and it is to be hoped that any readers who wish to go more deeply into the principles of logical thought will turn to these works. The present list is, however, something quite different. Its aim is practical and not theoretical. It is intended to be a list which can be conveniently used for detecting dishonest modes of thought which we shall actually meet in arguments and speeches. Sometimes more than one of the tricks mentioned would be classified by the logician under one heading, some he would omit altogether, while others that he would put in are not to be found here. Practical convenience and practical importance are the criteria I have used in this list. If we have a plague of flies in the house we buy fly-papers and not a treatise on the zoological classification of Musca domestica. This implies no sort of disrespect for zoologists; or for the value of their work as a first step in the effective control of flies. The present book bears to the treatises of logicians the relationship of fly-paper to zoological classifications. Other books have been concerned with the appraisal of the whole of an argumentative passage without such analysis into sound and unsound parts as I have attempted. Undoubtedly it is also important to be able to say of an argued case whether it has or has not been established by the arguments brought forward. Mere detection of crooked elements in the argument is not sufficient to settle this question since a good argumentative case may be disfigured by crooked arguments. The study of crooked thinking is, however, an essential preliminary to this problem of judging the soundness of an argued case. It is only when we have cleared away the emotional thinking, the selected instances, the inappropriate analogies, etc, that we can see clearly the underlying case and make a sound judgement as to whether it is right or wrong.

The thirty-eight dishonest tricks of argument described in the present book are the following

(1) The use of emotionally toned words (pp 10-25)
Dealt with by translating the statement into words emotionally neutral
(2) Making a statement in which "all" is implied but "some" is true (pp 27-38)
Dealt with by putting the word "all" into the statement and showing that it is then false.
(3) Proof by selected instances (pp 32-37)
Dealt with dishonestly by selecting instances opposing your opponent's contention or honestly by pointing out the true form of the proof (as a statistical problem in association) and either supplying the required numerical facts or pointing out that your opponent has not got them.
(4) Extension of an opponent's proposition by contradiction or by misrepresentation of it (pp 39-43)
Dealt with by stating again the more moderate position which is being defended.
(5) Evasion of a sound refutation of an argument by the use of a sophistical formula (pp 41-44)
Dealt with by analysis of the formula and demonstration of its unsoundness.
(6) Diversion to another question, to a side issue, or by irrelevant objection (pp 44-48)
Dealt with by refusing to be diverted from the original question, but stating again the real question at issue.
(7) Proof by inconsequent argument (pp 49-50)
Dealt with by asking that the connection between the proposition and the alleged proof may be explained, even though the request for explanation may be attributed to ignorance or lack of logical insight on the part of the person making it.
( The argument that we should not make efforts against X which is admittedly evil because there is a worse evil Y against which our efforts should be directed (pp 50-52)
Dealt with by pointing out that this is a reason for making efforts to abolish Y, but no reason for not also making efforts to get rid of X.
(9) The recommendation of a position because it is a mean between two extremes (pp 52-54)
Dealt with by denying the usefulness of the principle as a method of discovering the truth. In practice, this can most easily be done by showing that our own view also can be represented as a mean between two extremes.
(10) Pointing out the logical correctness of the form of an argument whose premisses contain doubtful or untrue statements of fact (p 58)
Dealt with by refusing to discuss the logic of the argument but pointing out the defects of its presentations of alleged fact.
(11) The use of an argument of logically unsound form (pp 58-64)
Since the unsoundness of such arguments can be easily seen when the form of the argument is clearly displayed, an opponent who does this can be dealt with by making such a simple statement of his argument that its unsoundness is apparent. For one's own satisfaction when reading an argument of doubtful soundness, it will often be found useful to make a diagram.
(12) Argument in a circle (p 64)
(13) Begging the question (pp 65-66)
Both 12 and 13 can be dealt with in the same way as 11; by restating your opponent's argument in such a simple way that the nature of the device used must be clear to anyone.
(14) Discussing a verbal proposition as if it were a factual one, or failing to disentangle the verbal and factual elements in a proposition that is partly both (pp 67-77)
This is really an incompetent rather than a dishonest way of arguing. The remedy is to point out how much of the question at issue is a difference in the use of words and how much (if at all) it is a difference as to fact or values.
(15) Putting forward a tautology (such as that too much of the thing attacked is bad) as if it were a factual judgement (pp 71-72)
Dealt with by pointing out that the statement is necessarily true from its verbal form.
(16) The use of a speculative argument (pp 78-83)
Rebutted by pointing out that what is cannot be inferred from what ought to be or from what the speaker feels must be.
(17) Change in the meaning of a term during the course of an argument (pp 88-94)
Dealt with by getting the term defined or by substituting an equivalent form of words at one of the points where the term in question is used and seeing whether the use of this form of words will make true the other statements in which this term is used.
(18) The use of a dilemma which ignores a continuous series of possibilities between the two extremes presented (pp 103-105)
Dealt with by refusing to accept either alternative, but pointing to the fact of the continuity which the person using the argument has ignored. Since this is likely to appear over-subtle to an opponent using the argument, it may be strengthened by pointing out that the argument is the same as saying, "Is this paper black or white?" when it is, in fact, a shade of grey.
(19) The use of the fact of continuity between them to throw doubt on a real difference between two things (the "argument of the beard" (pp 105-108)
Dealt with by pointing out that the difference is nevertheless real. This again may be made stronger by pointing out that application of the same method of argument would deny the difference between "black" and "white" or between "hot" and "cold".
(20) Illegitimate use of or demand for definition (p 109)
If an opponent uses definitions to produce clear-cut conceptions for facts which are not clear-cut, it is necessary to point out to him how much more complicated facts are in reality than in his thought. If he tries to drive you to define for the same purpose, the remedy is to refuse formal definition but to adopt some other method for making your meaning clear.
(21) Suggestion by repeated affirmation (pp 111-114)
(22) Suggestion by use of a confident manner (pp 114-115)
(23) Suggestion by prestige (pp 115-118)
The best safeguard against all three of these tricks of suggestion is a theoretical knowledge of suggestion, so that their use may be detected. All three devices lose much of their effect if the audience see how the effect is being obtained, so merely pointing out the fact that the speaker is trying to create conviction by repeated assertion in a confident manner may be enough to make this device ineffective. Ridicule is often used to undermine the confident manner, or any kind of criticism which makes the speaker begin to grow angry or plaintive.
(24) Prestige by false credentials (pp 115-118)
The obvious remedy for this is, when practical, to expose the falsity of the titles, degrees, etc, that are used. The prestige then collapses.
(25) Prestige by the use of pseudo-technical jargon (pp 116-118)
Best dealt with by asking in a modest manner that the speaker should explain himself more simply.
(26) Affectation of failure to understand backed by prestige (pp 118-119)
Dealt with by more than ample explanation.
(27) The use of questions drawing out damaging admissions (pp 199-120)
Dealt with by refusal to make the admissions. The difficulty of this refusal must be overcome by any device reducing one's suggestibility to the questioner.
(28) The appeal to mere authority (pp 122-125)
Dealt with by considering whether the person supposed to have authority had a sound reason for making the assertion which is attributed to him.
(29) Overcoming resistance to a doubtful proposition by a preliminary statement of a few easily accepted ones (pp 128-130)
Knowledge of this trick and preparedness for it are the best safeguard against its effects.
(30) Statement of a doubtful proposition in such a way that it fits in with the thought- habits or the prejudices of the hearer (pp 133-135 and p 157)
A habit of questioning what appears obvious is the best safeguard against this trick. A particular device of value against it is to restate a questionable proposition in a new context in which one's thought-habits do not lead to its acceptance.
(31) The use of generally accepted formulae of predigested though as premisses in argument (pp 161-166)
The best way of dealing with predigested thinking in argument is to point out good- humouredly and with a backing of real evidence that matters are more complicated than your opponent supposes.
(32) "There is much to be said on both sides, so no decision can be made either way", or any other formula leading to the attitude of academic detachment (pp 166-167)
Dealt with by pointing out that taking no action has practical consequences no less real than those which result from acting on either of the propositions in dispute, and that this is no more likely than any other to be the right solution of the difficulty.
(33) Argument by mere analogy (pp 169-178)
Dealt with by examining the alleged analogy in detail and pointing out where it breaks down.
(34) Argument by forced analogy (pp 178-179)
The absurdity of a forced analogy can best be exposed by showing how many other analogies supporting different conclusions might have been used.
(35) Angering an opponent in order that he may argue badly (pp 146-147)
Dealt with by refusing to get angry however annoying our opponent may be.
(36) Special pleading (pp 154-156)
Dealt with by applying one's opponent's special arguments to other propositions which he is unwilling to admit.
(37) Commending or condemning a proposition because of its practical consequences to the bearer (pp 157-158)
We can only become immune to the effect of this kind of appeal if we have formed a habit of recognizing our own tendencies to be guided by our prejudices and by our own self-interest, and of distrusting our judgement on questions in which we are practically concerned.
(38) Argument by attributing prejudices or motives to one's opponent (p 159)
Best dealt with by pointing out that other prejudices may equally well determine the opposite view, and that, in any case, the question of why a person holds an opinion is an entirely different question from that of whether the opinion is or is not true.

This is quite good:

http://web.archive.org/web/20070106063753/www.infidels.org/library/modern/mathew/logic.html

Krayola:

haha. I know exactly what u mean. Mine was really bad when I was younger but I have it under control now. As u can imagine life in school in Naija for me meant daily flogging and punishment. From drumming on the table during class to straight up standing on the desks and walking from desk to desk, out of the classroom during class. I had to bring my mother to school at least once every other week for having done some totally ridiculous stuff. haha It's funny now, but back then it was hell. I don't like the medication though. I only used it when i had tests or exams to study for. I don't trust all these pharmaceutical companies. They'll just get u hooked on drugs so they can make a buck. Using the prescribed dosage I would have gone through about 5 refills last term, but I only used one and was only half way through it at the end of the term.

Serious flogging o!!! But luckily I then came to boarding school in England which was like I died and went to heaven. I had my formulas of responses that made it seem like I was listening, but I was caught out quite often.

The other stuff you will have to happen off Nairaland.

I don't know why I didn't make mention of Wittgenstein.

In the spirit of Xmas,
One for brainwork..

Bump