The South African Navy’s frigates and submarines are operational, with the submarine SAS Manthatisi being the only exception, as it is out of service and awaiting a new battery.

Minister of Defence and Military Veterans gave the operational readiness update to the Navy’s vessels in a reply to a parliamentary question by M A Mncwango of the Inkatha Freedom Party.

She stated that the frigate SAS Mendi is within the planned operational cycle and recently returned to Simon’s Town having returned from a four month deployment in the Mozambique Channel as part of Operation Copper. “On completion of this assignment the SAS Mendi returned to Simon’s Town and her crew is currently enjoying operational leave,” Sisulu stated. “In accordance with the Maintenance Upkeep Plan SAS Mendi will be entering an extended maintenance period in May 2012. Such scheduled maintenance periods always require the use of the dry dock to enable standard maintenance on the hull.”

The frigate SAS Amatola and submarine SAS Queen Modjadji 1 are operationally available and recently took part in Exercise Good Hope V with the German Naval Forces last month.

The frigate SAS Isandlwana, which had been on patrol off Mozambique, returned to Simon’s Town in mid-March as a consequence of participating in Exercise Good Hope V with the German navy. The fleet support vessel SAS Drakensberg has subsequently been despatched to the Mozambique Channel to replace the Isandlwana.

This is not the first time that the Drakensberg has been deployed for anti-piracy operations. The Drakensburg, accompanied by the Mendi and the submarine SAS Charlotte Maxeke, visited Tanzania in September last year to conduct joint exercises with the Tanzanian navy as well as perform anti-piracy patrols.

According to Sisulu, the submarine SAS Manthatisi is presently still in reserve as was reported to the Portfolio Committee on Defence on the 17 November 2010. “A complete new battery has been ordered and will be delivered towards the latter part of the year. This submarine is now also serving as the “first in class” to be scheduled for a planned refit; whilst establishing an indigenous and in-house refit capability.”

SAS Manthatisi has been held in reserve since October 2007 but serves as a platform for training and for planning of maintenance, repair and refit (overhaul) purposes. There have been several incidents involving the Manthatisi. The first occurred when the submarine was in harbour and plugged into a shore service to keep its 250 tons of batteries charged. Someone connected the submarine to this “the wrong way round", blowing fuses in the submarine, apparently because the wires had not been marked properly. The sailor responsible was disciplined.

In another incident, in rough weather the vessel “banged” into a quay, causing minor damage to the aft plane, which helps steer and trim the submarine underwater. A third issue involved the efficiency of the batteries. When being charged, the batteries produced hydrogen and the build-up of the gas damaged some of the submarine’s batteries, of which there are 480. The problem had been solved by introducing hydrogen release valves and the manufacturer had given the undertaking that some of the damaged units would be replaced free of charge.

The Manthatisi is the lead-boat of class of three submarines acquired for R8.1 billion as part of Project Wills, a component of the Strategic Defence Package. She was laid down at Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, Thyssen Nordsee Werke, Kiel on May 22, 2001, and arrived in South African waters in April 2006.

The submarine SAS Charlotte Maxeke is fully operational “and serves within the planned operational cycle for this type of vessel,” according to Sisulu. “This submarine and her sister-submarine, the SAS Queen Modjadji 1, have exceeded the expectations with regard to their availability and utilisation for operational utilisation.”

“None of the vessels, excluding the submarine SAS Mathatisi, are presently ‘out of service’. They are all being managed within the approved SA Navy Maintenance and Upkeep Programme (MUP) and as part of the Short and medium term Force Employment Plan. All issues regarding the SAS Manthatisi have been reported extensively and she will in due course once again provide our country with valuable service at sea, whilst the next submarine will enter a refit phase.”

Here below an indication of the role played by 250 South African Special Forces in the conflict of Siera Leone:

23 March 1991: A motley group of about 100 fighters comprising Sierra Leonean dissidents (mostly former university students), Liberian fighters loyal to Charles Taylor, and a small number of mercenary fighters from Burkina Faso invaded eastern Sierra Leone at Bomaru, Kailahun district. A second flank was opened in Pujehun District by a group entering from the Mano River bridge linking Liberia and Sierra Leone. The RUF was unknown to most Sierra Leoneans at the time; most believed it to be a front organisation for Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia. It was the start of a civil war which has destroyed Sierra Leone's development prospects and led to an almost total dependence upon paid mercenary forces and foreign troops.

Since 1985 Sierra Leone's government had been run by the former head of the military, President Joseph Momoh, a well-meaning drunken womaniser with few political skills or leadership qualities. He had taken over from the ageing Siaka Stevens (a.k.a. Shaking Stevens in his later years), the dominant political figure in the country's post-Independence history.

April 1991: More details emerged about the mysterious rebels who were terrorising Sierra Leone's hinterland. A communiqué announced the rebellion had been started in the name of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) whose leader was Foday Sankoh, an ex-army sergeant and professional photographer in his 50s. The RUF initially waged a war against farmers, villagers and alluvial miners, rather than against the central government in Freetown. The RUF espoused a crude ideology of rural resentment against exploitation; they used brutal tactics to terrorise civilians - often mutilating and amputating their limbs - in their efforts to exploit the inability of the Freetown government to protect its citizens. The rebellion worsened and civilian casualties mounted.

May 1991: Momoh, who knew his own army well, became increasingly worried about the threat the rebel RUF presented to internal security and fearful of the subversion of his own dissatisfied soldiers. Momoh looked towards Britain, the former colonial power, and expected Whitehall to help him out. Ties with Britain had been strong: the Royal Navy had used Freetown's port as a staging post during the Falkands War. Momoh himself had served in the West Africa Frontier Force along with senior British officers during the colonial era. He asked for military advisors to boost the Sierra Leone Army's capacity to deal with the terror threat, and to improve communications and intelligence capacity. Although individual officers were highly sympathetic to Momoh's request for help, the Ministry of Defence turned it down. After this point, officers in the SLA and government officials began to cast around for help from foreign mercenary troops against the RUF rebels.

October l991: There were clear signs that not only was the SLA losing the war against the RUF rebels, but that many of its brigades had become totally demoralised - and some were cooperating with the rebels. The government army was beginning to split into factions which made the RUF's operations (often backed up by intercepts of government intelligence reports) increasingly effective.

January 1992: A series of daring operations by the rebels in the diamond-rich south-east of the country indicated their strategy was to escalate from terrorising civilians to attacking economic targets

March 1992: There were more successful attacks by rebels on government army convoys. Some dissident soldiers appeared to have a secret alliance with the rebels: they were christened 'sobels'- rebels by day and soldiers by night. Morale in the army was deteriorating further.

29 April l992: Junior officers led by 26 year-old Captain Valentine Strasser delivered a démarche to Momoh's office in Freetown complaining about sinking army morale. Momoh, fearing the officers were trying to topple him, fled his office and told his guards to resist with military force. Capt. Strasser and his fellow officers then overwhelmed the guards while their supporters in the north of the city seized the government radio station and declared that the Momoh government had been overthrown.

1 May 1992: Capt. Strasser declared himself head of state (the youngest in the world at the time) and appointed Solomon Musa, another even younger junior officer as his number two. [Both are now in British Foreign Office-financed exile as law students in Britain.] Strasser presented himself as 'The Redeemer' - a reforming, popular figure in stylish fatigues and sun-glasses who would clean up the country's politics and end the rebel war. He initially tried to negotiate with RUF leader Foday Sankoh but several attempts at talks failed because Sankoh's preconditions were unacceptable to the Freetown government.

July 1992: Strasser reorganised the cabinet, replacing most of the military officials with civilians appointees. The idea was to allow the military members of the government to concentrate on winning the rebel war.

November 1992: Strasser decided to launch a major military offensive against the RUF after attempts to negotiate failed. The government army dislodged the RUF from its hold on the alluvial diamond mining areas in south-east Sierra Leone. For some months the rebels were pushed across the border into Liberia.

March 1993: As the war continued, the RUF were helped with military aid and logistics by faction leader Charles Taylor in Liberia. The RUF regrouped and infiltrated into the countryside again, waging an increasingly savage - and increasingly successful - rural revolt and exploiting rural grievances against Strasser's government. Taylor, (now President Taylor of Liberia after elections in mid-l997) had interfered in Sierra Leone since 1990 in order to shore up his own position and counter the influence of the regional power - Nigeria. The Nigerian military presence had supported successive Freetown governments, including Stevens and Momoh. Nigeria, which had a peace-keeping force based in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, moved two battalions of troops to assist Strasser's war efforts against the rebels. Nigeria also based its Alpha Jets at Freetown's Lungi airport from where they flew bombing raids into Liberia against targets occupied by Taylor's forces.

January 1994: The Strasser government launched an army recruitment drive, often signing up poorly-educated youths from the city streets, including orphans and abandoned children from age 12 upwards. The government army grew from 5,000 in l99l to 12,000 men in early l994.

February l995: The situation grew even more desperate when well-organised and ruthless groups of RUF fighters advanced towards the capital. Strasser's government was increasingly dependent upon foreign troops, particularly the 2,000 Nigerian troops stationed near the capital. The SLA was even more grossly ineffective, although it had swollen in size to over 14,000 by l995. Strasser requested further foreign assistance, initially from a group of former British Army Gurkhas, as the rebel war became international news with the capture by the RUF of groups of Western hostages (a group of Italian nuns, British VSOs and expatriate mine workers). The Channel Islands-based Gurkha Security Group, despite their fearsome reputation, proved ineffective. They got off to a poor start, embroiled in a road ambush in rural Sierra Leone. The RUF killed their Canadian commander, Colonel Robert MacKenzie, and other troops in February l995. The 50 Gurkha soldiers departed soon afterwards.

March 1995: Strasser then invited in the South African private security force, Executive Outcomes. By that stage the RUF rebels were less than 20 miles from the capital, although their hold on the rest of the country outside of the main diamond mining areas was intermittent. The RUF then had control of and was asset-stripping most of the mining operations in the country: diamonds, rutile and bauxite. This hit the government's revenue base. EO started by initiating training programmes for the army. EO was run by Eeben Barlow, formerly of the 32nd Battalion of the South African Special Forces, which was active in South Africa's destabilisation policy against its neighbours in the l980s. Many key figures in EO are also from the 32nd Battalion and served in covert operations in Angola and Mozambique. Barlow left EO in l997 but maintains close links with Sierra Leone, Sandline and its affiliated mining house, DiamondWorks, in which he has shares. EO's initial operation involved defending Freetown in collaboration with Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, at a time when it was felt that the capital would fall to the RUF and many expatriates were leaving. A bloody fight on the outskirts of Freetown in May l995 - less than 15 miles away with the gunfire clearly heard in central Freetown - led to a retreat by the RUF despite their pincer-movement attack with thousands of well-armed fighters. EO's operations in Sierra Leone were highly controversial. Many thought that because of their South African connections they were - in effect - sent by Nelson Mandela.

December 1995: EO expanded their operations into rural Sierra Leone, re-taking the diamond mining areas by the end of l995. And EO provided the security which enabled internal refugees to return home. They also started to co-operate with one of the rural militias (the Kamajors) which had emerged to provide a local defence force in the absence of help from the incompetent and corrupt government army. EO's assistance helped the ethnically-based Kamajors (their members were Mendes from the largest ethnic group) to become a powerful fighting and political force; they provided training and logistical support for the militia under the command of Hinga Norman.

Early January 1996: EO also retook the Sierra rutile mine, although the plant was looted by an SLA contingent led by Johnny Paul Koroma. In concert with the Nigerian troops, EO took the war to the RUF, fighting the RUF in its rural redoubt in the Kangari Hills in early l996. Sankoh's forces were badly defeated in a series of set-piece' encounters and quickly initiated peace negotiations with Strasser. Elections were scheduled, after British and American pressure, for 25 February 1996.

16 January 1996: Brigadier General Julius Maada-Bio overthrew Strasser who, he claims, was clinging to power. Many suspected Maada-Bio's motives: his sister, Agnes Deen Jalloh, was a senior member of the rebel RUF. But Maada Bio insisted he would go ahead with the elections as planned and that he did not aim to prolong military rule. He was close to Nigerian military leader Gen. Sani Abacha who had advised him to postpone the handover to civilian rule. Freetown's market women, suspicious that Maada-Bio was conspiring with local politicians to delay the handover to civilian rule, marched through the city and threatened to expose those politicians who had received bribes from the military to postpone the elections.

26 February 1996: Presidential and legislative elections were held, contested by 13 political parties and monitored by international observers. None of the presidential candidates won the required percentage of votes in the first round of the polls.

15 March 1996: In the second round of voting in presidential elections Ahmad Tejan Kabbah leader of the southern-based Sierra Leonean People's Party was elected President with 59.9 per cent of the votes; but the runner-up, John Karefa-Smart, leader of the northern-based United National People's Party, complained of widespread fraud. Kabbah, a self-effacing former UN diplomat who had been out of the country for many years, agreed to keep on the foreign security companies, including South Africa's EO, Britain's Defence Systems Limited, and local affiliates such as Lifeguard (which EO director Eeben Barlow says he owns) and Teleservices. Under Kabbah, EO's training programme for the Kamajors intensified and the militia became an increasingly important force, militarily and politically. Kabbah appointed former Kamajor leader, Hinga Norman, as Deputy Minister of Defence

July 1996: Criticism mounted at the slow pace of change under the Kabbah government. His decision to use the Kamajors as a de facto Presidential guard made him very unpopular with the army, which was increasingly factionalising into loyGlist and pro-rebel groups. Matters were made worse by Kabbah's announcement that he was planning a dramatic reduction in the size of the forces and a retraining programme. Kabbah's critics argued he was kept in power only by the combination of an ethnic militia, South African mercenaries and Nigerian troops.

August 1996: With the Nigerian troops in l996, EO took the war to the RUF: fighting the RUF in its rural redoubt in the southern Kangari Hills in early l996. Sankoh's forces were badly defeated in a series of encounters. They then proposed peace negotiations with Freetown. Sankoh offered serious negotiations and the recognition of Kabbah's government on condition that the EO troops be withdrawn. London-based International Alert positioned itself as a mediator for the RUF, handing out copies of Sankoh's ideological pamphlets to puzzled journalists. International Alert tried to organise talks between the RUF and Kabbah in neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire.

September 1996: A public row erupted about the cost of the EO contract to the Kabbah government. EO was charging US$ 1.8 mn a month for the services of less than a hundred personnel, along with two Russian Mi 17 helicopters and logistics. Freetown politicians complained that EO were exacerbating the civil conflict and that there were covert elements in its fees which meant the government was paying well above the US$1.8 mn monthly fee it had declared. There were growing allegations that individuals linked to EO were engaged in illegal diamond extraction and export. The International Monetary Fund, which was pressuring the government to cut spending, told it to reduce payments to EO and improve accountability in the mining sector. Kabbah renegotiated EO's fee down to US$ 1.2 mn. But independent sources reported that the Kabbah government still owed Executive Outcomes US$30 mn in arrears.

October 1996: Reports of its heavy fees and activities in the diamond fields turned public opinion against EO, Lifeguard and the mining companies it was linked to as well. EO's arrival in Sierra Leone had preceded the rapid expansion of the Isle of Man-registered Branch Energy's activities in Sierra Leone's mining sector. Branch Energy's Managing Director, Alan Paterson, was formerly head of Sierra Leone's National Diamond Mining Company. Branch Energy (in which Kabbah's government had a 30 per cent stake) said it had invested US$12 mn. in exploratory mining between 1994-96 - a period in which almost all the other mining companies pulled out. Branch Energy was taken over by Canada's Carson Gold in August 1996; and later that year Vancouver-based DiamondWorks bought 100 per cent of the Branch Energy stake.

November 1996: A peace agreement was signed in Abidjan between the Kabbah government and the RUF. An important provision of the agreement was that EO would leave Sierra Leone by January 1997. But EO's affiliate company, Lifeguard, which was registered in Sierra Leone, renewed its security contracts with several mining companies.

January 1997: Executive Outcomes formally withdrew from Sierra Leone. The Kabbah government established a power-sharing multi-party cabinet. The rebel RUF was also supposed to participate indirectly in government through a series of peace, reconciliation and demobilisation commissions. But Kabbah's administration was damaged by indecision and drift. Worst of all was its handling of the military. The army was due to be substantially reduced in size under a plan drawn up by British military advisors. Junior officers were accused of a number of coup attempts in late l996 and early 1997. Kabbah was increasingly reliant on the Kamajor militias for his security and ever more distant from the SLA. The Nigerian army maintained two battalions of troops in Freetown.

February 1997: Kabbah announced that a Nigerian-led security investigation had pinpointed members of the previous Maada-Bio government as coup plotters. RUF leader Foday Sankoh flew to Nigeria, apparently on an official mission. But he was arrested soon after his arrival and held under surveillance in the Sheraton Hotel, Abuja.

April 1997: After a row within the main opposition party, the UNPP, the government suspended its leader, Karefa-Smart, from parliament for a year.

25 May l997: Major Johnny Paul Koroma,33, led a successful coup d'etat against the Kabbah government. Kabbah's Nigerian and Kamajor guards appear to have been surprised and the President was airlifted out to Conakry in neighbouring Guinea. Maj. Koroma was a poorly educated soldier who had been over-promoted with the rapid army expansion of the early l990s. Fearful that he would be dismissed when the army was 'down-sized', he had already been implicated in one coup plot. Earlier Koroma had also been involved in corrupt accumulation, including asset-stripping of the rutile mining operation. He put together a ramshackle military junta amidst widespread popular unrest against his intervention. Dressed in a tee-shirt and baseball cap, barely articulate, he made an unprepossessing head of state. After the coup, there were days of looting by soldiers who commandeered cars and persecuted members of Tejan Kabbah's party. The Ministry of Finance was torched.

28 May 1997: An attempt by Nigerian troops to oust the Koroma junta ended in fiasco after Nigerian troops and foreigners were trapped in the Mammy Yoko Hotel in Freetown and surrounded by junta forces. Some South African soldiers working with Lifeguard fought alongside the Nigerians to try to force back the junta soldiers. Foday Sankoh gave interviews to the BBC from his hotel room in Abuja, praising the overthrow of Kabbah. Koroma declared that Sankoh was the ideological leader of his coup; Nigerian officials moved Sankoh from the Sheraton Hotel to a local security installation. British High Commissioner to Freetown Peter Penfold successfully escorted several hundred foreigners out of the city after negotiating with junta officials and threatening (without any likelihood of it happening) that US troops would intervene unless the foreigners were let through.

1 June 1997: Maj. Koroma invited the rebel RUF to join his junta and the feared RUF fighters came to town to misrule in the name of the merged 'People's Army'. Koroma's junta was internationally isolated, an unstable, brutal, populist regime. Its main military challenge was from the Kamajors and from the Nigerian troops who maintained their military bases north of Freetown and on Lungi Island.

July 1997: Kabbah was described as a 'rabbit caught in a car's headlights' at the time of the coup by one of his associates. Invited to set up a government in exile in Conakry he failed to do so. Instead he was surrounded by a group of Sierra Leonean politicians of dubious credibility, Nigerian military advisors and security men. Also spending time in Conakry were a group of supportive UN and international community figures - and British High Commissioner Penfold. Nigeria moved 4,000 troops from its operations in Liberia to Freetown.

Kabbah then opened discussions with Indian-born Thai banker Rakesh Saxena who offered to provide up to $10 million in finance for a counter-coup in return for Sierra Leonean diamond concessions. Saxena contacted Colonel Tim Spicer of Sandline International and commissioned on 3 July an intelligence assessment of the military and political situation in Sierra Leone. Spicer claims that he has a 'very good' relationship with Kabbah and with the Nigerian-led Ecomog force; he asked Saxena for $70,000 for the first week's work and said that further intelligence work would be charged at a rate of $10,000 a week. A four-nation nation committee of Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Ghana was formed by the sub-regional Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) to negotiate a return to constitutional rule with the Koroma junta. The four-nation Ecowas committee imposed an embargo on military supplies to the Koroma junta; the Nigerian navy mounted a naval blockade of Freetown and told the junta to clear any cargo ship with Ecowas officials first. The UN Security Council met, condemned the coup and endorsed Ecowas measures to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means and sanctions. In Resolution UNSC1132 it imposed a ban on arms shipments to all parties in Sierra Leone.

August 1997: A number of businessmen approached Kabbah with offers to finance an operation to reinstate his civilian government. They included Chief Executive of American Mineral Fields (AMF) Jean-Raymond Boulle, whose company played a key role in financing the successful rebellion against Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaïre earlier in 1997. AMF has a majority stake in Nord resources, a major mining house in Sierra Leone. Among the companies offering security services to Kabbah were Defence Systems Limited and Sandline, both based in London and with strong links to the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

September 1997: With Kabbah winning increasing diplomatic support from the British government, there was an invitation to the Commonwealth Conference in Edinburgh in October 1997 - as the guest of Prime Minister Tony Blair - and British government funding for conferences on a 90-day reconstruction plan later that month. Much of this was pushed forward by High Commissioner Penfold, rather than Kabbah and his advisors. British policy was driven as much by enthusiasm to return Kabbah and a constitutional government to power in Sierra Leone as by concern that Nigeria's Gen. Abacha was posing (bizarrely) as a guardian of democracy in Sierra Leone. Also Whitehall fearred that the Abacha regime had plans for a type of pro-consul role in Sierra Leone if it was able to restore Kabbah to power.

October 1997: Nigeria's Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi stepped up his country's diplomatic role after the Nigerian navy and Air Force had tightened the embargo on Freetown. The Koroma junta accused the Nigerian air force of bombing civilian targets. Liberian soldiers detained a plane at Spriggs Payne Airport, Monrovia, which was found to be carrying several South African mercenaries working for EO, some Kamajor militia men and assorted arms and military equipment. After pressure from Nigerian troops in the Ecowas peace-keeping operation in the country, the Liberian officials released the plane. President Charles Taylor and most of his cabinet had remained highly sympathetic to the Koroma junta.

Another round of negotiations between the Koroma junta and the Ecowas Committee on 22-23 October produced a peace treaty of sorts and a promise by Koroma's ministers that the junta would hand over to civilians by 22 April 1998. Nigeria lauded this as a great diplomatic breakthrough and requested an invitation to the Commonwealth Conference in Edinburgh on 24-27 October (Nigeria's membership of the Commonwealth was suspended in November 1995 after its military government executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists). Kabbah attended the Commonwealth meeting, yet his officials admitted they had no knowledge of the Nigerian-brokered deal with Koroma and were skeptical about its viability.

November 1997: Several plans for the ousting of the Koroma regime were floated. Efforts were made to interest South African officials in the plan and to win the Organisation for African Unity's backing. A secret mission to South Africa ended in fiasco after a Nigerian plane and its crew are impounded on landing at a military airbase near Pretoria. South Africa declined a request to provide air-logistical support for a Nigerian operation to oust Koroma; Pretoria's military advisors feared huge casualties in Freetown should such an operation have gone ahead.

December 1997: After discussions with Penfold, a meeting is arranged between Kabbah and Sandline International. They propose a plan to Kabbah and financier Boulle for the ousting of Koroma. But Boulle, a commercial rival of DiamondWorks, was unconvinced. Instead Rakesh Saxena made a definitive offer to finance the overthrow of Koroma, following his receipt of intelligence submitted by Tim Spicer in August. Saxena paid $1.5 million to Sandline as the first instalment of the operation. His second instalment was held up after Canadian police arrested him in Vancouver on charges of being in possession of a forged Yugoslavian passport.

28 January 1998: Penfold visited Sandline's Office in Kings Road, Chelsea for a briefing on the development of its military plan in Sierra Leone.

February 1998: A Nigerian-backed offensive by the Kamajors began in south-east Sierra Leone. Sandline provided intelligence and logistical support for the operation and flew an attack helicopter in the area. President Taylor accused Nigerian troops in Ecomog of transiting South African mercenaries across his territory. The Ecowas Committee of Four, led by Tom Ikimi, travelled to New York to brief the UN Security Council about progress on negotiations with the Koroma junta and the prospects for its handing over by 22 April. When questioned about reports of a Nigerian led-offensive against the Koroma junta, Ikimi denied it and dismissed the fighting as isolated skirmishes. No attempt was made to inform the Security Council about what was really going on in Sierra Leone or to seek its endorsement. As such the operation to oust Koroma was illegal under the terms of the UN resolution. However, within days Nigerian-led Ecomog troops launched an assault on Freetown.

15 February 1998: The Koroma junta was put to flight after less than a week of fighting in Freetown and Nigerian troops took over the government in Freetown, saying they had to stabilise the security situation before Kabbah's return. A British Foreign Office official expressed disappointment that the Nigerian forces didn't inform the UN Security Council of what they were up to as they would 'probably' have won approval for the plan. When asked at a Foreign Office reception what he thought of the Nigerian-led ousting of the Koroma junta, Minister of State for Africa Tony Lloyd replied 'Two cheers'.

2 March: The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group met in London about the situation in Sierra Leone and Nigeria. Lloyd insisted that the Nigerian action in Freetown was illegal but Ghanaian Foreign Minister Victor Gbeho said it was fully backed by Ecowas and that the Commonwealth should support it.

6 March 1998: The newsletter Africa Confidential published a report on the detailed planning between Sandline, Kabbah and Nigerian forces and on the financing of the counter-coup and it pointed to the involvement of Penfold as a key player in the plan. Africa Confidential said that the way Koroma was ousted had raised awkward questions for Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's 'ethical foreign policy' and its ban on military cooperation with Abacha's government. Later that day the Foreign Office confirmed that Penfold had met with Sandline about Sierra Leone.

10 March 1998: British Customs & Excise launched an investigation into Sandline's role in Sierra Leone, in particular claims that it had illegally shipped arms there.

12 March 1998: In a parliamentary debate on Sierra Leone, Tony Lloyd made no reference to the ongoing customs investigation into allegedly illegal arms shipments to Sierra Leone, the foreknowledge of his officials about the counter-coup or the involvement of Sandline. Instead he condemned press reports as 'scurrilous' and 'ill-informed'.

30 March 1998: Andrew Breaden, an inspector with the British Customs intelligence unit requested a meeting with Sandline Director Michael Grunberg about possible illegal arms shipments to Sierra Leone.

3 April 1998: Customs investigators searched Sandline's premises at 535 Kings Road, London and two of Spicer's houses. They took away paper and computer records relating to the Sierra Leone operation. Customs investigators requested Guernsey-based Hansard Management, which handles Sandline's administrative and financial affairs, to hand over documentation relating to the company's security operations.

24 April 1998: Sandline's solicitors, S J Berwin & Co, wrote to Foreign Secretary Cook on behalf of Spicer and Grunberg to complain of harassment by British Customs about arms shipments to Sierra Leone. The letter argues that from the beginning its operations in Sierra Leone were known about by both Foreign Office officials in Whitehall and High Commissioner Penfold in Freetown.

The South African Navy replenishment ship SAS Drakensberg has helped catch seven Somali pirates in the Mozambique Channel, in the Navy’s first hands-on capture of pirates since it began patrolling the waters off the East coast as part of Operation Copper.

According to the South Africa Navy (SAN), the capture of the pirates started off with an unsuccessful pirate attack on a Filipino merchant vessel last Friday at the Northern end of the Mozambican Channel. At about the same time, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Dar Es Salaam raised concern regarding the safety of a South African owned yacht, the Dandelion, en route from the French Island of Mayotte to the Mozambican port of Pemba.

By Sunday, the French Navy, who takes responsibility for this area in terms of Search and Rescue, had requested the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to assist in search efforts.

The SAS Drakensberg, with anti-piracy assets onboard, was already conducting patrol duties in the Mozambican Channel at that time as part of Operation Copper. The Drakensberg immediately commenced with a search for the missing yacht with the assistance of its embarked helicopter and a French maritime patrol aircraft.

On Monday morning, the French aircraft located the suspected pirate mother ship off the Tanzanian coast, moving in a Northerly direction. The pirate mother ship, with a skiff in tow, was identified as the Sri Lankan fishing vessel Nimesha Duwa, which was captured by pirates on November 9 last year.

At midday on Monday, the South African yacht was located off Pemba, having been delayed after suffering technical difficulties. The operation then changed from a Search and Rescue mission to a piracy interdiction operation. European naval units participating in the anti-piracy Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, the Tanzanian Navy out of Dar Es Salaam, as well as the SAS Drakensberg were being controlled via three different Headquarters in a coordinated multi-national operation.

By Monday afternoon, the Tanzanian Navy had provided permission to the SANDF to conduct anti-piracy operations within its territorial waters and the hunt was on, the SA Navy said.

During the next 24 hours, an intensive search was conducted by the SAS Drakensberg and its SAAF helicopter along the cluttered Tanzanian coast. European and Tanzanian vessels were closing in from the North. Unfortunately, poor weather conditions hampered the search effort. However, the plan remained for the SAS Drakensberg to force the pirate vessels to escape to the North where the Tanzanian and European Union forces would be waiting.

By midday on Wednesday, the concerted pressure of the search efforts had forced the pirates to split up and the skiff with five suspected pirates were located on Songo Songo Island and subsequently arrested by Tanzanian authorities.

Wednesday evening saw units from four different countries closing in on the estimated position of the pirate mother ship. The Spanish warship got there first and managed to capture the vessel by 20:30. Seven suspected pirates were apprehended and the six Sri Lankan crew members were freed.

The SAS Drakensberg spent Wednesday night in the area to assist Tanzanian forces if so required. The suspected pirates have been handed over to the Tanzanian authorities for prosecution.

“In the end, it seems clear that a loud message has gone out that SANDF forces, as part of SADC armed forces, will not allow illegal activities within SADC waters,” the Navy said in a statement. “It is also clear that the Tripartite agreement between South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania, and the subsequent deployment of SADC forces to safeguard our sea lanes, is paying off dividends in ensuring the safety of our seafarers and their precious cargoes. To the sailors and air crew of the SAS Drakensberg, the operational planners of Chief of Joint Operations and all others involved; we salute your valiant efforts!”

A trilateral agreement was signed by South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania in February this year, allowing the three countries the right to, among other things, patrol, search, arrest, seize and undertake hot pursuit operations on any maritime crime suspect. In accordance with the trilateral agreement, this allows the SA Navy to patrol as far as Tanzania.

Tanzania has recorded an unprecedented number of pirate attacks, reporting 57 incidents in its territorial waters between February 2011 and February 2012, which is indicative of the relocation of piracy to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) ocean.

The chief of the Tanzanian Navy, Major General Saidi Shabani Omar, has reported that the effects of piracy have caused a third fewer ships to enter Dar es Salaam port, increasing the cost of living and commodities. Oil exploration recently commenced in Mozambique and Tanzania, but explorers require protection from pirates, which is very expensive.

Tanzania has arrested around two dozen pirates in the past few years, including seven in October last year. They were captured shortly after joint exercises with South African forces, including the Drakensburg, frigate SAS Mendi and the submarine SAS Charlotte Maxeke.

As part of Operation Copper, the Drakensberg recently relieved the frigate SAS Isandlwana, which returned to Simon’s Town in mid-March as a consequence of participating in Exercise Good Hope V with the German navy.

Anti-piracy patrols are usually conducted by the SA Navy’s four frigates (SAS Amatola, SAS Mendi, SAS Spioenkop and SAS Isandlwana). The latest patrols have generally been of six months duration. As the frigates are required to undergo repair and scheduled maintenance, they were replaced by the Drakensberg.

Although the Drakensberg is slower and is not armed like the frigates, it does carry two Oryx medium transport helicopters and is able to accommodate members of the Maritime Reaction Squadron, who perform the actual boarding and inspection of merchant vessels at sea.

[quote author=umaru41]Someone said Ethiopia and eritrea, Are u kidding? Those malnourished people are not even strong enough to man an AK47. I have dogs bigger than those people.
Thats why we kicked the whites. War is not about fattening you a.s.s but courage f.u.ck you bantu.

Agreed. Ethiopia has a strong history of winning, they where the only nation to stand up to europe and give them a run for there money. My great grand father from my fathers side fought in the Italian in east Africa and mentioned how the locals where better solders than than the Italians. The only reason they lost was due to gas attacks from air craft. And even to day they have a competend milttary and one of the best in the region.

Myth should be dispelled that African Bantus folded their arms and never offered any resistance against white occupation and colonisation...here below is an account of brave Zulu warriors

The Battle of Isandlwana
Isandlwana, the battle that rocked Victorian Britain; at which the Zulus wiped out a substantial British force including the 1st Battalion, 24th Foot.

War: Zulu War

Date: 22nd January 1879

Place: 10 miles east of the Tugela River in Zululand, South Africa.

1st Battalion, 24th Foot, massacred at the hands of
the Zulus at the Battle of Isandlwana, 22nd January 1879
Click here or image to buy a print

Combatants: Zulu army against a force of British troops, Natal units and African levies.

Generals: Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine of the 24th Foot and Lieutenant Colonel Durnford commanded the British force at the battle. The Zulu Army was commanded by Chiefs Ntshingwayo kaMahole and Mavumengwana kaMdlela Ntuli.

Size of the armies: The British force comprised some 1,200 men. It is likely that they were attacked by around 12,000 Zulus.

Orders of Greenwich, Conn, USA.Uniforms, arms and equipment: The Zulu warriors were formed in regiments by age, their standard equipment the shield and the stabbing spear. The formation for the attack, described as the “horns of the beast”, was said to have been devised by Shaka, the Zulu King who established Zulu hegemony in Southern Africa. The main body of the army delivered a frontal assault, called the “loins”, while the “horns” spread out behind each of the enemy’s flanks and delivered the secondary and often fatal attack in the enemy’s rear. Cetshwayo, the Zulu King, fearing British aggression took pains to purchase firearms wherever they could be bought. By the outbreak of war the Zulus had tens of thousands of muskets and rifles, but of a poor standard, and the Zulus were ill-trained in their use.

The regular British infantry were equipped with the breach loading single shot Martini-Henry rifle and bayonet. The British infantry wore red tunics, white solar topee helmets and dark blue trousers with red piping down the side. The irregular mounted units wore blue tunics and slouch hats.

Winner: The British force was wiped out by the Zulu Army.

British Regiments:
2 guns and 70 men of N Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery (equipped with 2 seven pounder guns).
5 companies of 1st Battalion, the 24th Foot
1 company of 2nd Battalion, the 24th Foot
Mounted volunteers and Natal Police
2 companies of the Natal Native Infantry


Account:
The battle at Isandlwana stunned the world. It was unthinkable that a “native” army armed substantially with stabbing weapons could defeat the troops of a western power armed with modern rifles and artillery, let alone wipe it out.

Until news of the disaster reached Britain the Zulu War was just another colonial brushfire war of the sort that simmered constantly in many parts of the worldwide British Empire. The complete loss of a battalion of troops, news of which was sent by telegraph to Britain, transformed the nation’s attitude to the war.


In December 1878 the British authorities delivered an ultimatum to Cetshwayo requiring him to give up a group of Zulus accused of murdering a party of British subjects. In the absence of a satisfactory response Chelmsford attacked Zululand on 11th January 1879.

Chelmsford’s previous wars in South Africa did not prepare him for the highly aggressive form of warfare practised by the Zulus.


Chelmsford divided his force into three columns. Colonel Evelyn Wood VC (won in the Indian Mutiny) of the 90th Light Infantry commanded the column that crossed the Tugela into the North of Zululand. Colonel Pearson of the 3rd Foot (the Buffs) commanded in the south, by the Indian Ocean coast. Colonel Glynn of the 24th Foot commanded the Centre Column, comprising both battalions of the 24th Foot, units of the Natal Native Infantry, Natal irregular horse and Royal Artillery.


Chelmsford’s original plan had envisaged 5 columns crossing the Tugela. Shortage of troops forced him to reorganise his force into the 3 columns. Chelmsford required the original Number 2 Column under Colonel Durnford, a Royal Engineers officer with considerable experience in commanding irregular South African troops, to act in conjunction with Glynn’s Centre Column.

Chelmsford resolved to head for Isandlwana Hill. Isandlwana can be seen from Rorke’s Drift, a distinctive shape some 10 miles into Zulu country that the British troops likened to a Sphinx or a crouching lion. The proximity of this strange feature adds substantially to the macabre aura that hangs over the battle.

In the face of the invasion Cetshwayo mobilised the Zulu armies on a scale not seen before, possibly some 24,000 warriors. The Zulu force divided into two, one section heading for the Southern Column and the remainder making for Chelmsford’s Centre Column.


The Centre Column reached Isandlwana on 20th January 1879 and encamped on its lower slopes.
On 21st January 1879 Major Dartnell led a mounted reconnaissance in the direction of the advance. He encountered the Zulus in strength. Dartnell’s command was unable to disengage from the Zulus until the early hours of 22nd January 1879.

Receiving Dartnell’s intelligence Chelmsford resolved to advance against the Zulus with a sufficient force to bring them to battle and defeat them. 2nd Battalion, 24th Foot, the Mounted Infantry and 4 guns were to march out as soon as it was light.


Lieutenants Melville and Coghill escape with
the Queen's Colour of the 24th FootEarly on the morning of 22nd January 1879 Chelmsford advanced with his force and joined Dartnell. The Zulus however had disappeared. Chelmsford’s troops began a search of the hills.

The Zulus had bypassed Chelmsford and moved on Isandlwana. The first indication in the camp that there was likely to be a Zulu threat came when parties of Zulus were seen on the hills to the north east and then to the east.

Colonel Pulleine, the officer in command in the camp, ordered his command to form to the east, the direction in which the Zulus had appeared. Pulleine dispatched a message to Chelmsford warning him that the Zulus were threatening the camp.

At about 10am Colonel Durnford arrived at Isandlwana with a party of mounted men and a rocket troop.

Durnford promptly left the camp to follow up the reports of the imminence of the Zulus and Pulleine agreed to support him if he found himself in difficulties. Captain Cavaye’s company of the 1st/24th was placed in picquet on a hill to the North. The remainder of the troops in camp stood down.

On the heights, Durnford’s mounted troops spread out and searched for the Zulus. One troop of mounted volunteers pursued a party of Zulus as they retired until suddenly out of a fold in the ground the whole Zulu army appeared.

The Zulus were forced to act by the sudden appearance of the mounted volunteers and advanced in some confusion, shaking out as best they could into the traditional form of assault: the left horn, the central chest of the attack and the right horn.

One of Durnford’s officers rode back to Isandlwana to warn the camp that it was about to be attacked.

Pulleine had just received a message from Chelmsford ordering him to break camp and move up to join the rest of the column. On receipt of Durnford’s message Pulleine deployed his men to meet the crisis.


British troops escaping from
the Zulus across the TugelaIt is thought that neither Pulleine nor any of his officers appreciated the scope of the threat from the Zulus or the size of the force that was descending on them. Pulleine acted as if the only need was to support Durnford. He sent a second company under Captain Mostyn to join Captain Cavaye’s on the hill and 2 guns were moved to the left of the camp with companies of foot to support them.

As the Zulus advanced Durnford’s rocket troop was overwhelmed and the equipment taken, the Royal Artillery crews managing to escape.

The main Zulu frontal assault now appeared over the ridge and Mostyn’s and Cavaye’s companies hastily withdrew to the camp, pausing to fire as they went.

Pulleine’s battalion, drawn up in front of the camp at the base of the ridge, opened fire on the advancing Zulus of the “chest”, who found themselves impeded by the many dongas, or gullies, in their path and eventually went to ground.

The danger to the British line was presented by the Zulu “horns” which raced to find the end of the British flank and envelope it.

On the British right the companies of the 24th and the NNI were unable to prevent this envelopment. In addition the Zulus were able to infiltrate between the companies of British foot and the irregulars commanded by Durnford.

It is said that a major problem for the British was lack of ammunition and failings in the system of re-supply. It seems that this was not so for the 24th. However Durnford’s men on the extreme right flank did run out of ammunition and were forced to mount up and ride back into the camp, thereby leaving the British flank open.

The Zulu chiefs took this opportunity to encourage the warriors of the “chest”, until now pinned down by the 24th’s fire, to renew their attack. This they did causing the British troops to fall back on the encampment.

A Zulu regiment rushed between the withdrawing British centre and the camp and the “horns” broke in on each flank The British line quickly collapsed.


As the line broke up, groups formed and fought the Zulus until their ammunition gave out and they were overwhelmed. A section of Natal Carbineers commanded by Durnford is identified as giving a heavy fire until their ammunition was spent. They fought on with pistols and knives until they were all struck down.

The “horns” of the Zulu attack did not quite close around the British camp, some soldiers managing to make their way towards Rorke’s Drift. But the Zulus cut the road and the escaping soldiers from the 24th were forced into the hills where they were hunted down and killed. Only mounted men managed to make it to the river by the more direct route to the south west.


A group of some 60 soldiers of the 24th Foot under Lieutenant Anstey, were cornered on the banks of a tributary of the Tugela and wiped out.

The last survivor in the main battle, a soldier of the 24th, escaped to a cave on the hillside where he continued fighting until his ammunition gave out and he was shot down.

The final act of the drama was played out along the banks of the Tugela River. Numbers of men were caught there by the Zulus. It is thought that natives living in Natal came down to the river and on the urgings of the Zulus killed British soldiers attempting to escape.


The most memorable episode of this stage of the battle concerns Lieutenants Melville and Coghill. Melville was the adjutant of the 1st Battalion, the 24th Foot. He is thought to have collected the Queen’s Colour from the guard tent towards the end of the battle and ridden out of camp heading for the Tugela River. Melville arrived at the river, in flood from the rains, with and plunged in. Half way across Melville came off his horse, still clutching the cased colour. Coghill, also of the 24th Foot, crossed the river soon after and went to Melville’s assistance. The Zulus were by this time lining the bank and opened a heavy fire on the two officers. Coghill’s horse was killed and the colour swept away. Both officers struggled to the Natal bank where it seems likely that they were killed by Natal natives.

Melville and Coghill probably died at around 3.30pm. At 2.29pm there was a total eclipsed of the sun briefly plunging the terrible battle into an eerie darkness.

Casualties:
52 British officers and 806 non-commissioned ranks were killed. Around 60 Europeans survived the battle. 471 Africans died fighting for the British. Zulu casualties have to be estimated and are set at around 2,000 dead either on the field or from wounds. The Zulus captured 1,000 rifles with the whole of the column’s reserve ammunition supply.


The death of Lieutenants Melville and Coghill after Isandlwana

Follow-up:
Chelmsford’s force was unaware of the disaster that had overwhelmed Pulleine’s troops until the news filtered through that the camp had been taken. Chelmsford was staggered. He said “But I left 1,000 men to guard the camp.”

Chelmsford’s column returned to the scene of horror at Isandlwana and camped near the battlefield.

Chelmsford’s nightmare was that the Zulus would invade Natal. In the distance the British could see Rorke’s Drift mission station burning. From that Chelmsford knew that the Zulus had crossed the Tugela.

In the longer term the British Government determined to avenge the defeat and overwhelming reinforcements were dispatched to Natal. General Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent to replace Lord Chelmsford, arriving after the final battle of the war. Cetshwayo’s overwhelming success at Isandlwana secured his ultimate downfall.


21st May 1879: Chelmsford's column returns to bury the dead from the
Battle of Isandlwana and to retrieve the wagons.

NO COUNTRY CAN CLAIM MONOPOLY TO AFRICAN WARS OF RESISTANCE

;Dy do u dumb bleeps believe da shit u talkn?eritrea?egypt?nigeria?really.get ur facts.we(south africa)still have nuclear power.thats y ur countries are so bleeped up coz u knw shit about nothing. SA will mop the floor with all of u together.get the right education and knowledge than maybe we cn talk.if any of ur countries were so strong than y 2day are they so corrupt?we are self sufficient in any way.and numbers mean nothing.we can be 20 000 soldiers bt have alot more in reserve.to da guy that asked y arent SA helping in the other regions coz ur monkey republics should sort out ur own shit.u always want other countries to sort out ur shit.to the guys that actually knw what u talkn about bigup!!!look at egypt today,the horn of africa is a joke.the only thing u good at is looking poor on tv for us to feel sorry 4 u when u Bleep each other up with ur rubber boots.broken ak47's and 2nd hand weapons from russia or china get ur damn facts.

SOUTH AFRICA is clearly the strongest military on the African continent.


@andrewza, were talking modern (right now) NOT historical so it's irrelevant to bring up a conflict Ethiopia fought over 50+ years ago. Not to mention Ethiopia was fighting against one of the weakest European colonial powers (Italy) at the time. The war Ethiopia fought against Eritrea should be used as a gauge of what Ethiopia's made of.

98% of our countries don't even have our own weapons manufacturing industries (South Africa actually does). That fact alone puts South Africa head and shoulders above the rest of us. (I am Ghanaian BTW)


TOP 5 is:
1. South Africa
2. Egypt
3. Nigeria
4. Algeria
5. Ethiopia



here are two important criteria to be taken into account IMO:


1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_military_and_paramilitary_personnel

2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

Yewe2011: SOUTH AFRICA is clearly the strongest military on the African continent.


@andrewza, were talking modern (right now) NOT historical so it's irrelevant to bring up a conflict Ethiopia fought over 50+ years ago. Not to mention Ethiopia was fighting against one of the weakest European colonial powers (Italy) at the time. The war Ethiopia fought against Eritrea should be used as a gauge of what Ethiopia's made of.

98% of our countries don't even have our own weapons manufacturing industries (South Africa actually does). That fact alone puts South Africa head and shoulders above the rest of us. (I am Ghanaian BTW)


TOP 5 is:
1. South Africa
2. Egypt
3. Nigeria
4. Algeria
5. Ethiopia



here are two important criteria to be taken into account IMO:


1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_military_and_paramilitary_personnel

2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

sorry dude,the first weapon manufacturing industry in Ethiopia was opened in 1867 at Gafat during the reign of Emperor Tewodros even if it was destroyed by the Britsh later. Now ethiopia has some WM industries near to the capital.
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_industry_sector_Ethiopia

I know we are not the best but we aren't that much bad.( we and Eritreans are the best interms of courage)
http://www.ethiotube.net/video/16098...orce institute

Remember Ethiopia is a landlock nation means we have no navy. But we are one of the best in the continuent ha ha ha do you understand how Zap.ing we are good? [b][/b]

The argument advanced by Ethiopians is irrelevant, hogwash, baldadash, and carry no substantial facts. Debates are about what you have, capable of achieving, competency, qualification and quality. To boast about 18 century achievements hold no relevancy in today´s military modern world. To advance narrow nationalism as facts is an outdated form of defence bring facts....cite one thing that is MADE IN ETHIOPIA not a 18 century muskeet, coffee and plastic shoes.

Yep time changes every thing. 1945 Canada had the 3rd largest navy in the world. Now SA can put more subs to sea than they can. But there is Tradition and it dose count for something. If all it dose is improve Moral then it done enough. But note I never said Ethiopia was the best in Africa but it is one of the strongest if not the strongest in it's region. It is the closest thing east africa has to a regional supper power.

And yes SA is on top.

Who is South Africa fighting? The last time the 'country' had a good war was during appartheid,since the new goverment took over we tried to occupy Lesotho under the leadership of Mangosuthu Buthelezi when Mandela put him in charge for a week.And guess what? Our super military was humbled by Lesotho defence force.

So until we go to war with some country,I wont rate SA millitary as the best in the continent.Atleast Nigerians are using their fighters jet on MEND and BOKOHARAM,which means they're getting some actions,there fore I rate them higher than RSA.

My list will be

Egypt(They're forever ready to engage,with Israel as neighbour they have to be prepare,and they're better equipped)

Angola(Just came out of one of the longest and brutal civil war,with oil money and the combat history,they could fight tomorrow

Rwanda( they're still at war,although not in their country but are running things in DRC,Kabila is originally from Rwanda

Ethopia (They have the history and combat culture and East Africa best millitary)

Nigeria (They're the biggest contributor of personels to UN and other international peace keeping communities,and with MEND and BOKO they're getting enough action.

RSA (One of the best equipped millitary in Africa but lack experience,all the former soldiers are mersenaries in American,British,Australian armies and they're also helping in topling some goverment in Africa.They're soldiers for hire.

guys we are not talking about making small arms please?.South Africa makes tanks,attack helicopters,unmanned drones,fighter jets,radar systems missiles and more?search anything you want you will find what SA manufactured.we were the first country to create the AMR rifle and the rest followed.if you wanna know what our capabilities were even back then during the BUSH WAR search it,We beat Russia,CUBA ang angola at once and we were out numbered 3/7.we had the 1st anti landmine vehicles and now the US is using some of our vehicles and designs.PLZ catch a wake-up.

and to you that know nothing bout anything dnt show ur stupidity on the net.you stay in ur raggedy ass country and yet you know more bout SA than me that studied in the army.tell me who did mozambique and tanzania ask for help because that same sumali and whoever you say is so powerfull in africa is creating that piracy serge on the east coast of africa?who's helping the congo ?nigeria cnt even handle their own pirates that kidnap oil workers in the niger deltathey cnt even feed their armies properly!!!!!!and i have a degree in the institute of security studiesim not gonna argue with you coz you will drag me down to your level!!the only experience you have is when you kill each other with your ak 47's and rubber boot armies.and even than you kill women and children.TRY PICKING ON SOMEONE YOUR OWN SIZE AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS!!!!!!

SA intervention in leshoto came during a time of turmoil for the SADF/SANDF that lasted for some time. And they had restrictive ROE. And we are heavily involved in peace keeping.

during that time we stopped the lesotho government from being overthrown and we helped,we stopped their defence force from doing that in 5 days and not the other way around.we acted in self defence and exchanged fire and only one SADF soldier got wounded in the face and more of them got killed in the process.they complained to our then president mandela about us having attacked them.lesotho have never and will never humble the SADF.They buy 2nd hand weapons from us and we regularly donate weapons to them

Nigeria wouldn't make top five in my list. I believe a dose of professionalism should also be a criteria which most of the NM clearly lacks.
Many cases of looting and extra judicial killings abound.

[size=16pt]Kony: The greatest African General ever...[/size]
After all, African wars are fought by kids

For those who undermine Ethiopia, these are some flash to think calmly even if they have no connection with the military.
The tallest building in africa will be
http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2012/05/14/chuan-hui-international-hotel-in-ethiopia-to-be-africa-s-tallest-building-1
The tallest dam in africa
http://www.powermag.com/renewables/hydro/Ethiopia-completes-construction-of-Africas-tallest-Dam_2012.html
the largest hydroelectric plant in the continuent will be
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Ethiopian_Renaissance_Dam
to be continue

Weslataw: For those who undermine Ethiopia, these are some flash to think calmly even if they have no connection with the military.
The tallest building in africa will be
http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2012/05/14/chuan-hui-international-hotel-in-ethiopia-to-be-africa-s-tallest-building-1
The tallest dam in africa
http://www.powermag.com/renewables/hydro/Ethiopia-completes-construction-of-Africas-tallest-Dam_2012.html
the largest hydroelectric plant in the continuent will be
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Ethiopian_Renaissance_Dam
to be continue

Why you bragging about china building a tall building in your country. Knowing china the benefits to you will be small.

andrewza:


Why you bragging about china building a tall building in your country. Knowing china the benefits to you will be small.

I'm not surprise since you are one of the victims of the neo liberal media.

jist pointing out that china has a bad record when it comes to sino-african deals. At least for the guys on the ground for the rich they just get richer. And i do not watch the news i get my info from other sourses ISS is a big one.

Prefering china over the western world is quite profitable. Shall I list my reasons?

wesly
No! Dont list anything. Dem send you? Black Africans dont seem to possess the nature of attacking other people, and looting their resources.

Weslataw: Prefering china over the western world is quite profitable. Shall I list my reasons?

Who said deal with the west. Why can't you do this on your own.

And I would rather deal with the west than china.

Some pics of Ethio air force

That SU (looks like a 27) is one of the best aircraft in Africa. Will out fly and out gun(if the pilot is any good) a F16 any day.

People saying that ethiopians can't fight need to go ask about the only army that was able to tame the somali clans and al-shabab. Don't play with ethiopian infantry o. They have a proud tradition and are used to fighting realy tough enemies

joeyfire:
People saying that ethiopians can't fight need to go ask about the only army that was able to tame the somali clans and al-shabab. Don't play with ethiopian infantry o. They have a proud tradition and are used to fighting realy tough enemies

No one said you could not fight.

Al shabab and the clans where never a real army. They thought they where but they where not. Same thing happened to the tamil tigers.

Tradition dose not win wars.

Has I said they somalia enemy beat them self by fighting to a organized army's strengths.

Until we have war, we can't know which country has the strongest military in Africa. Strength can only be determined in battle. At one time, Egypt thought they had stronger army than Israel but were proved wrong when they engaged Israel in War. The only question that can be answered now is "Who has the largest army in the world"?