₦airaland Forum

ogawisdom:
I just like the argument for and against this IPO with everyone presenting their perspective logically using historical facts.

Keep them coming guys it's what makes this platform solid. We need to see every side before concluding on the best strategy to adopt.

For me I will buy some say 30% in IPO and wait for listing to buy 70% if the price crashes as you postulated . I plan to hold for at least 5 years and with that I won't lose long term.

Personally, I don’t believe Dangote Refinery is accurately priced right now.

But one thing I strongly believe in is averaging, whether the price goes up or down.

I remember when I exited Oando at ₦90 and bought back at ₦78. People like street were insulting me then, but the difference between me and them is simple. I don’t put all my eggs in one basket.

For example, if you have ₦10 million, I would not advise putting everything in at once. I would put 25% now, then continue to average up or down on a monthly basis depending on how the market moves.

That was exactly what I did with Oando.

And look at me now.

I hate coming to this thread and seeing so many posts that are irrelevant to NSEMPA. If i wanted to see petty arguments i will be on instablog. Sometimes just ignore the urge to respond.

Stockhunter:
So wema bank eps in Q1 2026 is more than their entire 2025 eps. Interesting.

Q1 2026 eps is 7.90 while entire 2025 eps is 7.08. this was achieved not recovering from loss o. i think the market is underating this bank. If the earnings hold for the rest of the quarter or even do 5 naira for the remaining 3 quarters, thats over 20 naira eps. Matching that of the fugaz like zenith and stanbic.. if we do PE of 3.5x thats above 100 naira... In less than 2 years wema go touch 100.. i need to beam my touchlight on this stock though not a fan of banks

Is there any blind spot i am missing.

Its trading at 2x its book value and it did eps of N8.03 in Q1 25, so even lower. I think its fairly valued now. Additionally, the disclosed Q1 26 EPS appears to be annualized, not actual three month EPS and restricted deposits of ₦974.02bn are not operationally available, limiting the usefulness of headline cash balances.

Ahead of the curve as always, I hail o . I really enjoy reading this thread like a week late cause i can be emotional sometimes so these late nights allow me to sleep on some investment decisions. If they sell down to meet 10% it will actually be a postive as it frees up cash to pay dividend earlier.

Sunrisepebble:
It will be a miracle if Access pays an interim dividend this year.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-05/nigeria-s-access-bank-to-sell-down-foreign-units-after-central-bank-order?taid=69fa2a3c16d544000169c559&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter

pluto09:
https://doclib.ngxgroup.com/Financial_NewsDocs/ACCESS_HOLDINGS_PLC_-_CLARIFICATION_ON_NON_PAYMENT_OF_DIVIDEND.pdf

I've gone to look at the rules and access Q1 and compared it with what they put here. I'll be as detailed as possible. But summary is, its not looking too good. Those acquisitions outside are the reason they cannot pay dividends as they are over the 10% CBN Limit.

Access Holdings Dividend: The Rules, The Limits And What They May Pay In 2026

Access Holdings’ dividend issue is not mainly about profit. It is about regulatory approval and how much dividend the parent company is allowed to pay.

The company made strong profit, but because it is a financial holding company with banking subsidiaries, CBN still has to be comfortable that all capital and foreign subsidiary rules have been met before dividend can be paid.

The simple summary is this:

Access can report strong profit and still pay no dividend if CBN does not approve it.

So the possible 2026 dividend range is:

Minimum: ₦0.00 per share

Current possible ceiling based on Q1 2026 parent retained earnings: about ₦1.09 per share

Higher possible ceiling if Q1 parent earnings continue for the full year and approval is received: about ₦1.63 per share

Why They Did Not Pay Dividend

Access referred to two main regulatory issues.

1. The CBN HoldCo Capital Rule

Access Holdings is not just a bank. It is the holding company above Access Bank and other subsidiaries.

Under the CBN HoldCo rule, the parent company must have enough recognised capital to support the businesses under it.

The important point is that CBN was not looking at all forms of equity. The regulator clarified that the minimum paid up capital should be calculated using only:

Par value of issued shares plus share premium

This means retained earnings and other reserves may not count for that specific capital test.

Access said this issue affected the half year dividend, but it has now been resolved after the private placement.

The private placement was about ₦21.42 billion, and Access said this brought the Group into compliance with the revised minimum paid up capital requirement.

So this first issue appears to have been addressed.

2. The BOFIA Foreign Subsidiary Investment Rule

This is the bigger issue for the full year dividend.

The BOFIA rule basically says a Nigerian bank should not have too much of its shareholders’ funds tied up in foreign subsidiaries without CBN approval.

The rule refers to a limit of 10 percent of shareholders’ funds unimpaired by losses, unless CBN allows another percentage.

In simple terms:

Access Bank cannot put too much capital into foreign subsidiaries unless CBN is comfortable with it.

This matters because Access has expanded heavily outside Nigeria.

Access Bank has foreign subsidiaries in places such as Gambia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Zambia, the UK, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, Kenya, South Africa, Botswana, Cameroon, Angola and Tanzania.

From the latest Q1 2026 financial statement, Access Bank’s indirect subsidiaries were about ₦446.6 billion.

Access Bank Nigeria’s equity was about ₦2.316 trillion.

If the 10 percent rule is applied strictly, then 10 percent of ₦2.316 trillion is about ₦231.6 billion.

That means the foreign subsidiary investment of ₦446.6 billion may be above the 10 percent threshold by about ₦215.0 billion.

That is likely why CBN is cautious.

So even though Access made profit, CBN may still say:

First resolve the foreign subsidiary exposure issue before paying dividend.

Why The Minimum Dividend Is ₦0.00

The minimum possible dividend is ₦0.00.

This is because if CBN does not approve dividend payment, Access may not be able to pay anything.

Profit does not automatically mean dividend.

For banks and holding companies, regulatory approval can override accounting profit.

So the regulatory floor is zero.

Why The Current Possible Ceiling Is About ₦1.09 Per Share

For dividend purposes, the most important number is not Group profit.

The most important number is the parent company’s retained earnings.

This is because Access Holdings Plc is the listed company that pays dividend to shareholders.

The Group can make large profit, but the dividend must still be supported by distributable reserves at the parent company level.

As at Q1 2026:

Parent company retained earnings were about ₦59.175 billion

Share capital was about ₦27.188 billion

Since each ordinary share has a nominal value of 50 kobo, this implies about 54.376 billion shares in issue.

So the calculation is:

₦59.175 billion divided by 54.376 billion shares

That gives about:

₦1.09 per share

Or:

109 kobo per share

This means that based on Q1 2026 parent retained earnings, the current practical ceiling is about ₦59.2 billion total dividend, or about ₦1.09 per share.

This does not mean Access will pay ₦1.09. It only means that this is the rough current ceiling based on available parent retained earnings.

Why The Higher 2026 Ceiling Could Be About ₦1.63 Per Share

Access Holdings parent company made about ₦9.87 billion profit in Q1 2026.

If that Q1 profit continues at the same pace for the rest of the year, annualised parent company profit would be:

₦9.87 billion multiplied by 4

That gives about:

₦39.48 billion

Access Holdings’ parent retained earnings at the end of 2025 were about ₦49.305 billion.

If you add the estimated full year parent profit of ₦39.48 billion, you get possible full year parent retained earnings of about:

₦88.785 billion

Then divide that by about 54.376 billion shares.

That gives about:

₦1.63 per share

Or:

163 kobo per share

So if Access gets regulatory approval and Q1 parent earnings continue at the same pace, the higher possible ceiling could be about ₦88.8 billion total dividend, or about ₦1.63 per share.

Why Group Profit Does Not Mean They Can Pay More

This is a very important point.

Access Holdings reported very strong Group numbers.

Some of the key figures include:

Gross earnings of about ₦5.53 trillion

Profit before tax of about ₦1.01 trillion

Total assets of about ₦51.56 trillion

Q1 2026 Group profit for the period of about ₦216.537 billion

Q1 2026 profit attributable to equity holders of the parent of about ₦200.526 billion

Group retained earnings of about ₦1.997 trillion

But the parent company retained earnings were only about ₦59.175 billion at Q1 2026.

That is why investors should not simply look at Group profit and assume that Access can pay a very large dividend.

The Group profit sits across the banking group and subsidiaries. Before money can be paid as dividend to Access Holdings shareholders, it must be available and distributable at the parent company level.

Also, banking subsidiaries must meet their own capital requirements before they can upstream cash to the holding company.

So the dividend capacity is much smaller than the headline Group profit suggests.

My Estimated 2026 Dividend Range

If CBN does not approve dividend payment, Access may pay:

₦0.00 per share

Based on Q1 2026 parent retained earnings of ₦59.175 billion, the current possible ceiling is:

About ₦1.09 per share

If Q1 2026 parent profit of ₦9.87 billion continues for the full year and approval is received, the higher possible ceiling is:

About ₦1.63 per share

So my working range is:

₦0.00 to ₦1.63 per share

But the more realistic approved payment, if CBN clears them, may fall somewhere between:

₦1.09 and ₦1.63 per share

depending on how much parent company retained earnings Access has by the time dividend is considered.

Final Take

Access Holdings’ issue is not that the company is unprofitable.

The issue is that CBN needs to be satisfied with two things:

The holding company’s capital position

The foreign subsidiary investment exposure under BOFIA

The first issue appears to have been resolved through the ₦21.42 billion private placement.

The second issue, the foreign subsidiary investment limit, appears to be the bigger outstanding matter.

Until that is resolved, Access may still pay ₦0.00, even with strong profits.

Once CBN approval is received, the likely dividend capacity based on the latest numbers is about ₦1.09 to ₦1.63 per share.

My Access
No dividend it seems

Byankee:
https://doclib.ngxgroup.com/Financial_NewsDocs/46694_STANBIC_IBTC__HOLDINGS_PLC-_QUARTER_5_-_FINANCIAL_STATEMENT_FOR_2025_FINANCIAL_STATEMENTS_APRIL_2026.pdf


Final dividend #4
Interim dividend #2.5

Total dividend #6.5

At current prices, Access offers the stronger cash yield on a simple dividend basis. Stanbic at ₦188 and a dividend of ₦6.55 per share gives a dividend yield of about 3.48%, while Access at ₦29 and a dividend of ₦2.00 per share gives a dividend yield of about 6.90%. That means Access is offering roughly 3.42 percentage points more in dividend yield based on those numbers.

What makes Access even more interesting is the pattern of its dividend payments. In recent years, Access has typically paid a smaller interim dividend and then a much larger final dividend. For example, it paid an interim dividend of ₦0.30 and a final dividend of ₦1.30 for 2023, and an interim dividend of ₦0.45 with a final dividend of ₦2.05 for 2024. So historically, the larger part of shareholder cash return has tended to come at the final dividend stage rather than the interim stage.

The implication is simple. If an investor is buying mainly for income, Access currently looks more attractive on headline dividend yield. Stanbic may still appeal for other reasons such as earnings quality, capital strength, and overall market positioning, but on pure cash yield at these prices, Access is ahead.

Jagabanomics
https://doclib.ngxgroup.com/Financial_NewsDocs/OANDO_PLC_-_PRESS_RELEASE_16APRIL26.pdf

Oando is for diamond hands only. If you don't have money that's patient, just leave it . See context below. Just know when the share price starts moving, it won;t be because of any of these news/disclosures.

Oando’s newly announced gas supply agreement for the Bayelsa 60MW power plant is positive for shareholders, but it should be viewed in the right context. Based on the disclosed contracted supply volume of 11.2 million standard cubic feet per day, the agreement implies annual gas supply of about 4.09 billion standard cubic feet. Using current domestic gas pricing assumptions, this suggests gross annual revenue to the joint venture of roughly $9.3 million to $11.4 million, which converts to about ₦13.0 billion to ₦15.9 billion at an exchange rate of ₦1,400 to $1.

Assuming Oando’s effective economic interest is 40%, the company’s attributable share would be about $3.7 million to $4.6 million, or roughly ₦5.2 billion to ₦6.4 billion per year. That is clearly value supportive, especially because it points to more stable and predictable domestic gas monetisation. It also improves the quality of earnings by tying gas volumes to a long term offtake arrangement rather than leaving them exposed to more volatile or uncertain monetisation channels.

That said, this is not a transformational contract for Oando at group level. Relative to the size of the business, the deal looks economically incremental rather than valuation defining. The real importance lies more in what it signals: stronger participation in Nigeria’s gas to power value chain, better utilisation of existing infrastructure, and a gradual shift toward more visible and recurring cash flows. For shareholders, the announcement is therefore best understood as strategically strong and financially positive, but not large enough on its own to materially re rate the stock.

Happy New Year! I sense 2026 would be even better in our market . More liquidity to your elbows

Ellah real result:
https://ellahlakes.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Ellah-Lakes-12-Months-to-July-2025-Audited-Financial-Statements_Final_Executed_Compressed.pdf

A lot of people did not read that access report well and it shows. Anyway, sell your holdings, we would keeping mopping up from you

ACCESS
https://doclib.ngxgroup.com/Financial_NewsDocs/45213_ACCESS_HOLDINGS_PLC-_QUARTER_2_-_FINANCIAL_STATEMENT_FOR_2025_FINANCIAL_STATEMENTS_OCTOBER_2025.pdf

Mop

mikeapollo:
What's your take on Access? Time to mop up or time to dump?

Access Bank

"Ellah Lakes Plc Announces Agreement to Acquire Agro-Allied Resources & Processing Nigeria
Limited."
https://doclib.ngxgroup.com/Financial_NewsDocs/45090_ELLAH_LAKES_PLC.-PRESS_RELEASE_ON_ELLAH_LAKES_PLC'S_AGREEMENT_TO_ACQUIRE_ARPN._CORPORATE_ACTIONS_OCTOBER_2025.pdf

Mpeace:
It's an improvement on last year's N2. They also paid N3 as final dividend for last year. Not bad.

Zenith and Stanbic improved on their interim dividend. I believe Access will do better.

My only concern with stanbic is that SEC fine in their statement

Now that buying opportunities have presented themselves, you'll still hear people say "had i known" later. And the cycle continues. As always, buy what you understand, stop looking for follow-follow. Reminds me of transcorps pull back at 6 naira, oandos pull back at 25 naira. Don't let anyone scare you out of your positions.

...

70k in 2003 is 900k in 2025 lol

nosa2:
I opened my brokerage account with N70k in 2003. So nothing is too small. It's developing the habit of saving and investing that matters

My Thoughts on UACN Acquisition:

1. Strategic Impact
* Acquiring Chi Limited (Chivita & Hollandia) gives UACN an immediate leadership position in juice, value-added dairy, and beverage categories. All of which are markets with high margins and growing consumer demand.
* Chi Limited is the clear market leader in both juice (Chivita) and drinking yoghurt/milk (Hollandia).
* The deal diversifies UACN’s revenue base away from animal feeds and paints into more defensive, high-turnover consumer goods.

2. Balance Sheet and Earnings Impact
* The acquisition will boost UACN’s topline (revenue) and EBITDA margin. However, much depends on:
* The acquisition price (not disclosed, but see estimate below)
* Funding structure (cash, debt, shares)
* Integration effectiveness and cost synergies
* EPS: If Chi is profitable and growing, it will lift UACN’s earnings power and could justify a re-rating (higher sector P/E, more in line with consumer staple blue chips).
* Book Value: Will increase if funded via share issue at a premium or assets injection; could fall if high leverage is used.
* Multiple Expansion: UACN will move from a low-multiple conglomerate to a consumer staple profile, attracting higher valuation multiples.

Chi Limited Valuation (Speculative):
* Industry Benchmarks: In 2019, Coca-Cola acquired the rest of Chi Limited reportedly at a $500–$600m enterprise value (when Naira was under ₦400/$).
* Current market: Nigerian consumer sector has re-rated upwards, and Naira has devalued. Category leaders trade at 2.0x–3.0x sales and 8x–12x EBITDA.
* Estimated 2025 numbers: Based on Chivita/Hollandia’s market dominance and the scale implied by 5,000 employees, a conservative 2025 revenue estimate is ₦300–₦400 billion, EBITDA margin of 15–20 percent.

Quick Speculative Valuation:
Metric | Estimate (2025) | Multiple | Implied EV (₦bn)
Revenue. | ₦350bn. | 2.0x. | ₦700bn
EBITDA. | ₦60bn (17% margin). | 9x. | ₦540bn

* Likely deal value: ₦540–₦700 billion EV (approx $370–$480m at ₦1,450/$)
* If UACN acquires at this range, the implied equity value (after any debt) would be slightly lower, but Chi Limited could add ₦5–₦7 per UACN share in earnings power over time if integration is efficient and margins are sustained.

My Opinion and Rationale
* UACN’s Fair Value Impact: If acquisition is at fair price, UACN could see its fair value per share move up by 30–50 percent range based on new sector P/E and increased earnings as long as synergy and brand momentum are captured.
* Chi Limited Standalone Value: Using industry multiples, Chi’s standalone value today is ₦540–₦700 billion.
* Long-term: If well-executed, this deal could make UACN the top Nigerian consumer staple play after Nestle and Nigerian Breweries.

mikeapollo:
Nice to see and read your piece. Seems you've been somehow quiet in 2025, after the ''loud'' Xmas/December of 2024

I don't have bandwidth for back and forth lol. Enjoying my audio millions

Let me give you people small backstory on Ellah Lakes:

Chuka Mordi’s Background and Ellah Lakes Ownership Structure

Professional Background of Chuka Mordi (Pre–Ellah Lakes)
Chuka Mordi is a Nigerian investment professional with over two decades of experience in investment management, financial advisory, and corporate leadership.. He holds a Philosophy degree from King’s College, University of London, and began his career in the UK as an equities analyst at SBC Warburg. He later worked at firms such as Hardman & Co. (focusing on UK AIM stocks), InterSec Research (investment research), and Société Générale Asset Management (covering European emerging markets). In 2009, Mordi co-founded CBO Capital, a Lagos-based private equity and investment management firm, where he served as Managing Partner. He also headed the Infrastructure Financing division at First City Monument Bank (FCMB) in Nigeria. In addition to his banking and investment roles, Mordi held executive positions in other companies – notably serving as Co-Managing Director of Union Dicon Salt Plc in 2014 as part of a turnaround investment led by CBO Capital. This blend of international finance experience and local industry leadership defined Mordi’s career prior to his involvement with Ellah Lakes.

Path to Control of Ellah Lakes
Ellah Lakes Plc was a struggling fish-farming company until 2019, when Chuka Mordi and his partners orchestrated a strategic takeover via an agribusiness company called Telluria Limited. In May 2019, Ellah Lakes announced the acquisition of 100% equity in Telluria, effective May 7, 2019. Shortly after, on June 12, 2019, the board appointed Chuka Mordi (who had been a director of Telluria) as the new Managing Director/CEO of Ellah Lakes, replacing Frank Ellah (a member of the founding family). This leadership change was part of a broader restructuring to recapitalize Ellah Lakes and pivot its operations from fish farming to crop cultivation (especially oil palm), leveraging Telluria’s farmlands and expertise.
Notably, the deal was structured as a reverse takeover: Ellah Lakes paid for Telluria by issuing new shares rather than cash. In other words, Telluria’s owners received equity in Ellah Lakes, effectively giving them control of the listed company. Approximately 1.88 billion new Ellah Lakes shares were issued to Telluria’s shareholders, increasing Ellah Lakes’ total shares from about 120 million to roughly 2 billion. This equity swap made Telluria’s investors (with Mordi among them) the majority owners of Ellah Lakes – “Telluria Limited actually owns the company,” as a contemporary report observed . Mordi’s private equity firm, CBO Capital, was a core investor in Telluria, which further explains his leading role in the post-merger ownership and management of Ellah Lakes. In summary, through the 2019 Telluria transaction, Chuka Mordi and his investment partners assumed both executive control and a controlling shareholding in Ellah Lakes.

Ellah Lakes Ownership Structure: Historical vs. Current

Historical Ownership: Ellah Lakes Plc was founded in 1980 by the late Senator F. J. Ellah as a fish farming business and became the first agribusiness company listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 1993. For its first few decades, the company was closely held by its founders and early investors. Frank Ellah (the founder’s son) served as CEO from 2008 until 2019, and the Ellah family remained significant shareholders during that period. Prior to the 2019 restructuring, Ellah Lakes had only about 120 million shares outstanding, indicating a relatively concentrated ownership (primarily in the hands of the founding family and a small number of investors).

[b]Current Ownership (Post-2019): [/b]The Telluria reverse acquisition in 2019 dramatically altered Ellah Lakes’ shareholding structure. Telluria’s backers – notably CBO Capital Partners – emerged as the new controlling shareholders of Ellah Lakes. As of the 2022–2023 period, the major shareholders of Ellah Lakes were as follows:
- CBO Capital Partners Ltd – ~28.2% ownership (the private equity firm that led the 2019 investment)
- Enotie Ogbebor – ~18.8% (an Ellah Lakes director and investor associated with the Telluria acquisition)
- Blackman & Co. Ltd. – ~16.9%
- Lake Oko Farms Ltd. – ~9.4%
(No other individual shareholder held 5% or more of the company’s shares in that period..) These four shareholders collectively owned over 70% of Ellah Lakes, reflecting the concentration of ownership in the hands of Mordi’s investor consortium. CBO Capital, in particular, has been described as a “major shareholder” and key stakeholder in Ellah Lakes.

[b]Changes Over Time: [/b]In the years since the takeover, Ellah Lakes has undertaken further capital restructuring that affected its ownership distribution. The company raised additional equity to fund its expansion in agribusiness. For example, in 2024–2025, Ellah Lakes’ shareholders approved a conversion of about ₦3.1 billion of debt into equity. This debt-for-equity swap led to the issuance of approximately 1.10 billion new shares, which were listed on the NGX in March 2025. The total number of shares outstanding increased from about 2.75 billion to 3.86 billion after this conversion. During the same period, CBO Capital slightly pared down its stake – offloading roughly 81 million shares – in order to improve the stock’s liquidity and comply with free-float requirements of the exchange. Despite these adjustments, the core investor group introduced in 2019 (led by Chuka Mordi through CBO Capital and affiliates) remains the dominant shareholder bloc in Ellah Lakes, maintaining effective control of the company’s direction. This is evident from the fact that the majority of shares are still held by that group and its representatives, even as the company expands and brings in new capital.

Conclusion (my opinion as always): Was a smart public market play. Instead of doing an IPO or registering a new company, Chuka used a struggling listed entity to gain immediate market access, reputation, and funding pathways. It shows strategic thinking that most Nigerian entrepreneurs don’t apply. The structure is similar to what global private equity does. You inject value, control through equity, and scale with investor capital.

ppogba:
Well-done for this your analysis oo.
At least, it will help some educated ignorant .
I keep wondering whether it is the 20 percent of Nigeria' s population that people do not know what it translates to or the sum of N200m itself.

A clown talked about the number of houses in his village to argue his position while another said most people he knows are in the category of those that owns houses with SUVs.

Like I said earlier, I just hope that keeps are not migrating here surreptitiously.

Thank you! You cannot use a bubble mindset or what you see around you to judge. That's like saying nigerians are not suffering cause you see lamborghini in Lagos everyday. There's serious poverty in the land.

ositadima1:
Just because I have ₦500,000 in the bank doesn’t mean that’s all the resources I have.

I’m sure that if you had ₦200 million, you wouldn’t keep it all in the bank either — you’d invest most of it and maybe leave around ₦300,000 for day-to-day expenses.

You're looking at the wrong data — lol.

Let me illustrate with a famous story from World War II:

During the war, military analysts wanted to know where to add extra armor to their bomber planes to make them more resilient. They studied all the planes that returned from missions and mapped out where they had bullet holes. They saw that the wings, fuselage, and tail often had many hits.

Their first thought was, 'Let's reinforce these areas; they're clearly getting hit the most.'

But a brilliant statistician named Abraham Wald pointed out the flaw: They were only looking at the survivors – the planes that made it back.

What about the planes that didn't return?

He argued that the areas without bullet holes on the surviving planes (like the engines and cockpit) were actually the most vulnerable. If those critical areas were hit, the plane likely crashed and never came back to be counted. So, they reinforced the areas that appeared untouched on the survivors, and it significantly improved plane survivability.

So they have less than 500k in the bank but they are hiding 200m naira somewhere else? Okay got it . No counter data or anything, Just vibes. How would i have amassed the 200m in the first place?

Mankind2024:
In clearer terms, the government can only track money in deposit bank accounts. We also need to consider physical cash stocked in the rich informal sector.
Now that wealthy informal sector operators are aware of the government's plan to monitor their bank balances, starting January 2026 with the Nigerian Revenue Services' initiative, the benefits of the cashless policy may be outweighed by massive losses. Trust Nigerians; come January 2026, some traders might insist on cash transactions only.


https://nairametrics.com/2025/04/22/currency-in-circulation-drops-to-n5-trillion-in-march-2025-cbn/

Even when you assume that the 5 trn is in the hands of the 20% alone (40m nigerians) are you saying they hold 125k each? Let's be realistic. If only 2.4% are earning over 200k a month, even if they earn 100% for 10 years, it won't reach 200m in assets. 1% of Nigerians control 99% of our wealth. The numbers do not lie.

emmanuelewumi:
I have heard you, 20% of Nigerians have a networth of N200 million

Let’s take a step back and look at the numbers. Nigeria has approximately 64.8 million BVN-linked bank accounts, yet only 5% of these accounts hold balances above ₦500,000. That’s just about 3.24 million individuals. In a country with a population exceeding 230 million, this means only around 1.4% of Nigerians have access to more than ₦500,000 in their accounts.

Now consider this: if only 1.4% have over ₦500,000, it is highly unlikely that up to 1% of the population has a net worth of ₦200 million or more — even when you factor in non-cash assets.

Zoom in on Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial capital, with a population of about 15 million. How many of its residents can realistically be classified as wealthy? Then extend that question to the rest of the country — from smaller cities to rural communities.

Even in government, the numbers don’t stretch far. How many politicians do we actually have? Not nearly enough to tilt the wealth statistics significantly. And if we look at the private sector, Dangote — Nigeria’s largest private employer — has fewer than 50,000 employees. That’s a drop in the ocean compared to the labour force.

So when we talk about wealth in Nigeria, let’s be honest and grounded. The numbers paint a clear picture: true wealth is held by a very small fraction of the population.

Also, see image. Can download report with last link.

Sources:
https://nairametrics.com/2024/02/24/only-about-5-of-nigerians-have-over-n500000-in-their-bank-accounts-wale-edun/
https://punchng.com/bvn-enrolments-hit-64-8m/
https://intelpoint.co/report/the-nigerian-financial-services-market/

KarlTom:
BearBullMarket
DesignKing
Bovali
AwesomeJ

Trust you're good

I'm okay. Just a lot of noise here lately. Hope you're well?

SohSoh:
AGAIN YOU GUYS ARE FAILING TO SEE THE POINT, MECURE INDUSTRIES PLC " CURRENTLY " IS A BETTER BUY THAN FIDSON,
WHICH IS WHY I'M RECOMENDING IT AS A CURRENT BUY RECOMMENDATION.

Mecure Key Financials (Q1 2025)
- Profit After Tax (Q1 2025): ₦568.71 million
- Basic EPS (Q1 2025): ₦0.14 per share
- Shares Outstanding: 4,000,000,000
- Annualized EPS: ₦0.14 x 4 = ₦0.56 per share
- Total Equity (March 2025): ₦14,527,713,000
- Book Value Per Share: ₦14,527,713,000 / 4,000,000,000 = ₦3.63 per share

Valuation
1. P/E Multiple (Nigerian Pharma: 8x–12x)
P/E - Implied Value (₦)
8x - 0.56 x 8 = 4.48
10x - 0.56 x 10 = 5.60
12x - 0.56 x 12 = 6.72

2. Price/Book (P/B) Method
- Book Value Per Share: ₦3.63
- P/B Range (1.0x–1.5x): ₦3.63 – ₦5.45

Fidson Key Financials (Q1 2025)
- Profit After Tax (Q1 2025): ₦3,250,658,000
- Basic EPS (Q1 2025): 142 kobo = ₦1.42
- Shares Outstanding: 2,294,996,000 shares
- Annualized EPS: ₦1.42 x 4 = ₦5.68
- Total Equity (March 2025): ₦26,976,971,000
- Book Value per Share: ₦26,976,971,000 / 2,294,996,000 ≈ ₦11.76 per share

Valuation
1. P/E Multiple (Sector Range: 6x–10x)
P/E - Implied Fair Value (₦)
6x - 5.68 x 6 = 34.08
8x - 5.68 x 8 = 45.44
10x - 5.68 x 10 = 56.80

2. Price/Book (P/B) Method
- Book Value per Share: ₦11.76
- P/B Range (1x–1.5x): ₦11.76 – ₦17.64

My Opinion
- I intentionally used a lower multiple for Fidson just to show why it is fundamentally stronger than MeCure on both earnings and asset base.
- The market should and does price Fidson at a premium to MeCure, justified by higher profit, superior balance sheet, and a track record of sector leadership.
- If you are considering both as portfolio candidates, Fidson offers better downside protection (via asset base) and greater upside if sector multiples expand.
- MeCure remains investable at the lower band of sector multiples, especially if its cancer center and recent projects drive sustainable profit growth, but it is a “mid-tier” play versus Fidson’s “sector leader” status. Mecure is overvalued as it is. Best case it goes to 14 naira (26% upside) or it drops to 7 naira (37% down side)

thebargainhunte:
Ellalake don release their bomb, make Una check am, make Una no forget to tell us wetin dey result.

Revenue: ₦18.97m > ₦68.73m (+262% growth; revenue finally picking up, likely early yield from biological assets)
Net Loss: -₦396.6m > -₦238.2m (Reduced by 40%, showing operational improvement)
Borrowings: ₦1.14bn > ₦609.9m (47% decline; reflects active deleveraging strategy)
Equity: ₦19.95bn > ₦22.81bn (Strengthened via ₦3.1bn debt-to-equity conversion and share issuance)
Total Shares: 2.75bn > 3.86bn (Reflects recent equity injection)

My concerns
- Operating Cash Flow Still Negative: ₦(286m), despite revenue growth; improvements not yet yielding cash. Core operations are still loss-making and cash burning. No tangible gains from plantations yet.
- Persistent Retained Losses: Now at ₦(5.05bn), widening from ₦(4.81bn) last quarter.
- Cash Position Deteriorating: ₦15.9m in cash left vs ₦243m last quarter. Extremely low cash balance poses short-term liquidity risk

Positives
- Revenue is finally materializing
- Debt is reducing
- Equity base is growing
- Finance costs are falling
- Strategic conversion of debt to equity is improving solvency


Updated Valuation Analysis
- Book Value per Share
Equity: ₦22.81bn / Shares Outstanding: 3.86bn = ₦5.91

- DCF-Based (Post-Maturity Potential)
Assuming full plantation maturity in 2026 and earnings ramp-up (from prior DCF model)
I applied a 1-year delay due to continued net losses and low revenue base. Still reasonable to expect ₦6.00 – ₦7.50 per share in future value.

- Current fair value (discounting maturity risk) = ₦3.50 – ₦4.50

My Opinion
This quarter is a directional improvement, not yet a turnaround. If the company sustains revenue growth and avoids further dilution, valuation could settle near ₦5–₦6 over the next 12–18 months. Hold if already invested. If considering entry, wait for one more quarter showing solid positive cash flow or meaningful profit.

emmaodet:
Have gone through their financial report quickly and noticed they burn roughly 400m per quarter in free cash flow.
200m plus to operate the business (operating cash flow) and another roughly 200m in capital expenditure.
Plus or minus, they will be using 1b per year to run the farm pending when it will start generating meaningful revenue.
current OS is 3.86b
Cash at hand as at 31st jan, 2025 was 23m
current assets is about 25b that can be converted to cash to run the biz within a year.
Given it will take another 3 years before Ellah lake will be generating enough revenue to finance itself,
They may likely have to raise atleast 3b more to do that PROVIDED they couldn't convert their current assets to cash to do that.
That will dilute the shares about 100% more, probably seeing the price go down to #1.5/shares before experiencing price appreciation we are anticipating.
We will see how the management run the biz on quarterly basis

You're right. Part of the initial analysis i had to cut short. Summary is:
1. Operating Cash Flow
Net cash from operating activities: ₦650.3 million

Driven by:

- Loss before tax: ₦(344.2) million

- Depreciation: ₦11.1 million (non-cash)

- Huge increase in payables: ₦990.96 million

- Modest decrease in receivables: ₦2.89 million

Observation: The positive operating cash flow is not from operating efficiency or revenues (₦18.9m revenue is negligible), but mainly from growing unpaid obligations (payables). This is not sustainable and reflects pressure on liquidity.

2. Investing Cash Flow
- Outflow: ₦683k only

Represents minor capital expenditure, likely maintenance or asset upgrades.

Observation: [/b]Very limited investment in fixed assets, which aligns with their claim of already planting palm and just waiting for maturity.

[b]3. Financing Cash Flow
- Net outflow: ₦48 million

No equity raise or inflow during the period

Represents reduction in borrowings (especially SPUD and Octerra Capital)

Observation: The company is quietly paying down debt without new financing inflows. That shows intentional deleveraging, which supports management's claim of a post-rights issue cleanup.

4. Cash Position
- Closing cash balance: ₦23.1 million

- Opening balance: ₦308.1 million

- Net cash decrease: ₦285 million

Observation: Despite reporting ₦650 million in operating cash flow, the actual bank balance is down by over 90%, suggesting:

- Timing differences

- Possibly some non-disclosed or misclassified cash movement

- Reliance on short-term liabilities to fund operations

Conclusion (My Opinion o):
- Cash flow from operations is artificially positive, sustained by growing unpaid liabilities. This is not indicative of a business generating true internal cash flow.

- No real revenue traction means the current cash burn is being deferred, not eliminated.

- Debt is being quietly reduced, which is commendable, but needs equity backing or real income soon.

- The extremely low cash reserve (₦23m) is a red flag if maturity is delayed beyond 12 months.

- Unless the plantations start yielding within the next 9–12 months, the business will likely need to raise additional capital or renegotiate debts to avoid a cash crunch.