₦airaland Forum

They budgeted billions for hospital while they feel so proud going for Medical leave outside the country

Nonsense policy

BabaRamota1980:
Inciting? Really??

I thought everything from SW is now to be tagged "muslim Yoruba"....is it not?

People are always trying to destroy us and create division in West but we always outsmart our detractors...and then you get upset and start playing either to the constitution or the tune of Nairaland rule. So you call it inciting, you wqnt me banned, dont you? So for every Ibo that has tagged SW articles or threads or labeled us "muslim Yorubas"....they need to be banned if Im banned.

Waiting for your response.

How old are you? Seun please look into this kind of people that promote hate here always

Anita Joseph we now know you are in the news

Next please

deji15:
Unfortunately it is Ipobs that are weeping and dying in their scores.. Remind us again, how many died during Trump inauguration parade? Keep at it, your wailing, crying and gnashing of teeth is just beginning.

Stupid statement from a Kindergarten

I stand with Bisi Alimi for this. He wants to bring the plight ofNNigeria women to world attention. This is better than marching against Trump


Kudos.

To all the whole idiots celebrating this news what business does Tinubu do to acquire private Jet?

Can we now see it as normal if all the ex governors have Private jets?



Can we also see it as normal if Diezani have private jet since both she and Tinubu retired as senior staff in a major oil firm

We will see more of this and a lot of Custom officers lives will be on the line because of smugglers

I just want Trump to end radical Islamist and their founders.

Stupid liars. Where are the pictures or police report?
You want to do emotional blackmail on us after the genoicide you did in Southern Kaduna

Concluded.


A very interesting piece.


It will be debated some other time to glean the success and failures from both sides.

That's the Story of How Benjamin Adekunle was relieved of his post and Obasanjo took over

Biafran Colonel Joe “Hannibal” Achuzia (rtd)
 
Biafran Colonel Joseph Oseloka Achuzia (rtd) (a.k.a. “Hannibal”, “Air Raid”) never served in the Nigerian Army.  For that reason there are no Nigerian Army records in his name.  He did write a book titled, “Requiem Biafra” (Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1986).
 
He says he originally served as a conscript in the British Army in Korea under the assumed name “George Taylor.”   However, Commonwealth war records that I have reviewed identify “George Taylor” as Brigadier George Taylor, Brigade Commander of the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade - one of the two Brigades in the Commonwealth division during the Korean War. ‘George Taylor’ was definitely a Caucasian. But it is possible that Achuzia may have served under him as a black man with the exact same name.
 
Be that as it may, Achuzia returned to Nigeria on July 29, 1966 as elements of the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja Barracks were closing down the Ikeja International airport in Lagos during the early stages of the northern counter-coup.  With the assistance of coup leader Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed (whom he knew personally), Achuzia and his expatriate wife were given safe passage to Benin City (capital of his home region), from where he later made his way to Port Harcourt.  It was after he returned that he re-assumed his ancestral Asaba family name.
 
When the war broke out he joined the Biafran Militia.  As a militiaman he played an active role in the August 1967 Biafran invasion of his home region in the Midwest.  In fact he was involved in the arrest of several Biafran officers (like 101 Division Chief of Staff Major [Lt. Col.] Adewale Ademoyega) in that theater after suspicion fell upon them for alleged sabotage. He later claimed command of the “Republic of Benin Division” after Colonel Banjo was withdrawn, tried and later shot by Ojukwu.  Along with other Biafran elements, he fell back across the river Niger Bridge in the wake of Lt. Col. Mohammed’s rapid advance.  
 
As a volunteer militiaman, Achuzia was very active in the defence of Onitsha.  After the heroic defence of Onitsha against the initial efforts of Colonel Murtala Mohammed to take it across the Niger, fellow Midwesterner, Brigadier Nwawo, who was then 11 Division Commander, recommended that Achuzia be commissioned.  He was inducted into the Biafran Army with the rank of a Major – in a move Madiebo calls “the greatest mistake of my military career.”  Achuzia proved to be an expert in publicity stunts – and had very poor relationship with officers who had been conventionally trained in military academies.  There is no doubt, however, that he was quite useful to Ojukwu in keeping the regular military boys “in line.”  He was an absolute gem for Biafran propaganda.
 
Just before Onitsha eventually fell in early 1968 (to then Major Shehu Musa Yar’Adua), civilian militia elements moved in to take control of some regular army formations.  Citing his Korean War experience, Achuzia lobbied for, and was appointed the Division Operations Officer for the Biafran 11 Division, previously commanded by Colonel Nwawo.  In this position he was technically the Divisional Commander – an appointment he attained within three months of being commissioned into the Biafran Army.  Achuzia had direct reporting relationship with the Head of State, Ojukwu, thus bypassing the Biafran Army HQ.  His new Administrative Officer was none other than Brigadier Nwawo – his former Divisional Commander (and one time Nigerian Defence Attache in London)! 
 
According to several regular former Biafran officers I have spoken to, Achuzia never wrote operational orders for any battle – although to be fair to him, neither did Nigeria’s Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed, who trained at Sandhurst.  But time and time again, Achuzia would start off an operation and then lose interest and go somewhere else, and then return later on when it seemed things had worked themselves out.  This happened in Onitsha during Mohammed’s final push into the town from Awka in March 1968.  When Achuzia staged one of his disappearances, military officers like Colonel Chude-Sokei (Biafran Air Force Commander), Brigadier Nwawo, Colonel Eze, Colonel Aghanya, Major Okeke, and others rallied the front.  Chude-Sokei died from mortar fire and most of the others mentioned were seriously wounded by the time Achuzia returned.  On March 21st, Nigeria’s Major S.M. Yar’Adua took Onitsha.  When, however, a column of 2DIV logistic vehicles tried to link up with Yar’Adua from Abagana, they were destroyed in an ambush led by Biafran Major Uchendu on March 31st at Abagana – in another disaster for Nigeria’s Colonel Murtala Mohammed.  Nevertheless, Major Joe Achuzia promptly reappeared to address a Press Conference about it and did a photo-op at the scene with journalists, explaining in detail how he accomplished the ‘feat’.  To the amusement of regular Biafran officers who say he was not even there, it was on this basis that he got the nickname “Hannibal” – in memory of the great Carthaginian General.
 
When asked to comment on Madiebo’s criticisms of his military methods, Achuzia said:
 
“Yes, the point is that there has been a long drawn disagreement between me and Madiebo over the conduct of the war.  Madiebo was our Artillery officer but unfortunately an Artillery officer who could not stand the sound of artillery. Hearing the explosion of artillery shots he would place himself five miles away from the scene………Our disagreement grew from lack of faith because I made it clear to him that if for one second I lost faith in this cause I would remove myself from command and participation…”
 
Anyway, Achuzia was later relieved by Ojukwu of command of 11 Division and replaced by P.C. Amadi, a graduate of the MONS Officer Cadet School.  This would later prove vital when federal troops tried unsuccessfully to take Nnewi.  Achuzia, meanwhile, was ordered to relieve Colonel Ogbugo Kalu as the 52 Brigade Commander in the Port Harcourt sector.   When he failed to stop Colonel Adekunle’s advance there, Navy Captain Anuku, a graduate of the Royal Naval School at Portsmouth  – who also failed to stop Adekunle’s march into Port Harcourt - relieved him.
 
In September 1968, when Colonel Adekunle launched Operation OAU, Achuzia was at it again. He was embroiled in a command controversy with Biafran Navy Captain Anuku over control of the joint 52 and 60 Brigade HQ in the Owerri-Ahoada axis – under control of a newly created 14 Division.  Eventually, Anuku was asked to accompany Ojukwu for an OAU meeting in Addis Ababa while Colonel Ben Nwajei of 53 Bde was asked to take command of the Division as its first Commander.  In this way, Madiebo outmaneuvered Achuzia.  
 
Nevertheless, he bounced back into political prominence, distinguishing himself during the Biafran counter-offensive to retake Oguta in collaboration with Colonel Nwajei and Captain Anuku. Later in September, Achuzia made an unsuccessful attempt to retake Obilagu airstrip from Nigeria’s Major Abdullai Shelleng of the “Jet” 22 battalion, 1 Sector, I DIV.
 
When Brigadier Nwawo’s 13 Division lost Okigwe to elements of the Federal 1st DIV on October 1st, 1968, Achuzia was ordered by Ojukwu to take over command of the badly battered Division while Nwawo was redeployed to AHQ and Colonel Ude sacked.  Achuzia then changed the name to “15 Division” because he felt “13” stood for bad luck.  Nevertheless all three (3) attempts by Achuzia’s new 15 Division to retake Okigwe failed woefully.  By the time of his third attempt, many Biafran officers had abandoned their troops for fear of failure and Achuzia’s dreaded retribution – which some allege included summary executions.  The 15 Division later came under command of Biafran Colonel Linus Ohanehi.
 
Experience under Achuzia at the Okigwe sector became the subject of Biafran folklore.  On the day of the planned third assault on the town, its Biafran administrator was driving toward the frontline in a car similar to Achuzia’s vehicle.   When soldiers saw him coming, they abandoned their trenches and scampered into the jungle thinking it was Achuzia coming to carry out his threats against them.  The hapless administrator initially misinterpreted the behavior of the soldiers as a sign that there was a Nigerian “air raid” in progress.  When he later discovered that there was no Nigerian plane in the area, the incident served humorously to confer Achuzia with another of his nicknames,  “Air Raid.”  That is why he is known as Colonel Joe Hannibal “Air Raid” Achuzia.  The implication was that his own troops took cover from him whenever he was in the area – for fear of friendly fire!
 
After the failure of efforts to retake Okigwe, Achuzia, once again, got into a controversy with Colonel Amadi over the best way to stem federal advance in the Agulu and Adazi areas.  With Ojukwu’s backing, he even allegedly expropriated ammunition and fuel supplies meant for the operation, delaying it in the process.  Were it not for the “Umuahia Brigade” under Major Nwosu, the story would have been different.  An entire battalion of federal troops was later destroyed at Agulu and Adazi – the only major disaster experienced by Colonel Shuwa’s 1st Division throughout the war.  The outcome of that battle, in late November 1968, saved the 11 Division under Amadi and prevented the fall of Nnewi, Ojukwu’s hometown. 
 
Other than the arrest and deportation of mercenary Colonel Steiner, which he claims credit for, Achuzia was quiet and subdued for a while, preferring to stir up trouble in the Midwest.  But in March 1969 he convinced Ojukwu to allow him take temporary control of the “S” Division from Lt. Col. Onwuategwu in an effort to penetrate federal 16th Brigade lines during the siege of Owerri.  This effort also failed, and as previously noted, led to a shoot out between Achuzia and Onwuategwu, his rival. Achuzia, therefore, left the sector and returned to planning guerilla operations behind 2DIV lines inside his home region in Midwestern Nigeria. 
 
When Umuahia was threatened by the federal “Operation Leopard” offensive, however, Colonel Achuzia returned from his Headquarters and showed up.  He took control of one axis of the attack plan to retake Uzuakoli (along with Lt. Col. Onwuategwu and Majors Ananaba, Ginger and Okafor). Biafran troops, badly disorganizing Nigerian Major Ibrahim Bako’s battalion and wounding Major IB Babangida, temporarily retook Uzuakoli.   Achuzia wasted no time addressing an international Press conference about it and exaggerating federal losses – but in no time Uzuakoli was again in federal hands.  Achuzia drifted away once again to plan further operations in the Midwest.
 
Ojukwu’s apparent inability to resist Achuzia’s requests despite his shortcomings has led some commentators to speculate that perhaps he feared him.    Commenting on accounts that Biafran leader Emeka Ojukwu may well have feared him, Achuzia said:
 
“I think so.  I will illustrate with one incident.  When Owerri was recaptured, I was in Owerri. I was the one who created 14 Division from a Brigade. [This is untrue]   Having put it together, I handed it over to Ogbugo Kalu.  [Also untrue] At this time there was a Professor from present day Akwa Ibom, Effiong’s home, who was detained.  Effiong was under pressure by his people to get Ojukwu to release him and the day I was handling operations at the Ogbugo front I was told to take the task force and penetrate into Owerri.  He came with Okwechime and said to me that Ojukwu sent him to me that I was the only one who could give orders for those detained to be released.  You can see it is not true but under war situations you don’t know what to believe and what not to believe. So I looked at him and said: “Sir, you are the Defence Chief of Staff. You are number two to his Excellency. How does it sound that I, a mere Field Commander and a Colonel should be the one to give instructions for the release?”
 
He answered that he was sent, and that I should ask Okwechime. Okwechime confirmed and said that Ojukwu said he was coming to Owerri for a meeting with the chiefs around that area, that he wanted me at the meeting.  When I arrived there at 3 pm, Ojukwu was already there, the other chiefs, Effiong and so on. I walked in and saluted. The first thing he said was, “Are you averse to taking responsibility for me?” I said, “No, Sir”. That ended the matter. That shows order from somebody who is afraid of you.”
 
The real explanation for this bizarre chain of command (if true) may have been that Ojukwu did not fully trust or feel comfortable with the regular Biafran Army. Both Hilary Njoku (the first Biafran Army Commander) and Alexander Madiebo (the second Biafran Army Commander) have said – on record – that the regular Biafran Army was not consulted when Ojukwu decided to secede from Nigeria.
 
When asked a few years ago to name those in Biafra he trusted during the war, Ojukwu avoided the question by asking:
 
“Is this a fair question?”
 
When Ojukwu – who was himself the product of a conventional, but not so prestigious former military academy at Eaton Hall - was asked to assess his various Biafran commanders, he said:
 
“Achuzia was very good….”
 
When asked if he subscribed to any theory of war, he said,
 
“I wasn’t trained at Sandhurst….I found that the classic mode of that war was wrong and, in fact, I had a lot of problems with my commanders.  One of the first problems I had was this insistence that an officer has to be a gentleman.  Yes, in peacetime you have to be; in warfare he has to be a beast…..”What I want from my officer is victory in battle. If they ate with their feet I didn’t care but let them go for war and win battles”…So there was a dichotomy in the Biafran Army symbolised by the ex-Nigerian military men and people like Achuzia who had joined them...." 
 
In May 1969, Achuzia’s units were again in the news.  This time, while he was personally based at Oraifite near Onitsha, a detachment of his Republic of Benin Division took some European oilmen hostage at Kwale in the Midwest, across the river Niger.  A number of Italian oilmen were killed. Although tactically successful, the raid eventually proved strategically harmful to Biafra internationally.  It certainly cost Biafra the support of the Vatican, among others. France reportedly reduced arms supplies.
 
In September 1969, Achuzia was again in action.  This time he withdrew a Brigade of his “Republic of Benin Division” from the Midwest to assist in Biafra’s “Operation Do or Die” - the effort to relieve the Biafran 57 Brigade in the vital food producing area of Otuocha.  The Brigade had been cut off by elements of the federal 1st Division (including Captain Bello Khaliel, Major Muhammadu Buhari, etc.) as they secured the Onitsha-Enugu road in one of their many efforts to link Abagana with Onitsha. 
 
As previously noted, Achuzia’s press conjured reputation among civilians was mythical, even though not highly respected by professional soldiers.  Ojukwu manipulated this tension for effect.  On January 9, 1970, for example, at the final meeting of the Biafran leadership at Ogwa where Ojukwu announced his plans to go abroad “in search of peace”, Ojukwu used Achuzia’s name in a morale boosting decoy.  Fully aware that federal troops were already in control of Owerri, and fully aware of the hopeless condition of the Biafran resistance at that point, he announced that plans had been made for Achuzia to command two thousand troops in defence of Owerri.   He also announced that Achuzia was on the verge of taking four (4) thousand soldiers across the River Niger in another invasion of the Midwest.  Neither force existed. Neither event occurred.
 
What did occur was that a few days later, Colonel Achuzia was among those who surrendered to Nigerian Colonel Obasanjo at Amichi on January 13, 1970, following the previous day’s broadcast by General Effiong.  He later faced a Board of Inquiry and was held at the Kiri-Kiri prison for many years. Indeed, even when the very last batch of imprisoned Biafran officers who took part in the January 1966 coup (like Captain Christian Ude) was released on August 11th, 1975 by the new Murtala Mohammed regime, Colonel Achuzia was still ordered held (along with Shadrack) – for reasons never officially confirmed.  What is certain, however, from sources that prefer to remain unnamed is that there may have been unconfirmed allegations from former Biafran colleagues of Achuzia, alleging wartime atrocities.  He was, therefore, according to these sources, held in his own interest until he was let go later on the life of that regime. 
 
In his memoirs, Colonel Achuzia expresses the opinion that he saved Biafra during the war.   When asked to explain why he had not been given credit for this gigantic claim he said:
 
“Very simple.  Those that denied me or wanted to deny me the credit are my professional colleagues.  They never saw me as part and parcel of Biafra.  I am a Midwesterner.  It was by the same token that Brigadier Nwawo was equally denied his rightful place.  That I performed was because they had no alternative.”

i
 
B[i]IAFRAN PERSONALITIES DURING THE SIEGE OF OWERRI [/i](continued)
 
Former Lt. Col. Ogbugo Kalu [Biafran Brigadier]
 
Ex-Biafran Brigadier Ogbugo Kalu, commander of the Biafran 14 Division during the siege of Owerri joined the Nigerian Army in September 1958.  After training at the ROSTS (Ghana) and MONS Officer Cadet School (UK), he was short service commissioned 2/Lt. in November 1959.  Like his colleagues of that era, he rose rapidly and was already a substantive Major by May 1966 when Major General Ironsi promoted him Acting Lt. Col.  He saw action as an infantry officer during the Cameroon uprising and served with UN peace-keeping troops in the Congo.  At the time of the northern counter-coup of July 1966 he was the Commandant of the Nigerian Military training College (NMTC) in Kaduna, as the successor to Colonel Ralph Shodeinde who had been assassinated in January.  (Kalu was neither informed nor did he take part in the January 1966 coup.) 
 
On July 29, 1966, as conditions in Kaduna became increasingly tense following reports of the northern counter-coup in the south, he hosted an early afternoon meeting at his house in Kaduna of a few officers who were concerned about their safety.  These officers included Lt. Col. Madiebo, and Majors Emelifonwu, Ogunro and Ogbemudia. Ogunro and Emelifonwu were later killed. Kalu eventually slipped out of Northern Nigeria and, as Madiebo was to do subsequently, escaped to eastern Nigeria in the water-tank of a Goods Train.
 
In early February 1967, the then eastern region government, concerned about the gathering clouds of confrontation decided to create two new infantry battalions that would not be under the control of the federal government.  These were the 7th and 8th battalions.  Lt. Col. Ogbugo Kalu was asked to command the 8th battalion based at Port Harcourt while Madiebo was in command of the 7th, based at Nsukka.  The 8th Bn was initially responsible for Ahoada, Calabar, Oron and Bonny.  By the time war actually broke out on July 6th, a new 9th Bn (under Biafran Major Ogbo Oji) was in the process of being formed at Calabar.  52 Brigade was then created – to include the 8th and 9th Battalions, initially under Colonel Eze. Kalu later took command of this Brigade after further differentiation.   He was, therefore, in command of unsuccessful efforts by 52 Bde to resist Colonel Adekunle’s landing at Bonny in July 1967.  However, Kalu nearly recaptured Bonny in December 1967 and January 1968 from the federal 15 Brigade under Lt. Col. Julius Alani Akinrinade.  Akinrinade had transferred to the 3MCDO from 2DIV after falling out with Col. Murtala Mohammed over the Onitsha disaster.  But he then got into a disaster of his own and was barely saved at Bonny by timely reinforcements from Lagos.  (It was during this operation that Lt. Col. Onifade died) 
 
Again, in late March and early April, after a series of reversals, Kalu blocked the first major attempt by Adekunle to take Port Harcourt through Onne.  Akinrinade’s 15 brigade was practically wiped out.  According to Oluleye, the only survivors were “Ijaw swimmers” who knew how to disappear into the creeks.   If Kalu had sustained the momentum and conducted a hot pursuit he would have retaken Bonny and made history. 
 
Unfortunately for Kalu, local Biafran civilian leaders were frustrated with his inability to stem the overall tide of Adekunle’s subsequent advance on Port Harcourt.  Therefore, in an atmosphere rife with unnecessary suspicions of sabotage, he was replaced in late April as Brigade Commander initially by then Major Joe “Hannibal” Achuzia of Abagana fame and subsequently by Navy Captain Anuku.  This did not, however, stop Adekunle from eventually taking the city via other axes the following month – in what was clearly a major military disaster for the Biafran military. 
 
After the Port Harcourt debacle, Kalu led the 63 Brigade of the 11 Division under Colonel Amadi and staged a successful assault crossing of the River Niger. He slipped behind 2 Division lines and temporarily harassed Asaba, Ogwashi-Uku and even Ibusa, all in the Midwest.  The significance of this move was that it was the first return of Biafran units to the Midwest since they were evicted in October 1967.  Unsurprisingly, the incursion was not significantly publicized on the federal side.
 
In September 1968, as elements of the 3MCDO were linking Aba to Owerri during the opening phases of Operation OAU, Ojukwu relieved then 14 Division Commander, Colonel Nwajei and placed Colonel Kalu in charge – with the initial task of defending Mbaise against the federal 14th Brigade.   Although unfairly needled by Ojukwu about his problems at Port Harcourt, he subsequently led the Biafran double envelopment of the federal 16th Brigade at Owerri, which – under Madiebo’s supervision - he recaptured in April 1969.  As a result, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. 
 
Brigadier Kalu was still in command of the 14 Division when Owerri was taken back, this time, finally, in January 1970, during ‘Operation Tail-Wind’, the final federal offensive of the war. He was among the officers who accompanied Biafran Major General Phillip Effiong to Amichi, and later Owerri for the military surrender to Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo in the field after the broadcast of January 12, 1970.

Captain (Field Major) ATG Hamman
 
Ted Hamman, as he was popularly known, grew up in Maiduguri.  He entered the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) on December 10, 1962, along with now well-known personalities like Ibrahim Babangida, Garba Duba, Mamman Vatsa etc.  After six months of basic training, he proceeded to the Mons Officer Cadet School at Aldershot in the UK.  He was commissioned Second Lieutenant in February 1964.  
 
As a subaltern, he served in the 1st battalion at Enugu. He was among the non-eastern officers and soldiers evacuated from Enugu in September 1966 (along with Adekunle, Jalo, Jega, Yar’Adua and others) when there was break down of law and order following the events of the weekend of July 29, 1966.  They went by train to Kaduna and then to Lagos. Upon arrival in Lagos the unit was redesignated the 6 Battalion at Ikeja Barracks and Lt. Ted Hamman replaced Yar’Adua as the adjutant. The Commander was then Major Benjamin Adekunle.  The second-in-command was Gibson Jalo.  Adekunle subsequently moved on to take command of the Lagos Garrison Organization (which had been previously commanded by Anthony Eze).
 
When the civil war broke out in July 1967, the Lagos Garrison Organization (LGO) was tasked with operations along the Biafran seaboard, beginning with the capture of Bonny, in support of the naval blockade.  Following the surprise Biafran invasion of the Midwest in August, units of the Garrison were redeployed from planned operations against Calabar to clear Biafran troops from the riverain areas of the Midwest.  They concentrated at Escravos and were subsequently christened the 3rd Marine Commando (3MCDO) division. Three battalions, the 32 Bn under Ted Hamman, 31 Bn under AR Aliyu, and 8 Bn under Anthony Ochefu took Koko, Sapele, and Warri, before exploiting northwards to link up with Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed’s 2nd Division.  
 
Elements of the 3rd MCDO then disengaged from the Midwest (leaving Yar’Adua, Jega and Jalo behind to merge with 2 DIV) and returned to carry out ‘Operation Tiger Claw’, the seaborne landing and capture of Calabar.  The two lead battalions for the Calabar operation were under Ted Hamman and Anthony Ochefu.  Hamman commanded the 33 Bn that set ashore on the Henshaw Town beach.  When the 16th Brigade was created, Hamman was ordered to move his 33 Bn to form up with two other battalions under Etuk for the assault on Port Harcourt and subsequent “Operation OAU”. 
 
It was as the second-in-command to Etuk, during the siege of Owerri, that Major Hamman was killed by sniper fire on April 20, 1967.

Notes on key commanders during the siege of Owerri
 
FEDERAL NIGERIAN SIDE
 
Colonel E.A. Etuk (rtd)
 
Throughout this essay I have referred to this fine officer as “Etuk.”  In some publications he is referred to as “Utuk” but I have used “Etuk” because that is what was used in the most recent official Army publication on the Civil War.  Colonel EA Etuk (rtd) [N415] was admitted to the “Boys Company” (Nigerian Military School) in 1954 at age 14.  In 1958, he graduated from NMS and was a soldier at the officer preparatory school at Apapa in Lagos.  He was selected for further officer cadet training at Fort Dix in New Jersey, followed by six months of cavalry and armored training at Fort Knox in Kentucky, both in the United States – as part of the USAAF Officer Leadership Training program of that era. He was commissioned Second Lieutenant in June 1963, underwent further training and was welcomed home in 1964 by then Defence Minister, Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu.
 
Etuk served as a subaltern in the 4th Battalion at Ibadan under the late Lt. Col. Abogo Largema.  As a Captain he was deployed to the 2nd Brigade at Apapa under the late Brigadier Zakaria Maimalari.  During the count down to the war he rejected an invitation by Colonel Effiong to return to the eastern region to fight under Ojukwu.  He was subsequently a staff officer (operations), charged with weapons acquisition under Lt. Col. Iliya Bissala at AHQ and went on arms purchasing missions abroad for Nigeria at the onset of the civil war.  In October 1967, Lt. Col. Bissala prevented then Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed from drafting Etuk to the 2nd Division for the disastrous Onitsha assault river crossing.  However, he was later literally “hijacked” by Lt. Col. B.A.M. Adekunle and deployed to the 3rd Division as the Officer Commanding the 8 Battalion in Calabar.  After battalion operations in the Calabar-Itu-Ikot-Ekpene axis he was redeployed to Port Harcourt as Commander, 16 Brigade.  As a Field Major, he took part in the successful 3MCDO campaign for Port Harcourt along with officers like Lt. Col. Filemon Shande, Lt. Col. Pius Eromobor, Major George Innih, and (initially) Adaka Boro, among others.
 
After the fall of Port Harcourt, Etuk was tasked (as a Field Lt. Col.) with the capture of Owerri as part of  “Operation OAU”.
 
As the commander of the subsequently beleaguered 16th Brigade, he emerged among all the Nigerian field commanders of the civil war as the most highly thought of by his Biafran opponents.  According to Madiebo,
 
“….. the enemy force at Owerri which was the [16] Brigade under a young Calabar officer called Utuk [Etuk], was easily the best fighting unit fielded by Nigeria throughout the war.  Right from Port Harcourt, and particularly at Afam, it had become obvious that the Brigade was a force well led.  Inside Owerri, they fought with extraordinary courage, flexibility and determination.  The withdrawal of the Brigade from Owerri was tactically tidy and well planned and executed.  Without doubt no other Nigerian Brigade could have withstood for more than a month the punishment the enemy [16] Brigade absorbed with patience for over four months.  Only that Brigade could have got out of Owerri under the circumstances.”
 
After the Owerri debacle, Lt. Col. Etuk was temporarily appointed Garrison Commander for Port Harcourt before returning to command the newly reinvigorated 16 Brigade under the new 3MCDO Commander during “Operation Tail Wind” – the final offensive of the war.  His second-in-command this time around was Captain Buhari, a former NCO and concessional commissioned officer who had distinguished himself during the Owerri breakout.
 
However, Madiebo is not the only former Biafran military leader to complement Etuk.  When the war finally ended in January 1970, after Ojukwu and Madiebo had fled into exile, Etuk joined then Colonel Obasanjo for a meeting with the Biafran high command, which was going through the process of surrendering.  After the formal introductions, Colonel Joe ‘Hannibal‘ Achuzia, who mostly commanded the Biafran ‘Republic of Benin’ Division but had faced Etuk in battle at various times in Port Harcourt and Owerri, asked,
 
“Are you the Etuk who gave us all these headaches and all these troubles?”
 
Etuk later privately hosted former Biafran Chief of General Staff and COS (DHQ) Major General Phillip Effiong for a meal. Effiong reportedly said:
 
“You, this boy, you gave us headache.”
 
Colonel EA Etuk (rtd) was retired from the Nigerian Army in January 1979.

HOW THE ARMY HQ DISCOVERED THAT OWERRI HAD BEEN RECAPTURED
 
The exact date Owerri was lost was not reported to AHQ by the 3MCDO.    On April 26th 1969, the BBC announced the previous day’s recapture of Owerri by Biafran troops. That was how Major General Gowon and the AHQ in Lagos found out about it on radio in Lagos.
 
According to Major General Oluleye (rtd), it was only after a confrontation between then Colonels Shuwa and Adekunle of the 1st and 3rd divisions respectively, at an Army conference in Lagos, that the GOC 3MCDO admitted that Owerri had fallen. 
 
According to Major General Shuwa (rtd),
 
"When Adekunle heard that Umuahia was taken, instead of telling me, "Thank you, well done!” he now asked, "Why did you take Umuahia?"
 
Shuwa turned to the gathering of senior army officers and said,
 
"Here is the map, Adekunle should show us where his troops are in Owerri.” 
 
He was sitting down. 
 
“Show us where your troops are." 
 
General Hassan asked why I was demanding that.   I said:
 
'Sir, I have been trying to get these boys on their wireless; by now I don't think we have any boy left in that town. The last time I heard human talking was three days ago. I think these boys are gone. We have lost them." 
 
So Hassan said: "Please Adekunle, show us where the boys are." He said they were about 10-15 Kilometers outside the town.
 
I said, "Sir, there is no truth in that."
 
Hassan said:  " You are in Enugu. How do you know that these boys were gone."
 
I said, "Okay, find out."
 
Adekunle finished talking. So I went to the telephone and was ringing the Brigade Head [Commander] for Hassan."
 
Hassan commented, "I Division is telling us to tell the world that we lost." 
 
I said, "No Sir. You don’t do it like that oh!"
 
He had to announce on network that for tactical reasons the 3 Marine Commando pulled out of Owerri and actually we did.  There was a routing and 90% of our boys died... “
 
Lamenting then Colonel Adekunle’s lack of candidness about the conditions within his Division and unwillingness to seek assistance, Shuwa said:
 
“Now, if he was so pressed and he knew he was not going to be able to extricate himself by himself;  if he said, look, 1 Division, you must try as much as you can and push towards me so that you may relieve pressure on me, we could have, instead of going to Umuahia, pushed toward Owerri and could have relieved the pressure.  I [had] the troops. I [had] the ammunition.  I didn’t see the reason why I should sit down [doing nothing] and I was familiar with the ground." 
 
Then Colonel Adekunle on the other hand, may have been misguided by other considerations.  According to him, he often misinformed the Army HQ,
 
“Because in the first instance you [they] want the glory of the Civil War to go to the North alone.  That the North alone will say we saved this country.  That you [they] didn’t believe in any other person being able to do it”

According to him:
 
“…it became so nasty that you wouldn’t know who was who. With the assistance of my binoculars I was able to sight troops standing up there; soldiers moving around and it was difficult for me to know whether they were friendly troops or rebels…….
 
I had to send my intelligence officer to disguise himself as a hunter with a note to [Colonel] Ally that when I wave my hand he should wave and I would know it was a friendly force. Because at this time there was no question of saying there was connection in terms of radio, no!  We were all saying ‘life or death let us face whichever.’  So by the time this young man got there and gave him the note all I saw was a wave of hand as arranged….”
 
But there was one final surprise for the survivors of the 16th Brigade encirclement.  When they got back to their mother division in Port Harcourt, they discovered that their identity had been changed.  Colonel Adekunle had written off the 16 Brigade as totally lost and created a brand new unit called the ’16 Infantry Commando Brigade.’  Etuk and his boys were told that they were all presumed dead.  Needless to say, the men went berserk.

According to Madiebo:
 
“Right from the very start of his operation, it was clear the enemy was beginning to feel the bite of his over four months of isolation inside Owerri town.  Everywhere his resistance was stiff but shortlived and mainly sustained with armoured vehicles.  From the four corners of Owerri, our troops gradually closed in, and even began to set up road blocks in parts of Owerri.  Yet in the part of the town the enemy occupied, it was still impossible to break through the armour barrier.  That was the situation when I returned to Owerri front in the evening of the  23rd of April, 1969, following the fall of Umuahia the previous day.  The first report I got on my arrival was that the enemy at Owerri had lined up all his vehicles facing southwards, in a manner suggesting a withdrawal.   After a very lengthy discussion of the situation with the Division Commander, I decided it would be better to allow the enemy to leave the town and then attack him somewhere out of Owerri, at a point where we still stood a chance of destroying him.  I thought that for us to put in everything we had against the enemy inside the town could result in our exhausting our limited resources without success, and then run a risk of losing a large part of the town which we already controlled.  For that reason, a battalion of 60 Brigade was despatched to Umuguma to wait for the enemy.  To encourage the enemy to start the move we began to shell his convoy at a very slow rate with the little quantity of bombs we had.  During the month of March, the enemy had on two occasions similarly lined up his vehicles to withdraw from Owerri.  On each of those occasions, we had attacked him and it had resulted in his redeploying to defend himself and successfully too.  This time we were not going to attack him and therefore hoped that he would not change his mind.
During the night of the 24th of April the enemy began to move out of Owerri to the uncontrollable joy of all.  Once out of town, a Biafran company was put on their trail to harass them and hasten the withdrawal.  At Umuguma, the major battle began on the morning of the 25th and the enemy suffered very heavy casualties indeed.  Many vehicles carrying women, children and enemy casualties were allowed to proceed on their journey southwards unmolested.  After 24 hours of heavy fighting the enemy shifted further down to Avu, only to face another biafran force waiting for them there.  After barely four hours encounter at Avu, the enemy moved again further south to Ohoba and there linked up with his counterparts advancing from the south.  Thereafter all attempts to move him again failed, in the same way as did all his attempts to move back from there into Owerri.”
 
Etuk recalls it differently.  According to him:
 
“I called my officers and told them, ‘This morning I am calling you, telling you, giving you directive as your Commander that we are leaving Owerri by 6 o’oclock. If you like follow me; if you like stay here;” they laughed and retorted, ‘Oga don come oh! Ah! Oga. Wey the men now to fight the rebels? Wey the weapon? Wey the ammunition?”  I said, ‘Don’t you worry, we are going.’”
 
So by 6 o’clock we decided to take off; all of us, men, women, rebel prisoners of war etc.  We all moved out of Owerri.  I said within my mind that this is what they call American wonder. Let them sit and wait for me at the tarred road while I use track. There was no time to waste and before long we linked up with [Colonel] Godwin Ally.”
 
The link-up was not without high drama, however.  After rupturing the encirclement, the main body of the convoy moved out in front of the original mechanized rupture force.   As noted previously, the main danger was determining how to distinguish Nigerian from Biafran troops wearing Nigerian uniforms.  While the women and children were out in front, Etuk and his troops were behind assessing the situation ready to fire if necessary.

Out of the 3rd marine commando the 16th Brigade was declared dead.

Once this was accomplished on April 24th, 1969, Etuk decided it was time to move.  Preoccupied with his own travails, he may have missed the big news that at 1500 hours on April 22nd, the 21 Battalion under Major YY Kure and 44 Battalion under Major MJ Vatsa, both of the 1st Division entered the abandoned town of Umuahia – Biafra’s erstwhile capital.
 
Late that night (24th/25th), Etuk called his boys and gave the formal order for the Owerri break out.  Excess ammunition that could not be taken along was buried.  Strict radio silence was to be maintained.  The force was organized with armor and artillery leading as the perimeter rupture or breakout force in front of the main body of the convoy. Meanwhile infantry elements folding back from their positions along the perimeter to join the convoy were instructed to fight rearguard and flank action to delay and frustrate any Biafran counter-attack.  An infantry and engineer detachment was told to secure the far end of the riverbank to protect the vital crossing site during the initial stage of breakout.  Because of the lack of resources there were no diversionary attacks.  It was all based on speed, momentum, surprise and stealth.
 
But the element of surprise was not total.  Biafran forward observers from besieging units knew something was up, although they failed to anticipate the precise route of breakout via a disused old road track.   Fate and luck also played a role.  Etuk may have been helped by a decision made by Madiebo not to attack the breakout force inside Owerri.  Madiebo was concerned that Etuk might suddenly reconfigure and use his armored vehicles with deadly effect – as he had done in the past

To mislead the Biafrans, Etuk aligned his vehicles in a manner that suggested a breakout along the main road.  Then he decided to launch the effort in the early morning hours before sunrise to exploit the limited visibility.
 
In the course of all the months of defensive fighting throwing back Biafran attacks from all directions, Etuk had made a number of important observations based on his early warning systems and reconnaissance reports.  Man being a creature of habit, he noticed that there was an axis from which the Biafrans had not attacked for a long time.   Along this bush track there was an old bridge – the only one leading to the town.  Although a retrograde assault river crossing is by no means an easy operation he elected to use it.   He reasoned that it would be an unexpected route – thus exploiting the principle of surprise – and if it succeeded it gave him the best chance of avoiding confrontation with strong Biafran units in the perimeter.
 
The first step, therefore, was to establish the feasibility of using the planned route.  Elements of the Engineer Squadron attached to the Brigade were sent to reconnoiter the bridge.   Not surprisingly, they discovered that it was heavily mined with explosives and returned to Etuk to report their finding.  He then ordered them back to the bridge under cover of darkness to disarm the explosives.   
 
According to Etuk:
 
“They came back sometime later saying they had a successful operation.  The news made me happy because it meant that I had boys who were ready to fight. They said that if we could just cross the river, then we could fight our way all through.”

The plan for the Breakout
 
Having left the decision to break out until so late in the game, the 16th Brigade was in the unenviable position of attempting it when already severely drained of its human and material resources. 
 
Then Lt. Col. Etuk’s first priority was to determine possible escape routes through weak points and gaps in Biafran lines while at the same continuing to give the impression that he was maintaining all round defence.  The timing would have to be precise to prevent the encircling forces from sealing off his escape route or launching a final all-out offensive against him before he had the time to escape.  The other potential problem was that since either 3MCDO HQ or AHQ had not actually ordered the breakout, there would be no coordinated assistance from friendly external forces outside the Owerri pocket.  Nor could prospective plans be made for a link-up at that stage of the game. To compound matters, it is not clear that Etuk was reliably informed while in isolation at Owerri, of ongoing federal military operations outside the Owerri area or the precise locations of federal units.  He knew that his sector commander – Colonel Godwin Ally – was based in Port Harcourt, but he also knew that all along the route to Port Harcourt, Biafran soldiers had the habit of wearing the Nigerian uniforms of dead Nigerian soldiers. 
 
Another big problem was what to do with enemy civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) as well as wounded and dead Nigerian soldiers - from recent skirmishes or sniper activity - who had not yet been buried.  To leave the civilians and POWs behind would simply create an opportunity for the betrayal of operational security.  To shoot them would be illegal and counter-productive, since they may well be useful as “human shields”. As for the dead body of his second-in-command, Major AT Hamman, unit morale and officer bond demanded that he take it along.   Thus, Etuk decided to take everyone along.  The corpse of the late Major Hamman was entrusted to one Captain Buhari, a former NCO who had served in Enugu before the war

Coming as it did at the tail end of the siege, after a preliminary decision had been made to plan a break out, the death of the competent and popular Major Ted Hamman was absolutely devastating for unit morale.  It stretched the cohesion of the unit to the limit and sorely tested the command and leadership skills of Etuk.  The next day, April 20, 1969, Ojukwu made an entry in his diary, documenting the Biafran interception of weak federal radio transmissions from Owerri alerting 3MCDO HQ of Major AT Hamman’s death.  However, 3MCDO HQ did not notify AHQ of the development.  For the Biafran side, Hamman’s death was a signal that before long the 16th brigade might simply collapse.
 
Meanwhile, according to Colonel Etuk (rtd):
 
“The death of that young man forced me to take a decision of praying to God that if He is the God that delivered the children of Israel from Egypt then He should deliver my troops.  Of course, God delivered us.”

of this time, the surviving troops of the 16th brigade had acquired the “thousand yard stare.”  As described by a survivor of the American break out from the Chosin reservoir in Korea, the stare results from a combination of tiredness, sleeplessness, and fear, combined, paradoxically, with a strong will to survive.  When men get into that condition, they are fighting for no one but themselves and their buddies, not any country or imaginary ideal.  For many months, the Brigade had endured chronic sleep deprivation, repeated mortar and 105mm artillery barrages, short, but repeated violent firefights back and forth in and out of foxholes and buildings with shot guns, rifles and machine guns.  Practically every building in the town had been destroyed.  Then there were the deaths of numerous colleagues, impromptu burials, personal injuries, near death experiences, rain, hunger, cold, heat, insect bites, separation from family, the emotional highs and lows of relief over-flights and DC-3 air drops, the stench, and worst of all, a suspicion that they had been abandoned. 
 
 According to Colonel Etuk (rtd),
 
“My decision to withdraw wasn’t proper. The Army Headquarters should [ordinarily] give me the go-ahead but I did [without authority] and said let me be court-martialled when I am out with my troops.  [If] I didn’t do that, it would have meant complete elimination of the whole troops and that was what Ojukwu was waiting to do. If not through hunger it would have been through torture by whatever means he chose to use. But the Army Headquarters did little or nothing to get me as a Brigade Commander out of that place. What sort of battle organization is that?  So I said to myself, ‘When I come out let them put me on trial.’  But they didn’t do it; maybe they knew that that was the only way to save the few lives I was able to…..”
 
“…..the rebels had penetrated into the town where my headquarters was situated and so the firing was so close; as we are sitting here you will just hear deafening sounds. One should not stay at a position for too long for the time may turn out to be enough for the enemy to kill you….”
 
“So one Sunday morning, when the rebels were almost at my headquarters and we were doing nothing because there was nothing we could do then – no ammunition, the men were gone, no weapons – I called the attention of others and said to them: 
 
“We have to pull out of this place to see what we can do next week to save a few lives remaining”
 
So we set out towards Emmanuel College.  We were all determined to get out of the place, be it a cook, a washerman; in fact, every one of us with or without a weapon.  As we left, within 30 minutes after the decision, I heard a cry,
 
“Oga, come oh! Oga come oh!  Dem don kill Oga oh!”
 
Behold, he was shot right there.  The man was gasping for breath. He had a very large wound. If the road had been opened and if we had immediate medical attention, possibly his life might have been saved.   There weren’t even drugs. The doctor I had was just sitting and watching while the man died. 
 
“…before the poor boy died, he [Major Hamman] said,
 
“Oga, Allah, Allah, if I see Adekunle I will finish him. Adekunle is the man that has caused this.”
 
I said, “Well, we cannot say, but all we should be thinking is to be able to leave this place if it is possible.”

Far away in Monrovia, Liberia, the OAU consultative committee was meeting on April 17th.  No one knew that history was about to be made on an African battlefield.    Remnants of the 16th Brigade of the 3MCDO that had held Owerri since September 16, 1968 and was at least partially cut off for almost six months since November 1st, and totally besieged since March 14th, were about to break out.  Etuk was finally persuaded not just by Biafra’s equally historic final offensive to retake Owerri, an act that in turn had been prompted by the impending fall of Umuahia to federal units under Col. ADS Wya, but by what transpired inside Owerri on April 19th. 
 
April 19th, 1968: The Final DC-3 overflight and death of Major A Ted Hamman
 
On April 19th, Captain Francis Mokonogho and his DC-3 crew lifted off from Port Harcourt airport for yet another routine tactical airdrop over Owerri.  But, unknown to them, fate beckoned.  They flew right into a Biafran offensive.  Biafran anti-aircraft gunners were no longer in the mood to accept the free aerial gifts from the federal government, nor were they going to allow Etuk the luxury of any more ammunition or food, no matter how small.  Thus, they shot at the plane furiously, forcing Mokonogho to abort its final approach and turn around to Port Harcourt with its cargo.  He barely made it back.  The DC-3 was badly riddled with bullet holes.  It would be the last attempt by the 3MCDO to resupply its beleaguered brigade. 
 
Back in Owerri, Etuk, now at his wit’s end, was faced with the penetration of Biafran units, so close in one axis that they were nearly upon his HQ.  He called his trusted second in command and Brigade Major (Hamman) aside for urgent consultations.   They agreed – without reference to 3MCDO HQ or AHQ - that a last ditch effort to breakout towards the rear with all they had was only the only credible option.  Surrender was out of the question.

Biafra’s final offensive to retake Owerri
 
Beginning with his visit to Uzuakoli, followed by the precautionary evacuation of the Biafran government from Umuahia to Nkwerre, near Orlu on April 4th up until the fall of Bende on April 14th, Ojukwu became increasingly concerned about the fate of Umuahia, where his bunker was located.  According to Madiebo:
 
“By the 14th of April, it had become obvious judging from the situation on the ground, that Umuahia was going to be lost.   It was also clear that such an event would destroy completely the will of the Biafran people to continue the war.  It was then that Colonel Ojukwu told me of the need to revive the Owerri operation on the off-chance that we might score a victory there to counter-balance the loss of Umuahia.  The idea was to share the few resources available into two to try and clear what was left of Owerri before it was too late.  The whole idea was a calculated risk worth taking if the Head of State who alone knew what ammunition the nation had, thought so.
 
On the 18th of April, therefore, the Owerri operations were reopened.  As I was still at Umuahia, I did not know exactly what was available for the offensive.  However, the plan of the operation which was sent to me for approval, showed that the 60 Brigade was again to clear the right side of the town up to the Clock Tower and including the Holy Ghost College, the Catholic Cathedral and the Progress Hotel.  The 52 Brigade, now under Major Igweze, was to have another go at Orji and the northern part of the town, down to the Public Works Department and the Government Secondary School.  Elements of “S” Division under command of 14 Division in the absence of Onwuatuegwu, who was still at Umuahia, had the task of advancing through Egbu and Nekede into Owerri, as far as to the motor park.”

Relevant developments outside Owerri
 
On the federal side and international front, other developments ultimately impacted the Owerri situation.    At the February meeting in Lagos of divisional commanders mentioned earlier, a semblance of coordination was urged.  But deep mistrust and rivalry remained.  Colonel Adekunle, for example, did not tell his fellow divisional commanders (ie Colonels Shuwa and Ibrahim Haruna) in the 1st and 2nd divisions the full extent of his Owerri dilemma.  Instead, the meeting focused on resolving the question of which Division would be given the task of taking Umuahia, following Adekunle’s disaster in October 1968 when he tried doing so on his own to beat Shuwa to it and end the war.
 
Therefore, rather than instructing the 1st Division to relieve the 16th Brigade directly by attacking Owerri from Okigwe which is 30 miles away (as the crow flies) in the north-easterly direction, Shuwa was told to veer southwest to take Umuahia, then administrative capital of Biafra. This clarified an old dispute with Adekunle but did not directly address the Owerri situation.  In retrospect, although Umuahia was highly significant, if Shuwa had successfully attacked Owerri (rather than Umuahia) in early 1969, in coordination with a southern assault on Owerri from Port Harcourt by 3MCDO, both divisions would have relieved the beleaguered 16th Brigade. They would also have divided Biafra into two, separating the Biafran capital at Umuahia from its resupply airfield at Uli-Ihiala in the west.  Chances are that the war – with its horrendous losses - may have been shorter. 
 
The fall of Umuahia to the 1st Division will be discussed in detail in a future essay.  In summary, Colonel Shuwa tasked the commanders of 1 and 2 Sectors (later called Brigades) of the 1st Division to take Umuahia and Bende respectively.  Under the command of 1 Sector Commander, Lt. Col. ADS Wya, the plan for the fall of Umuahia – code-named Operation Leopard - was drawn up by his Brigade Major, Major Abdullahi Shelleng and the Sector Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General  (DAQMG), Major Mamman Jiya Vatsa. 
 
Meanwhile, the other brigades of Adekunle’s 3MCDO division had reorganized and recaptured Mkpom, Usung-Ubum, Ikot-Abia and Ikot Obom on February 3rd, followed on March 20th and 27th by the recapture of Umudike and Aba Ala earlier lost in the Biafran counter-offensive of 1968.  The Colonel General Staff at 3MCDO HQ at this time was Major George Innih while Lt. Col. Emmanuel Abisoye, a former 2 Sector Commander with the 1st Division, was in charge of 3MCDO (rear) in Lagos, securing supplies for front-line units “by any means necessary”.
 
On March 27, 1969, with the support of a squadron of armored vehicles under Captain Garba Duba, 11 Field Squadron of Nigerian Army Engineers under Captain Gida Inakusu, “Q” Battery of Nigerian Army Artillery under Captain AB Mamman, and 1 Field Ambulance, five infantry battalions launched the assault on Umuahia.  These battalions, namely the 4th, 21st, 25th, 44th, and 82nd were commanded by Major Ado Mohammed (later replaced by Lt. Steve Samaila Yombe), Major YY Kure, Lt. Balarabe Haladu, Major IB Babangida (later replaced by Major MJ Vatsa) and Major Ibrahim Bako respectively.  NAF fighter-bombers later assisted in close air-support although there were a few unfortunate incidents of deadly ‘NAF friendly fire’ at Abriba and Uzuakoli.
 
A Zambian delegation had visited Biafra from March 13 – 15 followed two weeks later by the British PM’s visit to Nigeria.  When the objective of ‘Operation Leopard’ became evident, Ojukwu started desperately mobilizing soldiers and resources from all corners of what remained of Biafra (including Owerri) to save Umuahia, eventually stalling but not stopping Col. ADS Wya’s advance in two weeks of fierce fighting.  During the time, nevertheless, Ezi Alayi, Ovim, Amoyi, Ndi Ihube, Uzuakoli, Isikwuato, Umuokorola and Bende fell to the 1st Division, while elements of the 3rd MCDO took back Umuomayi and Okuenyi on April 4th. This was followed by the recapture of Obetete on April 5th which had been lost only 24 hours earlier.  On April 13th, 3MCDO lost Obokwe again, typical of its extremely labile situation since October 1968.

These stories are from commanders from armies in both side and our respect should go to them all for their bravery and intelligence.


Sit tight and relax.


Please if you come across a young buhari there tell me so that i can highlight it because he was part of 16th brigade

However, the Biafrans soon settled in for an alternative strategy. In between infantry assaults, harassing artillery fire and long range snipers gradually reduced the 16th Brigade by continuous external pressure through attrition.  This approach enabled the besieging Biafran units to conserve men and perhaps redeploy them for emergencies in other fronts.  But it had the disadvantage of using up a lot of ammunition in an endless orgy of repeated bombardments, which, although murderous and highly effective, were ultimately insufficient to compel Etuk to surrender.  It also allowed the siege to drag on.  The “penetration” attempt by Colonel Achuzia failed because it used only one frontal axis.  Eventually, 14 Division Commander, Colonel Ogbugo Kalu, supported by Major General Madiebo, armed with intimate knowledge of Etuk’s hopeless situation, correctly chose to attack, penetrate and exploit along multiple converging axes with little fear that Etuk – desperately short of men and supplies - could inflict punishment in retaliation.  This combination of fire and maneuver eventually forced Etuk to choose between surrender, displacement, or complete destruction.  When that point was reached, then Lt. Col. EA Etuk, with the support of his second-in-command, Major AT Hamman, decided they would ignore the suicidal orders of the 3MCDO HQ and AHQ to “hold until relieved.”  They decided they would either break out or exfiltrate to the rear, in the direction of friendly 3MCDO forces.
 
Indeed, Biafran sources are of the opinion that Etuk considered this line of action at least three times. Two of these occurred in March when he first realized encirclement was total on or about March 7th, and then later in the month had to beat back ferocious efforts by the “S” Division to penetrate and divide his forces.   Russian and German forces often did this to encircled enemy units during WW2.   However, on each occasion impatient Biafran units rushed into the Owerri pocket in frontal pursuit to take advantage, only to be badly beaten back when Etuk suddenly reconfigured his armor for counter-attack.
 
There is some evidence that Biafran units used the technique of selective reduction of strong points.  On February 10th, for example, Ojukwu claims that 500 Russian automatic rifles and 100 boxes of ammunition were secured from one of the 16th Brigade’s defensive positions.  Madiebo does not, however, make any comment that such a vast haul of weapons was secured.  In any case, organized systematic selective reduction targeted at large groups of key battlefield assets did not occur.   This would have involved choosing one of Etuk’s main ‘teeth’ arm detachments, such as armor, for example, (or artillery) and then destroying that first (as a whole) before focusing on other combat and combat support elements. One reason was that Etuk usually withdrew his armored vehicles back into center of the Owerri pocket after using them for a counter-attack.  He never left them open.  The other reason was the shortage of appropriate anti-tank weaponry.  It does, however, seem that there were efforts at reduction by infiltration which involved penetrating the perimeter with small commando units designed to isolate small elements of the 16th brigade from their parent unit.  
 
During pauses between attacks, such as was the case when Ojukwu called off Achuzia’s penetration attack, Biafran Commanders supported their attrition strategy with continuous reconnaissance probes and psychological operations (psyops).  Examples of psyops include the case of the female Captain who regularly showed up in full view of federal troops to hail “Biafra Kwenu” and the choice of nighttime to do most of the shelling of federal positions in Owerri.  In addition, inadvertently routing the final approach to over-fly Owerri of early morning relief aircraft bringing ammunition to Uli-Ihiala airstrip before daybreak sent an unmistakable message to the besieged forces.   They also had to live with the knowledge that most of the federal para-dropped ammunition and food meant for them were going to their tormentors.   They even had to fight for the little they got!  Then there were the sniper shots, slowly but surely killing all the leadership figures in the Brigade.  All of this was backed up by electronic measures such as federal communications interception.   On the flip side, Ojukwu visited Biafran units besieging Owerri at least twice in the month of March, raising morale and getting involved in tactical decisions

The 16th Brigade Breakout From Encirclement

Choices open to the 16th Brigade at Owerri
 
Faced with encirclement, the 16th Brigade had a number of choices. 
 
First, they could continue their attack northwards, deep along the original axes hoping to attain the initial grand objectives of ‘Operation OAU’ and relieve their sister Brigades in the process.  As noted previously, this option was briefly pursued and then terminated.
 
Secondly, they could hold their position in Owerri and environs and defend encircled, as they did for many months.  This was based not only on their original operational orders in September 1968 but also the direction of AHQ, confirmed by a “stand and fight” radio signal from the C-in-C, Major General Gowon himself in February 1969.   It did seem that higher national pride (not to mention the need to maintain the aura of the 3MCDO and protect Colonel Adekunle’s image) was involved in the decision not to allow Owerri to be abandoned.   Military factors in favor of this option included the built in advantage of defending an urban area, equipped with armored vehicles (which the besieging Biafrans did not have).    These vehicles included Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers, Ferret and Saladin Armored cars, which gave Etuk a fire power and mobility advantage using “interior lines” for rapid support by force transfer from his core support area of all round front-line positions in the “hedgehog”. In any case, if and when he had to break out he could rupture the encirclement by sheer armored force.  In support of this optimistic thinking was the initial assumption that the Brigade could be supported by air, reinforced and relieved before certain destruction by the Biafran armed forces.   The absence of Biafran air power and the curious initial Biafran strategy of attacking with one infantry Brigade at a time from only one direction in a sequential manner rather than a simultaneous all round assault encouraged such thinking.  All Etuk had to do was “jab” with his front-line infantry positions and support artillery before delivering a powerful “counter-punch” using armored vehicles concentrated on the attacking force at the point of threatened penetration. The last factor that gave Etuk initial confidence was the federal effort to para-drop supplies, supported by occasional strafing and bombing of Biafran positions by NAF L-29, Mig-17 and Ilyushin fighter jets and bombers

“Biafra Kwenu!”
 
Quite apart from the drama of airdrops, life in the 16th Brigade under siege provided an opportunity to become intimately familiar with the mettle of opposing Biafran troops.  According to Colonel Etuk (rtd),
 
“They [Biafrans] were more determined than the Federal troops from my own assessment because as a field commander certain times you move and think it was just going to be a child’s play but by the time you get there you’ll be faced with a different situation [sic] entirely.  You may, for example, reach a point where you’ll have to dislodge three rebels.  [Then] at a point you realize [sic] that you have put up a strong battle to dislodge them. 
 
What about the woman who had always been threatening my troops, a female Captain!   So a number of times my boys will come and say as soon as this woman comes she will stand just on the road like that and with her walking stick as soon as she surfaces she will say, “Biafra Kwenu!  Biafra Kwenu!”  They will follow up.
 
So one day, one Fulani boy came to me and said, “Oga, Walahi! Talahi! Zai kacheta” meaning, “I will kill her.”  I asked him how he was going to do that. So when she came and started doing all that the boy just kept quiet. He took [sic] only one round. He dropped it on the ground and sharpened it, squeezed the sand off, tucked it in, aimed at her – because each time she came she would do that [and] the boys would run away.  The boy aimed and got her right there and by the time we went to and recover the body – Oh! My God!  That is why I said the rebels were determined.  For us to succeed in getting this woman it was a tug of war.  The rebels refused to let us carry this woman.”

Instead, the Biafrans made arrangements to collect from the DC-3 overflights at Owerri what they had been denied by DC-3 airfield denial attacks at Uli-Ihiala.   According to Madiebo,
 
“After two months of daily promises of a link-up by Port Harcourt had failed, the enemy resorted to air dropping of ammunition and food.  What was left under enemy control in Owerri was so small that most of what was dropped fell into Biafran hands.  Any Biafran unit around Owerri which wanted something dropped for it by the enemy, only needed to clear a bit of bush, spread a white sheet of cloth over the clearing, and he would get a drop.  Unfortunately, due to the gross inefficiency of the enemy air-drop operations, the very large quantity of ammunition we acquired through it was almost all damaged and therefore useless to the Army.  Gunpowder was however laboriously extracted from the damaged ammunition for use by the BOFF and other civil defence organisations.  As a result of enemy air drops, the 14 Division was for some time fairly well fed and thus became fitter for its operations.“
 
This situation was obviously frustratingly evident to the men of the 16th Brigade.  According to Colonel Etuk (rtd),
 
“They [NAF] used passenger aircraft to be dropping things – so you come and see another line of battle – when this plane started coming and hovering around town, the rebels were waiting – when they knew that the plane was there they would be waiting for any drop that came – so it was a battle for my troops to be able to collect these things and for the rebels to – so it was cross-fire.  So this thing continued and continued; each time the plane took off [from Port Harcourt] everybody was ready.  At times the pilot would come but because of the firing from the rebels he would go back with all the cargo.  He couldn’t come down nor could he even go within the level at which he should drop these things.”
 
The interesting thing about this scenario is that at no time were the NAF resupply DC-3s accompanied by NAF bombers.  Tactical airdrops – usually launched in response to requests from the Divisional Commander - occurred independently of close air-support and ground-attack missions, which took place at other times!